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# ABSTRACT

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
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SOVIET NEGOTIATING TECHNIQUES IN ARMS  
CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE  
UNITED STATES

by

Frank John Dellermann

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A Dissertation Presented to the  
FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL  
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA  
In Partial Fulfillment of the  
Requirements for the Degree  
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY  
(International Relations)

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## ABSTRACT

This thesis analyzes the Soviet negotiating techniques used in arms control negotiations with the United States. The existing literature on the subject is reviewed and analyzed. This general survey includes authors who have had personal experience negotiating with the Soviets from the second world war to the present. It also includes the writings of noted scholars who have studied Soviet negotiating techniques. A most complete picture is constructed of the factors that influence the Soviet negotiators and the methods they use to achieve their objectives.

SOVIET NEGOTIATING TECHNIQUES IN ARMS  
CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE  
UNITED STATES

by  
Frank John Dellermann

Continued

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA  
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL  
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LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90007

*This dissertation, written by*

Frank John Dellermann

*under the direction of his... Dissertation Com-  
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the degree of*

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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

The United States and the Soviet Union have recently signed a major agreement concerning the limitation of strategic forces. This is only the latest of a long series of arms control agreements that have been arrived at by the United States and the Soviet Union. The agreements were neither quickly nor easily negotiated, but only through long and arduous negotiations. There have been continuous negotiations on arms control and disarmament since the early days of the post-World War II era. However, it has only been in the past twenty years that agreements have been reached in the area of arms control. These agreements have often caused heated debate in the United States. The crucial question has always been whether the United States actually benefits by making the particular agreement or not. Critics of the agreements often emphasize that the manner in which the Soviets negotiate puts the United States at a disadvantage. Others argue that mutually beneficial arms control agreements can be arrived at, and

that the Soviet method of negotiating is little different from that of the United States.

This paper will analyze the Soviet negotiating techniques used in arms control negotiations with the United States. The purpose of this analysis will be to produce a clear description of the major characteristics of Soviet negotiating techniques. The term "techniques" is used here in the broadest sense. It includes the specific negotiations and the attitudes held by the Soviets that form the basis for both their style and their specific tactics. This broad terminology permits the construction of the most complete picture of the factors that influence the Soviet negotiators and the methods they use to achieve their objectives. This analysis can then be used by others to ascertain the proper United States approach to arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union.

The subject of Soviet negotiating techniques will be approached in two ways. First, the existing literature on the subject will be reviewed and analyzed, the findings of this literature will be categorized so as to indicate the major areas stressed and the important points emphasized by the authors. This general survey includes authors who have had personal experience negotiating with the

Soviets from the Second World War to the present. It also includes the writings of noted scholars who have studied Soviet negotiating techniques. Only those sources that have dealt specifically with the Test Ban Treaty negotiations and the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) have been consciously omitted. The reason for this omission will be explained below.

This review of the literature will form the basis for the rest of this study. Given the findings summarized from this survey, two specific sets of negotiations will be analyzed in detail and compared with the findings of the literature. The first set of negotiations reviewed will be the negotiations from 1957 to 1963 that led to the conclusion of the Limited Test Ban Treaty. The second set of negotiations reviewed will be those leading to the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Limitation Treaty and the Interim Agreement Limiting Strategic Offensive Weapons, both collectively known as the SALT I agreements. The SALT negotiations are traced from the initiation of the concept in 1964 through to their conclusion in 1972.

These negotiations culminated in the most important arms control agreements in the postwar era. They are each representative of two different Soviet regimes. The first

was negotiated and concluded under the leadership of Nikita Khrushchev. The second was negotiated and concluded under the Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership. Therefore, these case studies will be representative of Soviet negotiating techniques employed in the post-Stalin era. Finally, each of the two negotiations were significant enough to be given major press coverage, be given significant attention by scholars, and be the subject of memoirs and articles by many of the participants. Each of the negotiations will be treated in a separate chapter. The sources used in the analyses of these negotiations will complete the review of the literature on Soviet negotiating techniques. These three chapters will form the primary analysis in this dissertation.

Within this scope a traditional analytical approach is used. The negotiations will be divided into chronological periods based on the Soviet attitude toward reaching an agreement. The course of the negotiations during each period will be summarized and then analyzed for the Soviet negotiating techniques employed. Each technique noted will be evaluated for its importance, any variation from the basic technique, and how it was used. At the end of each chapter, the Soviet negotiating techniques for the entire

course of the negotiations will be reviewed and analyzed.

A variety of sources is used for this analysis. For the review of the literature a general survey of writings was made, including both Western and Soviet sources. Both scholarly research and memoirs of officials who have negotiated with the Soviets are included. The primary source for the chapter on the test ban negotiations was the verbatim records and summary records of the various forums where the negotiations took place. In addition, memoirs of the participants, collections of documents, such as Documents on Disarmament, and contemporary analyses of the negotiations were used. For the SALT negotiations, from 1964 to 1969, verbatim records and summary records of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) and various United Nations organizations were available. However, no record of the formal negotiations from 1969 to 1972 has been released to the public. One author, John Newhouse, has been given access to many of the records and his account of the SALT I negotiations has been noted by numerous officials to be the authoritative account of the negotiations from the perspective of Henry Kissinger. However, because of his bias in some areas and his lack of information in others, his work must be used with caution.



In addition, a number of United States officials have written at least partial accounts of the negotiations. Therefore, by using these primary sources in conjunction with congressional testimony, official public statements and newspaper accounts, a fairly clear analysis of the Soviet negotiating techniques is achieved.

After using these sources to review the literature, the nuclear test ban negotiations and the strategic arms limitation negotiations, the concluding chapter will assess the techniques observed, compare the findings in the literature with the findings in the case studies, and arrive at a number of observations regarding Soviet negotiating techniques.

## CHAPTER II

### REVIEW OF LITERATURE

#### Overview

This chapter will review the existing literature concerning Soviet negotiating techniques. This will be used as a basis for analyzing the Soviet actions in the two disarmament negotiations that comprise the main body of this study.

The literature on Soviet negotiating techniques can be analyzed from several different perspectives. One perspective is the author's basic attitude toward Soviet negotiating techniques. The second perspective is the author's view of the historical origins of the techniques. The third is the author's concept of the attitudinal factors--cultural, ideological, etc.--that influence Soviet negotiating techniques. Altogether, these three perspectives form a convenient and logical framework for analyzing and comparing the existing literature on Soviet negotiating techniques.

The first perspective, and the most important, is the author's basic attitude toward the topic. The term "basic attitude" is used here to indicate what the author emphasizes as the most important characteristic of Soviet negotiating techniques. Invariably this is accomplished by comparing it with the traditional, Western or American, negotiating techniques. Some see the methods the Soviets use in negotiating as being fundamentally different from the normal Western negotiating styles. At the opposite end of the spectrum, others hold the differences to be minor or nonexistent. A third group can be placed between these two extremes. These scholars emphasize both the differences and the similarities, and the interrelation between the two.

A number of authors attempt to support their positions on Soviet negotiating techniques by chewing the historical origins of Soviet diplomacy. Still others attempt to link the Soviet's negotiating style to attitudinal factors rather than historical factors. In actuality, the two concepts of historical sources of Soviet negotiating techniques and attitudinal sources overlap a great deal, and it is impossible to make a complete separation of the two. However, it is advantageous to make a

distinction between them for each has a unique role in the evaluation of Soviet negotiating techniques. For the purpose of this study, the historical sources are those sources from which the actual techniques used were acquired. These sources might be persons who espoused the use of such tactics, e.g., Lenin, or historical entities, such as imperial Russia, that are cited as having used negotiating techniques similar to those employed by Soviet negotiators.

On the other hand, attitudinal sources are the philosophies or cultures from which emerged the current Soviet attitudes toward the various components of negotiation, such as the act of negotiating itself, those with whom the Soviets are negotiating, and the purpose seen in negotiating.

Discussing these various aspects will help form a clearer picture of how Soviet negotiating techniques are viewed by Westerners and by the Soviets themselves. This discussion will also help show the relationship among the various schools of thought on this topic. With these differing theories catalogued and arranged along a spectrum, it will be possible to see clearly their points of coincidence and divergence.<sup>1</sup> This, in turn, will aid in analyzing the Soviet actions in the two disarmament negotiations.

The final section of this chapter will summarize those Soviet negotiating techniques most often mentioned by Western observers and by the Soviets themselves.

#### Authors' Attitudes Toward Soviet Negotiating Techniques

The author's basic attitude toward Soviet negotiating techniques is of fundamental importance in his analysis. There is a significant diversity among scholars on this point. As noted above, this perspective either implicitly or explicitly, is related to the question: How similar are Soviet and Western negotiating tactics? At one end of the spectrum are those who emphasize the differences and put Soviet negotiating techniques in a class of their own. This was especially prominent in the late 1940s and the early 1950s when such works as Dennett and Johnson's Negotiating with the Russians were published. In the book, General John R. Deane describes his negotiating experiences with the Russians during World War II.<sup>2</sup> Deane portrays his years in Moscow as being totally alien to anything he had experienced before. The Soviets simply did not negotiate in a manner comprehensible to an American. John N. Hazard's chapter in the same book reinforces Deane's evaluation of the vast differences

between Soviet and American negotiating techniques.<sup>3</sup> Frederick Osborn's account of negotiating with the Soviets on atomic energy in the immediate postwar period is also included in Dennett and Johnson's book. After discussing his experiences with the Soviets in the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, Osborn states,

In contrast to the behavior of the delegates of the Soviet Union and its satellites, the other nine or ten delegates behaved as one might expect any high-grade group of serious men to behave in similar circumstances.<sup>4</sup>

In evaluating the Soviet negotiating tactics, Osborn concludes, "Was this a negotiation? Certainly it was not in any ordinary sense of the term."<sup>5</sup> This sentence clearly expresses the common theme of all those who contributed their experiences to the book.

In their book, Dennett and Johnson also included a work by Philip E. Mosely entitled "Some Soviet Techniques of Negotiation." This has gained the status of being a classic work on Soviet negotiating techniques and is often quoted by others writing on the topic. The emphasis throughout this chapter is on how different Soviet techniques are from those of the West. In 1960, Mosely incorporated this chapter, with only slight modifications, into his own work, The Kremlin and World Politics. In

assessing his original work, Mosely notes that while the post-Stalin Soviet negotiators are "much better acquainted with the languages, politics and internal divisions of the West," these negotiators "still adhere closely to the doctrinal core and rigid techniques" he had described while Stalin ruled.<sup>6</sup> A year earlier, Dean Acheson had written in a similar vein:

It seems almost as though Russians going abroad went to a school of dialectics, . . . where the students were trained in a technique of intellectual deviousness designed to frustrate any discussion.<sup>7</sup>

Former Canadian Prime Minister, Lester B. Pearson, took a position on Soviet tactics closely akin to this, warning that the West "should not permit the Communists to drag us down to their level of debate and dialectic."<sup>8</sup>

Other notable scholars and statesmen must also be included in this category. The noted scholar and former Hungarian diplomat, Stephen D. Kertesz, has asserted that "on the deepest level of thought and life Soviet diplomacy has broken with the traditions of the Western diplomatic profession."<sup>9</sup> Vernon Aspaturian, while stressing the Soviet use of duplicity, wrote in the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis, "Soviet conceptions of diplomacy . . . are distinguished from all other. . . ."<sup>10</sup>

Similarly, in hearings of the Senate Committee on Government Operations, Leopold Labedz noted the difference between Western and Soviet negotiators: "We have the information, and they [the Soviets] have the persistence."<sup>11</sup>

Perhaps the two most emphatic writers on Soviet diplomacy have been Charles W. Thayer and Gerald L. Steibel. While disagreeing with those who argue that Soviet diplomacy is not diplomacy at all, Thayer maintains that the Soviet method of negotiation "seems to fall within the definition of the diplomatic art" but has evolved for more than a millenium along a different path from Western diplomacy.<sup>12</sup> Steibel brings forth no new or personal experiences but simply, and without footnotes, quotes from many noted scholars, diplomats and statesmen to show how completely alien Soviet negotiating techniques are from those used by the West. He aptly titled his work How Can We Negotiate with the Communists? Steibel emphasizes that despite the almost total difference he sees between the Soviet and Western negotiating techniques,

. . . there is a rationality about the Soviet negotiating model which, however different from, or repugnant to, the West's conception of rationality, is comprehensible and, within wide margins of error, predictable.<sup>13</sup>



Despite this formidable array of experience and scholarship that emphasize, in somewhat varying degrees, that there is a fundamental difference between the Soviet and the Western concept of negotiation, there is a second position which also has an imposing list of adherents. These students of Soviet negotiating techniques stress the point that Soviet negotiating techniques may be either quite similar or quite different from Western techniques. The usual governing factors cited are: (a) the purpose for which the Soviets are using the negotiations, or (b) the time frame of the negotiations. Richard Pipes has stated,

Frustrations experienced in negotiating with Communists derive from the fact that the latter often engage in talks in order not to reach an agreement but to attain some other, incidental objective. . . .

However, whenever they happen to be interested in a settlement, Communist diplomats act in a traditional manner, efficiently and undeterred by difficulties.<sup>14</sup>

Alexander Dallin takes essentially the same position.<sup>15</sup> Arthur Dean maintains this position also, noting that some aspects of Soviet "diplomatic style" are "much like the traffic noise . . . : it may be annoying but does not prevent one's getting ahead with the business at hand."<sup>16</sup> Dean further observed from his own negotiating

experiences with the Soviets that there had been times "when we [the Americans and the Soviets] have engaged in a real negotiating process, giving that term its traditional definition. . . ." However, he notes "much of the time . . . the Soviet Union was not interested in that kind of negotiating but merely in giving the appearance of it [for propaganda purposes]. . . ." <sup>17</sup> Bernhard G. Bechhoefer, in his work on arms control negotiations in the 1940s and 1950s asserted that

the Soviet approach during all this period has seldom shown promise but has occasionally held out suggestions that seemed to open attractive vistas for genuine negotiations and ultimate agreement. <sup>18</sup>

Certainly, Fred C. Iklé also belongs in this category. In his work, How Nations Negotiate, he examines many negotiating tactics used by both the Soviets and the West. Yet, he is still compelled in his final chapter to show the differences between the two negotiating styles. <sup>19</sup>

Other observers of the Soviet negotiating style emphasize the fact that the Soviets have changed their negotiating style over the years. The point made was that the Soviets use the tactics they feel are necessary at a given time, and that the Soviets are adept at using the traditional Western style as well as their own style. Walter C. Clemens, Jr. has observed that

. . . a relatively conciliatory position towards negotiations with the West was developed in the Soviet Foreign Ministry under Chicherin, Litvinov and Gromyko--all of them professional diplomats well versed in foreign cultures and languages. . . . This professional orientation and its concomitant willingness to explore the possibilities of negotiation were not nearly so pronounced when the Foreign Ministry was headed by Trotsky, Molotov or Shepilov. . . .<sup>20</sup>

Sir Harold Nicolson adheres to this theory as well. That this is so can be shown indirectly. When he first published his famous work, Diplomacy, in 1939, he wrote of the Soviet diplomatic style that while major changes were made in the aftermath of the Bolshevik Revolution,

as the years passed . . . the USSR relapsed not ungracefully into the manner of the older [diplomatic] convention. . . . With the waning of their first fine careless rapture, the style, the behaviour, the external appearance and the urbanity of the representatives of Soviet Russia approximated ever closer and closer to that of pre-war Balkan diplomats.<sup>21</sup>

In discussing types of European diplomacy, Nicolson only concerned himself with the British, German, French, and Italian styles. Apparently, Nicolson felt that Soviet diplomacy was not sufficiently different to warrant discussion. In his second edition (1950) to the book, Nicolson did not delete his two paragraphs dealing with the Soviet Union nor did he add anything to the body of his book to indicate the change in Soviet negotiating style.

Only the preface to the second edition shows his concern over Soviet diplomacy:

It appears more necessary than ever to affirm that the art of diplomacy . . . is not concerned with dialectics, propaganda, or invective: its purpose is to create international confidence, not to sow international distrust. I am glad indeed that this book has been translated into the Russian language and circulated by the Soviet Government to their missions and consulates abroad.<sup>22</sup>

The third edition (1963) did not change the body of the book but added an article Nicolson wrote in 1961 for Foreign Affairs. The article is primarily a commentary on Communist and Western diplomacy. Nicolson, noting the stark contrast between the two, concludes that "what is right for others is not right for us. That should be our motto; by that we shall in the end prevail."<sup>23</sup> Thus, by reading Nicolson over the years, it is clear that his evaluation of Soviet diplomacy has changed markedly, in that he goes from barely mentioning Soviet diplomacy to finding it necessary to devote an entire section to the comparison of Western and Communist diplomacy.

Another well-known British diplomat, Sir William Hayter, held a view similar to Nicolson's:

In the early days . . . the conventional practices of diplomacy were despised and discarded. . . . This phase did not last long. The Soviet Government soon realized . . . that they would have to play the game of diplomacy by the old rules. . . . They had

no great difficulty in conforming to these rules, and soon their representatives . . . were operating outwardly at least much like any other diplomats.<sup>24</sup>

These interwar diplomats were followed by Molotov and those "trained in his school" who personally and diplomatically differed from their predecessors. However, since Stalin's death, Hayter sees at least some little change back to the interwar Soviet diplomatic style.<sup>25</sup>

The noted scholar, Gordon A. Craig, in a perceptive evaluation of Soviet negotiating techniques, emphasized that the Soviets used their own peculiar tactics or traditional diplomatic methods as they saw fit to achieve their purposes. In the 1920s and 1930s,

Soviet delegations demonstrated that they could be scrupulously correct in matters of protocol and that they had also acquired considerable facility in the use of orthodox procedures and tactics.<sup>26</sup>

However, Craig also sees a reversion in Soviet negotiating techniques since 1945 to those used at Brest-Litovsk.<sup>27</sup>

It can be seen from the preceding examples that this category of scholars emphasizes two approaches in viewing the various negotiating tactics the Soviets choose to employ. Some relate the tactics used to the ultimate purposes to be served by the negotiations; others show continuity and change in Soviet tactics in a chronological format. Yet these two approaches are not really very

different, in that chronological changes are often directly linked to changes in purpose and, at time, to changes in personnel. Often scholars in this category stress one of these approaches rather than the other not to negate the latter, but simply to emphasize a particular point and to fit the example logically into the broader topic being discussed.

In addition to those who emphasize the differences between Soviet and Western negotiating techniques and those who emphasize both the similarities and differences, there are also some scholars who stress what they perceive as a lack of difference between Soviet and Western negotiating techniques. These scholars primarily criticize the first group and their emphasis on the differences between East and West. One author in this category is Louis J. Samelson. In his work on the Western view of Soviet and Chinese negotiating behavior, he asserts "upon subjection to critical analysis, the systemic regularities commonly attributed to communist negotiating behavior tend to lose their constancy and uniformity."<sup>28</sup> He severely criticizes Western assessments of the Eastern methods and motives.

. . . questions of ambiguity and incertitude plague the study of communist diplomacy. Forced to deal with such uncertainty, western negotiators generally have appeared reluctant to grant the Soviets . . .

the benefit of doubt; rather, by relying heavily on past experiences and the judgments of others, they have tended to reinforce prevailing denigrative opinions of communist diplomatic conduct, while at the same time perpetuating a self-righteous view of their own behavior. Essentially, the issue centers on perceptual biases and preconceived expectations which often impair objective appraisals and promote disparaging assessments.<sup>29</sup>

A similar view is taken by Christer Jonnson in his analysis of Soviet negotiating behavior in the negotiations leading to the test ban treaty of 1963. He concludes that the Soviets are not "guilty" of a number of tactics for which they have been criticized by the West.<sup>30</sup> The main effort of his work is to debunk the myths surrounding Soviet negotiating techniques.

Lloyd Jensen has also written on Soviet negotiating techniques in the area of disarmament. However, he has been primarily concerned with attitudes toward and proclivities to make concessions. Thus, his area of interest is much narrower than most of the scholars previously noted. Yet, within his area of interest, he is in sharp contrast to many of those who are included in the first category. Jensen emphasizes theories such as "approach-avoidance bargaining" in his analysis. This theory suggests that

as long as the goal of agreement appears to be remote, concessions can be made at minimal cost. As agreement is approached, concessions become more costly, particularly if there are strong

predispositions toward avoidance of agreement. When agreement is imminent, concessions are unlikely, and retractions become the mode of bargaining.<sup>31</sup>

Jensen applies such theories equally to the United States and the Soviet Union. He has also analyzed concession-making by the United States and USSR. In his analysis the differentiation he makes between Soviet and United States negotiating techniques is quite limited compared to those made by the scholars I have included in the first category discussed. Jensen sees differences between the United States and the Soviet Union in the timing of their concessions during a particular negotiation.<sup>32</sup> Many scholars included in the first category would question whether the Soviet Union makes concessions at all or even evaluates a concession the same way the United States does.

#### Authors Emphasizing the Historical Origins of Soviet Diplomacy

In this brief survey of the Western literature on Soviet negotiating techniques, the three major categories of opinions have been clearly defined. At times those who are associated with the first two categories have also attempted to indicate the origin of this perceived difference between Soviet and Western negotiating techniques.<sup>33</sup> The origins of the Soviet negotiating style can be divided



into two separate aspects. The first are its historical antecedents; the second could be called the attitudinal antecedents. In some cases both are closely related and reinforcing. A review of these antecedents is helpful to clarify the depth of the differences between Soviet and Western negotiating techniques as perceived by Western scholars and statesmen. If the origins of the Soviet negotiating style are seen to be greatly divergent from or incompatible with the Western tradition, then the differences said to exist might be more impervious to modification and reconciliation.

In looking at the historical source of Soviet negotiating techniques, Craig and Thayer trace the origins back the farthest. Both find its roots in Byzantine diplomacy. Thayer writes that

when the emperors in Constantinople sent Cyril and Methodius to teach the Slavs Christianity . . . they also sent along their diplomats who, intentionally or not, taught them the deception, chicanery, and treachery which characterized the Byzantine diplomacy of that day.<sup>34</sup>

Craig postulates,

Perhaps because they had gone to school in Byzantium before they established a firm relationship with the West, the Russians retained Eastern habits of thought and discourse that were irritating to Western negotiators.<sup>35</sup>

Both then trace the development of Soviet negotiating techniques through Tsarist Russia up to the present. Others find Soviet negotiating style having its roots in Imperial Russia. Steibel cites the native Russian fear and hostility of foreigners as one of a number of sources,<sup>36</sup> while Clemens notes that

Moscow's negotiating behavior [in disarmament negotiations] even in recent times continues to bear striking resemblances to the approach of Tsarist Russia to the Hague Conference on the Limitation of Armaments in 1899. . . .<sup>37</sup>

Most of the authors who discussed the historical antecedents of Soviet negotiating techniques emphasized the importance of Lenin or of Marxism-Leninism. Clemens, in discussing arms control, maintains that "virtually the entire evolution of communist thinking on arms limitation from before the Bolshevik Revolution to the 1970s was anticipated by shifts in Lenin's views on this subject."<sup>38</sup> With this came shifts in the Soviet negotiating style. Acheson, in 1959, saw the Soviets using negotiation as "a tactic specifically prescribed by Lenin to delay the crises while demoralizing and weakening the enemy."<sup>39</sup> With the tactic came the technique to make it effective. Kertesz mentions that "Lenin's principles" were accepted "for the basis of Soviet diplomacy."<sup>40</sup> Nathan Leites

wrote a study on the operational code of the Politburo which implicitly encompassed Soviet negotiating techniques. He based his study on the writings of Lenin and Stalin, and thus, by inference, should be included among those who see Lenin as the source of Soviet negotiating "rules."<sup>41</sup>

There are some further modifications on the theory that it all started with Lenin. Pipes advances the idea that in addition to ideology the Soviet Union's economic tradition has an important effect on its political conduct --including how it negotiates. In the American commercial tradition, the idea of compromise is a central concept. The Soviet Union "which makes its living primarily from the production and consumption of goods . . . is equally predisposed toward exclusive possession and the denial of the principle of compromise."<sup>42</sup> Aspaturian, on the other hand, presents a good argument for the thesis that "Soviet diplomacy has inexorably evolved within the context of the Stalinist image of bourgeois diplomacy whose concrete historical model was the diplomacy of Imperial Russia."<sup>43</sup> The Soviets considered diplomacy an essentially bourgeois institution, and since they were dealing with the capitalist world, Soviet diplomacy "patterned itself after the image of its class enemies."<sup>44</sup> Hayter emphasizes both

Leninism and traditional Western diplomacy as dual bases for Soviet diplomacy. This is logical in view of his emphasis on Soviet capabilities to use both traditional diplomatic methods and their own unique diplomatic methods.

Those who stress the historical antecedents of Soviet diplomacy for the most part stress the uniqueness or the separation of Soviet diplomacy from the roots of Western diplomacy. Imperial Russia and Lenin are generally considered the historical sources from which Soviet diplomacy received its characteristics. Both these sources imply that Soviet diplomacy has a perspective and frame of reference different from that of the West, particularly the United States. However, it also indicates that Soviet negotiating techniques are not something completely new and unexpected but, at least in part, are based on something which preceded the Soviet state.

#### Authors Emphasizing Attitudinal Factors

The attitudinal source of Soviet diplomacy is generally accepted to be Marxism-Leninism. The direct result of this is that the Soviet negotiator assumes an adversary relationship toward those on the opposite side of the negotiating table. As Averell Harriman has noted,

the Soviets "are taught to believe that man is destined to live by Communist ideology and that we, the imperialist aggressors, are blocking it."<sup>45</sup> Similarly, Dean finds that one of the major characteristics of Soviet diplomacy is "a dogmatic expectation of hostility from the outside world . . . which arises from Communist theory."<sup>46</sup>

A variation of this is that while Marxism-Leninism is a primary factor in the Soviets' maintenance of an adversary attitude, such an attitude actually antedates Marxism-Leninism. For example, Acheson accepts the idea of the Soviet negotiator maintaining an adversary attitude. Indeed, he states that the Soviets have perfected the use of negotiations as a "method of warfare," but he also maintains that "this use long antedates the Communists."<sup>47</sup> George F. Kennan sees the source of this adversary attitude in the Russian experience of having "dealt principally with fierce hostile neighbors."<sup>48</sup> This developed a Russian attitude toward diplomacy that was inherited by the Communists rather than created by them. Craig sees the existence of a "totalitarian" attitude in which he grouped the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany and fascist Italy, which "from the beginning of their existence rejected the values and standards of the western world and operated according

to rules of their own."<sup>49</sup> Similarly, Nicolson divides diplomatic theory into two main currents: the "warrior or heroic" theory and the "mercantile or shopkeeper" theory.<sup>50</sup> Although he did not specifically place the Soviet style in either category, his description of the former coincides with many of the characteristics attributed to Soviet diplomacy by other scholars and statesmen. Therefore, it is logical to conclude that had Nicolson given greater attention to an analysis of Soviet diplomacy, he certainly would have concluded that at least its beginning and post-Second World War years had the characteristics of the warrior or heroic theory. Adam B. Ulam also sees the Soviets as having an adversary attitude in negotiations, but regards its source as more than simply Marxism-Leninism. Ulam differentiates between the American view of negotiations, in which the interested parties "state their respective positions and . . . convince their antagonists of their goodwill and reasonability," and the traditional European approach, in which diplomatic negotiations are a "bargaining procedure in which you assess your opponent's strengths and weaknesses and test his endurance."<sup>51</sup> Ulam states that the Soviet approach to negotiation is essentially the European approach.

A third, and somewhat unique, perspective is given to Soviet negotiating attitudes by Clemens. Specifically addressing the question of Soviet arms control negotiations, Clemens claims that the Soviets "in the mid-1950s and the 1960s did begin to approach arms control negotiations in a manner that might promote the strategic interests of the parties concerned. . . ."52 This attitude of mutual advantage he traces back to Lenin:

Not only did he foresee a period when military technology would make war unthinkable, but he called it one of the main tasks of Soviet diplomacy to support the pacifist wing of the bourgeois camp "as one of the few chances for the peaceful evolution of capitalism to a new structure. . . ."53

Thus, Clemens retains the adversary idea as a basic premise, but he adopts what might be called a modified theory of mutual advantage as well.

This overview of the attitudinal sources of Soviet negotiating techniques makes at least one point quite clear: Those who maintain that Soviet negotiating techniques are different from those of the West point primarily to the perceptions inherent in the ideology of Marxism-Leninism as the source of Soviet attitudes toward negotiations and Western negotiators. Because of these perceptions, the Soviets maintain an "adversary" attitude, rather than entering the negotiations in search of an agreement

which would be beneficial to both sides. It is interesting that even if the source of the Soviet's attitude is said to be antecedent to Marxism-Leninism (for example, the Russian historical experience) the same attitude--an adversary attitude--is said to prevail. Only rarely is the idea of mutual advantage or an accommodating attitude attributed to Soviet negotiators.

#### Soviet Literature on Soviet Negotiating Techniques

An analysis of the literature on Soviet negotiating techniques would be incomplete without a review of the pertinent Soviet literature.<sup>54</sup> The organization of this review is similar to that of the preceding section so as to make the similarities and differences as clear as possible. However, a review of the Soviet literature on negotiating techniques first requires some general comments which will aid the reader in understanding the Soviet perspective. Most important is the fact that, in the open literature at least, Soviet negotiating techniques are not normally discussed in the specific way they are in the West. Soviet discussions of the topic are normally contained within the larger context of "Soviet diplomacy," with emphasis on the broader topic of foreign policy.



While this is not ideal for making comparisons with Western evaluations of Soviet negotiating techniques, a comparison is still possible if one carefully reads the Soviet comments on the tactics used and the philosophy which guides Soviet diplomacy.

In writings on Soviet diplomacy, a major theme is the profound difference between "socialist" diplomacy and "capitalist" diplomacy. Soviet diplomacy is held to be both an art and a science.<sup>55</sup> That is, first, the basic characteristics of the international situation are analyzed. When these are understood, then the correct course for Soviet foreign policy must be developed from these. Finally, this course must be skillfully translated into concrete foreign policy acts.<sup>56</sup> To comprehend the international situation, one must understand "the general laws governing the development of human society,"<sup>57</sup> as the Soviets claim to do. In contrast to this, the Soviets maintain that capitalist "foreign policy and diplomacy are safeguarding the interests of the classes which are historically doomed," and "will inevitably fail."<sup>58</sup> Thus, the Soviets start off by asserting that they have an indisputable monopoly on the correct perception of reality.

The Soviets say that the art of diplomacy lies in the skillful use of one's capabilities to gain the maximum benefit from the current international situation. As the Soviet Diplomatic Dictionary puts it:

In the final analysis diplomatic art amounts to influencing other states and the international situation in the interests of the ruling class in a given state and in the interests of strengthening the particular social and political structure which supports that state.<sup>59</sup>

According to the Soviets, in bourgeois diplomatic theory, "diplomatic art is usually reduced to the subjective qualities of a diplomat, to the qualities of his mind and character,"<sup>60</sup> but that is the end of it. The correct understanding of the nature of international relations, which is present in Soviet diplomacy, is held to be missing from bourgeois diplomatic theory. This is its fatal weakness, and places bourgeois diplomatic theory in complete opposition to Soviet diplomacy. This is true with regard to both goals and tactics: because the capitalist goals of their foreign policy are not in accordance with historical progress, the capitalists must depend on such tactics as deception, perfidy, terrorism, guile, intimidation, demagoguery, cynicism, etc. Two works are representative of this Soviet concept. The 1955 edition of the History of Diplomacy discussed in part bourgeois diplomatic practices.

It emphasized the complete dichotomy between Soviet and bourgeois techniques.<sup>61</sup> The second work is a Soviet study of the diplomacy of fascism written in 1970. It stressed that fascism was not fundamentally different from the normal diplomacy of capitalism. The difference between fascist diplomacy and the diplomacy of the United States, Great Britain, and France was one of degree only, fascism being "the most reactionary wing of the imperialist bourgeoisie."<sup>62</sup> The book emphasized the complete and unbridgeable differences between fascist and socialist diplomacy.

These two works are representative of Soviet writing on diplomacy and are most similar to the first category of Western writing on Soviet diplomacy--the category that stressed the fundamental differences between Western and Soviet diplomacy.

After the mid-1950s, the Soviet position on the relationship of contemporary socialist and bourgeois diplomacy was modified. Two concepts were put forth which indicated a greater compatibility of Soviet and capitalist negotiating techniques. The first concept is represented clearly in a work by Anatoly Gromyko, the son of the present Soviet Foreign Minister. In 1969, he wrote:

. . . it is also necessary to keep the following in mind. In the policy of any capitalist state, in its diplomatic actions, there can always be a rapid return to the old imperialistic methods of foreign policy and diplomacy. But it would also be incorrect not to see today that which is new on the international diplomatic scene. It is not precluded that a deeper understanding by the leading circles of the capitalist countries, primarily the United States, of the real ratio of power between socialism and capitalism on the world scene will gradually open the way to broader and broader international collaboration.<sup>63</sup>

The "real ratio of power" referred to by Gromyko is, of course, the ever-increasing political, military and economic strength of the Soviet Union and its allies. Simply put, the fact of socialist superiority is becoming so apparent that the leaders of the capitalist world will have to change their diplomacy to one of cooperation. It is interesting that in 1971, two years after Gromyko's book appeared, another Soviet academician propounded a similar theme, but even more forcefully:

Of considerable importance also is the fact that the socialist countries are gradually, as it were, "training" world public opinion, Western diplomacy in particular, for the practice of preparing and signing significant international treaties jointly with the socialist states and, what is more important, for the realisation that such treaties and agreements are indispensable. It is essential that Western ruling circles take into account the revolutionary changes that have occurred in international relations, so that they proceed in their policy from the existing balance of world forces. Here, substantial progress can be observed.

The socialist states impose their initiative upon the Western countries, and through joint and coordinated efforts force the capitalist partners in the negotiations to agree on certain problems or to make concessions which may not always correspond to the imperialist powers' aggressive policy, but may merely indicate that the latter are aware of the real state of affairs.<sup>64</sup>

The second concept is that of using the contradictions to be found within the capitalist camp for the benefit of socialism. Valerian Zorin notes that Lenin advocated such diplomatic tactics in "The Infantile Disease of 'Leftism' in Communism":

A more powerful opponent can be defeated only through supreme exertion and only with the categorical, most painstaking, thorough, careful, and skillful use of any "breach"--even the tiniest one--between the enemies and of any contradiction of interests among the bourgeoisie of individual countries and among the various groups or formations of the bourgeoisie of individual countries, as well as of any possibility--even the slightest one--to acquire a mass ally, even though it might be temporary, unstable, precarious, unreliable, and conditional.<sup>65</sup>

A. Gorokhov notes that

. . . fighting for peace means isolating the most militant and aggressive circles of the imperialist bourgeoisie.

The struggle against the threat of war arising from imperialism has always been concrete in character; its ways, forms and methods are determined by real circumstances and the necessity to counter imperialism's aggressive acts.<sup>66</sup> [Emphasis added.]

Here again the concept is to divide the adversary, and the inference is that opposition to one part of the bourgeoisie means cooperation with the other part. Cooperation, in turn, signifies at least a superficial compatibility and similarity in negotiating so as to ensure success. This might be exemplified by the change in the Soviets' diplomatic activities vis-à-vis the United Kingdom and France, when the policy of the "United Front" against Nazi Germany was initiated.

G. Andreyev also emphasized that Lenin himself indicated that at times it was necessary to have "normal businesslike relations with the capitalist states."<sup>67</sup> All this implies that compatible diplomatic techniques can and must be used when necessary. Both these concepts are compatible with the position of the second category of Western scholars, who maintain that there are both significant similarities and differences between Soviet and Western negotiating techniques. However, there are limits. As the Diplomatic Dictionary notes,

Socialist diplomacy combines principledness with flexibility, with a readiness for cooperation and agreement, for the concessions required to achieve cooperation and agreement, but not proceeding beyond the limits of its applicable foreign policy principles.<sup>68</sup> [Emphasis supplied.]

The basic differences between Soviet and Western diplomacy must remain because of the different foundations upon which each is built. As a consequence of this, while the Soviets may maintain that there are some areas where the negotiating techniques of the two sides are similar, there is no Soviet group which corresponds to the third category of Western scholars who stress the similarities in Soviet and Western negotiating techniques.

The Soviet analyses as to the historical and attitudinal sources of their negotiating techniques are quite straightforward. Lenin is seen as the historical source and Marxism-Leninism is the attitudinal source. Andreyev, writing in the Soviet journal International Affairs, is a prime example of the Soviet analyst examining Lenin's historical role in the formation of Soviet negotiating techniques:

Lenin himself gave brilliant examples of the creative application of the Marxist dialectical method.<sup>69</sup>

Lenin gave an unfading example of the way to use the labyrinthine inter-imperialist contradictions during the negotiation of the Peace Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. . . .<sup>70</sup>

and

[Lenin] taught Soviet diplomacy to act in such a way as "to create the deepest possible gap between

the pacifist camp of the international bourgeoisie and the grossly bourgeois, aggressively bourgeois, reactionary bourgeois camp."<sup>71</sup>

Another contributor to International Affairs wrote:

Lenin showed how to combine firmness and flexibility in international politics, resolute defense of the Socialist state's vital interests and diplomatic manoeuvring, including compromise.<sup>72</sup>

Numerous other examples could be cited, all expounding the same thing.

The only other point to be made in this connection is that contemporary Soviet writers also stress that while Lenin laid down the "theoretical propositions and basic principles" and even the tactics to be used by Soviet diplomacy, ". . . the leadership of the Communist Party determines and has always determined the proper direction and content and the best methods of Soviet diplomacy."<sup>73</sup> However, the function of the Communist Party is more than simply choosing from among the tactics devised by Lenin. Its function is one of "creatively enlarging upon and applying them in the new conditions" [emphasis added] of international relations.<sup>74</sup> The role of the current Soviet leadership is not to use Lenin's formulations in a mechanical way, but to remember that diplomacy is an art as well as a science. This, of course, allows the current leadership even greater freedom to be innovative and still



maintain that they are faithfully following Lenin's dictates.

This is true with respect to both the historical tactics as noted above and to the attitudinal or ideological basis of Soviet negotiating tactics. Soviet writers uniformly state that Marxism-Leninism is the source of their attitudes toward negotiation, toward the tactics used in negotiating and toward those with whom they are negotiating. In Diplomacy of Contemporary Imperialism, the question is asked, "What sort of interrelation exists between diplomacy and ideology, between diplomatic activity and ideological struggle?" The unequivocal answer is that

diplomacy, which is the set of means, devices, methods and forms of implementing the foreign policy of a state by peaceful means . . . undoubtedly reflects the ideology of the class that is ruling in a given country.<sup>75</sup>

For the Soviet Union this means

the character and most important peculiarities of Soviet diplomacy were and still are determined by the revolutionary and class content of Soviet foreign policy, which rests on the solid basis of Marxist-Leninist science.<sup>76</sup>

Since the attitudinal source of Soviet negotiating techniques in Marxism-Leninism and the West's is imperialism, the Soviets constantly emphasize the conflict of the two opposing attitudinal sources.

The competition and struggle in the world arena of these two basic forms of ownership--the socialist and the capitalist--have run like a red thread through the entire history of international relations since the time of the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution.<sup>77</sup>

The conflict is said to be caused by the diametrically opposed goals of the two ideologies. According to Soviet writers, the Soviet Union has striven for "the attainment of a democratic and just peace," while the foreign policy of capitalism concentrates on "preparing and unleashing predatory wars."<sup>78</sup> However, since the mid-1950s, the Soviets have increasingly stressed a second theme in addition to this basic adversary attitude toward capitalist foreign policy and its concomitant tactics. The second theme is that the world situation has so changed that now communism is the dominant power and the foreign policy of the capitalist states is becoming reactive rather than assertive. This has caused the emergence of "realistic tendencies" in capitalist foreign policy which "Soviet diplomacy is always ready to meet halfway."<sup>79</sup> Thus, two contradictory themes have been combined: (1) a basic hostility toward capitalist states, their foreign policies and their negotiating techniques; and (2) a cooperative attitude toward capitalist states when their activities are in accord with Soviet desires.

### Comparison of Soviet and Western Writings

It will be beneficial at this point to summarize and compare the various Western and Soviet schools of thought on Soviet negotiating techniques. Both in the West and in the Soviet Union there are those who emphasize the fundamental differences between Soviet and Western negotiating techniques. These scholars wrote primarily in the postwar years through the 1950s. In the West some recent publications have maintained this position.<sup>80</sup> In the Soviet Union this has been modified to a large extent, starting in the mid-1950s.

The second category of writings on Soviet negotiating techniques includes those who stress both similarities and differences between Soviet and Western negotiating techniques. Western writers in this category see two basic factors influencing the Soviet's choice of a particular negotiating style: (1) the purpose for which the Soviets entered the negotiation; and (2) the time frame of the negotiations. In contrast to this, the Soviet writings, which are included in this category, emphasize that it is the purpose of the negotiations that is the determining factor and that it is the West that changes its negotiating tactics. While both agree that "business-

like" negotiating tactics are the product of a common desire to see the negotiations succeed, there is a significant difference in explaining why the other side has changed from obstruction to cooperation. The Western writers have no clear consensus, but have expounded two primary reasons, noted above, to show why the Soviets have changed their negotiating technique. On the other hand, the Soviet writings explaining the modification of Western negotiating techniques are quite consistent. They contend that the West was compelled to change its tactics by the change in the correlation of forces in favor of the Soviet Union.

The third category of Western writers stress the similarities of Soviet and Western negotiating techniques. There is no comparable category of writers in the Soviet Union.

On the historical sources of Soviet negotiating techniques, there is also more diversity of opinion in the West than among Soviet writers. Three major historical sources stand out in the Western literature: Byzantium, Imperial Russia, and Lenin. The Soviet writers only acknowledge Lenin as the historical source of Soviet negotiating techniques.

There is more agreement between East and West on the attitudinal source of Soviet negotiating techniques. Most Western writers and all Soviet writers see Marxism-Leninism as this source. However, in the West there are some scholars who assert that the Soviet attitude is primarily a continuation of the native Russian attitude.

Specific Soviet Negotiating Techniques  
Noted by Western Authors

The scholars who have been concerned with Soviet negotiating techniques often have indicated the techniques used by the Soviets which set the Soviets apart from the Western tradition. The purpose of this section is to discuss those techniques which are indicated to be characteristic of the Soviets. This is not to say that these are the only techniques used by the Soviets or that the West never uses them. The techniques discussed below are those which the Soviets have used during negotiations to such an extent that the tactic has become associated with the Soviet negotiating style.

There are a number of difficulties associated with any attempt to catalogue particular Soviet negotiating techniques. In reviewing the literature on Soviet negotiating techniques, it is apparent that the treatment given

this topic is rather uneven. Often the question of Soviet tactics is only secondary to a larger topic about which the author is writing, such as Soviet foreign policy, international relations, arms control, personal memoirs, or the broad topic of negotiations in general. As a consequence, Soviet negotiating techniques are normally discussed in an unsystematic and incidental manner. Another problem is that many times the techniques are described in a vague manner or in the author's own terminology, and this makes it somewhat difficult to compare the techniques cited by a number of different writers. A third difficulty is that a particular technique may be used only sporadically, in certain situations, or at certain periods of time. Thus, it might be mentioned rather infrequently or by a limited number of observers. A final problem is that the techniques used are not rigidly applied, but may be varied according to the particular situation existing in the different negotiations, and it becomes a matter of personal preference as to whether the tactic should be cited as one tactic or whether there are actually two or more different tactics being used.

Despite these limitations, it is possible to compile a list of Soviet negotiating techniques which is

comprehensive, yet manageable. In studying the works of eighteen Western scholars, diplomats and observers of the Soviet Union,<sup>81</sup> the following negotiating techniques were found to be the most important:

1. Use rudeness and vilification
2. Use the negotiating process for propaganda purposes
3. Maintain an adversary attitude toward those with whom the Soviets are negotiating
4. Be stubborn; attempt to wear out the opponent
5. Be devious; use deceit with little or no regard for the truth
7. Refuse to make concessions; see concessions as a sign of weakness rather than goodwill
8. Have the Soviet government/Communist Party give little freedom to Soviet negotiators
9. Allow little or no real personal relationships to develop between the Soviet negotiators and their opponents
10. Demand agreement in principal before negotiations on technical or detailed topics is undertaken
11. Present unreasonable/exaggerated demands, so that any resulting compromise will ensure that the Soviets obtain the majority of their desired objectives

12. Use procedural devices (such as the formulation of the agenda) to gain substantive advantages
13. Use the threat to break off the negotiations to gain concessions from the opponent
14. Make a concession, repudiate the concession, then make the same concession again at a later time
15. Demand a concession from the opponent in return for agreement to enter into negotiations
16. Emphasize grievances the Soviet Union has with the opponent
17. Claim that a compromise position is actually only the opponent's position and does not actually reflect the Soviet position, then demand that a compromise be made between the Soviet position and the compromise position. This is known as "splitting the half" and has a number of variations all of which have the aim of giving the Soviets three-fourths of what they wanted while allowing them to claim that each side made equal concessions toward the other
18. Make increased demands each time the opponent makes a concession
19. Have the opponent agree to waive discussion of a certain topic at the current stage of the negotiations,



then, when he attempts to discuss it at a later time, refuse to discuss it at all. This is known as the "waiving gambit"

Chart 1 relates the eighteen authors studied with the negotiating techniques listed above. The authors are arranged by the number of techniques they note, from the greatest number to the least. The techniques are arranged from the one most often cited to the least often cited.

From the chart it can be noted that only the first eight techniques are noted by more than half the authors, and no author mentions all the techniques listed. This emphasizes both the unsystematic treatment given this topic by most of the authors and the possibility that these tactics are not always used by the Soviets, but rather they are used selectively.

In order to obtain a clearer understanding of each of the nineteen negotiating techniques listed above, and the Western evaluation of it, each technique will be discussed briefly. The Soviet tactic that is noted most often is the use of rudeness and vilification in the course of a negotiation. This technique includes the use of abusive language against the individual Western negotiator, his government or other representatives of his state. It

CHART 1. CITATION OF SOVIET NEGOTIATING TECHNIQUES BY WESTERN AUTHORS

Technique No.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	No. Techniques Cited
Iklé	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x		x	x		17
Steibel	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x								12
Mosely	x	x	x	x			x	x	x	x						x				9
Pipes	x	x	x	x			x	x			x		x				x			9
Holsti	x	x	x	x	x		x	x	x											9
Dean	x	x	x	x			x	x		x			x						x	9
Bechhoefer	x	x	x	x					x	x		x		x	x					8
Acheson	x	x	x	x	x	x		x												8
Nogee	x	x	x		x	x			x		x	x								8
Craig	x	x	x		x	x	x						x							6
Hazard	x	x	x	x	x	x														6
Hayter	x	x	x	x	x			x			x									6
Osborn	x	x	x	x	x		x	x								x				6
Pearson	x	x	x	x	x	x														5
Thayer	x	x	x		x	x														5
Deane	x			x	x				x											5
Kennan	x		x	x			x			x										5
Kertes	x	x		x	x		x													5
No. of Authors Citing Techniques	17	16	15	14	11	9	9	9	7	7	5	4	4	3	2	2	2	1	1	

also includes accusations of negotiating in bad faith and the impugning of states' motives for participating in the negotiations. Finally, it includes the use of derogatory labels when referring to a particular state or political

Lester Pearson warns the West:

We should not permit the Communists to drag us down to their level of debate and dialectic. In discussion we should not mistake vilification for vigor, or sound and fury for sense and firmness.<sup>82</sup>

Yet, it is not simply a case of "sound and fury," or a "wild burst of emotion or course pugilism."<sup>83</sup> Craig notes that

In the armory of Soviet negotiating weapons bad manners has been one of the most frequently used, and it is always used coldly and with calculation, with two main purposes in mind. The first is to disconcert the other side, throw it off balance, and betray it into ill considered statements or actions. The second is to demonstrate to peoples around the world . . . that the Soviet Union is contemptuous of the West. . . .<sup>84</sup>

Hazard maintains that the amount of "vindictiveness" and "spleen" is in a direct ratio with the weakness of the Soviet position.<sup>85</sup>

This technique is not always used to the advantage of the Soviet Union, however. At times this characteristic of the Soviet negotiating style was counterproductive in that it alienated potential allies.<sup>86</sup> In addition, its prolonged use may have dulled its effectiveness. As one

subjected over a number of years to such abuse by Soviet negotiators, Dean has asserted that the Soviet use of

rough, impolite, and even vituperative language . . . has become stereotyped. It is much like the traffic noise . . . : it may be annoying but does not prevent one's getting ahead with the business at hand.<sup>87</sup>

Within this technique, it is logical to also include the Soviet tactic of accusing the opponent of negotiating in bad faith. Such accusations commonly are accompanied by rude, disparaging remarks, and both are used to throw the opponent off balance.

The second technique, that of using negotiations for propaganda purposes, needs little amplification. Hayter cautions Western negotiators that

in negotiating with Russians it is always necessary to bear in mind that they are not really interested in impressing their immediate interlocutors. Soviet diplomacy, even in the narrowest sense, is directed towards influencing foreign public opinion rather than foreign Governments.<sup>88</sup>

Spanier and Noguee, on the other hand, see Soviet propaganda efforts as designed to have an indirect influence on the outcome of the specific negotiation. They see the purpose behind Soviet propaganda in disarmament negotiations as influencing governments and peoples of the world to exert influence on the American government to accept Soviet disarmament proposals.<sup>89</sup>

The third negotiating technique is that of maintaining an adversary attitude toward those with whom the Soviets are negotiating. It could be argued that this is not a negotiating technique, but rather an attitude inherent in the Soviet perception of reality. It is included here as a technique because it determines much of the Soviet action in negotiations, and whether it is sincerely maintained or simply used to achieve their objectives is a moot point. In either case, the result achieved is the same. Both Kennan and Mosely take the position that this is a part of the Soviet belief system. Kennan notes that for the Soviets "all foreigners are potential enemies,"<sup>90</sup> while Mosely emphasizes that the Soviet negotiator is trained to assume the ill-will of his capitalist counterpart.<sup>91</sup> As a result of this, the Soviets are said to use negotiations as a method of warfare,<sup>92</sup> rather than to achieve true accommodation of interests.

The fourth tactic to be noted is also one that has become almost proverbial. It is the tactic of intransigence--the tactic of constant repetition of one point, position or concept over a lengthy period of time. Whether the opponent can refute the Soviet argument or not appears to make no difference whatever. Any refutations of the

Soviet position are simply ignored or brushed aside with alacrity.

One purpose for this tactic, Bechhoefer asserts, is that

the Soviet negotiators [in disarmament negotiations] apparently as a matter of policy seek to protract and exacerbate the negotiations in order to exhaust the opposition and obtain a favorable denouement as a result of sheer fatigue.<sup>93</sup>

Osborn indicates a connection between Soviet obstinacy and propaganda goals. He indicates that in United Nations negotiations on atomic energy the Soviets continually repeated obvious falsehoods.

The other delegates did not believe them. But after hearing them repeated in almost every speech by the Russians or their satellites over a period of months and years, the other delegates stopped refuting them. It was hopeless; it only prolonged the debate, and gave the Soviet delegates renewed opportunities to repeat the falsehood. But they still got headlines in the American and other newspapers, and a considerable section of the American intelligentsia believed them.<sup>94</sup>

Here Osborn also connects this use of repetition with the fifth Soviet tactic: the use of lies and deceit, and having no apparent regard for the truth. Noguee noted that at least in the first decade of the United Nations "the Soviet representatives were not directly concerned with the truth or falsity of their statements," rather "what concerned them was the effect of what they said on

the attainment of their objectives."<sup>95</sup> Kertesz, after years of experience in dealing with Soviet negotiators, noted, "We had to learn the hard way that Soviet diplomacy has often equated diplomatic negotiations with deceit and treachery."<sup>96</sup> Included in this technique is the twisting and misrepresentation of what others have said or done as well as outright lying.

The sixth technique is similar to the technique of propaganda in that it is the use of negotiations for a reason other than to achieve agreement on a common problem. In this technique, the goal is to use the negotiating process to demoralize and weaken the enemy,<sup>97</sup> to sow discord among allies in the enemy camp,<sup>98</sup> to exploit internal conflicts within enemy states,<sup>99</sup> and to paralyze the will of an opponent to take a particular course of action.<sup>100</sup> The overall goal of this technique can be said to use negotiations to change the realities of relationships between the Soviet Union and its opponent to the advantage of the USSR, or to prevent the changing of a state's relationship with the Soviet Union to the USSR's disadvantage.

The seventh technique concerns the Soviet attitude toward concessions. There has been much debate as to

whether the Soviet Union views the role of concessions in a negotiation in the same light as does the West. On one side are those who maintain that there is little or no difference between the Soviet and Western attitude toward the use of concessions in negotiations. Others hold that there are significant differences. Partisans of both sides use copious quotations from Soviet leaders and theoreticians to prove their points. Mosely asserts that

compromise for the sake of getting on with the job . . . is alien to the Bolshevik way of thinking and to the discipline which the Communist Party has striven to inculcate in its members.<sup>101</sup>

Dean stresses that unilateral compromises by the West only arouse the Soviets' suspicion and concern, while any Western attempt to "split the difference between two positions" is only taken as a sign of the opponent's weakness.<sup>102</sup> Kennan notes that when the West makes concessions to convince the Soviets of their friendly intentions, it often has just the opposite effect. The Soviets

immediately begin to expect that they have overestimated our [the West's] strength, that they have been remiss in their obligations to the Soviet state, that they should have been more demanding of us all along.<sup>103</sup>

Craig sees the Soviets as using concessions only during periods when they have perceived themselves as being weak.<sup>104</sup> For this school of thought, Khrushchev's 1959



speech in Albania is a favorite for proving their point. In that speech, Khrushchev criticized what he held to be the Western position:

They say: "With the USSR one must negotiate as follows: concession for concession!" But that is a huckster's approach! . . . We do not have to make any concessions because our proposals have not been made for bartering.<sup>105</sup>

The emphasis of this technique then is negative--the absence on the part of the Soviet negotiator of a willingness to make concessions and the negative reaction of the Soviet negotiators toward Western concessions.

The eighth technique is not actually a technique, but rather an "operating limitation" imposed on Soviet negotiators which affects their use of all the other negotiating techniques. This, of course, is the rigid restrictions of freedom under which the Soviet negotiator must work. Mosely has given the most detailed description of the constraints under which Soviet negotiators operate. He holds the Soviet negotiator not to be a negotiator in the Western sense, but "a mechanical mouthpiece for views and demands formulated centrally in Moscow."<sup>106</sup> Mosely also shows how this affects the negotiating process:

Soviet experts and diplomats cannot participate in an informal day-to-day exchange of information, comments, and tentative recommendations concerning policy. Until Moscow has sent instructions they

can say nothing at all, for they may fail to express the exact nuance of thinking or intention which has not yet been formulated at the center, and transmitted to them. After Moscow has spoken they can only repeat the exact formulation given to them, and no variation may be introduced into it unless Moscow has sent the necessary further instructions.<sup>107</sup>

Because of this rigid adherence to instructions, Soviet negotiators are "in mortal terror of violating any part, minor or major, of their instructions. . . . Making recommendations for even slight changes in their instructions exposes them to serious risks."<sup>108</sup> Dean has characterized the resultant attitude of Soviet negotiators as being "an iron determination to carry out a program previously determined in Moscow and not subject to change by the diplomat in the field."<sup>109</sup>

The ninth negotiating technique is related to the eighth. Apparently part of the Soviet negotiator's restrictions is a limitation on the development of personal contact with their Western counterpart. Acheson has characterized his personal and social hours with Soviet diplomats as "a weariness of the flesh."<sup>110</sup> Hayter also stresses that it was not possible to "establish any kind of lasting or genuine personal relationship" with the Soviets.<sup>111</sup> This is one tactic, at least, that has had wide variations historically. Osborn notes that in his

postwar experiences, he found that "Gromyko, Malik and Skobeltzyn could all be very charming socially," but their behavior at negotiations was "entirely different . . . stylized to the extreme. It showed careful training."<sup>112</sup> Ikle, a decade after the fall of Molotov, acknowledges that "occasionally" some Soviet diplomats "have even developed personal relations with a Western opponent."<sup>113</sup> Yet, he also shows the dichotomy between the "human attractiveness of Communist delegates and the aggressive and frequently rude official behavior."<sup>114</sup> Both can be, and are, used for the maximum effect rather than because of natural proclivities toward one or the other.

The next technique is another for which the Soviets have gained a certain notoriety. This is the technique of demanding that an "agreement in principle" be agreed upon before negotiations are initiated on the more detailed technical or political issues involved. Such an agreement usually will be so vague that the Soviets "will be able to interpret it in their own way and act to their own advantage while professing to observe the agreement."<sup>115</sup> Thus, the Soviets gain the advantage of being seen as reasonable and willing to compromise and cooperate with the West, while, in reality, they are maintaining complete freedom of action.

Related to this, and included under this general technique, is the tendency of the Soviet negotiator to attempt to keep the negotiations on the level of general principles for as long as possible. This gives the Soviets full opportunity for endless debates and rhetorical fireworks.<sup>116</sup>

The eleventh technique is to make unrealistic demands of one's opponent, so that at a later time, these can be given up in return for concessions from the other side.<sup>117</sup> Of course, it is of great help if the demand sounds attractive even though both sides know that it is utterly impractical. "Ban the bomb," or "no troops on foreign soil" are examples of such demands. The demands normally will not be accepted by the opponent, and the Soviet negotiator is aware of this. The purpose, again, is to force the Western negotiator to make other concessions because of his rejection of the initial Soviet demand. The capability of a state's propaganda apparatus, is of great importance here. It is through the skillful use of propaganda that this technique can be successful.<sup>118</sup>

A method to reinforce the type of demands made in this technique, is to use unreasonable arguments or simply to ignore the opponent's refutation of the Soviet position.

The opponent's arguments are simply met with assertions that their questions are "hypothetical" or "imaginary" or with the assertion that the Soviet position is "indisputable."<sup>119</sup> This is an attempt to obscure the fact that the Soviet negotiator cannot defend his position with a detailed rebuttal of the objections raised.

The twelfth technique is to use procedural devices to gain substantive advantages in the negotiations. Bechhoefer indicates this was a common technique used by the Soviets in the early disarmament negotiations in the United Nations and became almost routine from 1952 to 1955. He cites the Soviet use of this technique in 1948. At that time the Soviet Union introduced a resolution into the General Assembly entitled: "The Prohibition of the Atomic Weapon and the Reduction by One-Third of the Armaments and Armed Forces of the permanent Members of the Security Council." The title was identical with the separate agenda item which the Soviet Union insisted was necessary for discussion of the resolution. However, once it was accepted as a separate agenda item, the Soviet representative insisted that the General Assembly had in effect adopted the proposal because its title had been approved by the General Assembly. At another time the Soviet Union

insisted that the title of this agenda item precluded adopting any proposal except the Soviet proposal.<sup>120</sup>

A related tactic is to arrange the agenda of a negotiation so that agreement must be reached on items in which the Soviet Union has an interest before the items of interest to the opponent are discussed. Ikle points out that "disagreement on the agenda has become so common in East-West disarmament conferences that the rotating agenda has lately almost acquired the quality of a diplomatic convention."<sup>121</sup>

The next technique is using the threat of breaking off the negotiations in order to obtain concessions from those with whom the Soviets are negotiating. A variation of this is for the Soviets to accuse their opponents of planning to break off the negotiations. Even if this accusation is not true, it may cause the other side to make a unilateral concession of some kind simply to "prove" its good faith and its desire to see the negotiations successfully concluded.

Also included in this technique is the actual breaking-off of negotiations by the Soviets. The Soviets have actually walked out of negotiations often enough as to ensure that their threats of walking out of other

negotiations are normally regarded as a valid threat rather than mere bluff. Craig characterizes the Soviet use of the Walk-out as "skillful" and usually accompanied "with a barrage of accusations of bad faith and unwillingness to treat and other crimes which enables them to leave the stage as they entered it, as the heroes of the piece.

... „122

The next technique is that of making a concession, repudiating it at a later date, and then making the concession a second time. There can be two purposes behind this technique. First, if it is properly orchestrated, there is a propaganda advantage in that the Soviets can hold themselves up for praise each time they make the same concession. Bechhoefer holds this to be a familiar Soviet pattern.<sup>123</sup> Second, while it is a common Western precept that a concession should be answered with a concession, the opposite is not considered proper, i.e., answering a retraction with a retraction. Therefore, if the Soviet Union makes a concession and it is reciprocated by the West, and then the Soviets retract their original concession, it is unlikely the West will retract their concession in response. Thus, the Soviet Union will have the advantage. If the Soviets should make the same concession,

earlier repudiated, there will be pressure on the West to reciprocate with still another concession, thus giving the Soviets two for the price of one.

Another technique also revolves around the obtaining of concessions. It is to demand concessions as a price for simply agreeing to negotiate. Bechhoefer notes that in the late 1940s Soviet proposals on atomic weapons

provided that if the United States and the Western powers agreed to eliminate their nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union would talk about a treaty for international controls to assure the observance of commitments.<sup>124</sup>

The sixteenth negotiation technique shown on the chart is that of playing up grievances. As Mosely puts it:

Instead of striving to reduce the number of points of friction and to isolate and diminish the major conflicts of interest, the Soviet negotiator often appears to his exasperated "western" colleague to take pride in finding the maximum number of disputes and in dwelling on each of them to the full.<sup>125</sup>

The purpose of this is either to put the Western negotiators on the defensive, perhaps making them more willing to make concessions or it may be to protect themselves against expected attacks by the Western negotiators, the idea being that the best defense is a good offense. This technique is also manifested when Soviet negotiators stress the points of disagreement during negotiations rather than in looking for points of agreement or common interest.



The seventeenth technique to be discussed is somewhat complicated and, therefore, will require some elaboration. The goal of the Soviets in this case is to shift the central ground between their own position and their opponent's position closer to that of the Soviet position without allowing the opponent to claim that he has made a concession which must be reciprocated. The Soviets accomplish this by first reaching agreement with their opponents on a certain issue. Then, after a period of time, the Soviets modify their demands, thus moving away from already agreed positions. Thereafter, the Soviets characterize their own position and the compromise position, which their opponents had previously agreed to, as the extreme alternative positions. The Soviets then call for a compromise to be made between these two "extremes." If the opponent agrees, what has happened is that the Soviets have obtained 75 percent of their objective. One variation of this is for the Soviets to reach agreement with their opponents on an issue and then to interpret the agreement in such a way that the Soviets have actually made little or no concessions. Pipes has noted another variation of this technique whereby

Russian negotiators work out with their opposite numbers from the West a compromise formula which is

then sent to Moscow as representing the Western position. Clearly, when Moscow sends back its counterproposals, the Russians come out the winners.<sup>126</sup>

This technique offers great opportunities for Soviet propaganda. If the opponent refuses to make a compromise with the new Soviet position, it can be accused by the Soviets of negotiating in bad faith and of not really wanting to achieve agreement through compromise.

A much more common variation of this technique is noted by Iklé, who complains that while Western negotiators have a tendency to mediate between their own position and the Soviet position, the Soviet negotiator invariably upholds his own position as the only correct one.<sup>127</sup> The tendency is thus to compromise more toward the Soviet position than toward the Western position.

The penultimate technique to be described is a method for continuing the conflict rather than for abating it, should that be the Soviets' desire. It is related to the preceding technique in that the seventeenth often constitutes an integral part of the one now to be described. This technique is as follows: As the Soviets' opponent makes concessions toward the Soviets' position, the latter will increase their demands. The result is that while the two sides are as far apart as before, they have both moved

closer toward the actual Soviet objectives. Should their opponent attempt to compromise again, the Soviets will achieve most if not all of their original goals. Iklé notes that this tactic can be used to draw an opponent into

negotiations through the modest initial proposals, whereas starting with the more demanding final position might have repelled him. Once the opponent is negotiating, the gradually increasing demands may help shift his evaluations and eventually make the final position acceptable to him.<sup>128</sup>

The last negotiating technique was noted by Dean, and he called it the "waiving gambit." As Dean describes it:

It is a favorite device of Soviet diplomats to press the adversary to set aside some aspect of a question in the interest of getting agreement and moving ahead and then, when the other party brings up the matter later, to claim that by agreeing to set it aside originally the other party had agreed to waive it entirely.<sup>129</sup>

This indicates the Soviet penchant for using seemingly innocuous actions on the part of the opponent and giving them disproportionate importance which rebound to the Soviet's advantage. This also emphasizes the validity of the view that procedures, such as waiving an item to later discussion, which enable negotiations among Western states to proceed smoothly, are often used by the Soviets to obtain a unilateral advantage in their negotiations with the West. Thus, when used by the Soviets, they become a

source of conflict rather than an aid to agreement.

A number of observations can be made from these techniques. Of fundamental importance are the first three observations. The fourth, in reality, simply emphasizes the first and second observations.

1. They are designed to obtain unilateral advantages. The concept of "reasoning together" to find a solution advantageous to all is completely alien. The techniques, therefore, indicate a perception of negotiations as a zero-sum game.

2. The emphasis is on conflict and confrontation as a vehicle to achieve perceived goals. More is to be gained by unpleasantness and stressing differences than is to be gained by mutual confidence, amicable relationships and concentration on areas of mutual agreement.

3. The effect of many of these techniques is to influence groups extraneous to the actual negotiations. Two considerations are important here: first, the actual negotiations and the result agreement may be only of secondary importance to the Soviets, their primary objective being to influence particular groups in a desired manner. Second, where the outcome of the negotiations are of primary importance, the extraneous groups are influenced

in the hope that they, in turn, will exert an influence on the Soviets' negotiating opponent. The result will be to force their opponents to agree to more of the Soviet demands than they otherwise would have.

4. Small, tactical errors made by opponents are given unwarranted emphasis by the Soviets in order to place the opposing side at a technical disadvantage. The emphasis is on "one-upsmanship."

Specific Soviet Negotiating Techniques  
Noted by Soviet Authors

Soviet descriptions of their own negotiating techniques correspond in some respects with this Western evaluation and differ in other areas. In reviewing the limited amount of Soviet literature on the topic that is available in English, the following negotiating techniques were given the most prominence:

1. Compromise, but remain true to your principles
2. Maintain an adversary relationship with your opponent
3. Maintain peace as the ultimate goal
4. Maintain an attitude of cooperation and a business-like relationship
5. Be flexible when it is required

6. Differentiate among the imperialists and use their contradictions to advantage
7. Relate tactics to the historical and present situations
8. Truthfully publicize the Soviet Union's foreign policy goals
9. Be firm and decisive
10. Maintain complete victory as the ultimate goal

Chart 2 indicates which Soviet authors cited which of the above negotiating techniques.<sup>130</sup> As in the case of the various techniques indicated by the Western scholars, each of the techniques listed in the chart require some explanation to clarify their full meaning.

The first tactic is that of compromise, while remaining true to Communist principles. This tactic is one of the most debated among Western scholars. The debate normally revolves around the question of whether the Soviets actually do compromise at all. The first category of Western scholars tend to maintain that the Soviets are functionally incapable of compromising as the West understands the term. Instead, they see the Soviets as either bartering or as viewing the situation as a zero-sum game. The third category of Western scholars generally hold this

CHART 2. CITATION OF SOVIET NEGOTIATING TECHNIQUES BY  
SOVIET AUTHORS

Technique No.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	No. of Tech- niques Cited
Diplomat. slovar'	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X		8
Andreyev	X	X	X	X	X	X		X		X	8
Gromyko	X	X	X	X	X		X	X		X	8
Gorokhov	X	X	X	X	X	X				X	7
Semenov	X	X	X		X	X	X		X		7
Kaplin	X		X	X	X		X		X		6
Maisky	X	X		X	X				X		5
Razmerov	X	X	X	X		X					5
Zorin						X	X	X		X	4
No. of Authors Citing Tech- niques	8	7	7	7	7	5	5	4	4	4	

idea to be so much cold war bunk. Given the correct circumstances, they suggest the Soviet Union can see, understand, and accept the concept of mutual advantage. As noted before, both sides make copious use of quotations of various Soviet leaders and theoreticians.

However, the Soviet concept of compromise, as it is described in the Soviet sources cited above is neither a simple rejection nor acceptance of the Western concept. It is a much more complex and future-oriented concept. The Soviet concept of compromise relates a specific act to two different time frames simultaneously. The time frame of primary importance is the future. When the Soviets consider whether to make or agree to a compromise, the question of primary importance is, "How will this aid in the eventual victory of communism over capitalism?" The secondary question is, "How does the compromise affect the current situation?" The Soviets' evaluation of a compromise, therefore, can have a dual set of standards. According to the Soviet perspective, the Soviets can honestly urge a compromise be made for a current mutual advantage. That is, it is currently advantageous to both the Soviet Union and their negotiating opponent, and may be of mutual advantage even for a definite period of time



in the future. Yet, when viewing the forward march of world history, the compromise must be seen to be ultimately to the net advantage of the Soviet Union and to the net disadvantage to their opponent. Thus, in this perspective it becomes a zero-sum game. Kaplin shows this dualism when he states Soviet foreign policy should use the contradictions within the imperialist camp as a guide.

Such an approach in its turn would create opportunities for reaching certain agreements and compromises with the imperialist countries, as long as the latter were dictated by the interests of socialism and peace.<sup>131</sup> [Emphasis mine.]

Semenov also is understandable only in this perspective. He also states that Soviet diplomacy is largely based on the contradictions within the capitalist world, "but [this] does not rule out the need for compromise, and, consequently, of certain agreements with the imperialist countries in the interests of Socialism." He then cited Lenin's refutation of those who would make no compromise with the capitalist states, the implication being that at times one must compromise to avoid defeat.<sup>132</sup> Andreyev emphasizes the necessary limits on compromises:

"... Through all compromises, when they are unavoidable, to remain true to its principles, to its class, to its revolutionary purpose, to its task of paving the way for the revolution."

That is precisely the policy the Soviet Union

has been following. . . .<sup>133</sup> [The first emphasis is author's, second emphasis is mine.]

A related strand that runs through the Soviet concept of compromise is that the Soviet Union compromised when it was weak to avoid defeat; now that the Soviet Union is strong, it forces compromises on the capitalist states.<sup>134</sup> Thus, both Western schools of thought are partially correct and partially in error. In viewing an immediate situation, there can be found examples of the Soviet Union making compromises and appearing to treat compromises in the Western manner. However, when one views the ultimate reasons for making a particular compromise, there is a great dichotomy between the Western concept of mutual advantage and the Soviet concept of their ultimate, total victory.

The second technique is to maintain an adversary relationship with your opponent. The concept of the non-communist states as adversaries permeates Soviet writing on diplomacy, and needs little elaboration. A few examples will suffice. Anatoli Gromyko notes that "attentive watching the situation on the international scene, Soviet diplomacy opposes the actions of the imperialistic powers."<sup>135</sup> [Emphasis mine.] He emphasizes the Soviet perception that "every imperialist state that is more

powerful than the others has set the conquest of world dominion as its longed-for goal."<sup>136</sup> In addition, ". . . the ideologues of the foreign policy and diplomacy of imperialism . . . all . . . consider the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries to be the principal socio-political adversary."<sup>137</sup> Finally, "it is natural that diplomacy cannot stand aloof from the ideological struggle."<sup>138</sup> It is noteworthy that it is the son of the current Soviet Foreign Minister who is being quoted here.

Andreyev notes that "the struggle between [the socialist and capitalist social systems] . . . constitutes the main content of a whole historical epoch, the one we live in."<sup>139</sup> Finally, Semenov, who headed the Soviet SALT delegation, wrote, "The pivot of modern international affairs is the struggle and competition between . . . Socialism and Capitalism."<sup>140</sup> [Emphasis mine.]

What is the cause of this unceasing struggle that brings about the adversary attitude? It is, according to the Soviet writers, the diametrically opposed goals of each side. This relates to the third technique espoused by the Soviets: maintain peace as the ultimate goal. Semenov states that "in its relations with the imperialist states, the Soviet Union does not stand for war, but for

peace, . . . ."141 In contrast, Gorokhov maintains that "at present the war menace of imperialism is continually growing."142 This can be dismissed merely as a propaganda tactic of no political substance. However, that is a rather superficial reaction. To go to the opposite extreme and simply accept the Soviet concept as having the same meaning as if it were stated by a Western statesman would be equally incorrect. In the Western context, to maintain peace as a goal has the connotation of maintaining the general status quo. This is not at all the Soviet concept. The Soviets put this statement into the context of their belief in the progressive march of history toward communism. To maintain peace means to reduce the possibility of a war--particularly now a nuclear war--which would hinder the growing power of the Soviet Union and the ultimate total victory of communism. It is only in this context that Gromyko can be understood when he writes:

The Soviet Union is struggling for preservation of stable political, economic and other relations between the socialist and capitalist states on the basis of the policy of peaceful coexistence and the renunciation of war as a means of resolving matters of dispute. Peaceful coexistence calls for a reasonable and realistic approach to relations between states. . . . [However, Communist] Party members assume the inevitable victory of socialism and communism in the entire world.143 [Emphasis mine.]

Similarly, it is only in this context that Gorokhov could state:

. . . it is impossible to achieve a democratic peace and create favorable external conditions for Socialist and Communist construction without a consistent and decisive struggle against imperialism and its policy of preparing and unleashing predatory wars.<sup>144</sup>

Thus, when Semenov writes that "in its relations with the imperialist states, the Soviet Union does not stand for war, but for peace, . . ."<sup>145</sup> this statement must not be either simply rejected or accepted. Instead, it must be placed in the whole framework of the Soviet belief system. This also brings out the intimate and logical relationship between several of the Soviet techniques which are contradictory in the Western perspective: maintain an adversary relationship with your opponent, maintain peace as the ultimate goal, and maintain complete victory as the ultimate goal.

The fourth technique is to maintain an attitude of cooperation and a business-like relationship. This, of course, is related to the first technique regarding compromise. It is interesting to see the context in which this technique is placed. Andreyev notes that this technique was laid down by Lenin when he gave the directives to the Soviet delegation prior to the 1922 Genoa

Conference. Lenin directed that the revolutionary rhetoric be dropped in the negotiations "because that would be playing into the hands of the enemy."<sup>146</sup> The concept that emerges is that this technique is to be used to obtain objectives which would be unattainable through the use of force or by indicating one's real attitude toward those with whom the Soviets were negotiating.

Gorokhov also advocates this technique, and his example of its profitable application is similarly enlightening. He states: "The anti-Hitler coalition . . . is proof of the possibility of fruitful cooperation between states with different social systems."<sup>147</sup> While not explicitly stated, the primary concept here is the temporary, tactical nature of the cooperation. What is not mentioned is that before June 1941, the Soviet Union had just as readily cooperated with Hitler. While this is contradictory to the Western mind, it is quite logical to the Soviet leadership. To the Soviets both Nazi Germany, the United States and the United Kingdom are all imperialist states. The difference is only one of degree. Here there is no question of cooperation or a business-like attitude with the good states as opposed to the bad states. Rather, the question is which will benefit the Soviet Union

and Communism the most, and this is subject to changing evaluations as witnessed by the changing Soviet attitudes toward France, Britain and Germany in the 1930s and early 1940s. The basis of Soviet cooperation and business-like attitudes has not changed over the years.

The fifth technique is that of being flexible when it is required. Flexibility, in the Soviet sense, means to be able to vary one's tactics as the changing situations demand without breaking stride and without deviating from the primary goal of advancing the Communist cause. The Soviets have always recognized that the unthinking application of previously successful formulas, i.e., dogmatism, would inevitably be disastrous. Kaplin reminds his readers that "Lenin often warned Soviet diplomats against being too keen to use conclusions and slogans which were effective only in some circumstances, but which proved erroneous and harmful in others."<sup>148</sup> Andreyev notes that Lenin taught a whole generation of Soviet diplomats the art of diplomacy, i.e., "to maintain the initiative, to attack, but also to defend themselves, and to manoeuvre whenever the interests of the Soviet state demand it."<sup>149</sup> Gromyko emphasizes that a change in a state's power (as he states it: "economic potential")

does not result in alteration of the foundations and character of the policy of that state, but it is undoubtedly reflected in the methods and forms with which it is implemented.<sup>150</sup>

Thus, flexibility is a result of a state's changing capabilities. Overall, in the Soviet treatment of this technique, the primary focus, is not on flexibility per se, but on its success in advancing the interests of the Soviet state.

This flexibility is directly related to the sixth negotiating technique, that of differentiating among the imperialists and using their contradictions to the Soviets' advantage. Semenov calls these contradictions "inescapable."<sup>151</sup> Andreyev credits Lenin, naturally, as having

taught Soviet diplomacy to act in such a way as "to create the deepest possible gap between the pacifist camp of the international bourgeoisie and the grossly bourgeois, aggressively bourgeois, reactionary bourgeois camp."<sup>152</sup>

He notes that Lenin used these contradictions during the negotiation of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk "when the country succeeded in securing the breathing space it so badly needed, and in temporarily screening itself from the other imperialist predators by placing one of them in their path."<sup>153</sup> Zorin emphasizes that

Soviet diplomatic tactics with respect to the capitalist countries are guided by the instructions [of Lenin] on the utilization of contradictions in



the enemy camp and the attraction of allies--even if only temporary ones. . . . These instructions are the theoretical foundation for the tactics of socialist diplomacy.<sup>154</sup>

And quotes Lenin who stated with regard to this technique:

The person who has not come to understand this has not understood anything at all about Marxism and the scientific, contemporary socialism in general.<sup>155</sup>

From this it can be seen that relations with various groups or noncommunist states by the Soviets are viewed from a strictly utilitarian perspective and are subject to change as the situation demands. Likewise in negotiations, it can be expected that the Soviets will attempt to emphasize differences among the states opposing it and will even attempt to split the members of an opposing state's delegation with a view toward maximizing the gains of the Soviet Union in the negotiations.

The seventh technique is to relate tactics to the historical and present situations. This concept is quite closely related to that of being flexible; indeed, the former is the objective basis for the latter. The Diplomatic Dictionary emphasizes that "first and foremost diplomatic art has to be considered in relation to those historically developing social and political conditions in which it is growing and developing."<sup>156</sup> As noted earlier in this chapter, these conditions are normally referred to

by the Soviets as the correlation of forces and include all the relevant international and domestic circumstances "and a precise assessment of all the economic, military and political resources available to a particular state."<sup>157</sup> Gromyko, in his work Diplomacy of Contemporary Imperialism, even makes a statement with which Hans J. Morgenthau could fully agree: "Diplomacy . . . can count on success only when its activity arises out of the balance of power that has taken shape in the world arena and when it is founded on a realistic base."<sup>158</sup>

This leads to a significant understanding of how the Soviets view their noncommunist opponents. The Soviets accept and exploit differences among "bourgeois" states and groups as evidenced in the previous technique. Yet, they maintain that they are the sole custodians of the correct perceptions of the contemporary and historical situation. Thus, when Gromyko states that "Soviet diplomacy is always ready to meet halfway the realistic tendencies in the foreign policy of the capitalist powers,"<sup>159</sup> what he is actually saying is that the Soviet Union will modify its position slightly in areas where the policies of the capitalist states already closely correspond to the Soviet position.

Soviet writers also cite the fact that they truthfully publicize the Soviet Union's foreign policy goals as a diplomatic technique. This can be understood in several ways. First, it can be taken at face value: that whatever the Soviets state concerning their foreign policy goals should be understood in its simplest meaning. However, this interpretation has the fallacy that the Soviet usage of such words as "aggression," "peace," "realistic," etc. is significantly different from the Western usage. Thus, such an understanding would simply lead one astray. Second, it can mean that the objectives are to be understood on their face value "in their Soviet context." This interpretation has much greater validity. From this perspective, at least the meaning is clear as to the Soviet perception of what is being stated. Yet this must be combined with an important function of Soviet diplomacy. As the Diplomatic Dictionary states, Soviet diplomacy:

. . . opens the eyes of all people to the actual state of events. It does this from the rostrum of diplomatic conferences, in official diplomatic acts and documents, and in the press. The unmasking of the aggressive plans and actions of imperialists is one of the important methods of socialist diplomacy, assisting it to mobilize democratic opinion and popular masses throughout the entire world against the aggressive policy of imperialist governments.<sup>160</sup>

Here it is clearly brought out that the primary purpose of this publicity is the persuasion of various political groups to aid in the achievement of both the Soviet Union's immediate and ultimate policy goals. Therefore, Soviet statements must be evaluated for their propaganda content as well as to see how accurately they reflect Soviet goals.

It should also be noted in this context that this technique concerned only Soviet long-range goals. It did not address the question of using deception for tactical objectives. The use of deception in diplomacy by the Soviet Union is often commented on in Western writings but very seldom in Soviet writings

The ninth technique, that of being firm and decisive, is normally emphasized in juxtaposition to the admonition to be flexible. Maisky writes that Chicherin skillfully combined firmness and flexibility in his activities at the Genoa Conference in 1922.<sup>161</sup> Semenov gives a clearer meaning of the Soviet concept of firmness, in that he equates firmness with a "resolute defense of the Socialist state's vital interests" and flexibility with "diplomatic manoeuvring, including compromise."<sup>162</sup> The concept of firmness is thus strongly linked to the belief that principles should not be compromised in any way, and

circumscribes the Soviet capability and willingness to compromise in negotiations, once the basic Soviet position has been decided upon.

The last Soviet technique is to maintain complete victory as the ultimate goal. As in the case of a number of the techniques previously noted, this is not so much a technique in itself, as an attitude or parameter used to make a correct choice from among the various negotiating tactics available. Andreyev quotes Lenin as demanding that Soviet policy "remain true . . . to its revolutionary purpose, to its task of paving the way for the revolution through any compromises it may have to make."<sup>163</sup> This technique is simply and clearly stated by Gromyko: "Party members assume the inevitable victory of socialism and communism in the entire world."<sup>164</sup> This technique is almost identical with the third technique: maintain peace as the ultimate goal. In Soviet theory, peace is equated with the victory of communism over capitalism. The difference is that peace has an immediate as well as a futuristic connotation, whereas the victory of communism is primarily a futuristic concept. The immediate peace is necessary to prevent harm to the Soviet Union and to prevent the ultimate victory of communism from being

delayed. This peace is characterized by the absence of threats to the security of the Soviet Union. Logically, from the Soviet point of view, the stronger the Soviet Union is, the stronger is the cause of peace, since it is only imperialism which has a "policy of preparing and unleashing predatory wars."<sup>165</sup>

Thus, the Soviet technique of maintaining the victory of communism as an ultimate goal contains two distinct parts: (1) preparation for the future final and complete victory, and (2) the immediate prevention of any actions by others which would thwart this victory in any way.

What conclusions can be drawn from this review of Soviet negotiating techniques as seen by Soviet writers? First, they must be viewed as an organic whole. To take any one in isolation distorts its meaning. For example, the technique of compromise can not simply be understood as a willingness to meet others halfway on any matter, but rather as a technique which may be used to aggravate differences among the opposition or to prevent a larger loss of position, but which will be of ultimate unilateral advantage to the Soviet Union. Second, they are founded on a single, uniform perception of the political

environment whose central theme is the conflict between an ever stronger communist sphere of influence and an ever weakening capitalist sphere. Third, within this narrow perception of political reality, there is a great latitude in which particular techniques should be used at a particular time or in a particular situation. The sole criterion for the choice of a technique would appear to be its efficacy in achieving Soviet aims.

### Conclusions

There appears to be a significant amount of agreement between the Western and Soviet perceptions of Soviet negotiating techniques. For example, both emphasize an adversary attitude on the part of the Soviet negotiators. Both also emphasize the use of the negotiating process to divide and weaken the opponent. However, some of the relationships are not quite as clearly seen. Certainly one technique on the Soviet list, truthfully publicizing the Soviet Union's foreign policy goals, is related to two techniques, perceived by the West: (1) use rudeness and vilification, and (2) use the negotiating process for propaganda purposes. To call the West "aggressive" or certain political groups "fascist" and to disparage Western aims during negotiations may appear as vilification to the

Western negotiator, but may equally appear as truth in the Soviet perception or may be used for its propaganda value. Similarly, the Soviets may see their own technique as "being firm" while the West looks at this as being stubborn, refusing to make concessions or even demanding agreement in principle before detailed negotiations take place.

There are also important differences in the two lists of techniques. It is obvious that the Western list is much more detailed. It describes a number of specific techniques, such as the "waiving gambit," which are ignored by the Soviet list. The Soviets emphasize techniques of a much more general nature. Similarly, where the West cites specific examples of Soviet use of these techniques, the Soviet authors rarely do this. At most the Soviets indicate a particular negotiation during which the technique was used. The Western list emphasizes a Soviet antagonism toward the West, while the Soviet description of negotiating techniques emphasizes Western antagonism toward the Soviet Union.<sup>166</sup>

This review of Soviet negotiating techniques can now be used as a basis for analyzing the negotiations which led to the partial test ban agreement of 1963 and the SALT agreements of 1972.



## NOTES

1. A note of caution must be added, however, in that in many of the authors' works their positions on these aspects of Soviet negotiating techniques were not specifically stated. Therefore, it was necessary to infer their positions in some cases. This was generally easiest to do with regard to the question of how similar Soviet negotiating tactics were to Western tactics. When reviewing the antecedents of Soviet diplomatic tactics and its attitudinal sources, this was much more difficult. Most authors were not concerned with these two last aspects, and did not address the questions at all. Therefore, there is a much smaller base involved here upon which to build trustworthy conclusions. Yet, I do believe the base is sufficient for this study.

2. John R. Deane, "Negotiating on Military Assistance, 1943-45," in Negotiating with the Russians, ed. Raymond Dennett and Joseph E. Johnson (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1951), pp. 3-30.

3. John N. Hazard, "Negotiating Under Lend-Lease, 1942-45," in Negotiating with the Russians, pp. 31-48.

4. Frederick Osborn, "Negotiating on Atomic Energy," in Negotiating with the Russians, p. 235.

5. Osborn, p. 235.

6. Philip E. Mosely, The Kremlin and World Politics: Studies in Soviet Policy and Action (New York: Vintage Books, 1960), p. 4.

7. Dean Acheson, Sketches from Life of Men I Have Known (New York: Harper & Bros., 1959), pp. 91-92.

8. Lester B. Pearson, Diplomacy in the Nuclear Age (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), p. 58.

9. Stephen D. Kertesz and M. A. Fitzsimmons, eds., Diplomacy in a Changing World (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1959), p. 144.

10. Vernon V. Aspaturian, "Dialectics and Duplicity in Soviet Diplomacy," Journal of International Affairs 17, no. 1 (1963):46.

11. U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Negotiation and Statecraft, Hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on Government Operations, 93d Cong., 1st sess., July 12, 1973, p. 83.

12. Charles W. Thayer, Diplomat (New York: Harper & Bros., 1959), p. 49.

13. Gerald L. Steibel, How Can We Negotiate with the Communists? Strategy Papers, no. 12 (New York: National Strategy Information Center, 1972), p. 22.

14. U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, International Negotiation: Some Operational Principles of Soviet Foreign Policy, by Richard Pipes, Memorandum prepared at the Request of the Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations, 92d Cong., 2d sess., 1972, p. 1.

15. Alexander Dallin, The Soviet Union at the United Nations: An Inquiry into Soviet Motives and Objectives (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1962), p. 82.

16. Arthur H. Dean, Test Ban and Disarmament: The Path of Negotiation (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), p. 19.

17. Ibid.

18. Bernhard G. Bechhoefer, Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1961), p. 5.

19. Fred Charles Iklé, How Nations Negotiate (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1964).

20. Walter C. Clemens, Jr., "Nicholas II to SALT II: Continuity and Change in East-West Diplomacy," International Affairs [London] 49 (July 1973):386.

21. Sir Harold Nicolson, Diplomacy, 3d ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 29-30.
22. Ibid., p. vii.
23. Ibid., p. 147.
24. Sir William Hayter, The Diplomacy of the Great Powers (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1960), pp. 21-22.
25. Ibid., p. 23.
26. Gordon A. Craig "Techniques of Negotiation," in Russian Foreign Policy: Essays in Historical Perspective, ed. Ivo J. Lederer (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), p. 364.
27. Ibid., p. 367.
28. Louis J. Samelson, Soviet and Chinese Negotiating Behavior: The Western View, Sage Professional Paper in International Studies, no. 48 (Beverly Hills, CA.: Sage Publications, 1976), p. 53.
29. Ibid.
30. Christer Jönsson, The Soviet Union and the Test Ban: A Study in Soviet Negotiating Behavior (Lund, Sweden: Studentlitteratur, 1975). It should be noted that while Jönsson criticizes Western characterizations of Soviet negotiating behavior, he does admit that at times some of these characterizations are more or less correct. His main point, however, is that these characterizations, even if they do have some validity at times, cannot be called prevalent characteristics, and are only used in circumscribed situations.
31. Lloyd Jensen, "Approach-Avoidance Bargaining in the Test-Ban Negotiations," International Studies Quarterly 12 (June 1968):152-60.
32. Lloyd Jensen, "Soviet-American Bargaining Behavior in Postwar Disarmament Negotiations," Journal of Conflict Resolution 6 (September 1963).

33. Those who fall into the third category naturally have no need to explain the origin of the different negotiating styles since they deny that different negotiating styles exist.

34. Thayer, Diplomat, p. 49.

35. Craig, "Techniques of Negotiation," p. 354.

36. Steibel, "Communists," p. 9.

37. Clemens, "Nicholas II to SALT II," p. 385.

38. Ibid., p. 399.

39. Acheson, Sketches, p. 103.

40. Kertesz, Diplomacy, p. 145.

41. Nathan A. Leites, The Operational Code of the Politburo, Rand Corp., Monograph R-206 (Santa Monica, CA.: RAND Corp., 1950), p. 28.

42. U.S., Congress, Senate, Some Operational Principles, p. 13.

43. Aspaturian, "Dialectics and Duplicity," p. 48.

44. Ibid., p. 49.

45. W. Averell Harriman, "Observations on Negotiating," Journal of International Affairs 29 (Spring 1975): 4.

46. Dean, Test Ban and Disarmament, p. 34.

47. Acheson, Sketches, p. 103.

48. George F. Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950 (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1967), p. 560.

49. Gordon A. Craig, On the Diplomatic Revolution of Our Times, Haynes Foundation Lectures (Riverside, CA.: University of California, Riverside, 1961), p. 23.

50. Nicolson, Diplomacy, p. 25.

51. Adam B. Ulam, "Communist Doctrine and Soviet Diplomacy," Survey, no. 76 (Summer 1970), p. 11.

52. Clemens, "Nicholas II to SALT II," p. 398.

53. Ibid., p. 399.

54. This review will be limited to that Soviet literature which has been translated into English. Admittedly, this excludes some important works, but a sufficient amount of the literature has been published in English, that one can make an accurate evaluation of the Soviet position.

55. N. I. Kapchenko, "The Leninist Theory and Practice of Socialist Foreign Policy," International Affairs [Moscow], no. 9 (September 1968), p. 58.

56. Ibid.

57. V. Israelyan, "The Leninist Science of International Relations and Foreign Policy Reality," International Affairs [Moscow], no. 6 (June 1967), p. 47.

58. A. Kaplin, "Lenin on the Principles of Socialist Diplomacy," International Affairs [Moscow], no. 6 (June 1969), p. 53.

59. A. A. Gromyko et al., eds., Diplomaticheskii Slovar' [Diplomatic Dictionary], 2d ed. (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1960), translated in The Soviet Approach to Negotiations: Selected Writings, U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, 91st Cong., 1st sess., 1969, p. 78.

60. Ibid.

61. E. V. Tarle, History of Diplomacy as quoted in Thayer, Diplomat, pp. 60-62.

62. V. Issraeljan and L. Kutakov, Diplomacy of Aggression: Berlin-Rome-Tokyo Axis, Its Rise and Fall (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1970), pp. 434-39.

63. Anatoly A. Gromyko, ed., Diplomacy of Contemporary Imperialism, trans. Joint Publications Research Service, no. 50134 (23 March 1970), (Moscow: International Relations Publishing House, 1969), p. 298.

64. Sh. P. Sanakoev, "Socialist Foreign Policy: Coordination and Effectiveness," International Affairs [Moscow], no. 6 (June 1971), p. 10. It is interesting to note in this quotation the idea that the Soviets are "training" Western diplomacy in the proper way to do things. The similarity with the popular Western idea that the West must instruct the Soviets in the proper concepts of nuclear war is striking.

65. Quoted in Valerian Zorin, Osnovy Diplomaticheskoi Sluzhby [The Bases of Diplomatic Service] (Moscow: Institute of International Relations, 1964), trans. in U.S., Congress, Senate, Soviet Approach to Negotiations, p. 86.

66. A. Gorokhov, "Leninist Diplomacy: Principles and Traditions," in Principles of Lenin's Foreign Policy (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1970), pp. 84-85.

67. C. Andreyev, "Lenin and Peaceful Soviet Foreign Policy," International Affairs [Moscow], no. 5 (May 1970), p. 8.

68. Anatoly A. Gromyko, Diplomaticheskii Slovar', p. 80.

69. Andreyev, "Peaceful Soviet Foreign Policy," p. 12.

70. Ibid.

71. Ibid.

72. V. Semenov, "The Leninist Principle of Soviet Diplomacy," International Affairs [Moscow], no. 4 (April 1969), p. 6.

73. Zorin, Osnovy Diplomaticheskoi Sluzhby, p. 86.

74. I. D. Ovsyany et al., A Study of Soviet Foreign Policy (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975), p. 16.

75. Gromyko, Diplomacy of Contemporary Imperialism, p. 15.

76. Gorokhov, "Leninist Diplomacy," p. 76.

77. Gromyko, Diplomacy of Contemporary Imperialism, p. 7.

78. Gorokhov, "Leninist Diplomacy," p. 78.

79. Gromyko, Diplomacy of Contemporary Imperialism, p. 297.

80. For instance, Steibel, Communists, published in 1972.

81. The following persons were used in this survey: Fred C. Iklé, Gerald L. Steibel, Philip E. Mosely, Bernhard G. Bechhoefer, K. J. Holsti, Arthur H. Dean, Richard Pipes, Dean Acheson, Joseph L. Noguee, Gordon A. Craig, John N. Hazard, Sir William Hayter, Frederick Osborn, Lester B. Pearson, Charles W. Thayer, John R. Deane, George F. Kennan, and Stephen D. Kertesz. The works used in this survey are to be found listed under each author's name in the bibliography.

82. Pearson, Diplomacy, p. 58.

83. Iklé, How Nations Negotiate, p. 116.

84. Craig, "Techniques of Negotiations," p. 370.

85. Deane, "Negotiating on Military Assistance," p. 27.

86. Joseph L. Noguee, "The Gamesmanship of International Negotiations," in U.S., Congress, Senate, Soviet Approach to Negotiations, p. 34.

87. Dean, Test Ban and Disarmament, p. 19.

88. Hayter, The Diplomacy of the Great Powers, p. 28.

89. John W. Spanier and Joseph L. Noguee, The Politics of Disarmament: A Study in Soviet-American Gamesmanship (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1962), p. 43.
90. Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950, p. 560.
91. Mosely, The Kremlin and World Politics, p. 34.
92. Acheson, Sketches, p. 103.
93. Bechhoeffer, Postwar Negotiations, p. 266.
94. Osborn, "Negotiating on Atomic Energy," p. 234.
95. Noguee, "The Gamesmanship of International Negotiation," p. 35.
96. Kertesz, Diplomacy, p. 164.
97. Acheson, Sketches, p. 103.
98. Thayer, Diplomat, pp. 61-62.
99. Pipes, International Negotiation, p. 1.
100. Spanier and Noguee, The Politics of Disarmament, p. 36.
101. Mosely, The Kremlin and World Politics, p. 33.
102. Dean, Test Ban and Disarmament, p. 43.
103. Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950, p. 562.
104. Craig, On the Diplomatic Revolution, p. 35.
105. As quoted in Craig, On the Diplomatic Revolution.
106. Mosely, The Kremlin and World Politics, p. 5.
107. Ibid., p. 9.
108. Ibid., p. 29.



109. Dean, Test Ban and Disarmament, p. 34.
110. Acheson, Sketches, p. 93.
111. Observer [London], 2 October 1960.
112. Osborn, "Negotiating on Atomic Energy,"  
p. 233.
113. Iklé, How Nations Negotiate, p. 124.
114. Ibid., p. 161.
115. Dean, Test Ban and Disarmament, p. 46.
116. Craig, "Techniques of Negotiation," p. 369.
117. Pipes, International Negotiation, p. 14.
118. Hayter, The Diplomacy of the Great Powers,  
p. 30.
119. Iklé, How Nations Negotiate, p. 205.
120. Bechhoefer, Postwar Negotiations, p. 144.
121. Iklé, How Nations Negotiate, p. 97.
122. Craig, "Techniques of Negotiation," p. 371.
123. Bechhoefer, Postwar Negotiations, p. 287.
124. Ibid., p. 126.
125. Mosely, The Kremlin and World Politics, p. 17.
126. Pipes, International Negotiation, p. 14.
127. Iklé, How Nations Negotiate, p. 149.
128. Ibid., p. 211.
129. Dean, Test Ban and Disarmament, pp. 32-33.

130. Nine specific Soviet authors and one Soviet text were used in compiling this chart: G. Andreyev, A. Gorokhov, Anatoli A. Gromyko, V. Semenov, A. Kaplin, Ivan M. Maisky, V. Razmerov (together with D. Tomashevsky), and Valerian A. Zorin (together with V. L. Israelian and Sh. P. Sanakoev), and the text Diplomaticheskii Slovar', 2d ed., a basic Soviet work on diplomacy authored by a number of Soviet writers. Each of the authors' works used in this review is to be found in the bibliography.

131. Kaplin, "Principles of Socialist Diplomacy," p. 54.

132. Semenov, "Leninist Principle of Soviet Diplomacy," p. 6.

133. Andreyev, "Peaceful Soviet Foreign Policy," pp. 8-9.

134. This relates the Soviet concept of compromise with the seventh technique: that of relating tactics to the historical and present situations.

135. Gromyko, Diplomacy of Contemporary Imperialism, p. 297.

136. Ibid., p. 18.

137. Ibid., p. 90.

138. Ibid., p. 15.

139. Andreyev, "Peaceful Soviet Foreign Policy," p. 7.

140. Semenov, "Leninist Principle of Soviet Diplomacy," p. 7.

141. Ibid.

142. Gorokhov, "Leninist Diplomacy," p. 80.

143. Gromyko, Diplomacy of Contemporary Imperialism, p. 16.

144. Gorokhov, "Leninist Diplomacy," p. 78.
145. Semenov, "Leninist Principle of Soviet Diplomacy," p. 7.
146. Andreyev, "Peaceful Soviet Foreign Policy," p. 8.
147. Gorokhov, "Leninist Diplomacy," p. 93.
148. Kaplin, "Principles of Socialist Diplomacy," p. 54.
149. Andreyev, "Peaceful Soviet Foreign Policy," p. 13.
150. Gromyko, Diplomacy of Contemporary Imperialism p. 6.
151. Semenov, "Leninist Principle of Soviet Diplomacy," p. 6.
152. Andreyev, "Peaceful Soviet Diplomacy," p. 12.
153. Ibid.
154. Zorin, in Soviet Approach to Negotiations, p. 86.
155. Ibid.
156. Gromyko, Diplomaticheskii Slovar', p. 78.
157. Semenov, "Leninist Principle of Soviet Diplomacy," p. 5.
158. Gromyko, Diplomacy of Contemporary Imperialism, p. 17.
159. Ibid., p. 297.
160. Gromyko, Diplomaticheskii Slovar', pp. 80-81.
161. Ivan M. Maisky, "Diplomats of the Lenin School: Georgi Chicherin," New Times, no. 44 (1967), p. 11.

162. Semenov, "Leninist Principle of Soviet Diplomacy," p. 6.

163. Andreyev, "Peaceful Soviet Foreign Policy," pp. 8-9.

164. Gromyko, Diplomacy of Contemporary Imperialism, p. 16.

165. Gorokhov, "Leninist Diplomacy," p. 78.

166. An interesting study, which has only been lightly touched upon by a few scholars, would be a comparison of the Western perception of Soviet negotiating techniques with the Soviet perception of Western techniques. A number of Western scholars, such as Thayer, maintain that Soviet negotiating techniques are modeled on the Soviet perception of Western negotiating techniques.

### CHAPTER III

#### THE NEGOTIATIONS CONCERNING A NUCLEAR

#### TEST BAN TREATY

##### Background and Introduction to the Negotiations

The Test Ban Treaty, signed on 5 August 1963, was the first major arms control agreement signed by the Soviet Union since the onset of the cold war.<sup>1</sup> The history of the negotiations which preceded this treaty spans more than six years and includes a variety of settings in which the negotiations were conducted. While the major portion of the test ban negotiations took place in formal negotiating sessions devoted solely to the topic of a test ban, a significant part of the negotiations were conducted via letters between heads of state, sessions of the United Nations and in informal negotiations.

There are differing opinions as to what date should be considered the start of the test ban negotiations. The formal test ban negotiations began on 31 October 1958. However, the Soviet Union first officially proposed the

concept of a test ban more than three and a half years prior to this, when, on 14 February 1955, Khrushchev formally proposed a test ban on hydrogen weapons. However, even this had been preceded by calls for a cessation of nuclear testing through lesser Soviet officials<sup>2</sup> and by calls from some nonnuclear states and some political groups to stop all nuclear weapons tests.<sup>3</sup> On 10 May 1955, at a meeting of the United Nations Disarmament Subcommittee, the Soviet union included a test ban as a part of a more comprehensive proposal for nuclear disarmament. However, it was only in November 1955, that the Soviet Union made a test ban proposal independent of comprehensive nuclear disarmament. On 1 November, the United States, United Kingdom and six other countries introduced a draft resolution in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly which called for the establishment of a scientific committee to study the effects of atomic radiation. The next day the Soviet Union proposed an amendment to the resolution which called for the cessation of experiments with all types of nuclear weapons.<sup>4</sup> While the Soviet amendment was rejected, the Soviet Union continued to call for a cessation of nuclear tests through 1956. In September and October 1956, Soviet Premier Bulganin wrote two letters to

President Eisenhower in which a cessation of nuclear tests was proposed. Bulganin noted that no international control was necessary since the current state of technology made it possible to detect any nuclear explosion that might be set off.<sup>5</sup> Eisenhower rejected Bulganin's proposal for an uncontrolled test ban. The Soviet Union then continued the idea of a test ban through diplomatic activity in the United Nations. This constituted the initial sparring over the question of a test ban. It was only in 1957 that the Soviet Union began a concerted effort to engage a reluctant West in negotiations dealing solely with a test ban. This effort started in the sessions of the subcommittee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, which met from 18 March to 6 September 1957 in London. Thereafter, the question of a test ban was the subject of continued negotiations between the Soviet Union and the West, and the negotiations were of primary importance to the Soviet Union. Whether the Soviet aim was the actual achievement of a test ban or some other aim was of primary concern will become apparent as the history of the negotiations unfold. Therefore, this examination of Soviet negotiating techniques will begin with the London Conference of 1957 and will conclude with the initialling of the agreed treaty on 25 July 1963, over six years later.

For ease of study, the course of the negotiations can be divided in a number of ways. For the purpose of examining Soviet negotiating techniques, the most profitable method is to divide the negotiations into chronological segments which reflect the amount of Soviet interest in reaching an agreement. Using this criterion, we have divided the negotiations into five periods:

I. March 1957-August 1958: The Soviets actively seek to initiate formal negotiations

II. August 1958-May 1960:<sup>6</sup> The Soviets actively seek a test ban agreement

III. May 1960-December 1963: The Soviets have little or no interest in a test ban agreement

IV. December 1962-June 1963: The Soviets regain interest in a test ban agreement

V. July 1963: The final negotiations

Each of these periods of the negotiation will be reviewed first by presenting an overview of the period. The overview will include a discussion of the probable goals toward which the Soviets' diplomatic activity was directed at the time and the arenas in which Soviet activity took place. The course of the negotiations will then be reviewed to include the negotiating techniques used by



the Soviets and the major changes which came about in the position of each side. Finally, the achievements or lack of achievement by the Soviets will be discussed. After all the periods are reviewed, the chapter will conclude with a summarization of the negotiating techniques used by the Soviets during the test ban negotiations.

#### Phase I: March 1957-August 1958

##### Overview

During this phase, the primary Soviet objective was to have the West agree to negotiate a test ban treaty independent of any other disarmament measures. Soviet efforts were directed at detaching the question of a test ban from the larger concepts of general disarmament and nuclear disarmament. At the same time, the Soviets attempted to elevate the test ban question to the position of primary importance so that the achievement of a test ban would not be sidetracked by Western emphasis on other aspects of disarmament.

During this phase, the negotiations over a test ban took place in a variety of arenas. The initial concerted effort by the Soviet Union took place at the London Conference of the Subcommittee of the United Nations

Disarmament Commission. The London Conference lasted from 18 March through 6 September 1957. The Soviet negotiating effort then was transferred to the twelfth session of the UN General Assembly. Beginning in December 1957, the negotiations were carried on primarily through an exchange of letters between President Eisenhower and Bulganin, first, and later, Khrushchev, and through an exchange of notes between the two governments. During this exchange, an agreement was reached to hold a conference of experts to discuss the technical possibilities of a control system to monitor a test ban. This conference was held in July and August 1958. The negotiations resulted in the United States proposing a conference on the question of a suspension of nuclear tests. The first phase concludes thereby with the first Soviet objective achieved.

#### The London Conference

The course of the discussions began on 18 March 1957, at the London Conference of the subcommittee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission. Five states were represented in the subcommittee: the United States, represented by Harold Stassen; the United Kingdom, represented by Allen Noble; France, represented by Jules Moch; Canada, represented by David Johnson; and the Soviet Union,

represented by Valerian Zorin.

In his opening speech, Zorin quickly indicated that the primary interest of the Soviet Union was in negotiations centering on the question of a nuclear test ban.

His first proposal was to sever

from the general problem of prohibiting atomic and hydrogen weapons the question of ending the testing of such weapons, and settle it here and now, keeping agreement on the ending of tests independent of agreement on other disarmament matters.<sup>7</sup>

Thus, Zorin indicated what the primary emphasis of the Soviet Union would be during the conference. In addition, at this meeting Zorin submitted a Soviet proposal on the reduction of armaments and armed forces and the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons, which included in its first stage a cessation of nuclear weapons tests although it was not explicitly stated.<sup>8</sup> In contrast to this, the Western representatives paid little or no attention to the question of nuclear tests.

The first five sessions of the London Conference were devoted to a general discussion of disarmament problems and proposals and procedural questions. In the general discussion, Zorin emphasized the importance of the question of nuclear tests: "This question is agitating millions of people." He also emphasized the simplicity of

its solution. He supported the latter point by noting that there was no need for any complicated agreements on control since nuclear tests "are nowadays easily recorded by science and cannot possibly be concealed."<sup>9</sup>

Stassen's reply to Zorin showed how far apart the two sides were. First, Stassen referred to a "cessation or limitation" of nuclear testing, indicating a desire for a less than absolute ending of nuclear tests. Second, he emphasized that there must be effective inspection included in such an agreement. Finally, a cessation or limitation of testing must be part of a larger agreement, which would include: (1) the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear fissionable materials together with an appropriate inspection to assure compliance; (2) the reduction of nuclear or fissionable materials now devoted to weapons.<sup>10</sup> The West simply would not ostensibly isolate the question of nuclear testing as an item to be negotiated as the Soviets public position indicated. The West simply would not take the question of nuclear testing as an isolated problem.

Zorin attempted to keep the topic at the center of the stage. He attempted this through the use of procedural maneuvers. First, he asserted that the conference should invite representatives of India, Japan, Norway, and

Yugoslavia to speak before the conference since they were the authors of proposals related to topics on which the conference would be negotiating.<sup>11</sup> All these nations' proposals dealt with the cessation of nuclear tests. However, Zorin was primarily interested in having India represented at the conference since India's position on a test ban was almost identical with the Soviet public arena position. The Western representatives rejected this Soviet proposal on the basis that the actual proposals were before the conference, and it was against the traditional method of operation to have nonmembers participate in the deliberations of the subcommittee. Yet, Zorin pursued this matter over the course of forty meetings.

The second procedural maneuver Zorin attempted was to have the discussion of a test ban placed first on the agenda, calling it "the first and most urgent question."<sup>12</sup> The West urged that the first topic be the reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons. Finally, during the third session in which the agenda was debated, the West gave in and accepted the Soviet demand that the cessation of nuclear tests be the first item on the agenda.<sup>13</sup> Thus, at the beginning of the conference, the Soviet Union succeeded in changing Western priorities vis-à-vis a test ban.

While the agenda was being debated, the Soviet Foreign Ministry announced in a press conference that it was prepared to conclude an agreement on a temporary suspension of nuclear tests for an agreed period of time.<sup>14</sup> The announcement was made conveniently at the end of the current Soviet series of tests and just prior to the beginning of United States and British series of nuclear tests. Thus, the probability of the West accepting the proposal was nil. However, it did keep the issue before the public, and thus kept pressure on the West to treat the question of a test ban more on Soviet terms.

In the opening discussion of a test ban at the London Conference, Zorin made the following arguments for the necessity of a test ban:

1. Nuclear tests heighten international tension since they are clear evidence of the nuclear arms race
2. Nuclear tests contaminate humans by their release of radiation
3. A cessation of tests would
  - a) comply with world public opinion
  - b) retard the development of new nuclear weapons
  - c) retard nuclear proliferations<sup>15</sup>

Zorin's arguments attempted to put the West in the position of being against the desires of the world, and being for the "mutation of the human race." However, Zorin also indicated the real concerns of the Soviet Union. A

major concern was the possibility of West Germany acquiring nuclear weapons. This was an event which the Soviets were greatly concerned about. In April, Chancellor Adenauer stated that West Germany should be allowed to have tactical nuclear weapons for its own defense.<sup>16</sup> A second concern was American nuclear weapons development. For example, on a number of occasions during the conference, Zorin complained about the "inhuman" neutron bomb being developed by the United States.

However, Zorin's explanation of the Soviet Union's conception of the parameters of a test ban clearly showed that there was no common basis for an agreement. Zorin emphasized that a test ban was too imperative to wait for a decision to halt the manufacture of nuclear weapons. Second, he rejected the Western assertion that a test ban would require a control system to ensure compliance by all parties.<sup>17</sup> The only concession Zorin made to the Western position was that if the West could not accept an immediate permanent cessation of tests, the Soviet Union would agree to a limited test suspension as proposed on 26 March by the Soviet Foreign Ministry.<sup>18</sup> In reality, this was no concession at all, for it was known to be unacceptable to the West.

The Western response to the Soviet proposal was typified by the United Kingdom memorandum submitted to the conference on 6 May. The memorandum dealt with nuclear tests in three stages:

1. Nuclear tests would be registered and subject to limited international supervision along the lines of the Canadian-Norwegian-Japanese resolution proposed in the General Assembly's First Committee on 18 January 1957.

2. A committee of experts would be set up to consider methods to limit and supervise nuclear tests. The limitations would be both quantitative and qualitative in nature.

3. There would be an eventual cessation of all nuclear tests as part of a more comprehensive agreement, after a cessation of the production of fissile material for weapons purposes.<sup>19</sup>

Zorin completely rejected the concept of registering nuclear weapons tests, condemning the proposal as "virtually . . . sanctioning and legalizing the atomic armaments race" and asserting that the proposal would benefit only those who are interested in the continuation of the atomic armaments race.<sup>20</sup> The remaining two points were equally disparaged.



Zorin defended the Soviet stand that each state is fully capable of detecting all nuclear explosions and that a special control system was not necessary. His rebuttal to the Western position was characteristic of the manner in which the Soviet Union handled this question through the entire history of the test ban negotiations. Therefore, it deserves particular attention. The question of test detection in this phase of the negotiations centered around the ability to detect the resulting radioactivity. Zorin maintained that the released radioactivity always makes nuclear tests detectable. However, when he was pressed for proof, all he would say was:

On the basis of the information in the possession of Soviet scientists, I can state that none of the thermonuclear explosions which have so far taken place have escaped detection, not only in the territory in which they took place, but also in the territories of other states; the same applies to any explosions which may occur in the future.<sup>21</sup>

However, he would produce no technical data to support his position. Throughout the negotiations, the Soviets simply would not release any technical data they had to the West, even to prove their point.

On 10 May, the Soviet Union again employed an act outside the negotiations to enhance their negotiating position. The Supreme Soviet adopted a resolution

approving the Soviet government's position on ending nuclear tests. In addition, it called upon the United States Congress and the British Parliament to agree to an immediate cessation of nuclear tests and to consider the establishment of an interparliamentary committee with representatives of all three legislatures "for the purpose of exchanging views on possible ways of ending tests of and prohibiting atomic and hydrogen weapons."<sup>22</sup> This, of course, brought the whole discussion of nuclear tests to the public again, which was the primary purpose of the action. Had the suggestion for an interparliamentary committee been accepted, the question of a test ban would have been effectively separated from all other disarmament questions, and the Soviets would have had their desired negotiations and world attention focused on the proceedings. However, the West refused to be drawn into a situation where they would have conceded to all the important Soviet demands even before the discussions had begun.

By mid-May, Stassen noted the delegates to the London Conference were all agreed "that we should concentrate our attention upon a partial agreement for first steps [toward disarmament]."<sup>23</sup> The only question was what partial measures would be acceptable to all members of the

subcommittee. The Soviet Union continued to ostensibly maintain that it should be the cessation of nuclear tests. To exert more pressure on the West, the Soviet Union was prepared to modify its position regarding the question of control.

On 14 June, Zorin introduced a new Soviet proposal into the conference. It modified the Soviet position on testing enough to form a common basis for the negotiation of a test ban by both the Soviet Union and the West.<sup>24</sup> The major points of the proposal were that the Soviet Union: (1) now explicitly states a time limit for the suspension of tests of two to three years; (2) accepted the institution of control over the test suspension, and "the establishment of an international commission to supervise the fulfillment by States of their obligation to cease tests"; and (3) proposed the establishment of control posts on a reciprocal basis in the United States, United Kingdom, USSR, and in the Pacific Ocean area to supervise the agreement.<sup>25</sup>

Most important to the West was that the Soviet Union now appeared to have accepted the Western demand that any test suspension must be adequately controlled. However, when the Western delegates attempted to have Zorin

clarify the Soviet concept of control, Zorin refused, indicating that agreement on a test suspension must come before the question of control could be discussed.<sup>26</sup>

On 2 July, a little more than two weeks after the Soviets ostensibly accepted the concept of a controlled test suspension, the West made its own concession. It was now willing to accept a temporary cessation of tests before a comprehensive disarmament agreement was entered into. This acceptance was conditional upon a number of factors:

1. A precise agreement on its duration and timing
2. A precise agreement on the installation and location of the necessary controls, including inspection posts
3. A precise agreement on the cessation's relationship to other provisions of a first stage agreement, including:
  - a) the first steps to halt the growth of armaments
  - b) initial reductions in armed forces and armaments
  - c) the cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapons purpose<sup>27</sup>

Finally, the four Western states proposed "that a group of experts . . . meet . . . to proceed with the design of the inspection system. . . ." <sup>28</sup> In expanding on the proposal, Stassen indicated that the test suspension should be of ten months' duration, but he left open the

possibility that the suspension could be extended to two to three years under certain conditions.<sup>29</sup> However, the most important Western concession was the willingness to have the test suspension begin with the ratification of the agreement prior to the control posts becoming operational.<sup>30</sup> The West was slowly acknowledging the primacy of a test suspension, but the two sides were still far apart.

Zorin was bitter in his reply to the proposal of 2 July. He called it "worthless" and five times in his speech he labeled it "unrealistic."<sup>31</sup> Moch labeled Zorin's speech as chiefly propaganda, and labeled certain of Zorin's remarks as "little short of insults."<sup>32</sup> Despite the hostile exchanges that took place regarding the West's proposal of 2 July, Zorin did indicate that a conference of experts would be needed to discuss the question of control if the West agreed to "the immediate cessation of tests for a period of two to three years . . . , independent of any other measure."<sup>33</sup> Thus, the Soviets left the door open for a conference of experts, but they would not let it sidetrack them from their primary goal of achieving an agreement on the cessation of tests.

After the Western proposal was presented, the hostility shown by the Soviets abated somewhat, but reappeared in August and intensified as the meetings continued.<sup>34</sup> Even the further Western concessions of 21 August did not mollify Zorin's ill humor. On that day, Stassen presented a modification to the Western proposal of 2 July which extended the initial suspension to twelve months with a possible twelve months' extension conditional only on satisfactory progress in the preparation of an inspection system to oversee the cut-off of nuclear materials production.<sup>35</sup> Six days later on 27 August, the day after the first reported successful launching of a Soviet ICBM,<sup>36</sup> Zorin delivered a 90-minute, vitriolic statement of the Soviet government at the conference, which signaled the collapse of the negotiations and the demise of both the Disarmament Commission and its subcommittee. Moch characterized it as reminiscent of the "worst days of the cold war and propaganda. . . ."<sup>37</sup> Despite this setback, the West made a formal proposal on 29 August on partial measures of disarmament. It included, inter alia a provision for making almost automatic the extension of the test suspension from one to two years in duration in that it implied that even if the inspection system for

nuclear materials production cut off was not progressing satisfactorily, testing should not be resumed until two years after the treaty entered into force.<sup>38</sup> Zorin's reaction to the proposal was totally negative, claiming the Western proposal was obstructionists and retrogressive.<sup>39</sup>

On 5 September, Zorin agreed when the West suggested that the subcommittee adjourn because of the impending start of the twelfth session of the UN General Assembly, but he refused to set a date for reconvening the subcommittee. Therefore, the next day, the subcommittee adjourned sine die, never to meet again. The forum for the test ban negotiations now became the General Assembly.

#### The Twelfth UN General Assembly

The Twelfth General Assembly convened less than two weeks after the London Conference had ended. The primary topic of discussion was disarmament, and worldwide attention was given to the proposals being discussed.<sup>40</sup> A total of eleven different resolutions dealing with the problem of disarmament were submitted to the General Assembly. Both the West and the Soviet Union carried over their positions on a test ban from the London Conference to the deliberations in New York. In the

opening general debate, U.S. Secretary of State Dulles reiterated the Western proposal on partial disarmament measures. He then accused the Soviet Union of wanting to keep the size and character of nuclear weapons as they are so that the Soviets can stigmatize them as horror weapons, so that

governments subject to moral and religious influences will not be apt to use them, and that the Soviet Union . . . would thereby gain a special freedom of action and initiative as regards such weapons.<sup>41</sup>

The next day, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, in his speech, emphasized the aggressive nature of NATO, its plans for an aggressive war and United States intentions of placing nuclear weapons "into the hands of the very same forces of German militarism which unleashed the Second World War. . . ."<sup>42</sup> He included in his speech a lengthy review of the disarmament problems faced by the world. On the suspension of nuclear tests, Gromyko submitted a special memorandum which reiterated the Soviet position taken at the London Conference, and he urged that the question of a suspension of nuclear tests "be considered separately and that its solution should not be made contingent upon that of other disarmament questions."<sup>43</sup>

Thereafter, the Soviet delegation attempted to have



the Soviet draft resolution, "Discontinuance Under International Control of Tests of Atomic and Hydrogen Weapons," placed on the agenda as a separate item. However, this effort was defeated in both the General Committee and in the General Assembly, and the memorandum was placed under item 24, entitled "Regulation, Limitation and Balanced Reduction of All Armed Forces and All Armaments; Conclusion of an International Convention on the Reduction of Armaments and the Prohibition of Atomic, Hydrogen and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction."<sup>44</sup>

The disarmament debate then centered in twenty-eight meetings of the First Committee from 10 October through 6 November. The United States delegate, Henry Cabot Lodge stressed how the differences between the West and the Soviet Union had been narrowed by the efforts of both sides, and hoped for continued efforts to reach agreements.<sup>45</sup> Gromyko emphasized the differences separating the two sides.

The Western position was encompassed in the 24-Power draft resolution which reflected the Western position at the end of the London Conference. The resolution called for a suspension of nuclear tests as only one, albeit the first, of six different aspects of a disarmament agreement

which should be negotiated in the Disarmament Commission and its subcommittee.<sup>46</sup> The Soviet Union fought doggedly against it, but the resolution was approved in the First Committee and in the General Assembly, with one significant amendment. The amendment, sponsored by Norway and Pakistan called for the establishment by the subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission a group of technical experts "to study inspection systems for disarmament measures on which the subcommittee may reach agreement in principle. . . ."47 However, even this amendment was the same concept as that which the West had espoused from the first meeting of the London Conference.

The Soviets did not even press to a vote their resolution on a suspension of nuclear tests, but instead switched their support to a similar Indian resolution in the First Committee.<sup>48</sup> The Indian resolution dealt solely with a test suspension and called upon all states to agree to such a suspension "without delay." A significant difference between the Indian and Soviet resolutions was that the former also called for the creation of a scientific-technical commission which would recommend an adequate inspection system to supervise a test suspension.<sup>49</sup> Yet, even the Indian resolution was defeated in

the General Assembly by a vote of 34 against it to 24 for it.

The Soviet Union's efforts to have the Twelfth General Assembly sanction its efforts to isolate and emphasize the question of a test ban were defeated. Yet, at least two significant results emerged from the debate at the United Nations. First, the Soviets refused to participate further in the Disarmament Commission and its subcommittee. Whether or not this was a direct result of Western victory in gaining UN approval for their proposals of 29 August in the form of the 24-Power resolution,<sup>50</sup> the Soviet decision eliminated the only existing arena where formal negotiations on a test ban could take place. A new avenue for negotiations would have to be formed. Second, by supporting the Indian resolution, even though it was ultimately defeated, the Soviets were, in fact, formally supporting a call for a technical conference on the question of control. This moved them closer to accepting the Western calls for a study of the possibilities of a control system.

#### Intergovernmental Exchanges

With the end of the discussion of disarmament in the UN, Soviet Premier Bulganin initiated an exchange of

letters with Eisenhower that continued the negotiations on a test ban through June 1958. The first letter from Bulganin to Eisenhower was on 10 December 1957. Clearly, the primary Soviet concern was the emplacement of United States nuclear warheads in Europe, especially in West Germany. Bulganin warned:

The placing of nuclear weapons at the disposal of the Federal Republic of Germany may set in motion such forces in Europe and entail such consequences as even NATO members may not contemplate.<sup>51</sup>

With regard to a test ban, Bulganin proposed a joint United States-United Kingdom-USSR announcement of the cessation of all types of nuclear weapons test explosions as of 1 January 1958, for at least two or three years.<sup>52</sup> This was followed by a similar proposal from the Supreme Soviet on 21 December. Eisenhower's formal reply was made on 12 January 1958. In his letter to Bulganin, Eisenhower indicated that the real problem of armament was the mounting production of new types of weapons and the Soviet test ban proposal does not meet this problem. Eisenhower also mentioned the possibility of a technical conference to discuss control measures.<sup>53</sup> Bulganin's reply ignored the latter, but pressed again for a two-to three-year suspension of tests.<sup>54</sup>

In March, the Soviet Foreign Ministry firmly rejected attempts by other states to revive the Disarmament Commission. Instead it reiterated Bulganin's earlier suggestion for a meeting of the heads of state to discuss inter alia the "immediate suspension of atomic and hydrogen tests."<sup>55</sup> Also in March, Khrushchev succeeded Bulganin as chairman of the Council of Ministers, and the Soviet Union concluded its newest and most extensive series of nuclear tests. As in 1957, the Supreme Soviet then issued a decree calling upon the other nuclear states to agree to discontinue all nuclear tests.<sup>56</sup> Despite the fact that this action was taken after the completion of the Soviet tests, it won worldwide public acclaim.<sup>57</sup> On 4 April, Khrushchev followed up this decree with a personal letter to Eisenhower, also calling for a suspension of tests.<sup>58</sup> Eisenhower quickly replied and while rejecting the Soviet proposal, emphasized:

If there is ever to be an agreed limitation or suspension of testing, . . . plans for international control should be in instant readiness. Why should we not at once put our technicians to work to study together and advise as to what specific control measures are necessary if there is to be a dependable and agreed disarmament program?<sup>59</sup>

Khrushchev replied on 22 April. He rejected the call for a conference of experts: "It is impossible to

permit the solution of the problem of disarmament itself to be endlessly delayed under the pretext of studying the problems of control" [emphasis mine], and he simply called again for an immediate cessation of testing.<sup>60</sup> Nevertheless, Eisenhower continued to press for a technical conference on control emphasizing that "studies of this kind are necessary preliminaries to putting political decisions into effect"<sup>61</sup> (emphasis mine). The first indications of the Soviet response to Eisenhower's call for a technical conference were negative. On 5 May, Foreign Minister Gromyko handed the United States ambassador a memorandum proposing a list of questions to be considered should the West accept the Soviet's call for a summit conference. Naturally, the question of the "immediate cessation of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests" headed the list. The memorandum emphasized that

. . . it will not be difficult to agree on concrete measures for such control as soon as the governments of the USA and the United Kingdom also cease testing such weapons. Otherwise, any negotiations concerning questions of control, whether they be on the level of experts or any other level, will inevitably become fruitless discussions and will, naturally, have no real results.<sup>62</sup>

Thus, the Soviets were demanding agreement on a cessation of tests as a precondition for a discussion on appropriate controls. However, only four days later,

Khrushchev sent Eisenhower another letter which accepted the convening of a conference of experts to discuss controls for a cessation of tests, despite the former's continued assertion that the methods of detecting tests which are available to modern science "completely preclude" the possibility of a violation of a test ban agreement.<sup>63</sup> The Soviet Union had suddenly accepted a Western position which it had unremittingly denigrated for over a year.

The next series of letters decided the timing of the conference, the participants and the location. Khrushchev pressed for a short conference, located in Moscow, and suggested that India and "certain other countries" might be invited to participate.<sup>64</sup> However, the Soviet Union soon acquiesced to holding the conference in Geneva, beginning on 1 July, with the participation of experts from the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Canada for the West and experts from the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania from the East. For the first time, the Soviet Union and its allies were given equal representation with the West at an international conference on disarmament.

The major controversy involved the implication of a successful conference. Eisenhower had maintained in his

letters that even if such a conference were successful, this would not bind the United States to accept a suspension of nuclear tests. The Soviet Union was equally adamant that a successful conference would result in a cessation of tests. In an aide-memoire of 25 June, the Soviet Union even threatened to boycott the conference unless the United States agreed that the results of the conference "should assure the cessation of the tests of nuclear weapons by all powers. . . ." <sup>65</sup> Despite this threat, the United States officially maintained its position that the conference would be held "without prejudice to our respective positions on the timing and interdependence of various aspects of disarmament." <sup>66</sup>

#### The Conference of Experts

On 1 July 1958, the representatives of eight nations met at the Palais des Nations in Geneva, Switzerland, to begin the Conference of Experts to Study the Possibility of Detecting Violations of a Possible Agreement on the Suspension of Nuclear Tests. The conference held thirty formal sessions and several informal sessions. At the conclusion of its work on 21 August, it represented a report to the participating governments.



The representation at the conference indicated the differing perspectives of the East and West. The Western representatives were all technical experts. Even among the advisors to the Western representatives only a small number of junior diplomats were included. The Soviet delegation included Semyon K. Tsarapkin, a leading Soviet diplomat who had been a member of the Soviet delegations to the United Nations since 1947.<sup>67</sup> After the Experts' Conference, Tsarapkin became the Soviet Union's chief delegate at the test ban negotiations. The Czechoslovak and Polish delegations also contained important representatives of their respective foreign ministries.<sup>68</sup>

During the first three sessions, the Soviet side attempted to obtain a commitment from the Western representatives that the goal of the conference was to establish a control system for a test ban.<sup>69</sup> At the third session, when the West continued to refuse the Soviets' demands, the Soviet delegation presented an agenda which reflected a technical discussion of the relevant issues. This was accepted by the West. The discussions then proceeded, for the most part, on a technical level through the various methods for detecting and identifying nuclear explosions. However, from 30 July through 12 August, the Eastern

delegates attempted to obtain agreement from the West that the control posts should be staffed by scientific personnel from the country in which the post was located.<sup>70</sup> Again, the West refused to be drawn into a purely political decision, and limited the final report's consideration of this to a statement indicating that each control post should be manned by approximately "30 persons with various qualifications and fields of specialization. . . ." <sup>71</sup>

In the technical discussions, the Eastern representatives were normally more theoretical and optimistic about verification capabilities than their Western counterparts. The tendency toward theoretical discussions on the part of the Soviets may, in part, be explained by a lack of empirical data in certain areas such as underground explosions. However, the Soviets have always been reluctant to share their technical knowledge with others. The Soviets based their optimism on the basis that technology was always improving, and thus, it would place more refined tools in the hands of the control organization.<sup>72</sup> The Eastern representatives also tended to try to avoid questions concerning the possibilities of evading the controls.<sup>73</sup> Fedorov, the head of the Soviet delegation, argued that only a limited number of on-site inspections

would be required for ascertaining whether a nuclear test had taken place, not on scientific grounds but on a political basis:

. . . we should again bear in mind that the obligation of Governments not to conduct nuclear weapons tests will have such a moral significance and will attract so much attention from other governments that no one assuming such an obligation will dare violate it.<sup>74</sup>

Ciro Zoppo has noted that such arguments during the conference showed that ". . . the imperatives of Soviet policy demanded that scientific facts be forced into an integrated political mold,"<sup>73</sup> and indeed, to the Soviets the political aspects of the conference clearly predominated. To the Soviets, as indicated in both their statements agreeing to hold the conference and their attitude during the conference, held the talks to be a kind of a ritual to be performed before they could obtain a test ban on their terms.<sup>74</sup>

Two further examples will be sufficient to indicate how thoroughly the political factor permeated this conference from the Soviet perspective. The first involved a discussion of meteorological flights for collecting radioactive air samples. The Soviets pressed for the term "oceans" to be used to indicate the areas over which the planes should operate, rather than using the term "high

seas." This minor change advocated by the Soviets could have had a significant effect, had it been accepted, since the Soviet Union's land mass touches an ocean only at the lower end of the Kamchatka Peninsula, while the rest of its thousands of miles of coastline are bordered only by seas, from the Baltic Sea in the west to the Sea of Japan in the east.

The second involved the form of the final report of the conference. The Western delegates wanted to indicate several possible control systems with varying capabilities. However, the Soviets insisted that the final report recommend only one control system. The reason for this was that the latter would have much more political impact in that popular opinion would see the one recommended system as an indication that a control system had been devised and that an adequately controlled test ban was, in fact, feasible. If several different systems had been indicated, attention would have naturally been directed at the differing limitations of each system, and the political impact would have been diminished. The Soviet position carried the day, however, and when the conference ended, public opinion generally held that a control system for a test ban was, in fact, feasible.

The day after the conclusion of the conference, the United States and the United Kingdom offered to engage in negotiations with the Soviet Union on the subject of a suspension of nuclear tests. The United States and the United Kingdom saw the goal of the negotiations to be a test ban of a year's duration which could be continued for a longer period of time if the control system was working properly and if progress was made in negotiating and implementing other disarmament measures. In addition, both offered to suspend nuclear tests for one year from the beginning of the negotiations, provided that the Soviet Union did the same.<sup>76</sup> On 30 August, the Soviet Union replied that it accepted the Western proposal for negotiations. Although the West had attached what the Soviet Union considered unacceptable conditions on the negotiations, the Soviet Union had achieved its primary goal of engaging the United States and United Kingdom in negotiations on a test ban. Thus, the first phase of the test ban negotiations was completed.

#### Analysis of the Negotiating Techniques in Phase I

What negotiating techniques had the Soviet Union used during this first phase? The above review of the

negotiating process from March 1957 through August 1958 has shown that a number of negotiating techniques were used by the Soviets. At this point, it would be profitable to review individually the techniques used as a summary of this phase.

The use of rudeness and vilification was very selective throughout this phase. During the London Conference, its use was sharply curtailed until 27 August. Prior to that date, most of Zorin's comments which fit into this category were statements indirectly questioning the good faith of the Western representatives. Typical of these statements is the one Zorin made after hearing the American and Canadian statements on 1 April 1957. Zorin asked:

The question naturally arises: Do the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the other Western Powers truly wish to take a real step towards the cessation, or at least the suspension, of the atomic armaments race?<sup>77</sup>

This, of course, for the Soviets was exceptionally mild. There were even a number of occasions where the Western representatives noted with appreciation that Zorin's statements were free of polemics.<sup>78</sup> However, when the West remained adamant in its opposition to the Soviet desire for a separate negotiation on the test ban, the Soviets'

use of rudeness and vituperation grew greater. On 10 July, the Canadian representative complained of the "contemptuous language" used by Zorin in his speech of 8 July.<sup>79</sup>

Zorin's speech, on 27 August, was filled with polemics, and was clearly an indication that the Soviet Union had given up the idea that the subcommittee was a useful forum of disarmament negotiations. Typical of the change was the new Soviet characterization of Western aims:

Neither the political leaders of the United States nor the NATO chiefs conceal their aims; they openly declare that they are preparing for atomic war against the peace-loving states, preparing to bomb the territories of these States.<sup>80</sup>

During the twelfth session of the UN General Assembly, these attacks were somewhat toned down, but not eliminated. The emphasis was on the West's aggressive goals and desire for bringing about an atomic war. Yet, when the Experts' Conference convened, it was comparatively free from acrimonious political debate.<sup>81</sup> The reason for this change is clear. In the United Nations, the Soviets were playing before a world audience and the prime consideration was to place the West on the defensive, to put it in the position of being against peace and disarmament. That is, the goal shifted from achieving agreement by mutual assent to forcing the reluctant West into a position

where it had to accept Soviet demands. During the Experts' Conference, the Soviets' primary goal was still to force the West into negotiations on a test ban, but this could only be accomplished by ensuring the success of the conference. Therefore, polemics were avoided.

It is apparent that the Soviets used the London Conference, the UN General Assembly, the exchange of letters and the Experts' Conference as propaganda forums. However, their goal was not simply to gain debating points; rather, it was to force the West into negotiations through the use of popular pressure on the Western governments to compel them to change their policy in accordance with Soviet desires. There is a significant difference between the Experts' Conference and the other arenas in this phase. The Soviets were more concerned with the propaganda advantage resulting from the successful completion of the Experts' Conference than they were with using propaganda to change the course of the conference. The successful conclusion of the conference gave a strong impetus to the West to agree to formal negotiations. This, in turn, resulted in a unverified moratorium on all nuclear testing until 31 August 1961--in retrospect an actual Soviet goal. In the other arenas, propaganda was used in an effort to



change decisions made during the different negotiations.

For example, Zoppo notes that during the London Conference:

The Soviet maneuver [conceding that there would be control over a test ban] had generated public opinion pressures in the world at large, in the United States, and particularly in the United Kingdom, against the Western position on nuclear testing. . . .<sup>82</sup>

The third negotiating technique, maintenance of an adversary attitude, waxes and wanes during this phase, but never completely disappears. It is particularly strong from the end of the London Conference up to the Experts' Conference. Certainly, part of this was to enhance and emphasize the Soviet stand as the advocate of world peace, and therefore, had a definite propaganda value. However, the adversary attitude was not simply a maneuver. During the Experts' Conference, the Soviet Union consistently attempted to limit the amount of foreign intrusion it would have to accept as part of a control system. Thus, it pressed for a significantly fewer number of control posts on its territory than the Western delegations felt would be adequate for effective control.

This phase is an excellent example of the fourth technique. The Soviets certainly showed themselves to be tenacious in their efforts to engage the West in test ban negotiations. During this phase, they used all negotiating

arenas open to them to advocate their position. Indeed, it is remarkable to see the significant shift in the Western position during the phase: from a complete disdain for separate negotiations on a test ban to acceptance of negotiations, albeit while still attempting to maintain some link between the test ban negotiations and other arms control measures. On the Soviet side, however, the shift in position was minimal. Even after 14 June 1957, the Soviet acceptance of international control was constantly qualified by the Soviets stating that such control, in actuality, was unnecessary and that the Soviet Union accepted it only as a political compromise to gain Western agreement to the negotiations.

This last example can also be used as an example of Soviet deviousness and patent disregard for the truth, the fifth negotiating technique. The Soviets consistently maintained the position that all nuclear tests could easily be detected and identified by the efforts of each individual nation. This position was publicly maintained even during and after the Experts' Conference in which Soviet scientists indicated that there were limitations on even an international control system's capabilities.

The Soviets also used the negotiating technique to divide its opponents and to delay Western activities which would have been detrimental to the USSR. As Zoppo notes concerning the London Conference:

The Soviet delegate openly exploited the variance of views between the British and Americans. The British eagerness to start an expert group working on tests was made the pivot, briefly, for Zorin's divisive tactics aimed at fostering a separate agreement on a test ban.<sup>83</sup>

In addition, domestic British and American controversies were used by the Soviets to bolster their position. The Supreme Soviet's call on 10 May 1957, for the establishment of an interparliamentary committee of the United States, United Kingdom, and USSR for the purpose of exchanging views on possible ways of ending nuclear tests and prohibiting nuclear weapons can certainly be seen in this light.

The often cited Soviet negotiating technique of not making concessions was not characteristic of this period. It is true that the Soviet position remained adamant on some issues, such as refusing to participate in the Disarmament Commission and its subcommittee after 6 September 1957. On other issues the Soviets did make compromises. During the London Conference, the Soviet Union did modify its position. Initially, the Soviets

demanded an immediate and permanent cessation of nuclear tests. This was modified to a suspension of nuclear tests for a definite period. (The Soviets eventually proposed a two- to three-year suspension.) On the issue of control, the Soviet Union first maintained that national systems of detection would be completely sufficient, and although this position was never repudiated, the Soviets did accept the Western position that an international control system would have to be part of a test ban. Further, when the West insisted on a technical conference to discuss this system of control, the Soviets finally agreed to attend, even though they clearly indicated their misgivings about the real Western purpose for the conference.<sup>84</sup>

The Soviet technique of demanding an agreement in principle be reached before engaging in negotiations on technical points or details pervades this entire phase of the test ban negotiations. The Soviet Union consistently demanded that the West must first agree to a cessation of nuclear tests and only then could the details of the agreement be discussed. This is clearly shown by the following two statements made on 27 June 1957 at the London Conference. The Soviet Union had agreed on 14 June to the necessity for an international control system. The United

Kingdom representative stated the Western perception of the negotiations:

Now that the principle of control over tests and over production is accepted by us all, it seems to me that our next step might be to set up a special technical committee to deal with the many complicated details.<sup>85</sup>

However, Zorin diametrically disagreed:

If progress is to be made, the main necessity is not the establishment of working groups to undertake a detailed study of individual technical problems that may arise in the course of negotiations. Far from it: the main need is to reach agreement on the basic issues before us.<sup>86</sup>

What is significant, however, is that after almost a year of debate, the Soviets were willing to forego this demand and engage in a technical conference on control system. This, in itself, is an indication of the importance placed on a test ban by the Soviet leadership.

During this phase of the negotiations, the Soviets were not adverse to presenting what appeared to the West as unreasonable demands. Examples of such demands are the conclusion of a permanent test ban without discussing concomitant controls and the demand, made at the Twelfth General Assembly, that all United Nations member states be made members of the disarmament commission, and the Soviet demand that the Powers possessing nuclear weapons should assume a solemn undertaking not to use these weapons for a

period of five years. While these positions seemed unreasonable to the West in 1957, it should be noted that there is now a partial test ban without controls.

This phase of the negotiations also had several instances of the Soviets attempting to use procedural devices to achieve substantive advantages. In the London Conference, Zorin attempted to have the question of a test ban given the most prominent, i.e., the first, position on the agenda. In this he succeeded. Then, he used this to try to separate the topic of a test ban from the other items to be discussed. Noble, the United Kingdom representative, complained that Zorin was trying to obtain a decision on nuclear testing before any of the other agenda items were discussed, and in doing so was attempting to "prejudice the outcome of the Sub-Committee's decisions since it would de facto separate this question from the other questions under consideration, which the West did not want to do."<sup>87</sup>

The Soviet delegation made a similar attempt at the opening sessions of the Twelfth General Assembly. There Gromyko attempted to have the question of a test ban be made an agenda item separate from all other disarmament questions.<sup>88</sup>

In the Experts' Conference, the agenda controversy revolved around the format of the final report. The West wanted the report to include a number of control systems, the Soviets wanted the report to present one control system as the most effective. This debate was by and large decided in favor of the Soviet position, and thus, the report by its design strongly implied that an effective control system was technically feasible.

Another Soviet negotiating technique is to threaten to break off negotiations in order to gain concessions from the opposing side. An example of this was Zorin's warning of 17 June 1957, when the West pressed him to clarify the Soviet's "concession" of 14 June in which the Soviets acknowledged that a test ban should be placed under international control. Zorin stated:

Every time this question of control is moved to the fore, it means that a disagreeable stage in our work is approaching--in other words, that the ground is being prepared either for a suspension of or a complete breakdown in the Sub-Committee's work.<sup>69</sup>

In order to make such a threat credible, it must be carried out at times. With a slight modification, this happened at the end of the London Conference. On 5 September, Zorin agreed to adjourn the subcommittee because of the impending session of the UN General Assembly, but he

refused to agree on a date for reconvening the subcommittee. The ostensible reason for this was to preclude the West from preventing "the General Assembly from discussing disarmament questions by claiming that negotiations are under-way in the Sub-Committee."<sup>90</sup> While this may have been a secondary reason, in actuality, the Soviet Union had decided to press for equal representation in disarmament negotiations, and the way to impress the West with the seriousness of their demand was to destroy the Disarmament Commission and its subcommittee.

During this first phase, the Soviets also used the negotiating technique in which they demanded a concession from the West in return for simply agreeing to negotiate. When the Soviets agreed that there should be international control of a test ban treaty, they demanded that before they agreed to negotiate on controls, the West must agree on a test ban treaty. Zorin put the Soviet position quite clearly:

Do the Western Powers agree to the immediate cessation of tests for a period of two or three years from a specific date, independently of any other measure, or do they not? If the Western Powers agree to this, the Soviet Union is prepared to discuss forthwith all the forms of control which are necessary for this purpose.<sup>91</sup>



The Soviets consistently repeated this theme throughout the entire phase, even while they were negotiating a control system during the Experts' Conference.<sup>92</sup> At this time, the Soviets also refused to negotiate other disarmament matters unless the Disarmament Commission's membership was changed to suit their wishes.

The Soviet Union also piled up grievances against the West so as to bolster its own position. This went hand-in-hand with the use of rudeness and vilification. The Soviets complained of the West putting atomic weapons at the disposal of West Germany; they complained of the West's increasing production of armaments during disarmament negotiations; and they complained of Western nuclear tests.

The Soviets also employed some negotiating techniques which were not included in the Western compilation of Soviet techniques. One was to make a demand of their opponents, and if they refused to concede to the demand, claim that the demand must be granted, because it was originally offered by the opponents to the Soviets. This was used by the Soviets during the debate on the agenda at the London Conference. After the West had conceded that a discussion of a test ban would be first, Zorin then

demanded that the topic of nuclear disarmament should be third and the topic of international control should be fourth. He stated that this is what the West had previously proposed and the Soviets had agreed to. In reality, this had been offered to Zorin as part of a package proposal in which the Soviets would agree to discuss conventional disarmament first rather than nuclear tests. Although the Soviets had not agreed to deferring the question of a test ban, they still demanded that part of the Western proposal which suited them.<sup>93</sup>

Another Soviet tactic is to claim that their current proposal fully takes into account the Western position and, as a result, the Soviets cannot concede any more than they have and the West must accept the Soviet proposal as it stands. However, what the Soviets usually have done in stating this "compromise" position is to have simply reiterated their own position in slightly different language. This tactic was also used during the London Conference.<sup>94</sup>

Another technique which is quite important is to maintain the primacy of the political aspects of the negotiations. While this may appear simplistic and not at all profound, it would appear that during the test ban

negotiations there were times when the Western Powers did not follow this. Instead they assumed that technical or scientific facts were indisputable and would be judged on their own merit. The Soviets never took this view. For example, during the London Conference, when the Soviets accepted the idea of international control as part of a test ban, they made it abundantly clear that this was a political concession to the Western position and was not the result of scientific argument.<sup>95</sup> The most obvious case where this Soviet technique was observed was the Experts' Conference in 1958. As Zoppo has noted in his study of this conference:

Whereas the imperatives of Soviet policy demanded that scientific facts be forced into an integrated political mold, the West tried to separate technical and political questions and sought to build agreement on a prior scientific consensus.<sup>96</sup>

Another technique having a technical aspect which the Soviets employed was to refuse to divulge any technical data which the Soviets might have, even if this could enhance their side of the debate. Throughout this first phase, the Soviets asserted that all nuclear tests could be detected by national means. For example, at the London Conference, Zorin flatly stated:

On the basis of the information in the possession of Soviet scientists, I can state that none of the thermonuclear explosions which have so far taken place have escaped detection, not only in the territory in which they took place, but also in the territories of other States; the same applies to any explosions which may occur in future.<sup>97</sup>

Yet, despite numerous Western attempts to obtain the technical basis for this and similar statements from the Soviets, they refused to divulge any technical data. In this case, of course, it can be argued that no technical data was supplied simply because there was no technical data to supply. In retrospect, this is a rather valid point. However, the history of the Experts' Conference indicates that even when the Soviets agree to discuss matters of a technical nature, they avoid presenting their own empirical data. During the conference, Zoppo had noted,

. . . the Eastern scientists tended to be qualitative, theoretical, and optimistic about verification, while the Westerners were quantitative, empirical, and inclined to face the difficulties in advance.<sup>98</sup>

The Soviets also employed the technique of "negotiating by acts," that is influencing the opponent's negotiating position by deeds as well as by debate. In this first phase of the test ban negotiations, the Soviets sought to force the West into a test ban or negotiations on a test ban through actions taken by the Supreme Soviet.

Twice the Soviet legislature instituted a unilateral test ban dependent on the Western Powers also refraining from testing. In addition, the Supreme Soviet addressed a call to the British Parliament and the U.S. Congress to agree to the formation of an interparliamentary committee to exchange views on how to end nuclear tests.

During this phase it was normal for the Soviet representatives to have only criticism for Western proposals and only praise for their own proposals. There was no effort at all to find common ground between the two sides, this latter tactic being the hallmark of the British efforts during this phase.

The last additional negotiating technique that should be mentioned here is one which the Soviets often used during this phase. The Soviets would announce a major concession, but make the concession dependent on the West's acceptance of other demands which were known to be unacceptable to the West. Examples of this are the Soviets' acceptance at the London Conference of the West's partial disarmament measures, if the West accepted the liquidation of foreign bases and other measures unacceptable to the West;<sup>99</sup> and the Soviets making their unilateral test moratorium in 1958 dependent upon the United States and

United Kingdom abandoning their own previously announced series of nuclear tests.<sup>100</sup>

From this review of Soviet negotiating techniques used from March 1957 to August 1958, it can be seen that the majority of the techniques cited by Western scholars were indeed used. In addition, a number of other techniques were also employed which were characteristic of the Soviets during this period.

#### Phase II. August 1958-May 1960

##### Overview

##### Sparring Prior to the Start of the Formal Negotiations

The second phase of the negotiations begins with the West agreeing to participate in negotiations on a test ban treaty. The primary characteristic of this phase is the Soviets' ostensible desire to achieve a test ban treaty. The phase concludes with the Soviets' apparent shift in priorities and their concomitant loss of interest in achieving a test ban treaty in mid-1960.<sup>101</sup>

During this phase, negotiations first centered around an exchange of notes between the East and the West in which the parameters for the formal negotiations were decided. In September 1958, the Thirteenth UN General

Assembly convened, and each side attempted to gain advantages in this forum which would influence the formal test ban negotiations, which were to begin on 31 October. Throughout this phase, the latter remained the focal point of the test ban negotiations, although in the fall of 1959, the Fourteenth General Assembly was also the scene of diplomatic activity concerning the test ban.<sup>102</sup>

Once it was agreed that there should be negotiations on the question of a test ban, a number of administrative questions arose by which each side sought to gain some advantage prior to the actual negotiations. The American note of 22 August 1958 suggested that the proposed negotiations on suspension of nuclear tests should begin in New York on 31 October 1958. The Soviets accepted the date for beginning the negotiations, but suggested the more neutral city of Geneva as their location. In addition, the Soviets suggested that the period for negotiations be fixed at two to three weeks. By limiting the negotiations, the Soviets would raise popular expectations that a test ban could easily be achieved. In addition, such a short time limit would preclude any detailed negotiations on the specifics of an international control system. The United States refused to put a time limit on the negotiations.

In an interview with a Pravda correspondent on 29 August, Khrushchev had discussed the United States and United Kingdom's acceptance of negotiations on a test ban. In the interview, he held that the West was really maintaining its old position on a test ban. He called the demand for an effectively functioning system of control "artificial" since "modern science guarantees the possibility of detecting any nuclear explosion."<sup>103</sup> He also rejected the Western position that tied a test ban to other disarmament measures. Khrushchev warned that to accept the Western reservations and conditions "would be to foredoom the negotiations to failure."<sup>104</sup> Finally, Khrushchev indicated that the Soviet Union would attempt to keep the question of a test ban uppermost in the public's attention by using the upcoming Thirteenth General Assembly session.<sup>105</sup> The United States, however, refused to become involved in an exchange of notes over these various issues, preferring to discuss them at the negotiating table.

In October, as the beginning of the negotiations approached, the Soviets made another effort to ensure the negotiations would be short. They called for the negotiations to be held on the Foreign Ministers' level.<sup>106</sup> The West also rejected this ploy, firmly insisting that the



negotiations should be conducted at the diplomatic level.

As the date of the negotiations neared, the Soviet Union increased its criticism of the Western position. A statement of the Soviet government threatened that if the West did not agree "to conclude an agreement on the universal stopping of nuclear tests for all time," the Soviet Union would have every right to continue its nuclear weapons tests while the negotiations were in progress until the number of Soviet tests equalled the number of tests conducted by the United States and United Kingdom since 31 March 1958.<sup>107</sup>

The Soviets also sought to influence the pending negotiations by having the Thirteenth UN General Assembly adopt resolutions espousing their position. (The West attempted to use the General Assembly in a similar manner.) Since the United States and the United Kingdom had not yet accepted the Soviet demand that the test ban should be permanent and divorced from all other disarmament measures, the Soviet Union tried to have the General Assembly endorse its position. To do so would be to isolate the United States and United Kingdom and to weaken their position.

To achieve its goal, the Soviet Union requested that the General Committee include "the discontinuance of

atomic and hydrogen tests" as a separate item of the General Assembly's agenda. This was agreed to.<sup>108</sup> Then, during the general debate in the General Assembly, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko launched an attack on the Western position, accusing the United States and United Kingdom of not wanting to end nuclear testing and of wanting to engage in an unrestrained atomic arms race. Finally, he called upon the General Assembly to raise its voice in favor of the immediate discontinuance of nuclear tests.<sup>109</sup>

In the First Committee debate, Zorin pressed to have the discontinuance of nuclear tests discussed first and independently of all other disarmament topics. Lodge, for the United States, pressed to have all questions of disarmament discussed together.<sup>110</sup> In the end a compromise proposal was sponsored by the United States and adopted over the Soviet bloc's objections. It allowed a general debate on all disarmament items on the agenda, but the decision as to the priority of voting on the appropriate draft resolutions would be delayed until the general debate was over. The Soviet Union submitted a draft resolution which called upon all states carrying out atomic and hydrogen weapons tests immediately to stop such tests.<sup>111</sup> The resolution proposed by the United States, United

Kingdom, and fifteen other states simply urged the nuclear Powers to "make every effort to reach early agreement on the suspension of nuclear weapons tests under effective international control," and also urged "the parties involved in these negotiations not to undertake further testing of nuclear weapons while these negotiations are in progress."<sup>112</sup>

A third resolution concerning nuclear tests was sponsored by India and thirteen other nonaligned states. It called for

the immediate discontinuance of the testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons until agreement is reached by the States concerned in regard to the technical arrangements and controls considered necessary to ensure the observance of the discontinuance of such tests.<sup>113</sup>

The Indian draft resolution thus contained a combination of points which were backed by both the East and the West.

During the First Committee debate, each side attacked the other's draft resolution. The United Kingdom representative accused the USSR of urging the General Assembly to make a decision on the subject matter of the test ban negotiations before the negotiations had even taken place.<sup>114</sup> Zorin attacked the Western resolution as revealing the plans of its sponsors who only want to suspend tests for a limited period of time.

In the end, the West had their resolution voted upon first, and it was adopted, with the Soviet bloc voting against it. The Indian resolution was withdrawn after its main operative paragraph had been defeated through the opposition of the Western states. The Soviet bloc had voted for the Indian resolution, but once it was defeated, the Soviet Union did not put its own resolution to the vote, knowing it would also be defeated. The General Assembly then confirmed the votes taken in the First committee.

During the debate in the First Committee, there was one other aspect of the debate which was related to the forthcoming test ban negotiations. This debate revolved around whether the word "cessation" or "suspension" should be used in the discussion on weapons tests. The former was used by the Soviets and the latter by the West. When the Swedish representative suggested that all should use the more neutral term, "discontinuance," he was subjected to the wrath of the Soviet representative and given a stern lecture on the importance of using the correct word.<sup>115</sup> Despite the United States representative's weary complaint that the Soviet representative "was trying to deal with a serious problem in terms of mere

slogans,"<sup>116</sup> the episode highlighted the fact that the Soviet Union made every effort to influence the test ban negotiations in favor of the Soviet position even before the negotiations had begun. In this case, however, Swedish neutrality won out, and as a result, the negotiations which began on 31 October in Geneva bore the cumbersome, but neutral, title: Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests.

The Geneva Negotiations, 31 October 1958-  
27 August 1959

Once the Geneva negotiations opened, they remained the focal point of the test ban negotiations throughout the rest of this phase. Represented at the negotiations were the United States, represented by James J. Wadsworth; the Soviet Union, represented by Semyon K. Tsarapkin; and the United Kingdom, represented by David Ormsby-Gore. The Geneva test ban negotiations, up to May 1960, could be characterized in several ways. First, there was fairly rapid agreement on the general format of the treaty and on the preamble, seventeen articles and one annex of the treaty. It was also a characteristic of this phase that the hard core differences between the Soviet and Western concepts of a control system were clearly defined. Third,

this period was characterized by growing United States doubts about the adequacy of the control system as outlined at the Experts' Conference, and Soviet attempts to accommodate these Western misgivings while maintaining the goal of a treaty which would prevent all tests for all time.

As usual in postwar disarmament negotiations, the conference devoted its opening sessions to a debate over the agenda. The Soviets attempted to influence the outcome of the negotiations in several ways during the opening sessions. First, they attempted to have the negotiations called the "Conference on the cessation of tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons"<sup>117</sup> [emphasis supplied]. The official title was finally decided at an informal meeting on 1 November. Second, they attempted to relegate the question of control to a very minor position by proposing an agenda in which first an agreement on the cessation of tests would be concluded and then provisions for a system of control would be agreed upon separately.<sup>118</sup>

In line with their proposed agenda, the Soviets submitted a proposed test ban treaty at the first session of the conference.<sup>119</sup> (For the text of the proposed treaty see Appendix B.) The treaty would have immediately halted all nuclear tests for all time. However, the question of

control was dealt with in two vague articles which simply referred to the recommendations of the Experts' Conference. Thus, negotiations on a control system would have been completely divorced from the agreement on the test ban and if the Soviets' treaty and agenda had been accepted, the West would not have been able to use the Soviet desire for concluding a treaty as a lever for prying concessions on control from the Soviets. In contrast, the West pressed for a discussion of the control system first, to be followed by the drafting of an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests and the establishment of a control organ and a control system.<sup>120</sup> After ten sessions of bickering over the agenda, it was informally agreed that discussion of the agenda should be deferred and that both the control agreement and the cessation of tests should be discussed alternatively for two sessions at a time. However, the debate as to whether the agreement on a control system should be part of the basic treaty or a separate document continued until 29 November, when the Soviet Union agreed that the actual provisions for control could be contained in the treaty itself.<sup>121</sup>

At the same session, in which the Soviets agreed to have the test ban agreement and its control provisions

in one treaty, the West began a piecemeal presentation of draft articles for the treaty. These articles dealt with both the cessation of tests and the control system. Now the negotiations began on each particular article of the treaty.

A major concern of the Soviet Union became manifest at this time: the Soviet Union demanded parity with the United States and United Kingdom in the operation of the control organization. The Soviets demanded that the control organization be completely dominated by the three nuclear powers, and that its decisions should be based on the unanimous consent of all three states. In actuality, this meant that the Soviet Union was demanding the power to veto any action of the control organization of which it did not approve. The controversy over the ability of any one of the three states to hinder the work of the control commission persisted throughout this phase, and indeed, as long as there remained the concept of the control commission.

Despite this very basic conflict in the attitudes of the two sides, each of the three delegations proceeded with the negotiation of those areas in which agreement could be reached. On 6 December, Article 1 was agreed



upon. This article was based on the United States draft. By the time of the Christmas recess, the first four articles had been agreed upon and the basic outline of the future treaty could be seen. The Soviet Union had agreed to have the control system incorporated in the body of the treaty, and had agreed to the basic outline of the control system.

The treaty thus far was for a cessation of nuclear tests, although whether it was to be permanent or for a specified time limit was not yet decided. Each of the parties to the treaty was to cooperate with the control organization. This organization was to consist of a Control Commission, consisting of the three nuclear powers and four other states party to the treaty; a detection and identification system; a chief executive officer, who would be called the "Administrator"; and finally, a Conference of Parties to the treaty consisting of all states adhering to the treaty. As the negotiations proceeded through this phase, each of these were described in more detail and the areas of divergence between the two sides was progressively narrowed.

With the resumption of the negotiations on 5 January 1959, the United States formally raised the

question of the validity of the Experts' Conference.<sup>122</sup>

This was a result of the theoretical analysis made by Dr. Albert Latter of the RAND Corporation that it would be possible to muffle nuclear explosions to one-three hundredth their actual size. This could be done by making the cavity in which the explosion would take place large enough so that the medium around the explosion would remain elastic.<sup>123</sup> It is not necessary here to go into the details of the new American evaluation of the capability of the agreed control system to detect and identify nuclear explosions. It is enough that the findings of the Experts' Conference were questioned and found to be insufficient to achieve an acceptable level of reliability. The effect on the Soviets of the American presentation of the "new data" was tremendous. As James Wadsworth has noted:

The Soviets were convinced that the United States was deliberately sabotaging the conference and was simply seeking a pretext to resume testing. All the latent suspicion that had been lulled by our comparatively good progress in the negotiations blazed up more fiercely than ever.<sup>124</sup>

The common basis upon which the negotiations were founded was put in doubt. The Soviets responded by refusing to consider the new data.

In contrast to this adverse event, in some areas the two sides moved toward each other prior to the Easter recess. The West conceded that the duration of the treaty would not be made conditional upon progress in other fields of disarmament.<sup>125</sup> With this concession by the West, the Soviets obtained what they had demanded at the London Conference almost two years before: negotiations on a nuclear test ban treaty, which would be independent of any other disarmament measures and which would be in effect indefinitely. In line with this, on 10 March, the United States proposed an article on the duration of the treaty, and two sessions later it was accepted by the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union also accepted two other articles: the first concerned periodic reviews of the treaty, the second dealt with registering the treaty.<sup>126</sup>

Most of the negotiating effort from January through mid-March dealt with the form and the functioning of the control system. Three questions formed the core of the problem:

1. How are technical positions and the control posts to be staffed? The West maintained that control posts must be manned primarily by technicians and specialists who were not nationals of the country in which the

control post was located. The Soviet Union maintained that the host country nationals should perform most, if not all, the operational functions while a small number of foreigners could be observers to ensure the accurate reporting of all pertinent data.<sup>127</sup> The Soviet Union also insisted that host country nationals should be in charge of the operation and management of the control posts. The West took the opposite view. The West also insisted that a significant percentage of all technical positions in the control posts should be occupied by persons who were not nationals of the United States, United Kingdom, and USSR. The Soviet Union disagreed.

2. What procedures are necessary for on-site inspection teams which would investigate areas suspected of being sites where illegal nuclear tests had been conducted? The Soviets demanded the right to veto the dispatch of any on-site inspection team. The West opposed this. The Soviets also wanted the inspection teams to be formed on an ad hoc basis. The West wanted permanently organized inspection teams.

3. What would be the voting procedures of the control commission? The primary difficulty was to what extent would there have to be unanimity among the three

nuclear powers for actions to be taken.<sup>128</sup>

While these were areas of disagreement, each side slowly modified its position so that these questions were not thought of as being unsurmountable obstacles to a final agreement.

During the recess, two events took place which had an important effect on the course of negotiations. In a letter to Khrushchev, President Eisenhower proposed that an agreement be reached banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere as the first phase of an ultimate comprehensive test ban.<sup>129</sup> Khrushchev rejected this in his reply to Eisenhower. However, he did accept a suggestion made by Prime Minister Macmillan that the question of on-site inspections be surmounted by agreeing to the concept of a yearly quota of inspections, thereby circumventing the Soviet demand for the right to veto any decision by the control commission to dispatch an inspection team.<sup>130</sup> On 5 May, Macmillan and Eisenhower wrote Khrushchev accepting the concept of a quota, and from this time on a significant portion of the negotiations were devoted to arriving at a mutually acceptable number for the quota. Ironically, agreement was never to be reached on a mutually acceptable quota for on-site inspections, while the proposed partial

test ban, which Khrushchev rejected with such alacrity, was, in fact, the solution finally agreed upon.

With the resumption of the formal negotiations, the number of articles adopted rose rapidly. Between 13 April and 8 May, ten articles and the preamble was adopted. However, most of these were of a technical nature and of little substantive importance.

During April and May, the West pushed for the convening of a technical working group to discuss a control system for high altitude tests. This had been a topic for which the 1958 Experts' Conference had not made any recommendations. The Soviets resisted the calling of this technical conference, but on 14 May, Khrushchev accepted the calling of such a conference. When the test ban conference reconvened on 8 June, after the Foreign Ministers' Conference, the terms of reference for the technical working group became a primary object of negotiation.

The Technical Working Group began its meetings on 22 June 1959. The scientific discussions were similar in many aspects to that of the Experts' Conference. The Soviet scientists and their Western counterparts argued about the agenda: the Soviets wanting to keep it strictly within the limits of what had been discussed at the

Experts' Conference, the West wanting, and eventually obtaining, a broader definition of its task. The West presented most of the data. The Soviets pressed for general conclusions; the West wanted specific assessments. The West was concerned with the possibilities of violations of a ban on high altitude tests, the Soviets based their assumptions on the concept that a treaty once agreed to would not be violated.<sup>131</sup>

On 10 July, the Technical Working Group presented its report to the test ban conference. By the end of August all three governments had accepted the report. This was the last time that both sides would be able to make an agreed "scientific" report.

In addition to this technical question, which involved the concerted efforts of the three delegations, throughout the summer, the other area of negotiation for the three states centered around the question of control post staffing. Other questions such as the Soviet veto list, voting in the control commission, the selection of Vienna as the headquarters of the control system, and financing the control system all played a secondary role. On the central question of on-site inspection there was little if any movement.<sup>132</sup>

On 27 August 1959, the conference recessed due to the impending session of the General Assembly. In an interesting aside, Wadsworth spoke to Tsarapkin and Wright about the possible influence of the fourteenth session of the General Assembly on the work of the conference.

I raise this merely as a personal matter and not as one on which my Government has given me any instructions; but it occurs to me that we can give considerable impetus to this Conference in which we are now engaged if we, and our delegations, act in such a way in New York that no setback will be given to our Conference. It is not to be expected, of course, that the question of the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests will be passed over in silence by delegations to the United Nations General Assembly. I merely wish to express the hope that at least our three delegations in New York will so conduct themselves that there will be no setback either to the atmosphere of earnest co-operation which has been the rule here over the past months or to the general outlook about the whole question of nuclear testing on a world-wide basis. For myself, I would pledge that my own statements when I return to the United States will be based on such an attitude. I do not propose to exacerbate any of the difficulties which we have experienced here in reaching agreement on various of the issues on which we are still divided, and I sincerely trust that this will also be the attitude of the Soviet representative and delegation to the United Nations, as well as of the United Kingdom delegation.<sup>133</sup>

Before the General Assembly convened, one other matter of importance to the test ban negotiations occurred. On 11 August, Khrushchev had replied to a query from the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, headed by Canon Collins. In his reply, he indicated that the USSR would accept a



pledge not to be the first nation to resume nuclear tests.<sup>134</sup> On 26 August, the U.S. State Department made a statement extending the United States suspension of nuclear tests through 31 December 1959.<sup>135</sup> (The United States suspension had been previously announced as being in effect from 31 October 1958 to 31 October 1959.) On 27 August 1959, the British government indicated that it would not resume nuclear tests as long as useful discussions were under way at the test ban conference. On 28 August, the Soviet Union announced that it would not resume nuclear tests if the Western Powers did not: "Only in case of resumption by them of nuclear weapons tests will the Soviet Union be free from this pledge."<sup>136</sup> As Jacobson and Stein have noted, at this point the moratorium on tests would continue at least through the rest of 1959, and, with both the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom leaving their test suspensions open-ended, there would be great pressure on the United States to continue its moratorium into the new year. Thus, the Soviet Union had achieved what it had always demanded: test ban without any concomitant controls.<sup>137</sup>

### The Fourteenth UN General Assembly

The fourteenth session of the General Assembly opened in New York on 15 September. While disarmament was still a major topic during this session, the test ban being negotiated in Geneva was not. None of the three powers involved in the negotiations sponsored any resolutions pertaining to a test ban. Rather the nonaligned states, led by India, initiated a test ban resolution. While the Soviet Union attempted to have the question of nuclear tests put on the agenda as a separate item, it did not press its position with the vigor displayed in former years, and the topic of a nuclear test suspension was included in "the question of disarmament" in the agenda.<sup>138</sup>

In the general debate, it was Christian Herter who spent the most time discussing the question of a test ban. However, Herter ended by noting:

But the question of disarmament is much broader than that of the suspension of nuclear weapons testing. What we earnestly seek is the general limitation and control of armaments and armed forces.<sup>139</sup>

Khrushchev, in his speech before the General Assembly, barely mentioned the suspension of nuclear tests and only indirectly noted the Geneva negotiations. In his speech, he indicated the new, primary concern of the Soviet Union:

There is one necessity today--to eliminate the very possibility of an outbreak of war. . . . The Soviet Government . . . has reached the firm conclusion that the way out of the impasse must be sought through general and complete disarmament.<sup>140</sup>

While Khrushchev noted that this new priority "should not delay the settlement" of the test ban question, Khrushchev's speech indicated that the Soviets had found a new disarmament slogan on which to concentrate.

A further indication of the lower priority given to the question of nuclear tests in the General Assembly is the ordering of the items to be debated in the First Committee under the general heading of disarmament:

1. General and complete disarmament
2. French nuclear tests in the Sahara
3. Prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons
4. Suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests
5. The question of disarmament; the report of the Disarmament Commission<sup>141</sup>

Certainly an important part of the reason for this change in priorities were the facts that test ban negotiations were in progress and that no nuclear tests had been undertaken by any of the three nuclear powers for almost a year. Yet as the time passed, the shift in Soviet disarmament priorities would become more pronounced, and this factor would also play a role in subordinating the question of nuclear tests to other aspects of disarmament.

The First Committee adopted two resolutions concerning the suspension of nuclear tests. The first, sponsored by Austria, Japan, and Sweden, urged the three nuclear powers to continue their efforts to reach agreement at an early date and urged them to continue their present voluntary discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests. The United States, the USSR, and the United Kingdom all voted for the resolution. The second resolution was submitted by India, and a revised version was co-sponsored by twenty-three other states, primarily from Asia and Africa. It was almost exactly the same as the previous resolution, with the addition that it also called upon all other states to desist from testing nuclear weapons--a clear reference to France. This resolution also passed with an overwhelming margin. However, the United States, United Kingdom, and a number of other states abstained while France voted against it.<sup>142</sup>

The Geneva Negotiations--  
27 October 1959-27 May 1960

Once the disarmament debate in the United Nations was completed and the British general elections were over, the negotiations began again in Geneva. The major topic of discussion was the Western insistence that the new

seismic data be discussed, which the United States had introduced in January and which the Soviet Union, so far, had refused to discuss. On 3 November, however, Tsarapkin proposed the convening of a second technical working group to determine the criteria for on-site inspections. In this technical conference, Tsarapkin noted, the Soviet experts would examine the new seismic data.<sup>143</sup>

Despite the usual problems of arriving at acceptable terms of reference for the technical working group, there was an aura of progress surrounding the negotiations. On 30 November, the conference adopted Annex III to the treaty. The annex dealt with the preparatory commission, which would come into existence the day after the treaty had been signed in order to expedite the construction and operation of the control system. Two weeks later, the Soviet Union made a number of concessions dealing with control post staffing and voting on finance and the control system budget.<sup>144</sup> Outside the conference, the UN General Assembly unanimously approved a resolution recommending a 10-nation committee to study general and complete disarmament, the Antarctic Treaty was signed and the membership of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space was agreed upon.

On 25 November, Technical Working Group II began its meetings. Immediately, there was the usual disagreement over the agenda. Basically, the West wanted to reevaluate the findings of the Experts' Conference and the Soviet scientists would not agree to this.<sup>145</sup> As before, the West presented the bulk of the data, and the Western scientists were more pessimistic than their Soviet counterparts. During the discussions of the various technical data, it became apparent that the Soviets could not accept anything which would cast doubt on the effectiveness of the control system recommended by the Experts' Conference. Neither could they accept anything indicating that control over a comprehensive test ban was impossible. Finally, they could not accept anything which would indicate that more control posts or on-site inspections in the Soviet Union were necessary than the Soviets had originally believed.<sup>146</sup> In the end, an agreed report proved impossible. This resulted in the presentation of a report to the test ban conference which consisted of: (1) a summary of the agenda, (2) a listing of the possible techniques and instrumentation for improving the detection and identification of seismic events, (3) three recommendations for modifying the instrumentation agreed upon in the Experts'

Conference, and (4) separate annexes by each of the delegations giving their own report of the proceedings of the Technical Working Group.<sup>147</sup> On 19 December, the head of each delegation to the Technical Working Group made a statement to the test ban conference. James B. Fisk, who headed the American scientific delegation, spoke first and made only a few remarks, noting that while broad agreements were not reached, clearer understanding was achieved and in some "problems we are not too far apart."<sup>148</sup> His remarks were short, but conciliatory. Fedorov, the head of the Soviet delegation, then proceeded to read the entire Soviet report which was a severe criticism of the United States position. Fisk replied by calling Fedorov's statement "incorrect, distorted and misleading" and then summarized the American position.<sup>149</sup> With the presentation of the report of the Technical Working Group, the conference recessed until 12 January 1960.

Yet, 1959 was able to produce one more event of significance for the test ban negotiations. Since the United States had declared it would extend its unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests until 31 December 1959, it was obvious that as that date drew near, a decision would have to be made whether to extend the moratorium or not. On

29 December, President Eisenhower announced that the United States considered itself "free to resume nuclear weapons testing." However, he added that the United States would announce its intention prior to any actual resumption of nuclear tests.<sup>150</sup> Thus, one of the three nuclear states had announced that it was no longer bound by any obligation not to resume its nuclear test program. In response, Khrushchev declared on 3 and 14 January that the USSR would not test nuclear weapons first.<sup>151</sup>

Once the conference resumed its deliberations in January 1960, the primary problem facing the delegations was the disagreement over the capabilities of the proposed control system. Each side attempted to find a solution to the problem of control. However, each side viewed the problem from a different perspective. Wadsworth presented the American view that it was a technical problem which had to be overcome,<sup>152</sup> and it could be overcome by either an improvement in the technology or by a political solution which bypassed the technical problem while not doing violence to the Western concept of adequate control. Tsarapkin elucidated the Soviet perception of the impasse in the negotiations:

. . . the course of action embarked on by the United States experts [in December] was . . . to prevent a



comprehensive treaty. . . . Is not this a political task? . . . you say that we must not concern ourselves with politics, but solely with science. Science and politics are so much bound up together here that, short of casuistry, the two aspects cannot be distinguished.<sup>153</sup>

The Soviet attitude was in simple terms: if there is the political desire for a test ban treaty, a political solution can be devised that is agreeable to all. The Soviets effected the attitude that it was incomprehensible to them that what was politically desirable could be blocked by technical problems.

On 11 February, the West made a proposal to ban tests in those environments where control was possible: in the atmosphere, underwater, in outer space to the greatest height possible with respect to an agreed, effective control system, and underground above a seismic magnitude of 4.75. The proposal also allowed for on-site inspections equivalent of 30 percent of all seismic events. Finally, all three states would institute a program of joint research in seismic detection and identification the results of which would be incorporated into the control system. This would allow the seismic magnitude limit to be lowered, thus bringing the treaty ever closer to being a comprehensive test ban.<sup>154</sup> Tsarapkin's reply was less than enthusiastic. He professed that with such a limited

test ban treaty, no international control system would be necessary since national stations can easily identify those tests which the West proposed to limit.<sup>155</sup>

A little more than a month later, the Soviet Union presented a counterproposal on 16 February which was based on the idea of having "simplified criteria" for initiating on-site inspections within an agreed yearly quota. The temporary criteria would be in effect for two to three years, during which Soviet and Western scientists could study and resolve their differences about establishing a stricter set of criteria. Once these differences were eliminated, a stricter set of criteria for initiating on-site inspections could be instituted.<sup>156</sup> On 2 March, Wadsworth indicated that the United States accepted the Soviet concept of simplified criteria for on-site inspections with certain reservations.<sup>157</sup>

The next major proposal also originated with the Soviets and was formally presented on 19 March. Tsarapkin called the United States proposal of 11 February for a phased treaty "a retrograde move" and "a very dangerous step backwards . . . in . . . that it is designed to prohibit not all nuclear weapon tests but some." He then presented the Soviet alternative: (1) All tests would be

prohibited in the atmosphere, underwater, and in outer space; (2) all underground tests of a seismic magnitude of 4.75 or greater would be prohibited; (3) the USSR, United States, and United Kingdom would embark upon a joint research program to improve the control of underground tests below a seismic magnitude of 4.75; (4) all parties to the treaty would assume an obligation not to conduct any nuclear tests below a seismic magnitude of 4.75.<sup>158</sup> In other words, the Soviet Union had taken the United States proposal and modified it to propose that no nuclear tests be conducted, but without adequate means to ensure it.

The Western response came in a joint declaration by Eisenhower and Macmillan. The statement indicated that once a phased treaty had been signed and a coordinated research program arranged for progressively improving control methods for detecting and identifying events below a seismic magnitude of 4.75, then the United States and United Kingdom "will be ready to institute a voluntary moratorium of agreed duration on nuclear weapons tests below that threshold. . . ." The President and the Prime Minister then invited the Soviet Union to join at once with their countries in making arrangements for a

coordinated research program and in putting it into operation.<sup>159</sup> Despite some serious areas of divergence still remaining, it appeared that both sides were quite close to agreement on a test ban. By mid-April, Wadsworth was able to note that

for the first time in many months, we all in principle share a common approach to the scope of the treaty and to the technical foundation which must underlie the provisions to be agreed upon.<sup>160</sup>

The negotiations during April and the beginning of May were conducted with one eye toward the forthcoming Paris summit conference. The two chief concerns of the delegations were to eliminate as many minor matters as possible and to clarify the major items as much as possible.<sup>161</sup> One of the major items which grew in importance was the concept of a coordinated research program. On 12 April, Wadsworth submitted a working paper on joint research. The major points were that the test ban conference should make the arrangements for coordinating the efforts of the three nations' scientists; there was no need for a formal working group such as had been convened twice in 1959; and 11 May was proposed as the date on which scientific personnel should begin their meetings in Geneva to exchange information on their national research programs.<sup>162</sup> On 3 May, Tsarapkin indicated that the Soviet

Union agreed on 11 May to agree on a "joint program of research and experiments," which would include "a strictly limited number of joint nuclear explosions."<sup>163</sup> This indicated a little more joint activity than the United States was then considering, and the United States representative pointed out that his government perceived the joint research as:

1. An exchange of information concerning the individual research programs of the three states
2. Coordination of the three states' efforts in this area of research
3. The possibility of joint programs<sup>164</sup>

Yet, there was sufficient agreement to allow the scientists to gather once again at Geneva. The Seismic Research Program Advisory Group, as it was called, met from 11 May through 30 May.

While the scientists discussed the technical problems of control, a change took place in the attitude of the Soviet leadership, a result of factors unrelated to the test ban negotiations. Michel Tatu presents an intriguing, though admittedly speculative, case for a power struggle in the Kremlin during the first half of 1960 which was aggravated by the U-2 incident of 1 May. Tatu asserts that the U-2 incident was an embarrassing political reversal for Khrushchev which served as a

catalyst for his latent opposition. Because of the U-2 incident, this opposition was able to deal Khrushchev's ambitions a serious blow and to force him to accept some sharing of power.<sup>165</sup> Tatu indicates that while the first half of May was a period of indecision in the Kremlin, the second half of May was a period during which Khrushchev became the target of almost overt criticism, indicating his weakened position. It was also in the second half of May that the Soviet position in the test ban negotiations began to change and reflect a less cooperative attitude. This change marked the end of the second phase of the negotiations.

#### Analysis of the Negotiating Techniques in Phase II

The Soviets used a variety of negotiating techniques. During this phase, Tsarapkin normally kept polemical statements on a relatively low key. However, one theme continually employed was the questioning of whether the American and British delegations were negotiating in good faith. Any time the Soviet representative to the test ban conference felt that the negotiations were not progressing rapidly enough, he would bring this up. Tsarapkin kept up a fairly constant stream of accusations against the

United States and the United Kingdom in which Tsarapkin purported to show the true reasons for a number of Western proposals. For example, when Wadsworth submitted a draft article allowing peaceful nuclear explosions, Tsarapkin called it a thinly disguised ploy to allow the West to stockpile nuclear weapons, substitute new untested parts for old parts and to accomplish as much nuclear testing as desired.<sup>166</sup> Certainly, there are a number of motives for such a tactic. It may reflect the actual Soviet perception of the situation. It may also have an element of propaganda in it. It may also be used to keep the West on the defensive, and thus, at a disadvantage.

If the Soviet Union could identify any Western proposal as inimical to the achievement of a test ban, then the Soviet position would be that much stronger. This was clearly the case when the Soviets felt their position challenged in early 1959. In reviewing the test ban negotiations, Wadsworth has noted that after it was agreed to include the details of the control system in the treaty,

we really moved ahead quite well for a long time, and it was not until the introduction of our underground-test data that the Soviets' innate suspicion took over again. From then on, the Soviet representative lost no opportunity to excoriate the United States. . . .<sup>167</sup>

The other side of this, of course, was to rigorously defend the Soviet position against any similar tactics. Wadsworth noted wryly in one exchange with Tsarapkin:

. . . I am driven to the conclusion that it is apparently perfectly all right for the Soviet representative to charge the United States with all sorts of things, impugning our motives, distorting our statements, and so forth, but that when the United States representative expresses concern or suspicion as to demonstrated Soviet tactics this arouses righteous indignation.<sup>168</sup>

Taken as a whole, during this period, the Soviet negotiators normally kept their use of rudeness and vilification at a relatively low level, so much so that Sir Michael Wright, the British representative, was able to note, in January 1960, that recriminations "have on the whole--and happily--been absent from our political discussions.

. . . "<sup>169</sup>

As noted above, one of the uses of rudeness, vilification, accusations of bad faith, etc., is for their propaganda effect. Certainly, the Soviets made a concerted effort during this phase to achieve propaganda victories. Often Western positions were answered with propagandistic attacks on Western motives rather than with logical arguments. These Soviet statements were clearly not meant to persuade the other delegations, but were for public



consumption. At times, even Soviet proposals were more propaganda than substance. An excellent example of this is the first test ban treaty proposed by the Soviets. The Soviets submitted a complete treaty for the West's acceptance on the first day of the formal negotiations, before both sides could explain their positions. Soon thereafter, the Soviets released their draft treaty to the Western press, despite the fact that the negotiations were being held in private.<sup>170</sup> The format and content of the treaty also reflected its propaganda purposes. The treaty was short, easily understood by the public, and known to be totally unacceptable to the West because it failed to address the primary Western concerns. Yet, by tabling it and publicizing it, the Soviet Union appeared eager to reach agreement while the West was put in the position of preventing agreement.

In addition, there were numerous other instances which indicated the Soviets were using the negotiations for propaganda purposes. At the first meeting of the test ban conference, Tsarapkin advocated that the negotiations be held in public.<sup>171</sup> At each recess, Tsarapkin managed to make it appear that the West wanted the recess, while the Soviet Union would have preferred to continue its

efforts to reach agreement.<sup>172</sup>

The third Soviet technique of maintaining an adversary attitude was also evident in this phase. The most prominent example of this was the Soviet demand for a veto in the Control Commission. While surrounding this demand with phrases such as "the principle of cooperation among the Great Powers" and "the principle of unanimity," it was obvious the perception was that there would be conflict between the United States and United Kingdom on one side and the Soviet Union on the other. The Soviets were determined to ensure that the USSR would not be forced to do or accept any action of which it did not approve.<sup>173</sup>

In discussing membership in the Control Commission, the concept of an adversary relationship was again given prominence by Tsarapkin:

Here we shall have two sides. . . . And we must form the control organ in such a way that it reflects this relationship between two forces which has come into the world. This means that the equality of these two sides in the control organ must be absolute.<sup>174</sup>

In the negotiations concerning the position of the chief executive officer of the proposed control system, it became readily apparent that the Soviets could not believe that such a person could be impartial in directing the control organization. The Soviet attitude was that he

would favor either the West or the East. An example of this was the Soviet refusal to allow the administrator to appoint one-third of the technical staff of the control posts. Tsarapkin saw this as a Western plot to first win over the administrator and then "stealthily and in a camouflaged way to acquire in the end a predominant position in the control posts."<sup>175</sup> Thus, even in this relatively halcyon phase of the negotiations, the Soviet Union maintained its adversary attitude toward the West.

Another technique used by the Soviets was to be stubborn and to attempt to wear the West down. The primary areas where the Soviets employed this technique were in regard to: (1) the duration of the treaty; (2) the acceptance of the 1958 Experts' Conference report as the sole basis for the control system; and (3) the demand that the treaty should be comprehensive. With regard to the duration of the treaty, the Soviets achieved their goal in March 1959 when the West formally submitted a draft article indicating that the treaty should remain in force indefinitely.<sup>176</sup> Concerning the second item, the Soviets never accepted the Western contention that at least part of the Experts' report was invalid. However, after much argument, they did agree to review some of the conclusions of the

report. This review did not change their position, and during this phase, they unswervingly adhered to the position that the Experts' report was the sole basis for the test ban control system.<sup>177</sup> The Soviets were equally insistent that the treaty should cover all nuclear tests. Any Western suggestion that nuclear tests should be allowed in a particular environment was met with swift and intense Soviet opposition.<sup>178</sup>

The technique of being devious and using deceit was also employed by the Soviets on this phase. For example, the Experts' report clearly indicated that the control system recommended had certain limitations on its capability to detect and identify nuclear weapons tests. Yet, Soviet statements invariably indicated that according to the report, no nuclear weapons tests could escape detection.<sup>179</sup> It was also typical of the Soviet representative at the test ban negotiations to deliberately misquote a statement of the United States or British representative and then to use this to support the Soviet position.<sup>180</sup>

On at least one occasion, Tsarapkin deliberately lied to make a point. In discussing the draft preamble for the treaty, the representatives were vying to see who could support their version with the most recent UN General

Assembly resolution. When the British delegate indicated that his version of the preamble was based on a resolution made in November 1953, Tsarapkin asserted that his version was based on a 1954 resolution and, therefore, should be adopted. However, when the British representative could not find the wording he objected to in the 1954 resolution and confronted Tsarapkin with that fact, Tsarapkin then admitted that his wording, in fact, came from a 1946 resolution.<sup>181</sup>

The Soviets also successfully used the sixth negotiating technique noted in the previous chapter. This technique was to use the negotiating process to divide or demoralize your opponent or to prevent him from taking a specific action. In this phase, the Soviets were successful in preventing the resumption of nuclear weapons tests throughout the entire phase of the negotiations despite the fact that the United States and United Kingdom had previously indicated that they would not agree to an uncontrolled cessation of nuclear tests.

During this phase, contrary to what some Western observers had previously noted, the Soviet Union did appear willing to make concessions to Western demands on a number of issues. On the entire issue of control, the Soviet

Union was willing to compromise. As Sir Michael Wright has noted, during this phase the Soviet government showed "signs of willingness to accept minimal and reasonable international verification, at least it accepted the principle although leaving negotiating loopholes in practice."<sup>182</sup> In procedural matters, the Soviets made a concession to the West in that the test ban conference in this phase did in fact follow the Western agenda,<sup>183</sup> and the Soviets agreed to three scientific conferences during this phase, none of which were suggested by them.

On some substantive issues the Soviets were also willing to compromise. At first, the Soviets were unwilling to allow any nuclear explosions while the United States wanted to allow the continuation of explosions for peaceful purposes. The Soviet Union compromised on this.<sup>184</sup> The West also wanted to conduct some nuclear explosions to aid in improving the control system, and the Soviets reluctantly agreed to this as well.<sup>185</sup> One of the most obvious cases of compromise during this phase concerned the staffing of control posts. At the beginning of the negotiations, the Soviet position was that each control post should be manned by nationals of the country in which the control post was located with one "observer"

from the other side. The Western position was that there should be no nationals of the host country occupying technical positions in the control posts. By the end of this phase, agreement had been reached that the technical staff of the control posts should be one-third United States/United Kingdom, one-third Soviet, and one-third nationals of other states.<sup>186</sup> While some important differences remained, this is a classical case of mutual concession making.

The Soviets also used the negotiating technique of attempting to gain agreement in principle prior to detailed negotiations on the substantive issues. The Soviets' first draft treaty was just such an attempt in that it would have bound the West to an agreement for the cessation of nuclear tests before the substantive issues of control could even be discussed.

Similarly, at the Experts' Conference, the Soviets had accepted, in principle, the concept of on-site inspections as part of the control system. However, it was only during the detailed negotiations that the Soviets revealed that they wanted the ability to veto any inspection on their own territory, thus, negating their acceptance of the principle.

One other example of this technique is that the Soviets pressed for the West to agree in principle that substantive matters decided by the control commission should require the unanimous consent of the three nuclear powers. Tsarapkin noted that the decision as to which matters were to be considered substantive could easily be agreed to once agreement had been reached on the principle. The West refused to accept this and insisted on discussing the specific items which would require unanimity.<sup>187</sup>

The Soviet Union also resorted to the technique of making exaggerated and unreasonable demands. Before the test ban negotiations got underway, the Soviet representative to the General Assembly's First Committee made the demand that the Soviet Union should be allowed to conduct as many nuclear tests as had the United States and United Kingdom since 31 March 1958. However, Zorin then displayed the "reasonableness" of the Soviet Union when he offered to forego this demand if the West would agree to an immediate cessation of time.<sup>188</sup> At the test ban conference, Tsarapkin reiterated this offer after he had presented the Soviet draft treaty for the United States and British representatives' signatures.<sup>189</sup>



A similar example was the presentation of the list of items over which the Soviet Union demanded a veto in the control commission.<sup>190</sup> The list left almost no items free of a Soviet veto. Wadsworth noted that if even all other articles of the treaty were written by the West, this Soviet proposal would "completely nullify the effectiveness of the control organization."<sup>191</sup> A major portion of the conference's sessions from then on were devoted to attempts by the West to eliminate this all-pervasive veto--a task that was never fully achieved prior to the control system itself being discarded.

As noted in the previous chapter, a technique related to this is to ignore or simply brush off the arguments of one's opponents rather than trying to answer them. This was an extremely common Soviet technique. Within three months of the beginning of the test ban conference, Wadsworth was complaining:

It seems to me a rather unusual attitude to take that when the Soviet representative disapproves of or disagrees with a proposal made by the United States or the United Kingdom, that is negotiation, whereas if the United States or the United Kingdom disagrees with a Soviet Union proposal that is an attempt to break off the talks. He [the Soviet representative] just cannot have it both ways.<sup>192</sup>

Tsarapkin also brushed off Western concerns by indicating they simply did not exist. The British

representative indicated that to allow the Soviets a veto over the appointment of every one of the estimated 15,000 people who would be working in the control organization would make the system unworkable. Tsarapkin's answer was, "The difficulties apprehended here are merely imaginary."<sup>193</sup> When the West was insisting on putting an article in the treaty allowing the treaty's abrogation should a violation of the test ban occur, Tsarapkin argued vehemently against such an article, saying that it

. . . is one aspect of security which seems to us imaginary, since after the signing of the treaty we do not expect that any Power . . . will . . . violate the treaty and carry out secret nuclear weapon tests.<sup>194</sup>

When the West argued that the treaty should allow for special aircraft routes to be devised as needed in order to obtain possible radioactive air samples which would indicate a violation of the treaty, Tsarapkin maintained that all air routes must be determined when the treaty came into force. At one point of the discussion, the following exchange took place. Sir Michael Wright:

If the predetermined flight routes submitted by country X were not such as to permit the flight to traverse the area in which the suspected radioactive cloud was calculated to be, what, in the view of the Soviet representative, would be the position?

Tsarapkin:

Such cases will not occur. There can be no such cases as you have in mind.<sup>195</sup>

These examples are not simply isolated cases, but are representative of this frequently used technique.

Another technique used during this phase was to attempt to decide substantive issues through procedural devices. The glaring example here, of course, is the debate on the agenda that occurred at the beginning of the test ban conference. The debate lasted for ten sessions. The Soviets pressed to have the conference first agree on a test ban treaty, and once that was agreed to then discussion would begin on an appropriate control system.<sup>196</sup> Had the Soviet agenda been accepted, the Soviets would have gained all they wanted before even addressing the question of control, the topic of greatest importance to the West. Similarly, the Soviets pressed to have all the agreements on control in a document separate from the treaty itself. This would have relegated the control system to a position of only minor importance. The Soviets sought to put a time limit on the conference of two to three weeks<sup>197</sup> and have it negotiated by the foreign ministers rather than at a lower diplomatic level.<sup>198</sup> Both these procedural questions were intended to force the West into agreeing to

a short, simple treaty, leaving little or no time to discuss the complicated question of a control system. Even the communiques issued at the close of each session of the test ban conference were used, at times, to gain substantive advantages. For example, on 3 May 1960, Tsarapkin attempted to influence the agenda of the impending meeting of scientists by inserting in that day's communique the sentence:

The Conference agreed that experts of the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom should proceed on 11 May to agree on a joint programme of research and experiments.<sup>199</sup>

Yet, the United States and the United Kingdom had not agreed to a joint program, but wanted rather a coordinated program in which each country conducted its own research. Had the United States and United Kingdom agreed to the Soviet version of the communique, Tsarapkin would then have insisted that the research program would have to be one program agreed to and conducted by all three states rather than the three coordinated programs desired by the West.

During this phase, the Soviets did not break off or threaten to break off the negotiations. This is logical since they were the party that had the most interest in reaching agreement on a treaty. However, on a number of

occasions the Soviets accused the West of wanting to break off the negotiations.<sup>200</sup> This accusation had two obvious purposes: (1) to give the Soviets a propaganda victory, and (2) to force the West into modifying its position on a particular topic so as to show that the accusation was untrue. Iklé makes an interesting comment on the effect that the prior use of this Soviet technique had on Western perceptions during the test ban conference. He notes that the United States refrained from testing even after the expiration of the unilateral moratorium of 31 December 1959 because it expected that a resumption of testing would cause the Soviets to walk out of the conference. It considered a rupture of the conference more undesirable than continuing the uninspected moratorium.<sup>201</sup>

During this phase of the negotiations, the Soviets also used the technique of making a concession, repudiating the concession and making it again. The primary example of this is that in 1957, the Soviets had accepted the Western position that any test ban treaty must include an effective control system. Indeed, it was mainly this concession that forced the West to the negotiating table. However, on 30 January 1959, the Soviet Union submitted a proposal to the conference indicating on which items the

Soviet Union demanded a veto in the control commission.<sup>202</sup> The list was almost all encompassing, and was, in fact, a complete repudiation of the concept of effective control. The West then spent the next thirty-two months attempting to eliminate or circumvent the items on this veto list, and in doing so made numerous concessions to the Soviets. Thus, the West was both pressured into negotiations and forced to make significant concessions by the Soviets using this technique.

During the negotiations, Tsarapkin also used the tactic of piling up grievances against the West. He was constantly complaining that the negotiations were proceeding much too slowly, that the West was attempting to delay the negotiations. Prior to recesses, it was customary for the delegates to summarize the efforts made since the last recess. During these summations, the British and American representatives normally emphasized the progress made and the amount of agreement achieved. Tsarapkin, on the other hand, usually emphasized the amount of disagreement remaining (blaming it on the West). Tsarapkin also continually nagged the Western representatives for answers to his questions or for formal proposals on specific topics such as the duration of the treaty.<sup>203</sup>

The "waiving gambit" was another technique used by the Soviets in this phase. In this technique, the Soviets persuade their opponents to waive discussion of a particular topic to a future time, then at that later time the Soviets refuse to discuss the topic at all. A clear example of this concerns the question of whether on-site inspection teams should be formed only when needed or should there be permanent teams always on call. The former position was maintained by the Soviets at the Experts' Conference, while the West took the latter position. As a result of this disagreement, the Report of the Experts' Conference did not mention whether the inspection teams should be permanent or ad hoc. When the question arose in the test ban conference, Tsarapkin was adamant that since the Experts' Report did not mention permanent inspection teams that the Soviet delegation had convinced the Western delegations that permanent teams were not necessary.<sup>204</sup> That the report also did not indicate that the teams should be formed on an ad hoc basis was blithely ignored. Tsarapkin used the same tactic to refute the West's demand for special aircraft routes for the detection of radioactivity in the atmosphere.<sup>205</sup> In addition, Tsarapkin attempted to waive several topics brought up by the Western

delegates. He attempted to waive the new seismic data: any later technical and scientific developments in detecting and identifying explosions should be taken up by the control commission after the treaty comes into force.<sup>206</sup> He also attempted to have the question of on-site inspections waived, suggesting that the control commission should deal with the question as it gains practical experience.<sup>207</sup>

As in the previous phase, the Soviets used a number of techniques not listed by the Western scholars in Chapter II. For instance, Tsarapkin was adept at making a proposal and insisting that the West accept it because the West had made the proposal first. There are two primary examples of this technique during this phase. First, when Tsarapkin introduced the concept of having an annual quota of on-site inspections so as to circumvent the Soviet demand for a veto over any proposed inspection, he emphasized that this proposal was based on a suggestion made by British Prime Minister Macmillan during his February 1959 visit to Moscow.<sup>208</sup> This was true, with some modification: (1) Macmillan made the suggestion to Khrushchev that a quota system might be a way out of the deadlock on inspections, but he did not make a formal proposal; and (2) the actual idea of a quota system had been suggested to



Macmillan by a Soviet diplomat to begin with. Despite these facts, once Tsarapkin formally proposed the quota system, he demanded that the West accept it (without knowing what specific quota the Soviets would demand or agree to), simply on the basis that Macmillan was the originator of the proposal.

A similar example involved the question of "simplified" criteria to be used for initiating an on-site inspection under the quota system. When Tsarapkin proposed the simplified criteria one of his primary arguments for its acceptance by the West was that it was based on a similar British proposal of 15 January 1960. What Tsarapkin did not indicate, however, was that the Soviet proposal had added one more criterion which would have been very difficult to meet, thereby greatly limiting the number of events which could be inspected.<sup>209</sup>

During this phase, the Soviets continued to maintain the primacy of the political aspects of the negotiations. This is shown in Zorin's statement in the First Committee of the General Assembly prior to the commencement of the test ban negotiations. Zorin complained of "a clear effort by the United States and other Western Powers to transfer all discussion of disarmament questions from the

political to the technical level." To Zorin such a technical approach was "clearly unacceptable if the goal was to solve the principal questions of disarmament in substance and not merely to bury the question in endless technical disputes. . . ." <sup>210</sup> Throughout this phase, there appeared a definite Soviet reluctance to engage in technical discussions. One reason for this, of course, was the Soviet suspicion that the technical data would not support their positions. However, it is also clear from the transcripts of the negotiations that the Soviets considered the technical questions to be only of minor importance, and certainly not to be brought up and discussed on their own merit. To the Soviets, any discussions of technical data must have a political purpose behind it, and the Soviets undoubtedly understood the Western purpose was to delay or defeat the negotiations. <sup>211</sup> An example of this was the debate over what research should be conducted for improving the control system. The West insisted that the research should include possible methods for concealing nuclear tests. The Soviets simply could not understand this as a scientific necessity, as did the West. Instead, they saw such research as being politically motivated. Tsarapkin maintained that

if both sides were guided by [the positive task of concluding a treaty to ban all kinds of nuclear weapons tests], if both sides aimed at fulfilling only this task, then nobody would take upon himself the initiative of carrying out investigations in the absolutely opposite directions, in a new field and for purposes directly contrary to those of the treaty we are drafting. . . . But when the forces in the United States which are opposed to the conclusion of a comprehensive treaty were faced with the possibility of a treaty being concluded on the basis of the experts' recommendations of 1958, then --as the whole world sees-- . . . they had recourse to new tactics: they asked the scientists to work out the theory and to prove in practice that underground explosions cannot be distinguished from earthquakes and that this problem cannot be solved.<sup>212</sup>

After more than a year of negotiating a test ban, Wadsworth characterized the Soviet attitude in the following manner, as one which

. . . first considers a scientific problem in terms of whether it is positive or negative in a political sense--from the Soviet point of view. If the former, there is a chance for working out agreement, but if the latter, the USSR will never agree. This seems to me to presuppose that science will always be the servant of politics and that objective facts must be subordinated to political aims.<sup>213</sup>

A major consequence of this attitude was the East-West dispute over a quota for on-site inspections. To the Soviets it was a purely political question; to the West, the scientific aspects played a crucial role. This dispute was one never to be resolved during the negotiations.

In addition to placing the technical aspects of the negotiations in a subordinate role, the Soviets were also extremely reluctant to divulge their own technical data to the West. This was true in the political negotiations, despite numerous appeals by the Western representatives for Soviet data to refute the new seismic data,<sup>214</sup> and in the three technical conferences which were held during this phase.

The Soviets also used the technique of making a major concession in such a way that it was actually no concession at all. The most prominent use of this technique, during phase II, concerned the Western proposal of February 1960 for a phased treaty. The proposal would include a test ban on all tests except those underground tests having a seismic magnitude below 4.75. These tests would not be banned until their detection and identification were technologically feasible. While the Soviets were initially opposed to this, on 19 March 1960, Tsarapkin announced a major Soviet concession: the Soviet Union would accept a phased treaty as long as it included a moratorium on nuclear tests of less than 4.75 magnitude.<sup>215</sup> While the Soviets claimed this to be a major concession, in reality, it was a retrogression in that it included an

uncontrolled moratorium. In a similar manner, the Soviets proposed that they could give up their demand for a veto over the control organization's financial matters in the control commission if the West agreed to a control commission consisting of three Western members, three Soviet bloc members and one neutral, and provided that financial questions must be approved by a two-thirds majority.<sup>216</sup> Simple arithmetic shows that it still would be impossible for the control commission to approve any financial decision without the Soviet Union's approval. Therefore, the Soviet "concession" was actually no concession at all.

During the test ban negotiations, Tsarapkin routinely used Western news sources and statements by government officials to support his point, especially when he was accusing the West of negotiating in bad faith. Ormsby-Gore, the British representative, once retorted after Tsarapkin had quoted some London papers:

I have noticed on previous occasions that the Soviet representative, when he finds difficulty in presenting the case of the Soviet delegation sufficiently persuasively to the other delegations at the Conference table is apt to try to obscure the issue by quoting statements from prominent personalities, from newspaper and from other sources in an attempt to impugn the motives of the representatives of the Governments with whom his delegation is negotiation.<sup>217</sup>

One week later, Tsarapkin set a conference record by spending over an hour reading fifty-five letters into the record, all demanding that nuclear tests be ended immediately. He then quoted newspaper articles to show how the United States was planning to resume nuclear testing and destroy the conference.<sup>218</sup> This, of course, can be taken as merely an exercise in propaganda methods. However, it is probable that there is more to the Soviet obsession with quoting Western sources. One comment in the Soviet work, Diplomacy of Contemporary Imperialism, indicates the Soviet perception of the Western press that is quite revealing:

There is no greater error than the assumption that a "free press" exists in the capitalist countries. In the West the press, radio and television are at the service of the policy of the ruling class and their activity is strictly limited by the bounds which the ruling circles consider it necessary to set up, proceeding from the interests of their own course of foreign policy and domestic policy.<sup>219</sup>

If this accurately reflects the Soviet perception of the Western press, then the Soviet technique of constantly quoting Western sources to support their arguments and accusations seems much more purposeful. In further support for this argument, it should be noted that the above quote is fully compatible with the whole Soviet concept of political reality.

There is one last negotiating technique that was used by the Soviets in this phase of the negotiations. The Soviets often supported their arguments on a particular point by emphasizing that if the West would only agree to the Soviet position on this matter, everything else easily could be agreed to. For example, in April 1959, Tsarapkin pressed for the United States and United Kingdom to agree that there should be a quota for on-site inspections:

Having agreed on that it will not be difficult to agree on the status of inspection groups. . . . We do not expect to find any serious obstacle to a solution on the composition of inspection groups.<sup>220</sup>

On a subsequent occasion, Tsarapkin noted:

The inspection question is now paralysing our Conference; it is hindering and holding up progress. The settlement of the inspection question would enable us to draw up a treaty in a very short time.<sup>221</sup>

In summarizing this phase, it should be noted that most of the Soviet tactics observed in use were also used by the Soviets in the previous phase. In this phase, the Soviet aim was to achieve agreement on a test ban as rapidly as possible. This resulted in the emergence of two pronounced themes: (1) Soviet impatience with the West; and (2) Soviet suspicion of Western motives whenever the West pushed to discuss a particular topic in detail. Because of the Soviet desire to reach agreement on a treaty,

the Soviets appeared cooperative in many instances and, at times, the negotiations proceeded quite smoothly. Yet, at other times, Soviet tactics simply deadlocked the negotiations.<sup>222</sup>

### Phase III. May 1960-December 1962

#### Overview

This phase is characterized by a reversal of roles by the United States and the Soviet Union. Whereas before, it was the Soviet Union that had actively sought a test ban treaty, now the United States became the advocate of agreement. In contrast, the Soviet Union began to move away from an agreement, renouncing previously agreed treaty articles and resuming nuclear weapons tests, ultimately causing the breakdown of the test ban conference.

#### The Geneva Negotiations-- 27 May 1960-22 August 1960

As previously noted, the third phase of the negotiations commenced in mid-May 1960, while the technical negotiations concerning future research for improving the control system were in progress. Apparently, even the Soviet scientists attending the seismic Research Program Advisory Group were caught unawares by the change in the



Soviet position. During the fourth meeting of the scientists, Dr. Riznichenko, a Soviet delegate, had indicated that the Soviets were going to conduct four large chemical explosions in 1960-61, which would be part of the coordinated research program.<sup>223</sup> Yet, on 2 June, Tsarapkin indicated that any research agreed to would have to be carried out in the United States and that the USSR would conduct no tests, nuclear or chemical, as part of the coordinated research.<sup>224</sup> This obviously was a setback for improving the control system.

Yet, the rest of the negotiations conducted in 1960, reflected two conflicting trends: both a hardening of the Soviet position and, despite this, some minor progress. The Soviet position on the inspection quota indicated the extreme position the Soviets were assuming. On 26 July, Tsarapkin proposed that each of the three nuclear powers allow a total of three on-site inspections to take place on their territory.<sup>225</sup> Wadsworth was frankly taken by surprise by such a low figure.<sup>226</sup> On 11 February 1960, the West had suggested a yearly quota which was defined as a percentage of the total number of events qualifying for inspection under an agreed set of criteria. This was understood at the time to work out to approximately

twenty inspections per year. Tsarapkin emphasized that the Soviet proposal was a purely political determined figure,<sup>227</sup> and that any Western recourse to arguments based on technical data were simply not apropos. The Soviets also indicated a hardening of attitude on the question of when on-site inspections should begin. On 16 February 1960, Tsarapkin had indicated that such inspections could begin once the treaty came into force.<sup>228</sup> However, in mid-August, he submitted a proposal which indicated that such inspections could only take place four years after the beginning of the installation of the control system. Yet, it was only in November that Tsarapkin emphasized this aspect of the Soviet proposal.<sup>229</sup>

At the same time that the Soviet position was hardening, the three delegations were also able to reach agreement on three relatively minor issues. First, it was agreed that there should be five deputy administrators for the control organization, although their exact status and selection was never completely decided. Second, the conference agreed upon a definition of the term magnitude. While this was minor in itself, it did have major implications for the treaty since the test ban would only apply to nuclear tests above a magnitude of 4.75. Third,

Annex II of the treaty was adopted. This annex dealt with the privileges and immunities to be accorded the personnel of the control system. The great majority of this annex had been agreed to prior to May 1960. Therefore, the adoption of this annex was not really significant.

#### The Fifteenth UN General Assembly

The fifteenth session of the UN General Assembly, which met in the fall of 1960, indicated the changed Soviet priorities and concerns which had adversely affected the test ban conference. Of primary importance for the United Nations itself was Khrushchev's demand that the Secretary-General be replaced by a "troika." In his speech before the General Assembly, Khrushchev asked:

. . . how can we find one man for the post of Secretary-General of the United Nations who can take into consideration the interests of all three groups of states [i.e., communist, capitalist and neutral]? In our view this is impossible. . . .

The only correct way, therefore, of solving this problem would be to create an executive organ consisting of three persons, representing the three groups of States. . . .<sup>230</sup>

This attitude indicated a growing Soviet distrust of "neutral administrators," and a growing antagonism toward the West which would soon be reflected in the test ban conference.

Concerning disarmament, the Soviets emphasized general and complete disarmament. Khrushchev barely mentioned a nuclear test ban in his speech. In the First Committee's discussion on its agenda, Zorin pressed to have general and complete disarmament and the Disarmament Commission's report discussed first, and a test ban second.<sup>231</sup> It was decided, upon the suggestion of the Indian representative, that all disarmament items be discussed together. The question of a test ban was not discussed at great length, the Soviet and American representatives each reiterated their own version of why no agreement had been reached yet. The final outcome was that the Soviet Union supported the two resolutions finally passed by the General Assembly. The resolution urged the United States, United Kingdom, and USSR to continue their present voluntary suspension of nuclear tests and to reach agreement on a test ban as soon as possible. (The United States abstained on both resolutions, fearing that the voluntary suspension of tests might come to be regarded as an acceptable alternative to a safeguarded agreement on nuclear testing.)<sup>232</sup>

One interesting indication of the declining Soviet interest in the on-going test ban conference was a draft

resolution submitted to the First Committee by Poland on 24 October 1960. Although it was entitled "Establishment of Conditions Conducive to Reaching Agreement on General and Complete Disarmament," operative paragraph (a) called upon the three nuclear powers to reach

a relevant [test ban] agreement not later than 1 April 1961. Failing this, the problem should be immediately submitted to the United Nations General Assembly at a session specially convened for this purpose; . . . .<sup>233</sup>

The Soviet representative indicated his support for the draft resolution, but it was not put to a vote.<sup>234</sup> However, simply the fact that such a draft resolution should be presented by a Soviet satellite is significant. The attitude behind the draft resolution would seem to be that the test ban conference had dragged on long enough, and unless the United States and United Kingdom were willing to make significant concessions, the conference should be abandoned and the issue taken up by the General Assembly. Three reasons could be seen for the latter course. First, the General Assembly would offer a much better forum for propaganda. Second, the Soviet Union would have other states, such as India, supporting its position, thus putting greater pressure on the United States and United Kingdom to make concessions. Third, France would then be

included in the negotiations. The test ban conference did not include France, although France was now the fourth nuclear power.

The Geneva Negotiations--  
27 September 1960-9 September 1961

Shortly after the beginning of the Fifteen General Assembly, the test ban negotiations resumed in Geneva. Aside from agreement on Annex II, little was accomplished. On 17 November, the United States representative, Charles Stelle, complained that the Soviet Union had offered no new ideas since the negotiations resumed on 27 September.

Taken all together, the situation in which we find ourselves is that the Western representatives have repeatedly come forward with new proposals and new efforts to break the deadlock on many issues; either they received no answers or, in almost every case, when there is a reply it adds up to a rejection by the Soviet Union and a rejection on insubstantial grounds. Moreover, the Soviet delegation has, for some reason, been unwilling to elaborate and make clear those portions of its position which it must recognize are obscure.<sup>235</sup>

With the election of John F. Kennedy, there was little reason for the test ban negotiations to continue under the direction of the Eisenhower Administration, and the last meeting was held on 5 December 1960. The negotiations resumed on 21 March 1961 after the Kennedy Administration had reviewed the state of the test ban conference

and had coordinated its policy with that of the United Kingdom.<sup>236</sup> The United States' delegation was now headed by Arthur H. Dean. The opening session of the negotiations exemplified the course the negotiations would take to the end of this phase, in December 1962. At this session, the United States and the United Kingdom made a number of major concessions to the Soviets. At the same session, the Soviet delegation indicated a much harder Soviet position than before, including a significant Soviet retraction.

The Western concessions were wide ranging. The number of control posts the West wanted in the Soviet Union was reduced from twenty-one to nineteen. The West conceded that each of the three states involved in the negotiations should be subject to a quota of twenty on-site inspections --if so warranted by the objective criteria still to be agreed upon. This meant that the West would be allowed twenty inspections on Soviet territory while the Soviet Union could conduct a total of forty inspections: twenty in the United States and twenty in the United Kingdom. The West conceded equally to the Soviet bloc in the control commission, but made it dependent upon the Soviets accepting an enlarged control commission of eleven members: four Western states, four Soviet bloc states, and three neutrals.

The West agreed that the seismic research program should commence when the treaty was signed rather than immediately, and that it and the moratorium on tests below 4.75 magnitude should be extended to three years. Finally, the West accepted the safeguards demanded by the Soviets, on 15 June 1960, for any nuclear tests made by the West either for seismic research or for peaceful purposes under the Plowshare Program.<sup>237</sup>

At the same meeting, Tsarapkin announced no concessions, but did table two new Soviet demands. First, he demanded that the administrator, which had been previously agreed upon, be replaced by an administrative council consisting of three members, each representing a political bloc (Western, Soviet, and neutral), and who "would act as a single whole and would agree amongst themselves on all steps which they would undertake in the execution of their duties." Second, he demanded France halt its nuclear weapons tests.<sup>238</sup>

The negotiations quickly reached an impasse with each side denouncing the other. During the spring of 1961, the West further modified its position in an attempt to get the negotiations off dead center. First, to a large extent, Dean accepted the Soviet demand concerning the



staffing of control posts. Both sides had previously agreed that the technical and specialist positions in the control posts should be divided into thirds: one-third staffed with American and British nationals, one-third staffed with Soviet nationals, and one-third staffed with nationals of other states. Tsarapkin had demanded that the last third must be divided into thirds as well and staffed with allies of the West, allies of the Soviet Union, and neutrals in exactly equal proportions. The West had maintained that to be so exact would make the staffing of the control posts an impossibly complex job. However, on 28 March, Dean agreed that the last third should have a numerical balance between the Soviet bloc nationals and the Western bloc nationals with neutrals making up the remainder of the third.<sup>239</sup> Thus, while not completely accepting the Soviet position, the West moved ever closer toward it.

On 18 April, the United States and Britain tabled a complete treaty which they indicated they would be willing to sign on the spot. It incorporated all the previously agreed articles and annexes, some slightly modified, and put the remaining unresolved issues in treaty language.<sup>240</sup> However, it was clearly indicated that these

latter articles were to be considered negotiable.<sup>241</sup> This was the first complete treaty tabled by the West since the negotiations began. Then on 29 May, the West modified its proposal for a quota for on-site inspections. Previously, the West had offered the Soviet Union two choices: (1) a flat quota of twenty inspections on the territory of each of the three states, or (2) a percentage formula which, in reality, would also work out to approximately twenty inspections in the USSR per year. Now the West proposed a sliding scale for arriving at a quota. Each of the three states would begin with a quota of twelve inspections per year. However, if there were more than sixty seismic events in a year, for every five events over sixty, the country would allow one additional inspection, up to a maximum of twenty inspections per year. Thus, the West proposed a sliding scale of twelve to twenty inspections per year.<sup>242</sup>

The Soviets accepted neither of these concessions. Instead, during the Vienna meeting of Kennedy and Khrushchev, the Soviet leader clearly demonstrated the low priority he now assigned to obtaining agreement on a nuclear test ban. During the meeting, Khrushchev indicated to Kennedy that almost any other measure would be a better

beginning for disarmament than a nuclear test ban.<sup>243</sup> He also emphasized that both leaders were under pressure to resume nuclear tests, but that the Soviet Union would wait for the United States to begin testing first. If the United States tested, the USSR would also.<sup>244</sup>

On the last day of the meeting, Khrushchev handed Kennedy an aide memoire which reaffirmed the Soviet position on the questions of a moratorium, the administrative council and the size of the inspection quota. Then, after demonstrating the intransigence of the Soviet position, it called upon the United States to concentrate instead on the question of general and complete disarmament:

. . . if the Western Powers accept the [Soviet] proposal on general and complete disarmament, [the Soviet Union] would, for its part, be prepared to accept unconditionally any proposals by the Western Powers on control. The Soviet Government . . . would agree in that event to sign a document in which the Western Powers' proposals on the discontinuance of nuclear tests were included.<sup>245</sup>

The Soviet position was now clear. Only when the West had accepted and complied with the Soviet plan for general and complete disarmament, would the Soviet Union agree to the controls demanded by the West for a test ban.

The Soviet aide memoire touched off an exchange of notes in which each side reiterated its position, reflecting the impasse in the negotiations. However, on 28 August,

the West again attempted to bring life back to the negotiations by further concessions to the Soviet Union, offering to modify the proposed control system so that the threshold would be eliminated immediately or at the end of the three year moratorium. Tsarapkin responded with a diatribe against the West and asserted "the question of discontinuing nuclear weapon tests can be solved only in conjunction with that of disarmament."<sup>246</sup> [Emphasis mine.]

On 30 August, Dean announced two further concessions by the West, one dealing with the administrator, the other with the staffing of on-site inspection teams.<sup>247</sup> The next day, the Soviet Union announced in a lengthy, polemical statement that it was resuming nuclear weapons tests.

On the third of September, President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan jointly proposed to Premier Khrushchev a test ban on atmospheric tests. The most significant part of the proposal was that the two Western leaders indicated that they were "prepared to rely upon existing means of detection, which they believe to be adequate, and are not suggesting additional controls."<sup>248</sup> Thus, for the first time, the West offered to accept a partial test ban without linking it to an international

control system. However, the Soviet Union rejected this proposal and the test ban conference adjourned. The debate now moved once again to the UN General Assembly.

#### The Sixteenth UN General Assembly

To an outside observer, the test ban debate between the United States and the Soviet delegations during the Sixteenth General Assembly was the stuff of which cynicism is made. The two sides had completely reversed their positions since the Twelfth General Assembly in 1957. Now the United States was demanding a test ban agreement independent of all other disarmament measures, and the Soviet Union was arguing that there was no value in a test ban alone and its worth was only to be realized when it was achieved in conjunction with real disarmament. To say that both sides simply traded speeches would be an exaggeration, but not by much. Now the United States had proposed with the United Kingdom that the question of "the urgent need for a treaty to ban nuclear weapons tests under effective international control" be placed on the General Assembly's agenda and given high priority. Zorin, however, found it hard to understand why the United States and the United Kingdom delegations were insisting on the urgent need for a treaty to ban nuclear weapons tests.<sup>249</sup>

Soviet efforts during the session of the General Assembly were concentrated on: (1) defending its resumption of nuclear testing; (2) defeating a resolution appealing to the USSR not to explode a 50 megaton weapon; (3) defeating resolutions calling for rapid agreement on a test ban treaty; and (4) calling for the subsuming of the test ban negotiations under the discussions on general and complete disarmament. In the first three efforts the Soviets failed. In the fourth effort they were only partially successful.

The Geneva Negotiations--  
28 November 1961-29 January 1962

The test ban negotiations resumed on 28 November 1961 in Geneva. On that day, the Soviet Union indicated the extent of its reversal on the test ban question when it presented a new draft treaty to the United States and United Kingdom. The treaty took the Soviet position back past the treaty tabled on 31 October 1958, at the beginning of the test ban negotiations. It called for a ban on all tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and underwater. Each party would use its own national system for ensuring compliance with this part of the treaty. This took the Soviet position back to the beginning of the London

Conference in 1957. The Soviets proposed that a moratorium be instituted on all underground tests until a control system could be agreed to, which would be a constituent part of the control system over compliance with an agreement on general and complete disarmament. In simplified terms, this meant there would be no control over underground tests until after general and complete disarmament had been completed. Finally, to add insult to injury, the treaty would come into force upon its signature by the governments of the United States, United Kingdom, USSR, and France.<sup>250</sup> France, of course, had refused to have anything to do with the test ban negotiations and would not participate in the forthcoming negotiations on general and complete disarmament. In addition, the treaty violated the United States and British constitutional systems since it would have the treaty come into force prior to its ratification.

The Soviet draft treaty called for a total test ban with no attendant control system. It thereby refuted even the report of the 1958 Experts' Conference to which the Soviet Union had so tenaciously clung for more than three years. At this point, the little remaining common basis between East and West for negotiating a test ban was

officially shattered. The test ban conference limped on for another twelve sessions. On 29 January 1962 it recessed sine die.

The ENDC Negotiations--  
14 March 1962-18 September 1962

This did not end the negotiations for a test ban, however. On 14 March 1962, the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC) held its first session. Although it was chartered to be a forum for the discussion of general and complete disarmament, it quickly organized a subcommittee, consisting of the United States, United Kingdom, and the USSR to discuss the question of a test ban.<sup>251</sup> The plenary meetings of the ENDC also soon became a forum for the discussion of a nuclear test ban as well.

The Subcommittee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests held fifty sessions during 1962. However, after the Christmas recess it was not reconvened. The subcommittee quickly reflected the impasse that had destroyed the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests. The Soviet Union held to its draft treaty of 28 November 1961 as the basis for the negotiations, while the United States and the United Kingdom held to their draft treaty of 18 April 1961 as modified on



29 May 1961, 30 August 1961, and 15 March 1962. On the latter date the Western representatives had an informal meeting with the Soviet representative to the ENDC and suggested a number of further changes which the West would be willing to make in its draft treaty. The most basic change was to eliminate the threshold, thereby prohibiting all underground tests, not just those of 4.75 magnitude and above.<sup>252</sup> The Western amendments were rejected by the Soviet Union. This latest concession highlighted the difference in attitude between the two sides. The West indicated that their draft treaty was negotiable, even after the inclusion of many concessions. The Soviet Union held its treaty up as taking into full consideration all the Western demands, and therefore, the Soviets maintained, no further compromises could be made.

Actually, the Soviet position had hardened since the demise of the test ban negotiations. The Soviet Union now claimed that even underground tests could be fully monitored by national means of detection. This was based on the fact that the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission had announced its detection of a Soviet underground test in February. Khrushchev held that this proved that national systems could be used for monitoring underground tests as

well as those in the other three environments.<sup>253</sup>

With the negotiations deadlocked, the neutral states of the ENDC attempted to aid the nuclear powers in achieving a compromise. On 16 April, Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden, and the United Arab Republic submitted a joint memorandum for this purpose.<sup>254</sup> This Eight-Power Memorandum became the focal point of the subcommittee's negotiations from that point on. However, this effort did not result in any movement in the Soviet position of any consequence, and, although the United States and United Kingdom did indicate some modifications in their own position, they could not get the Soviet Union to engage in serious negotiations. Therefore, the Western modifications remained in outline form only.

The Eight-Power Memorandum allowed considerable debate between the United States, the United Kingdom and the USSR because the document was not particularly clear in a number of areas, especially concerning whether on-site inspections should be obligatory or conducted only upon the invitation of the state whose territory was to be inspected. This obfuscation was primarily the work of Arthur Lall, the Indian representative to the ENDC, who

wanted to make the memorandum more equidistant between the positions of the East and the West.<sup>255</sup> The United States and the United Kingdom posed a number of questions to the authors of the memorandum, in order to clarify the ambiguities.<sup>256</sup> However, the eight states refused to clarify their memorandum for a number of reasons.<sup>257</sup> The result was that the subcommittee debate became deadlocked over the differing interpretations of what exactly was meant in the Eight-Power Memorandum. The Soviet Union stated its complete acceptance of the memorandum as a basis for negotiations and demanded that the West do the same. However, the Soviet interpretation of the memorandum was such that it differed little from the Soviet draft treaty of 28 November 1961.

The situation in the negotiations remained static until August when the United States and United Kingdom modified their positions again. On 27 August, they submitted two joint draft treaties, the first for a comprehensive test ban, the second for a limited test ban which allow continued testing underground.<sup>258</sup> The Soviet representative rejected both proposals outright. The primary objections to the comprehensive proposal, Kuznetsov stated, were that it included mandatory on-site inspections, and

"it rejects completely the proposals of the neutral States [the Eight-Power Memorandum]." The primary objection to the partial treaty was that such a treaty appeared "to be bent on preserving the possibility of underground testing-- in other words, on legalizing the nuclear weapon."<sup>259</sup> Therefore, as Jacobson and Stein noted, when the ENDC recessed for the seventeenth session of the UN General Assembly, it was debatable whether the Soviets and Western Powers were any closer together than they had been at the end of the test ban conference.<sup>260</sup> While the United States and United Kingdom had modified their positions in a number of areas, they still insisted on compulsory on-site inspections in any comprehensive treaty, and this was simply not acceptable to the Soviet Union. At the same time, the Soviets rejected out of hand any limited test ban proposal which would not prevent underground nuclear tests.

#### The Seventeenth UN General Assembly

The UN debate on a test ban was initiated, as usual, at the suggestion of India.<sup>261</sup> In his opening speech before the General Assembly, Gromyko first stressed general and complete disarmament and only secondly turned to the question of a test ban. He insisted that there never had been a moratorium on nuclear testing and,

therefore, the USSR was only being accused of breaking it because the West needed an excuse for their new series of nuclear tests. He called for a comprehensive test ban with control based on national detection systems or a limited test ban plus a moratorium on underground tests while negotiations to halt all underground tests continued.<sup>262</sup>

The First Committee of the General Assembly gave priority to the question of a test ban. Both sides reiterated the old arguments which had become very familiar by now. The United States submitted two memoranda on "the detection and identification of underground nuclear explosions" and on the "technical considerations relevant to a nuclear test ban" to all the members of the United Nations in an effort to help them understand the technical difficulties which were pertinent to the problem under discussion.<sup>263</sup> (During the summer, the West had scientists discuss these problems with the nonnuclear members of the ENDC in Geneva, and had gained definite benefits therefrom.) The memoranda made only a limited impression on the delegations, and apparently, none on the representative of Mali who, in an interesting speech before the First Committee, suggested that "the General Assembly, at its current session, . . . impose a treaty banning nuclear and

thermonuclear tests in all environments."<sup>264</sup> [Emphasis mine.]

Aside from the mutual accusations of bad faith and perfidy, the debate in the First Committee centered around two draft resolutions. The first was ultimately sponsored by thirty-five third-world states, Sweden, and Yugoslavia (including all the neutral states on the ENDC). Its main emphasis was a call for all nuclear tests to stop immediately, but in any case no later than 1 January 1963. It also called upon all parties "to negotiate in a spirit of mutual understanding and concession" and endorsed the Eight-Power Memorandum as a basis for negotiating.<sup>265</sup> The resolution was amended a number of times, primarily by Canada, bringing it more in line with the Western position. The final version contained both items favored and objectionable to the United States, United Kingdom, and USSR. As a result, although the resolution was passed overwhelmingly by the First Committee and the General Assembly, the three nuclear Powers abstained in the votes for the resolution as a whole.<sup>266</sup>

The second draft resolution was sponsored by the United States and the United Kingdom. It urged the ENDC "to seek the conclusion of a treaty with effective and

prompt international verification which prohibits nuclear weapon tests in all environments for all time." If such a treaty were not reached expeditiously, the ENDC should reach agreement on a partial test ban which would allow underground tests. The only amendment to this draft resolution was made by the United States and United Kingdom themselves, who dropped the paragraph advocating a partial test ban. Although it passed on the strength of the states friendly to the United States and United Kingdom, the states voting against it (primarily the Communist bloc) and the states abstaining (primarily the nonaligned states) were four more than those who voted for it.<sup>267</sup> This weakened the impact of the Western success.

The results of this session of the General Assembly were mixed in that while the West's resolution was passed, it only barely passed after being modified to attract votes. The other resolution did not please either side much, but it did call for an immediate cessation of tests with a deadline of 1 January 1963, and this was certainly compatible with the Soviet position.

The ENDC Negotiations--  
20 September 1962-10 December 1962

The ENDC resumed its sessions on 26 November.

(The subcommittee had continued its meetings during the session of the General Assembly.) The ensuing debate was significantly affected by two events--the revival of the idea of automatic seismic stations and the Cuban missile crisis. During the Tenth Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, held in early September, three Soviet and three American scientists prepared a document outlining a "new approach" for the test ban negotiations. The scientists advocated the use of sealed automatic recording stations to augment a world-wide net of standardized seismic stations manned by nationals of the host country.<sup>268</sup> The concept of using such "black boxes" had been previously suggested by the West, in 1959, and rejected by the Soviets.<sup>269</sup> However, now the Soviets began to advocate the use of black boxes as a substitute for on-site inspections. The first indication of the Soviet government's interest was through informal meetings during the session of the General Assembly.<sup>270</sup> The Pugwash Conference's concept was also favorably mentioned in an article appearing in the 11 November issue of Izvestia.<sup>271</sup> On 13 November, Tsarapkin formally brought up the concept of black boxes at a meeting of the subcommittee, claiming that the United States scientists at the Pugwash Conference had originally



agreed with the Soviet scientists that their use would eliminate any need for on-site inspections.

Sometime later, however, the United States scientists took a somewhat different view. This view emerged after, apparently, it was decided in Washington to rectify their position.<sup>272</sup>

Despite the fact that the Soviets did attempt to fit the concept of black boxes into their framework of a control system without on-site inspections, this was the first time since the early part of 1959 that the Soviets had made a positive suggestion with regard to controls. In addition, the black box concept became the vehicle for an actual Soviet concession. On 10 December 1962, Tsarapkin proposed that each nuclear Power could have two or three automatic seismic stations, and he noted three areas in the Soviet Union where they might be located. He also indicated that he assumed the delivery and return of the sealed apparatus would be carried out by Soviet personnel. However, he then added that the Soviet Union would also allow the participation of foreign personnel in the delivery of the apparatus and its return if it were required.<sup>273</sup> This indicated a fundamental change was taking place in the Soviet position. If the Soviet government would allow foreign personnel on its territory in connection with the automatic seismic stations, then its

arguments against using foreign personnel for on-site inspection was fatally weakened. Indeed, ten days later, Khrushchev again agreed to the principle of on-site inspections. This change in attitude indicates that the third phase of the negotiations had ended and the fourth phase had begun.

Although the automatic seismic stations were significant as a vehicle for the first concessions by the Soviets after a long period of intransigence and, indeed, regression, the more significant event was the Cuban missile crisis. The Cuban crisis, as Adam Ulam so artfully describes, was itself only one part of a complex maneuver involving the Sino-Soviet dispute and the German problem as well.<sup>274</sup> However, it is generally agreed that this confrontation affected both the American and Soviet leadership. Marshall Shulman has indicated, "The main factor in the Soviet change of position [on the test ban] appeared to be a desire to clamp down international tensions in the wake of the Cuban episode."<sup>275</sup> Lincoln P. Bloomfield similarly argues that the crisis

left Moscow with little practical alternative but to soften the relationship with the United States by a further, although limited, show of flexibility in the Geneva negotiations. . . .<sup>276</sup>

Of course, the exact relationship between the events in the Caribbean and the changes in the Soviet attitude toward Western demands concerning a test ban must remain mere speculation for Western scholars at the present time. The significant aspect is that the negotiating process, the hours upon hours of debate, were of secondary importance at this point. The change in the Soviet attitude and actions at the test ban negotiations were the result of the Soviet perception of the political relationships existing at that time and the Soviets' desire to modify them.

#### Analysis of the Negotiating Techniques in Phase III

It is appropriate at this point to review the negotiating techniques used by the Soviets during the third phase of the negotiations. First, it is readily apparent that the Soviets' use of rudeness and vilification had sharply increased, particularly after the resumption of the negotiations in 1961. On 31 October 1960, Stelle, the United States representative, was still able to assert that during the two years of the test ban conference, "by and large, the verbatim records reflect an avoidance of polemics and a business-like approach to our many

problems. . . .<sup>277</sup> Obviously, Stelle was ignoring the continual Soviet assertions that the United States was negotiating in bad faith. Yet, subtle differences were occurring. In July 1960, Tsarapkin commented upon the American proposal for a limited test ban treaty, saying:

This step by the United States Government was something of a concession to the opponents of the prohibition of nuclear tests, who, as is well known, are very active in the United States and are exerting a constant and ever-increasing pressure and influence in this direction, and this directly affects our Conference.<sup>278</sup>

On 2 November, Tsarapkin complained that

the fact is also beyond question that . . . the United States position was always directed towards thwarting an agreement which would put an end to nuclear weapon tests for all time.<sup>279</sup>

The difference between the two statements is important. In the first statement, Tsarapkin differentiated between the United States government which wanted an agreement and "elements" in the government which were opposed to this policy. In the November statement, this differentiation is gone. There are no nice guys left in the United States government. It is also interesting that this statement is retroactive. Tsarapkin is condemning the United States government for its actions from the beginning of the negotiations. The dividing line is not obvious as to when the Soviets stopped using phrases similar to the first example

and started using the second type. Examples of each can be found throughout the negotiations. It is clear, though, that the first type was predominant in the second phase of the negotiations, while the second type was predominant in the third phase.

As this phase progressed, Tsarapkin's speeches became filled more and more with epithets rather than arguments. Once the Soviet Union had started making major retractions in its positions, it became common for Tsarapkin to make accusations such as the following, which he aimed at Sir Michael Wright in April 1961:

You have engaged in chicanery, ignoring real facts for propaganda purposes--for propaganda which has a bad smell due to your manifestly unscrupulous interpretation of the Soviet position. . . .<sup>280</sup>

This technique reached its logical limit with Tsarapkin's reversion to the use of Communist ideological phrases. He labeled the United States and United Kingdom as "the imperialist camp" in June 1961.<sup>281</sup> In July, he referred to "sinister, Jesuitical" elements in the United States' position.<sup>282</sup> In the sixteenth session of the General Assembly, Gromyko denounced "the aggressive policy of the Powers belonging to the NATO military bloc."<sup>283</sup> In the final days of the test ban negotiations, the Soviet delegation criticized the Western position in emotion-

laden language rather than with logic or persuasion:

The fact that the Western Powers persistently demand this "international control" shows that they are striving to secure this in the interests of their general staffs, in order to facilitate and speed up the preparation of criminal plans for an attack upon peace-loving States.<sup>284</sup>

With the advent of the ENDC, the Soviet delegation toned down its language to a certain extent by deleting most of the ideological name calling. This was probably done to avoid alienating the newer members. Yet the polemics still continued on a significantly higher level than was customary in the previous phase.

Concomitant with the increased use of this first technique was the increased use of negotiations for propaganda purposes rather than for achieving agreement. Since the Soviet Union was no longer anxious to reach agreement on a test ban treaty, it was not necessary to use propaganda to influence the Western governments through the manipulation of public opinion. During this phase, it would appear that the primary purpose of Soviet propaganda was simply to defend Soviet actions and to cast aspersions on the West. First, the Soviet Union must appear to be actively seeking a test ban even when making major retractions. Second, the West must be made to appear to be sabotaging the negotiations even when making major

concessions. Third, the Soviet resumption of nuclear testing had to be defended, with the blame being placed on the West. Finally, the West's resumption of testing had to be prevented or shown to be aggressive, antihumanitarian, long-planned and evil.

When the Soviet Union changed its position as to when on-site inspections would begin to be conducted, it attempted to delay the initiation of inspections by four years. When Sir Michael Wright confronted Tsarapkin with this, the Soviet representative attempted to conceal the true state of affairs with propagandistic bombast.

Ignoring the official documents before our Conference be tried, by distorting the sense of individual statements by the Soviet delegation on the subject of the beginning of on-site inspection, to represent matters as though changes had occurred in the Soviet Union's position on this question. . . . The object of these tactics is to prove that the Soviet Union has now departed from the position it occupied on this question and has created a new situation in the Conference which has considerably impeded our work. The use of this method by the United Kingdom representative in the discussion cannot be regarded as anything but an attempt to create an unbusinesslike situation in our Conference, to make trouble, and to mislead the public about the actual state of affairs and the true position of the Western delegations at our Conference, and by so doing to prepare the ground for shifting from the guilty to the innocent the blame for the breakdown of the negotiations, which is obviously what the Western delegations desire, judging by their tactics here and by the special trend of the propaganda outcry in the Western press.<sup>285</sup>

In attempting to mask the Soviet intentions of completely emasculating the control system through its insistence on an administrative council rather than a single administrator for the system, Tsarapkin used the same propaganda argument he had used when defending the Soviet demand for a blanket veto in the control commission. Tsarapkin complained that the West was

approaching this question from the negative side, while we are approaching it from the positive side. We talk about co-operation, while you talk about a veto being applied. We have different approaches to this question.<sup>286</sup>

As the time for the resumption of Soviet testing drew near, Tsarapkin's accusations that the West was planning to resume testing became ever more shrill. With the Soviet tests less than two months away. Tsarapkin stated:

It is becoming increasingly obvious to us now that the United States is concentrating all its efforts on disrupting the situation, existing in the world for over two and a half years, in which the nuclear Powers--the USSR, the United States, and the United Kingdom--have not been carrying out any nuclear explosions. The United States is now clearing a way to enable itself to do so. That is the aim for which the Americans have devised their strategy and tactics: to wreck the Geneva negotiations, or at least lead them into an impasse. . . . the United States expects thus to gain a free hand and justify its arbitrary decision to resume nuclear weapon tests. Freedom to resume nuclear weapon tests--that is what the United States is striving for at present.<sup>287</sup>



When the Soviet Union did resume nuclear tests, it already had its arguments prepared to defend its action. Typical of the Soviet arguments used is the following statement by Khrushchev at the XXII Party Congress on 17 October 1961:

Now the imperialists, as a ruse, have started a hypocritical fuss in connection with the fact that we were compelled to carry out experimental tests of nuclear weapons. But their fuss has not prevented the people from understanding that we did this only because the Western powers, having brought the solution of the disarmament problem and the talks on nuclear weapons tests to an impasse, turned the flywheel of their military machine on full speed to achieve supremacy in strength over the socialist countries.

We forestalled them, and by doing so retained the advantage for the side of the socialist camp, which stands guard over peace. (Stormy applause.) Our measures were forced upon us. It was known that the United States for a long time had been preparing to resume tests, while France repeatedly carried them out. . . . The problem of disarmament affects the vital interests of every nation and all mankind, and when it is settled any need for nuclear weapons will disappear, as will the need for their production and tests.<sup>288</sup>

As time progressed, the Soviets even refused to acknowledge that they had agreed to a moratorium. In December 1961,

Tsarapkin stated at the test ban negotiations:

It is time you abandoned, Gentlemen, all the talk about the Soviet Union having violated some sort of pledge. What has it violated? What pledge has it violated? We have violated nothing. If you compelled us with your military preparations and threats to take certain measures of a military nature, you have only yourselves to blame.<sup>289</sup>

Once the Soviet series of tests were completed, the Soviet Union produced its draft treaty of 28 November 1961 for an immediate and comprehensive cessation of tests. It was obvious that the treaty served only as propaganda and no real intention of using it as a basis for negotiation. First, its provisions were known to be completely unacceptable to the West. Second, the Soviets did not even bother to keep up the appearance of negotiating seriously, since they even gave the text of the treaty and an accompanying government statement to the press and to the Heads of Mission of the unaligned countries prior to presenting it at the test ban conference. The British and American embassies in Moscow were not even given copies of the treaty.<sup>290</sup>

As the start of the first United States atmospheric tests approached, the Soviets used propaganda to attempt to prevent the tests, or at least to set world public opinion against the United States. This, of course, was despite the fact that the Soviet Union had broken the moratorium on testing, and had executed an intense series of atmospheric tests, including the testing of a 58 megaton weapon! In the ENDC, Tsarapkin was the epitome of righteous indignation:

If the Western Powers are striving, not only in word but in deed, to reach agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests, they must abandon their unrealistic and obstructionist attitude. They must listen to the voice of the peoples of the world and renounce their intention of resuming nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere. They must stop all and every kind of tests of this weapon for the mass destruction of human beings. . . .

If you intend to negotiate seriously, you must cease nuclear weapon tests and tell the world that you will not resume nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere. By taking this step, the Western powers would create more favourable conditions for the negotiations.<sup>291</sup>

During the negotiations in the ENDC, which one Kennedy intimate called "a propaganda minuet,"<sup>292</sup> the Soviet propaganda objective was to show that the West was blocking all attempts to reach a compromise, while the Soviet Union readily accepted the proposals of the nonaligned states. In May 1962, for example, Tsarapkin disputed the Western demand that the Eight-Power memorandum be discussed, in detail, to arrive at a common understanding of it.

Tsarapkin argued:

The question of interpreting the proposals of non-aligned States does not exist. This question has been created artificially by the Western Powers as a smoke-screen and as camouflage for their negative attitude to the proposals. These proposals . . . are clear to us.<sup>293</sup>

In a similar vein, while addressing the Seventeenth General Assembly, Gromyko tried to show that the Soviet Union and the neutral states were being opposed by the obstinacy of

the United States and United Kingdom in the test ban negotiations.<sup>294</sup>

It was also during this phase of negotiations that the Soviets' adversary attitude toward the United States and United Kingdom was most clearly displayed. The question which always brought out the adversary attitude in the Soviet negotiators was the question of how much discretion the administrator of the control system should have. The West advocated giving the administrator some leeway in making personnel assignments to fill the last third of the control post staff. The Soviets wanted the administrator to have no freedom in this area.<sup>295</sup> The primary reason for this was the Soviets' adversary attitude. They could not comprehend an administrator being impartial. Tsarapkin clearly and precisely stated the Soviet case when he argued: "One cannot pretend that a servant could be found who would impartially serve both communists and capitalists, both socialist and imperialist states."<sup>296</sup> Tsarapkin even saw the West as having "some secret design" when the United States and United Kingdom advocated allowing the administrator to reject candidates for the position of deputy administrator.<sup>297</sup>

When the Soviet representative rejected the several Western proposals for a limited test ban as a way of circumventing the impasse connected with a comprehensive test ban, the Soviets' adversary attitude again became apparent. The Soviets could simply not understand the Western proposal as anything other than an attempt "to tie the hands of the Soviet Union and the socialist countries while leaving the aggressive NATO bloc free to increase its destructive power."<sup>298</sup> Bryant Wedge, in his study on the psychological factors in Soviet disarmament negotiations, called this attitude the Soviet assumption of the ultimate sovereignty of states. He noted that as a consequence of this attitude:

. . . any proposals put forward by the Soviet government are clearly in the Soviet national interest, no matter how much reference may be made to the common good of the peoples of the world; and it is understandable that every proposal from the West is suspected of concealing national advantages to the Western powers.<sup>299</sup>

The Soviet position on a limited test ban is also an excellent example of the fourth Soviet negotiating technique, i.e., being stubborn and attempting to wear one's opponent down. Throughout this phase, and indeed even earlier, the Soviet Union clearly and steadfastly refused to even consider a limited test ban that would allow

underground nuclear tests.<sup>300</sup> In this phase of the negotiations, the Soviet position on almost every aspect of a test ban was characterized by intransigence, if not regression. Indeed, this characteristic is what so sharply distinguishes this phase from those that immediately precede and follow it. In mid-July 1961, the United States and United Kingdom proposed that the forthcoming General Assembly include in its agenda an item on the test ban treaty. In stating the reasons for including this on the agenda, the Western states complained that

the Soviet Union . . . did not heed the counsel of the General Assembly "to make every effort to reach agreement as soon as possible." . . . It has not introduced a single positive proposal within the past year and a half.<sup>301</sup>

Intransigence was not only a characteristic of Soviet proposals, but also of the answers the Soviets gave to Western proposals. In August 1961, Stelle noted that Tsarapkin had repeatedly harped on three themes during the negotiations: (1) Western demands for adequate control are demands for espionage; (2) Western refusal to accept the Soviet proposal for a moratorium on small underground tests is an indication of Western plans to resume testing; and (3) Western rejection of the Soviet proposal for an administrative council means the West seeks to dominate the control organization.<sup>302</sup>

The same situation characterized the negotiations in the ENDC.<sup>303</sup> The Soviets would not even make the pretense of negotiating but simply repeated their position over and over and gave the standard replies to Western accusations and proposals. In late September 1962, Tsarapkin was still emphatically accusing the West of demanding international control for espionage.

. . . we are against allowing international control without disarmament. Yes, we are against it; we always have been and always shall be. . . . You really want to install an international system of control, but without disarmament. But we do not accept it we reject it. Remember that once and forever, and I would advise you never to revert to that theme; it would be wasted labour to try to sell us your consent to the banning of nuclear weapon tests in exchange for which the Soviet Union would throw its doors wide open to your intelligence services. That will not happen; we shall not agree to that. And you must start out from that premise.<sup>304</sup>

Another Soviet negotiating technique is highlighted in this phase of the negotiations. It is the use of deceit. The most prominent example of this is the Soviet resumption of testing. On 29 December 1959, President Eisenhower announced that the United States was no longer bound by its voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing after 31 December 1959. However, he did add "although we consider ourselves free to resume nuclear weapons testing, we shall not resume nuclear weapons tests without announcing our intention in

advance of any resumption."<sup>305</sup> The Soviet Union roundly condemned this American position and constantly accused the United States of planning to resume nuclear tests. For example, a little more than a month before the Soviets resumed testing, Tsarapkin made reference to articles in the Western press which stated that the United States planned to resume testing. He sanctimoniously decried such an action: "That . . . revolts the conscience of the peoples of the world."<sup>306</sup> Lest it should be thought that Tsarapkin's statement was made out of ignorance rather than as an act of duplicity, it should also be noted that Khrushchev, himself, on several occasions after Eisenhower's statement asserted that the Soviet Union would not be the first to resume nuclear tests. Even as late as 4 June 1961, at the Vienna meeting between Kennedy and Khrushchev, the Soviet Premier (while noting that both leaders were under pressure from their scientists and military to resume nuclear tests) assured Kennedy, "but we will wait for you to resume testing, and if you do, we will."<sup>307</sup>

The resumption of testing was not the only instance of Soviet duplicity during this phase. Another instance was the Soviet outcry at the planned United States high altitude nuclear tests. A statement by the Soviet government accused the United States of undertaking "new and



extremely dangerous operations, which, by extending the nuclear armaments race to outer space, will infringe still further upon the interests of all mankind."<sup>308</sup> What the Soviet government did not mention was that the Soviet Union had carried out tests the previous fall.<sup>309</sup> In addition, the Soviets made no mention of their advantage in the post-moratorium tests, this advantage being that all their tests were well planned so as to achieve the maximum benefit from their execution. The United States tests, on the other hand, were hastily planned and executed and, therefore, of far less benefit.<sup>310</sup>

Of course, throughout this phase, the Soviet Union continued to engage in its "normal" duplicity as well. That is, the Soviet representatives at the negotiations freely misquoted their opponents--and at times themselves--and stated that the Soviet position was fully in accord with the Report of the Experts' Conference or some other mutually accepted authority, when it was patently clear that this was not true.

A final example of Soviet disregard for the truth concerns the question of the detection and identification of nuclear tests. The Soviet Union has always insisted that national means of detection and identification were

adequate to insure a test ban treaty would not be clandestinely violated. On 16 March 1962, Khrushchev unequivocally stated that this was a universally known fact.<sup>311</sup> Yet, half a year later, a group of American and Soviet scientists at the Tenth Pugwash Conference advocated the use of automatic recording stations to supplement the national seismic stations so that there would need to be "very few on-site inspections."<sup>312</sup> Yet, how could Khrushchev maintain that national systems of control completely eliminated the need for on-site inspections, when six months later Soviet scientists admitted that even if augmented by automatic recording stations, some on-site inspections would still be required? From these examples it is clear that the Soviets were certainly not hindered by the truth in this phase of the test ban negotiations.

The sixth negotiating technique, which is characteristic of the Soviets, is to use the negotiating process to divide or demoralize one's opponent. This technique did not play a major role in this phase. The primary reason for this would appear to be that the resumption of tests by the Soviets precluded, to a large extent, the Soviets from gaining adherents in the West. Yet, the 28 November 1961 Soviet draft treaty and the attempts to

inhibit or prevent Western high altitude tests can be seen as an application of this technique. In these cases, the emphasis would be on dividing the West and political groups within the United States and the United Kingdom, through the effective use of propaganda, rather than for actually preventing the Western tests.

On the other hand, the seventh negotiating technique, the refusal to make concessions, is the hallmark of this phase. With the change in priorities, which occurred in May 1960 and which relegated the achievement of a test ban to a rather inferior position vis-à-vis other Soviet disarmament and international objectives, the Soviets no longer saw the need to make concessions to the West. As a result, none were made.<sup>313</sup> In speaking before the ENDC, Tsarapkin noted the following "great efforts" the Soviet Union had made to achieve "the speediest possible solution of the problem of cessation of nuclear weapon tests":

1. The Soviet Union agreed that the Eight-Power Memorandum should be the basis for agreement
2. The Soviet Union agreed to a test ban in three environments as long as it was accompanied by a moratorium on underground tests while negotiations for their prohibition continued

3. The Soviet Union indicated its readiness to end all tests by 1 January 1963 in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1762A(XVII) if the Western nuclear Powers would also comply with it<sup>314</sup>

While these may appear to be significant concessions, in each case the actual result would have been an uncontrolled test ban that the Soviet Union was willing to accept. Therefore, the Soviet position remained completely regressive.

The Soviet attitude during this phase was summed up quite succinctly by Tsarapkin on 3 May 1961. Speaking at the test ban negotiations, he noted:

If the Western delegations abandon these demands [i.e., all their positions on items on which there was still disagreement], reconsider their unrealistic positions on these matters and accept the proposals of the Soviet Union on all these issues, then we shall be able to finish our work here very quickly.<sup>315</sup> [Emphasis mine]

In other words, the only position that would be acceptable to the Soviet Union was total capitulation to its demands.

The Soviets also demanded that the West must agree in principle on several matters of importance before a discussion of the details could take place. The most prominent examples of this were the Soviet demands that the West accept the Eight-Power Memorandum and the concept

of automatic seismic stations in principle before the Soviets would agree to negotiate on pertinent specific details.<sup>316</sup> However, the United States and United Kingdom steadfastly refused to do this. Dean noted in reply to Tsarapkin's importunings to accept the idea of automatic seismic stations in principle:

But what they [the Soviets] say to us--and unfortunately I have had experience on this subject before in negotiating with our Soviet colleagues--is, "Will you accept this idea of 'black boxes' in principle?" What they mean, I find, is that if one is foolish enough to say "yes" to that, then one has, in their view, automatically abandoned everything else that one's own scientists have ever said, and from that point on all one can do is discuss the fact that the only thing we can have as part of the detection system is these "black boxes," because they will come back to us again and again and say, "You accepted them in principle."<sup>317</sup>

This basic divergency of approaches was never settled with regard to the Eight-Power Memorandum and automatic seismic stations during this phase of the negotiations.

Another technique used by the Soviets was to make exaggerated demands. Here a number of examples are obvious. On the question of conducting nuclear tests for research directed toward improving the control system, Tsarapkin adamantly maintained that the USSR would conduct no such tests, and that if the United States and United Kingdom were to conduct such tests, the Soviet Union should, along

with other safeguards, be given in advance, a full description and blueprints of the construction of the device to be detonated and should be permitted to inspect the internal and external construction of the device.<sup>318</sup> Thus, the Soviets demanded--and the United States eventually agreed--that they be given full access to certain American nuclear devices. Another exaggerated demand made by the Soviets during this phase was for only three on-site inspections per year on Soviet territory. Later this was changed to a demand for no on-site inspections. They also pressed to have the test ban negotiations subsumed into the negotiations on general and complete disarmament, and subsequently for a prohibition of all tests with no international control system.

The other aspect of this technique--ignoring or not adequately replying to an opponent's questions and rebuttal--was also resorted to innumerable times during this phase. In discussing, in June 1960, the safeguards to be applied to research on improving the control systems, Tsarapkin was forceful in demanding extensive safeguards be devised for American detonations. However, when Wadsworth noted that an industrial explosion of 3-1/2 kilotons was to be conducted in Alma Ata, and that there should

be some safeguards applied to insure that it was simply a chemical explosion, Tsarapkin simply said that such a request "cannot be taken seriously."<sup>319</sup> After extensive negotiations on this question of safeguards, the United States representative noted wryly that the USSR demands to see the internal workings of the United States weapons to be used in seismic research, but when the United States asks for reciprocity, the USSR accuses the United States of wanting to gather intelligence information.<sup>320</sup>

With the hardening of the Soviet position in 1961, the Soviet representative increasingly resorted to simply ignoring the questions and criticisms of the Western representatives. In June 1961, Stelle complained that

we have asked the Soviet representative time and time again to demonstrate to us, in concrete terms instead of in broad, vague generalizations, how any control activity could be misused for espionage work. This he has never done. . . .<sup>321</sup>

As Tsarapkin had done previously, he continued to label any Western questions about possible violations of a test ban treaty as "pure fabrication" and "entirely hypothetical."<sup>322</sup> During this phase this technique was used to such an extent that, in November 1962, the British representative characterized the Soviets negotiating posture in the ENDC subcommittee as:

Not only will they not discuss the detailed draft treaties put forward by the West . . . but they will not even discuss in detail the practical problems raised by their own proposals of 28 November 1961 or by their own interpretation of the Eight-Power Memorandum.<sup>323</sup>

However, perhaps the most glib answer ever given to a Western criticism was given by Tsarapkin on 26 July 1960. He was defending the Soviet position that only three on-site inspections a year would be necessary. In reply to the Western criticism that this number was not nearly large enough to provide any assurance that a violator would be caught, Tsarapkin maintained that

. . . inspections will be used not in order to apprehend violators, since we believe that there will not be any, but only in order to announce, after carrying out such an inspection, that suspicions that a nuclear explosion had been carried out were completely unfounded and that the treaty was being observed.<sup>324</sup>

Because of the nature of this phase, where the negotiations were well established, the Soviets did not attempt to use procedural devices to gain substantive advantages to any significant extent. In the sessions of the General Assembly, the Soviet Union attempted, in a moderate way, to assert the preeminence of general and complete disarmament over the question of a test ban. However, they were not nearly as vigorous in advocating this as they had been in advocating the importance of a



test ban in 1957 and 1958.<sup>325</sup> The only procedural maneuver of importance that the Soviets attempted was to have the question of a test ban joined with and subordinated to the negotiations on general and complete disarmament, but by then the test ban negotiations had developed a life of their own and a world-wide audience which would not allow this question to be shelved in such a manner.

The Soviet Union did not use the threat of breaking off the negotiations to gain concessions during this phase of the negotiations. However, on numerous occasions it accused the West of preparing to break off the negotiations.<sup>326</sup> On several occasions prior to 30 August 1961, the Soviet Union threatened to resume nuclear testing if the West did not comply with Soviet demands,<sup>327</sup> and, in fact, the Soviet Union did risk the complete breakdown of the negotiations when it resumed nuclear weapons tests in August 1961. Of course, at that time, the negotiations were of little practical importance to the USSR anyway.

One of the techniques that characterized this phase was for the Soviets to make a concession, repudiate it after having received reciprocal concessions from the West, and then make their same concession again, while demanding more concessions from the West. By January 1959, the Soviet

demand for a veto over an extensive list of control system activities had been enunciated. By the end of November 1959, the West had satisfied most of the demands by writing strict articles on staffing, inspection limitations, selection of control post sites, the primacy of the control commission, etc. It appeared that an accommodation was possible. Yet, by mid-1961, Dean observed that

. . . after extracting many concessions from the Western Powers to achieve its aims, the Soviet Union, without at all giving up what it has obtained, has reverted to a total veto demand at the executive level. This is like an attempt to get two ransoms for one kidnapping.<sup>328</sup>

What Dean did not know, of course, was that the Soviet Union would attempt to get a third ransom as well, because the Soviets shortly regressed even further: denying altogether the right of on-site inspections. This last regression was slightly moderated in April 1962, when the Soviets accepted the idea that a state may invite an inspection team to investigate a suspected event. Tsarapkin held this to be a "substantial concession."<sup>329</sup>

The Soviets also used the technique of emphasizing Soviet grievances with the United States and United Kingdom. During this third phase of the negotiations, this technique was used primarily as justification for the Soviets' resumption of nuclear testing. A typical example is that

of the Tass statement of 6 November 1961, which read in part:

The Soviet Government has repeatedly explained that only extremely necessity induced it to take such a step as the holding of nuclear tests. Were it not for the feverish arms build-up, increase in military appropriations and numerical strength of armies of the NATO countries, the transfer of their armed forces closer to the borders of socialist states; were it not for the breech bolt clicking in Berlin; were it not for the continuation of nuclear explosions by France, the scientific and technical results of which go into the common NATO pot, the reasons which made inevitable the resumption of nuclear tests by the Soviet Union would not have risen.

Suffice it to take a look at the map showing the ring of American military bases, springboards of aggression, spearheaded against the Soviet Union and its friends, to realize once more how fully reasonable and urgent are the measures taken by the Soviet Government to strengthen the military power of its country.<sup>330</sup>

The Soviets also used this technique to bolster their assertion, made after November 1961, that any test ban treaty must be devoid of international control and obligatory international on-site inspections.

During this phase, the Soviets used two techniques noted in the previous chapter which had not yet been employed in the test ban negotiations. The first of these is to claim that a compromise position which had been previously agreed upon is actually the opponent's position. Then the Soviets would demand a compromise between the new

Soviet position and their opponent's position, thus obtaining 75 percent of their objective. The clearest example of this technique was the Soviet position in the ENDC. For three and a third years, the three nuclear powers had negotiated the details of a test ban treaty. Agreement had been reached on the preamble, seventeen articles and two annexes. It was even more significant that on the remaining issues the differences between the two sides had been narrowed considerably. However, during the last one and a half years of this period, the Soviets staged a series of retreats from the areas of agreement while the West continued to make concessions. In the course of the negotiations, the United States and United Kingdom took all the parts of the treaty already agreed upon and incorporated them into a complete draft treaty which was submitted on 18 April 1961. The Soviets, on the other hand, submitted a treaty at their extreme point of regression, on 28 November 1961. When the ENDC commenced its deliberations, these two draft treaties for a comprehensive test ban were before it: the Western draft treaty of 18 April 1961 and its several later amendments and the Soviet treaty of 28 November 1961. In their desire to achieve an agreement on a test ban treaty, the nonnuclear powers tended to assume

that splitting the difference between the two draft treaties would be the logical solution. However, as the British representative noted,

. . . I think that what they perhaps tend to forget a little is that they are seeking a compromise between one side which has already been seeking a compromise and another side which has not. Therefore, with the best intentions in the world they are trying to get a compromise with a compromise.<sup>331</sup>

Yet, this complaint did little good, and the Soviets played on the desire of the nonnuclear states to split the difference. For example, in May 1962, Tsarapkin explained to the British representative in the subcommittee of the ENDC that the Eight-Power Memorandum was a compromise because it accepted neither the Western proposal of 18 April 1961 nor the Soviet proposal of 28 November 1962. "Nevertheless, it to some extent takes into account the positions of both sides. Therein lies the compromise nature of the document. . . ."<sup>332</sup> After the West had made still further concessions and had submitted a new draft treaty for a comprehensive test ban on 27 August 1962, Tsarapkin continued to employ this technique. Less than a month after the West submitted its new draft treaty, Tsarapkin noted that the Eight-Power Memorandum was a compromise proposal because it fell between two "extreme positions": the Soviet proposal of 28 November 1961 and the Western proposal

of 27 August 1962.<sup>333</sup>

In addition, the Soviets used the variation of this technique in which they agreed to a compromise and then proceeded to interpret the compromise in a totally arbitrary fashion. An excellent example of this is, again, the Eight-Power Memorandum. The Soviets accepted the memorandum as a basis for negotiations soon after it was submitted 16 April 1962. Tsarapkin asserted that "in order to end the deadlock in the subcommittee's work we must adhere strictly to the compromise proposals in the eight-nation memorandum."<sup>334</sup> [Emphasis mine.] Yet, as Dean ruefully noted, the strict adherence demanded was to the Soviet's own unilateral interpretation of the memorandum which was, in reality, little different from its retrograde draft treaty of 28 November 1961.<sup>335</sup>

The second of the two techniques which had not been used in the test ban negotiations prior to this phase is that of simply increasing one's demands as the opposite side makes concessions. This was a characteristic technique from the fall of 1960 through the fall of 1961. It was employed in connection with the negotiations on the details of the control system. The Soviet Union's original position had been that control posts should be operational

first on the territories of the three nuclear powers and that a simplified criteria for on-site inspections be used for the first two or three years that the treaty was in force.<sup>336</sup> However, as the agreement was being negotiated and the West attempted to accommodate Soviet demands, the Soviet Union's position became more demanding. Instead of the first phase of the treaty being two to three years, the Soviets demanded that it be four years and that on-site inspections begin only after the phase had been completed. The Soviets also increased their demands on where control posts must be constructed, insisting that control posts must also be built in Australia, Canada, and Africa.<sup>337</sup> In June 1961, Dean summarized the state of the negotiations by noting:

At whatever points we have been willing to modify the system of controls somewhat by moving part way towards the Soviet position . . . the Soviet Union's answer has always been to move away from its previous requests and to demand more and still more.<sup>338</sup>

The last technique noted by Western scholars in Chapter II was the waiving gambit. This technique was used during this phase in a rather significant way. The Soviet Union attempted to have the West waive the whole question of a test ban. As Gromyko stated before the Sixteenth General Assembly in September 1961:

What is the way out of the situation which has arisen over the question of nuclear weapons tests? There is a way out, and the Soviet Government is proposing it. It consists of reaching agreement on the questions raised by general and complete disarmament. Such an agreement will also mean the solving of the question of the cessation of nuclear weapons tests.<sup>339</sup>

Gromyko was asking, in effect, that the whole question of a test ban become a part of the negotiations on general and complete disarmament. It is obvious that that would have relieved the Soviets of the embarrassment of having to maintain a completely intransigent position in the test ban negotiations for another one and a half years.

This technique was also used when the concept of automatic seismic stations were discussed in the ENDC. The Soviet Union sought to have the West agree immediately on using these black boxes, once they were proposed. However, the Soviets wanted not simply an agreement on black boxes. Instead, they maintained that in accepting the installation of the black boxes meant the West had waived all discussion on the improvement of national detection systems, international coordination of the control system and the possibility of on-site inspections.<sup>340</sup>

Again, in this phase as in the previous two phases, there were some Soviet negotiating techniques which were not included in Chapter II. For instance, the Soviets



continued to assert that a number of Soviet proposals actually were initiated by the West and, therefore, should be completely acceptable to the West. Of greatest importance was the debate on the proposed Soviet quota of three on-site inspections per year. Tsarapkin continued to insist that the Soviet choice of three inspections had been originally suggested by British Prime Minister Macmillan. However, as the negotiations proceeded, Tsarapkin became more and more definite. In November 1960, Tsarapkin stated that Macmillan:

. . . said that the number should be a small one. Furthermore, in his talks he even named these specific figures. You know what they are. And one of these figures was very close to the figure we have named. Very close.<sup>341</sup>

In April 1961, Tsarapkin insisted that the Soviet proposal "for three inspections a year coincides, or almost coincides, with one of the figures proposed by the British Prime Minister. . . ."<sup>342</sup> In July 1961, Tsarapkin defended the Soviet proposal saying:

. . . in February 1959 Mr. Macmillan . . . himself proposed an inspection quota which we have been proposing for a long time . . . three inspections a year. Consequently, the position in February 1959 was that the proposal for three inspections a year was agreed to by the Governments both of the United Kingdom and of the Soviet Union, and the only government which objected to that proposal was the government of the United States.<sup>343</sup>

However, the British representative refuted these statements, and, on the contrary, indicated that the whole concept of a quota had been originated by Dr. Fedorenko, a member of the Soviet delegation. Fedorenko had indicated several possible figures as being possible alternatives and the Western proposal of twenty was not the highest figure Fedorenko had mentioned.<sup>344</sup> At a later session of the test ban negotiations, Sir Michael Wright presented a fairly detailed account of the Macmillan visit to Moscow and what was stated concerning a quota:

I am informed that the figures to which my Soviet colleague so constantly refers were a string of five or six different numbers mentioned by the Prime Minister at random in order to illustrate the idea of a fixed quota, whose actual size would have to be agreed in negotiation between all three parties to the treaty talks. . . . It is clear that the Soviet leaders with whom he talked did not then understand him to be making a proposal, because on two subsequent occasions during the visit Mr. Gromyko asked Mr. Selwyn Lloyd that the United Kingdom Government had in mind for the size of the quota. [To which he replied, the United Kingdom] ". . . had no fixed figure in mind."<sup>345</sup>

In a somewhat analogous manner, Tsarapkin also pressed the United States and United Kingdom to accept the Soviet draft treaty of 28 November 1961. Tsarapkin based his argument on the fact that President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan had offered Premier Khrushchev an immediate agreement to ban testing in the atmosphere on

3 September 1961. Thus, the Soviet delegate maintained, the West had acknowledged that

. . . national systems of detection . . . are perfectly adequate for the purposes of effective control over an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, underwater, in outer space and underground.<sup>346</sup>

The fact that the Soviets had added two additional environments to the uncontrolled ban was not of major significance to Tsarapkin.

On a number of occasions, the Soviets employed a technique to indicate their firm commitment to a position. In this technique, they asserted that they did not need to compromise since their current position took full account of the Western position. This argument was used after the reconvening of the test ban conference in the spring of 1961, in order to show why the Soviet Union did not respond to the series of Western concessions made at that time. In reply to the British representative, Tsarapkin defended the intransigent Soviet position by asserting that

. . . the proposals submitted by the Soviet Union are compromise proposals. They take into account not only the considerations put forward by either side, but they represent precisely that degree of compromise on the basis of which we could reach agreement.<sup>347</sup>

It was also used near the end of the test ban conference to defend the Soviets' draft treaty of 28 November 1961.<sup>348</sup>

The Soviet Union continued to maintain the primacy of the political aspects of the negotiations throughout this period, as it had in the previous phase. This was obvious in the determined Soviet refusal to consider allowing any research dealing with decoupling nuclear explosions.<sup>349</sup> In mid-1962, Zorin made an interesting comment on the data resulting from the United States' Project Vela. The comment clearly indicated the Soviet view of the role science played in the test ban negotiations. Zorin stated that the data had "no real significance for our negotiations, because they attempt, by invoking scientific authority, to confirm your position."<sup>350</sup> Since the data supported the West's position it was unacceptable. In December 1962, the opposing perspectives of the American and Soviet delegations to the ENDC were sharply defined when Dean stated,

What must now be apparent to everyone is that the USSR is simply not willing to negotiate a nuclear test ban treaty on any reasonable scientific basis. [Emphasis mine.]

To which Tsarapkin replied,

I must say that the weakness in the position of the United States is shown by the fact that it is unwilling to come to a political agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests.<sup>351</sup> [Emphasis mine.]

The Soviets also remained reluctant to divulge any technical data they had concerning the detection and identification of nuclear tests. While the delegations at the test ban negotiations engaged in furious debate over the quota for on-site inspections, the Soviet delegation never gave any estimate as to how many seismic events actually occurred annually in the Soviet Union.<sup>352</sup> In the debates in the ENDC, the West constantly asked for scientific verification that national systems were fully adequate to detect and identify nuclear explosions in other states. In November 1962, the United States representative noted that the advances in the detection and identification of nuclear explosions have all come from the West while "only unbroken silence on the scientific situation pervades the Soviet Press, scientific journals and diplomatic statements."<sup>353</sup> Dean has noted in retrospect:

We felt it therefore to be our particular responsibility to make as certain as we could that other nations were aware of the scientific facts involved in disarmament problems, so that they could both understand the bases for our policies and be better informed in the formulation of their own. . . . Our working papers and our statements in the verbatim records were available and did go to Moscow. Unfortunately for the possibility of careful true dialogue, there was no willingness on the part of the Soviet government to share freely with the world the results of its research on the scientific basis for its policies.<sup>354</sup>

Another negotiating technique used by the Soviets was to announce a concession they had made, when, in fact, they had made it in such a way that it was really not a concession at all. They continued to do this vis-à-vis the question of accepting a partial test ban treaty by insisting that a partial test ban must be accompanied by a moratorium on underground tests.<sup>355</sup> Similarly, in 1961 and 1962, the Soviet Union continuously stressed that it would accept any control measures proposed by the West for a test ban if the West first accepted and implemented the Soviet proposal for general and complete disarmament.<sup>356</sup>

The Soviets attempted during this phase to negotiate by acts as well as by words. The testing of a 50 megaton weapon in the fall of 1961 was certainly for political effect as well as for its military utility. In addition, the Soviets' completion of their fall 1961 nuclear test series was intended to coincide with the General Assembly's declaration of support for an uncontrolled moratorium on nuclear tests as embodied in the Indian resolution before the General Assembly.

The moratorium would then operate against the United States and the United Kingdom--which had observed the previous moratorium--and would place the United States in a most difficult position. . . .<sup>357</sup>

The Soviets also were continually quoting Western sources to support their positions. This technique was continued from the previous phase. Prior to the resumption of nuclear testing by the Soviet Union, Tsarapkin stressed Western press reports which indicated that the United States was about to resume testing.<sup>358</sup> Once the Soviet Union had once again espoused the position that national means for verifying a test ban were adequate, the Soviets incessantly quoted the Western press to prove their point.<sup>359</sup> The use of this technique was highlighted even more forcefully by the conspicuous reluctance of the Soviets to present their own data to support their arguments. Wright succinctly summed up the Soviets' perception and utilization of the Western press:

When a free [Western] Press criticizes, as it often does, Western delegations, that, according to the Soviet representative, is the voice of the people. He has often read to us such comments, such criticisms, from Western newspapers at this table. But when a free Press criticizes Soviet policies, that, he says, is a capitalist plot.<sup>360</sup>

Finally, the Soviets again used the negotiating technique of insisting that if the West would accept the Soviet position on a particular point, then everything else could be agreed upon with little difficulty. When general and complete disarmament became the primary

emphasis of the Soviet Union, Tsarapkin assured the United States and United Kingdom delegations to the test ban conference that

our main task now is to tackle immediately and in all earnestness the problem of general and complete disarmament. Within the scope of those talks we shall easily and quickly agree also on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests, since the obstacles which now prevent us from reaching agreement at this Conference on a mutually-acceptable basis will then disappear.<sup>361</sup>

When the Eight-Power Memorandum became the prime subject of debate in the subcommittee of the ENDC. Tsarapkin used the technique repeatedly. His basic argument was that if the West would only accept the memorandum without attempting to comment on it or modify it, i.e., if the West would accept the Soviet interpretation of the memorandum, then an agreement could be reached quickly.<sup>362</sup>

This review of the negotiating techniques used by the Soviets during the third phase indicates several points of interest. First, the techniques which were emphasized were similar in many respects to those emphasized during the Second World War and the decade thereafter. This might indicate a correlation between these techniques and periods of Soviet weakness or antagonism toward the West. Second, the objective of the Soviet negotiators was not to reach agreement, but to impede agreement while not appearing to



do so. The Soviet negotiators had to portray a regressive negotiating position as being progressive and fair. Third, the techniques were employed despite the fact that this caused the breakdown of the test ban negotiations in January 1962. Finally, it appears that a number of these negotiating techniques were not the result of long-range planning, or of a devious and subtle manipulation of an unwary opponent, but rather were the result of one side or both making policy changes as the negotiations progressed with little regard for the ultimate effect. An example of this is the Soviet regressions, particularly in 1961. This would appear to be a clear case of the Soviets making increased demands so as to obtain increased concessions from the West. Indeed, the history of the negotiations during that year indicates a West making concessions in a vain attempt to catch up with the ever more retrograde Soviet position. Yet, it is questionable as to whether this was a deliberate, well-planned Soviet negotiating technique or simply the result of a coincidental change in the policies of both sides. One could argue that in the spring and summer of 1961, the Soviet Union was not looking for concessions from the West, but was trying to so frustrate the West that they would break off the negotiations and resume testing. This

would have allowed the Soviet Union freedom to resume testing; it would have ended the test ban negotiations; and it would have given the spotlight to the question of general and complete disarmament. However, the West tenaciously continued to negotiate and even made concessions to the growing Soviet intransigence. This might not have happened had there not been a change in the American administration at that time.

#### Phase IV. December 1962-June 1963

##### Overview

This short phase was characterized by an initial shift in the Soviet position, followed by a resumption of the intransigent posture characteristic of the third phase, and concluded with a major shift in the Soviet attitude toward a partial test ban treaty. The focal point of the negotiations shifted in this phase from the ENDC to private negotiations among the principal states and exchanges of communications among the heads of the nuclear powers. As noted in the review of the previous phase, the fourth phase was begun in December 1962, with the first significant public Soviet concession since 1960. This was most likely

brought about as a result of the Cuban crisis. Norman Cousins wrote sympathetically, after a personal interview with Khrushchev in December 1962, that the Soviet leader had decided to show that he had not been an appeaser in Cuba

. . . by producing evidence that his coexistence policies were producing results. . . .

He was apparently confident he could conclude an early agreement with the United States banning nuclear tests, thus proving the practical wisdom of his policies.<sup>363</sup>

However, it should also be noted that at this time there was also a major increase in Soviet military expenditures from which the Soviets wanted to draw attention.<sup>364</sup> In addition, President Kennedy and United Kingdom's Prime Minister Macmillan were to meet from 18 to 21 December, to discuss the future of strategic forces and their relationship to NATO.<sup>365</sup> The new Soviet stance certainly might have been made with the intent of influencing these talks. In addition, Edward Teller indicated in congressional hearings that the Soviets' desire for a test ban at this point was influenced by their newly acquired knowledge concerning ballistic missile defense--knowledge acquired in the atmospheric tests of 1961 and 1962.<sup>366</sup> This phase was terminated by the onset of the high level negotiations which were begun in Moscow on 15 July 1963.

The ENDC Negotiations--  
10 December 1962-19 December 1962

Prior to 10 December 1962, the Soviet Union had advocated the use of automatic seismic stations as a substitute for on-site inspections and any international augmentation of the national control systems. However, the debate over these black boxes took place without any concrete Soviet proposals being made. The Soviets rectified this on 10 December when Tsarapkin made a formal proposal, noting that the Soviet Union "is prepared to agree that two or three such stations should be set up on the territory of the States possessing nuclear weapons, including the Soviet Union." In itself, this added nothing new to what had been discussed previously. Tsarapkin also indicated that the periodic replacement of the sealed apparatus in the stations on Soviet territory should be carried out by Soviet personnel in Soviet aircraft. However, he then made a most significant statement:

The Soviet Union is sincerely striving to reach agreement on a mutually acceptable basis. If the participation of foreign personnel is required for the delivery of this apparatus to automatic seismic stations from the international centre and for its return from the stations to the international centre, the Soviet Union would be prepared to agree to this.<sup>367</sup>

For the first time since the 28 November 1961 draft treaty was proposed, the Soviet Union now publicly stated it was willing to allow foreigners on Soviet territory in connection with the control system for the test ban.<sup>368</sup> Yet, as promising as this may have seemed at the time, the ensuing negotiations quickly became deadlocked.

#### Intergovernmental Exchanges

On 19 December 1962, the ENDC recessed with little having been accomplished. The center of activity then shifted to the Soviet and American chiefs of state. The same day the ENDC recessed, Khrushchev sent Kennedy a letter--part of a mutual correspondence begun during the Cuban crisis--which contained a further Soviet concession. After repeating the Soviet proposal concerning three automatic seismic stations in the USSR and their servicing, Khrushchev indicated that he would accept "a minimum number of on-site inspections." He then proposed a yearly quota of two to three inspections "in the territory of each of the nuclear Powers, when it was considered necessary, in seismic regions where any suspicious earth tremors occurred." As the basis for his proposed quota of two to three inspections, Khrushchev cited a prior discussion in New York between Dean and Kuznetsov, in which Dean

supposedly had said the United States would accept two to four inspections per year in the Soviet Union.<sup>369</sup> Although this was still a very retrograde position vis-à-vis the Soviet position in the spring of 1960, compared to the more recent Soviet position, it was a great step forward.

Kennedy replied to this letter on 28 December 1962. In his letter, he applauded the Soviet Union's forward movement on the question of on-site inspections, but firmly noted that Dean had not indicated two to four inspections but eight to ten. Kennedy also indicated that allowing on-site inspections only in seismic areas was an unacceptable restriction as was a limit of three automatic seismic stations in the USSR. Finally, Kennedy noted that the whole question of the black boxes had been brought up at the Pugwash Conference, in September, by the Soviet scientists attending and not, as Khrushchev had indicated, by the British scientists. Despite these several areas of disagreement brought out by Kennedy, the tone of his letter was positive and indicated a willingness to negotiate. In keeping with this attitude, Kennedy suggested private talks between William C. Foster, the director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and a Soviet representative.<sup>370</sup>

Khrushchev replied on 7 January 1963. In his letter, he reaffirmed the Soviet position that three automatic seismic stations in the Soviet Union would be "fully adequate." Vis-à-vis on-site inspections, Khrushchev reiterated the Soviet position that by allowing any inspections at all, the USSR was making a political concession unrelated to technical necessities:

It has always been our view, as it still is, that there is no need for inspection at all; and if we now agree to a quota of two or three inspections a year, we do so solely in order to remove the remaining differences for the sake of bringing about agreement.

He then emphasized the Soviet adherence to a quota no larger than three inspections per year. However, the Premier did indicate that he had no objection to inspections being carried out in aseismic as well as seismic areas although he did not consider it to be "the most rational course." Finally, Khrushchev indicated that N. T. Fedorenko, the Soviet Permanent Representative to the United Nations, and S.K. Tsarapkin, the Soviet Representative to the ENDC, would meet with Foster in January.<sup>371</sup>

The talks took place between 14 and 31 January 1963, and included the British Ambassador to the United States, Sir David Ormsby-Gore. During the talks, the West dropped its demand for international supervision of the

nationally manned seismic stations. The Soviets' position, on the contrary, remained static. While confirming their prior agreement to allow the automatic seismic stations to be periodically checked by international personnel, they were unshakable in their adherence to three automatic seismic stations and a quota of two or three on-site inspections per year. The Soviets simply refused to discuss any other questions until the Soviet numbers had been accepted by the West. The West would only come down to seven black boxes if certain conditions were fulfilled and a quota of eight to ten inspections per year.<sup>372</sup> On 31 January, the Soviets asked that the informal talks be terminated and the negotiations returned to the ENDC.<sup>373</sup>

The ENDC resumed its discussions on 12 February. The negotiations revolved around the questions of acceptable numbers for on-site inspections and automatic seismic stations. The Soviet position appeared immutable, while the West indicated its "offers are not made on a take it or leave it basis, but are linked with agreement on the shaded areas and are flexible and subject to negotiation."<sup>374</sup> In the ENDC, the representative of the UAR urged both sides to make an "act of faith" and help achieve a compromise on the question of on-site inspections. He,



himself, suggested four to five inspections per year.<sup>375</sup>

In the latter part of February, Foster indicated privately to Kuznetsov that the United States would accept seven on-site inspections "if there was a clear understanding of the set of principles governing on-site inspection procedures which would insure that each on-site inspection was meaningful."<sup>376</sup> In contrast to the Western indications of flexibility, the Soviet position remained unchanged, Kuznetsov continuing to maintain that the United States itself had indicated that two to four inspections would be acceptable. Kuznetsov also refused to have the subcommittee of the ENDC reconvened, preferring to have the question of a test ban discussed only in the plenary sessions of the ENDC.<sup>377</sup>

On 1 April 1963, the United States and United Kingdom submitted a joint memorandum on the arrangements for on-site inspections on Soviet, British and American territories. This detailed memorandum was rejected by the Soviets, who still refused to discuss any details until the West had accepted their proposed figures for automatic seismic stations and on-site inspections.<sup>378</sup>

The Soviet position then began to harden. On 12 April, Khrushchev had a seven-hour interview with Norman

Cousins. A significant portion of the interview dealt with the test ban negotiations. Khrushchev indicated, inter alia, that because of the Dean-Kuznetsov talks and talks between Jerome B. Wiesner and Fedorov, the Soviet scientist, Khrushchev had gotten the clear impression that if the Soviet Union would again propose around three inspections per year, this would be acceptable to the West. According to Khrushchev, he had been made to look foolish in persuading the Council of Ministers to agree to reinstate this proposal and then in having the West demand eight inspections when he offered three. Khrushchev now felt betrayed by the West, and threatened,

When I go up to Moscow next week I expect to serve notice that we will not consider ourselves bound by three inspections. If you can go from three to eight, we can go from three to zero.<sup>379</sup>

Eight days later, Khrushchev had an interview with the editor of the Italian newspaper Il Giorno. Khrushchev labeled the Western proposal of seven on-site inspections as a step backward (from the two to three the United States had supposedly offered in the fall of 1962). He reiterated the familiar theme that the current Western proposals were made because "certain American circles" wanted to "set up reconnaissance centers on the territory of the Soviet Union." Khrushchev again threatened to

retract the Soviet offer of two to three inspections.<sup>380</sup>

Despite this change in the Soviet attitude, on 24 April, Kennedy and Macmillan wrote to Khrushchev proposing an intensification of the negotiations, and indicated, according to Arthur Schlesinger, that the United States and Britain "would be ready in due course to send to Moscow very senior representatives empowered to speak for them directly with Khrushchev."<sup>381</sup> Khrushchev's reply, received on 13 May, was declamatory and rude,<sup>382</sup> but it did not withdraw the Soviet offer of two or three inspections as Khrushchev had threatened, and did accept the proposal of high level negotiations in Moscow.<sup>383</sup> The two Western leaders replied on 30 May. They ignored the temptation to reply in kind, and instead, centered on the Soviet acceptance of high level negotiations.<sup>384</sup> On 8 June, Khrushchev replied and, although the letter has been characterized as "ungracious and sulky," he did agree to receive the Western negotiators.<sup>385</sup> Two days later, it was announced in the three capitals that Andrei Gromyko, Averell Harriman, and Lord Hailsham would meet in Moscow in the near future to conduct negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty. Kennedy included this announcement in his speech at the American University on 10 June.

Kennedy's speech was dedicated to the topic of world peace. In it, he addressed the following topics: (1) the possibilities of peace; (2) the common interests of the United States and the Soviet Union; (3) the pursuit of peace and the need to reexamine our attitude toward the cold war; and (4) peace and human rights.<sup>386</sup> As Ted Sorensen, the primary architect of the speech, has noted, "The President was determined to put forward a fundamentally new emphasis on the peaceful and the positive in our relations with the Soviets."<sup>387</sup> As a gesture of American sincerity, Kennedy announced that the United States would not conduct atmospheric nuclear tests so long as other states do not do so. Khrushchev later indicated to Harriman that it was "the best speech by any President since Roosevelt." It was also printed in full in the Soviet Press and was not jammed when broadcast by the Voice of America.<sup>388</sup>

On 15 June, Khrushchev was interviewed by the editors of Pravda and Izvestia, and the interview centered on Kennedy's speech. In this public statement, Khrushchev was not as enthusiastic about the speech as Sorensen had indicated he had been in private, but while finding a number of areas to criticize, Khrushchev did note that "as a

whole President Kennedy's speech makes a favorable impression."<sup>389</sup> Nevertheless, in discussing the prospects of a test ban agreement, Khrushchev was not at all positive. On-site inspections, he insisted, were demanded by the West so as to open up Soviet territory

. . . to spies from NATO military headquarters. . . .  
. . . we are ready to sign an agreement on the discontinuation of all nuclear tests even today. It is up to the West. . . . But the success of this meeting [in Moscow] will depend on the luggage the United States and British representatives bring with them to our country.<sup>390</sup>

Between the date of this interview and 2 July, when Khrushchev made a major speech in East Berlin, there was a fundamental shift in Soviet policy vis-à-vis a test ban. In his East Berlin speech, Khrushchev announced that the Soviet Union was prepared to conclude an agreement with the United States and the United Kingdom on a limited cessation of nuclear tests, covering tests in all environments except underground.<sup>391</sup> This was a fundamental change in Soviet policy. Throughout the negotiations the Soviet Union had been adamant that the test ban agreement must be comprehensive. Even in 1959, when the Soviets had agreed to a test ban which included a threshold below which the treaty would not apply, the Soviets had demanded attaching a moratorium on low yield underground tests which de facto

made the limited test ban a comprehensive test ban. Thus, at the end of this phase, just prior to the commencement of the high level negotiations in Moscow, the problem of control for a comprehensive test ban appeared to be no nearer its ultimate solution than before, but a new possibility for agreement, a limited test ban, now seemed more promising than ever before.

#### Analysis of the Negotiating Techniques in Phase IV

In this phase, the Soviets used many negotiating techniques already familiar to those who had observed the first three phases of the test ban negotiations. As in all the other phases, the Soviets used rudeness and vilification. As noted above, Arthur Schlesinger has characterized Khrushchev's two unpublished letters of early May and early June as "declamatory and rude" and "ungracious, sulky, sullen and querulous" respectively.<sup>392</sup> On occasion during this phase, the West was referred to in polemical terms, however, the frequency and virulence of this was greatly diminished from the previous phase. This technique was primarily employed for casting aspersions on the West's negotiating in good faith. In his interview in Il Giorno, Khrushchev maintained that "the governments of the United

States and Britain are doing everything to hinder a positive outcome in the [test ban] talks."<sup>393</sup> Similarly, in the ENDC, Kuznetsov self-righteously declaimed:

For the Soviet Union there is no question as to whether an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests should or should not be concluded. We are in favor of its being concluded. The world wishes to know now whether the Western Powers intend at last to agree to the prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests, or whether they are only concerned with carrying out one new series of experimental nuclear explosions after another. . . . The present resumption of experimental nuclear explosions in . . . Nevada in flagrant violation of the resolution of the seventeenth session of the General Assembly, which called on the nuclear Powers to cease all tests as from 1 January 1963, can leave no doubt as to the intentions of the United States.<sup>394</sup>

The preceding quote also is a clear example of the continuing Soviet use of the negotiations for propaganda purposes. The role of propaganda in this phase was more similar to its role in the first and second phases rather than its role in the third phase. That is, the Soviets did not employ propaganda in this stage simply to put themselves in the best light and the West in the worst light, but it appears that the Soviets attempted to modify the Western position through the use of outside pressures generated by Soviet propaganda. This is the logical explanation for the Soviet maneuvers in December 1962 and the first two months of 1963.

The Soviets made two significant concessions in December concerning the automatic seismic stations and on-site inspections. They then agreed to private talks with the United States and Britain in January presumably under the impression that the West would accede to their demands concerning the number of black boxes and inspections. However, when the West did not accept the Soviet position during these talks, Kuznetsov terminated them and demanded the negotiations revert to the more public arena of the ENDC. In addition, to ensure the greatest amount of "outside" influence the Soviets refused to reconvene the subcommittee of the ENDC, thus forcing the test ban to be negotiated with the full participation of the nonnuclear ENDC members. The result of this was to place the West in the position of being the uncooperative party any time the nonnuclear states attempted to make a compromise between the two sides, such as when the UAR suggested the West accept four to five on-site inspections per year.<sup>395</sup>

The Soviets also continued to maintain an adversary attitude toward the West during this phase. The debate in the ENDC continued to be characterized by Soviet antagonism toward the West. Khrushchev's correspondence with Kennedy in the spring of 1963, continued the adversary attitude



toward the West during this phase. The debate in the ENDC continued to be characterized by Soviet antagonism toward the West. Khrushchev's correspondence with Kennedy in the spring of 1963, continued the adversary attitude even when accepting Western proposals. An example of this attitude was displayed by Khrushchev when he discussed Kennedy's American University speech with the editors of Pravda and Izvestia. While acknowledging the speech as "a step forward in a realistic appraisal of the international situation," Khrushchev continued to complain of "Western aggressive blocs" and to maintain that "the capitalist order is tumbling down and cracking owing to the objective laws of historic development." Finally, in advocating peaceful coexistence, Khrushchev was careful to emphasize that "we do not offer peaceful coexistence in the sphere of ideology."<sup>396</sup>

The fourth technique used by the Soviets was to be stubborn and to attempt to wear out the opponent. There are two excellent examples of the use of this technique during this phase. First, there was the continuing Soviet refusal to even discuss a partial test ban treaty. This had been an unchanging position of the Soviets since the negotiations had begun and was only modified at the very

end of this phase--and it should be noted that this change in the Soviet position came suddenly, with no prior hint that such a change was pending. The second example is that of the stance maintained by the Soviets. They had announced their willingness to accept three automatic seismic stations, and three on-site inspections per year. Once this position was taken, the Soviets literally would discuss nothing else until the West had accepted the Soviet proposal. As Kennedy noted in a press conference in late May 1963:

. . . since December there has been no change in the Soviet position on the number of tests [i.e., on-site inspections], nor willingness to discuss, in any way, any of these other questions until we accept their position of December, which is not a satisfactory position for us.<sup>397</sup>

During this phase, the Soviets also were not adverse to making statements which were patently false. Primarily, this was simply a reiteration of statements made previous to this phase, such as "it is well known that national detection systems are fully adequate for control over a nuclear test ban."<sup>398</sup> Another statement that was as specious as it was common was that Western demands for international control were made "in order to establish a comprehensive system of international espionage."<sup>399</sup> Yet, it should be noted that these were quite mild when compared

to the deception practiced in the previous phase vis-à-vis the resumption of testing. Yet, this abstinence from major deceptions during the fourth phase might be more rationally credited to a lack of opportunity rather than to a heightened sense of fair play.

In this phase, it is questionable as to what the Soviets' attitude was toward concessions. On one hand, it is obvious that the Soviets did modify their position concerning on-site inspections. Yet, this modification could only be considered a concession when compared with the retrograde position they held in late 1961 and during almost all of 1962. When viewed from the perspective of the whole history of the negotiations, the Soviet offer of three on-site inspections per year is either a slight regression from the earlier profuse promises of strict international control, or it is simply a return to an offer previously made.<sup>400</sup> This could be considered a concession only if one assumed the Soviets were being completely honest when they maintained that adequate control could be achieved with national systems. However, once this offer was made, the Soviets steadfastly refused to negotiate on it. According to the Soviets, it had to be accepted or there would be no on-site inspections at all.<sup>401</sup> The

situation was basically the same with regard to automatic seismic stations. At first, these were offered by the Soviets as a substitute for on-site inspections, and therefore, could only be considered a concession in the immediate context of the negotiations and not when viewing the entire history of the negotiations. In this case, the Soviets also presented their proposal of three such stations in the USSR as their first and final offer. Yet, Tsarapkin refused to negotiate on this while at the same time professing that "international problems can only be solved by negotiations, mutual concessions, the manifestation of goodwill and the desire to find mutually acceptable solutions."<sup>402</sup>

The only true concession made during this phase was on the acceptability of a limited test ban treaty. As noted above, Khrushchev announced on 2 July that such a treaty would be acceptable to the Soviet Union. This was the first time during the course of the negotiations that the Soviets had made such a concession. Therefore, this can be considered an actual Soviet concession of major significance. Even if considered simply as a result of the Soviets' acquisition of the desired knowledge of ballistic missile defense through previous atmospheric testing, the

emphasis here is that a limited test ban had not been acceptable before and now it was.

The Soviet attitude toward negotiations on the questions of on-site inspections and automatic seismic stations can also be included under the technique of demanding agreement in principle before negotiations on detailed or technical topics is undertaken. These two instances could be seen as extreme examples of this technique since the Soviet negotiators literally refused to discuss any aspect of these two parts of a control system until the West formally accepted the Soviets' proposals for three inspections and three black boxes in the USSR.<sup>403</sup> One other aspect of this technique is that, perhaps, the Soviets made the proposal on inspections, in December 1962, in the belief that all the West really wanted was for the Soviets to agree to in principle to the concept of on-site inspections. If this was what the West had in mind, then the proposal of three inspections per year would now be acceptable to the United States and United Kingdom.<sup>404</sup> When the West responded by demanding a larger number of inspections, the Soviet negotiators were unwilling to change an agreement in principle into an agreement in fact.

Throughout this phase, the Soviets presented what the West considered unreasonable demands vis-à-vis automatic seismic stations and on-site inspections. From the Western perspective, this could be a clear example of the Soviet technique of making unreasonable or exaggerated demands so that in any resulting compromise the Soviets would obtain the majority of their objective. Yet, if one accepted the Soviet version of how it was convinced that these proposals would be acceptable to the West, then it becomes uncertain whether the Soviets used this technique or not. However, the second aspect of this technique was certainly used during this phase, i.e., ignore the opponent's questions or criticisms. In relating to the ENDC the major points covered in the informal trilateral discussions of January 1963, Foster noted:

. . . the United States suggested that its requirements [for a verification system] might be met with seven automatic stations if satisfactory assurances could be obtained concerning the characteristics of the Soviet national seismograph network. There was no reciprocal response by the Soviet Union. . . .

At the private talks . . . the United States explained its views on appropriate general conditions under which on-site inspections should take place. We inquired whether the Soviet Union foresaw any serious difficulties in negotiating an agreement along lines envisaged by the United States. We received no answer.<sup>405</sup>

Western efforts to demonstrate why the Soviet position on on-site inspections was unacceptable were met by the invariable rebuttal:

It has been scientifically demonstrated and completely confirmed in practice that for the cessation of tests, including those underground, there is no need for inspections of any kind.<sup>406</sup>

Despite this assertion, the Soviets, as they had in the previous phases, continued to refuse to present detailed technical proof of this to the West.

The Soviets continued to use procedural devices to obtain substantive advantages. During this phase, the Soviets effected the transfer of the test ban negotiations from the subcommittee of the ENDC to the ENDC's plenary sessions.<sup>407</sup> As noted previously, this put greater pressure on the West to modify its position and further accommodate the Soviet Union.

The Soviets also used the negotiating technique of making a concession, repudiating it and then making the same concession again at a later time. This technique was used in connection with the Soviet reinstatement of the proposal for three on-site inspections annually. The result of this technique was described rather caustically by Senator Symington in hearings of the Committee on Armed Services:

There was a day when we said we needed 20 on-site inspections. . . .

At that time the Soviets said three. Then we went from 10 to 8--from 20, to 10, to 8. But the Soviets went from three to nothing. The Soviets now go from nothing to three, and we proclaim a great victory.<sup>408</sup>

In this connection with this question of an inspection quota, the Soviets demanded a concession from the West prior to engaging in substantive negotiations. Kennedy described the Soviet position as being that only after the West had agreed to three inspections per year would the Soviet representatives negotiate with the West on such matters as "the make-up of the inspection team, the rules under which the inspection team would operate, the area where there could be drilling," etc.<sup>409</sup> This position was maintained by the Soviets from the time they proposed three inspections per year, in December 1962, until July 1963, when Khrushchev announced Soviet acceptance of a limited test ban treaty.

With regard to both an inspection quota and automatic seismic stations, the Soviets also insisted that the West had originated both proposals. Therefore, since the Soviets were only agreeing to the West's proposals, they held that the West must agree to the Soviet positions which Khrushchev stated in his 19 December letter to Kennedy:



In its desire to find a mutually acceptable basis for an agreement the Soviet Union recently took an important step to meet the West: it agreed to the installation of automatic seismological stations. This idea, as you know, was not advanced by ourselves. It was proposed by English scientists during a recent meeting of members of the Pugwash movement in London.<sup>410</sup> [Emphasis mine]

However, the question of the black boxes was only secondary. This technique was used primarily in connection with the Soviet proposal for three on-site inspections per annum. Indeed, the Soviets became quite upset when the West rejected the Soviet offer of three inspections annually, even hinting that if the West would not accept three inspections, the Soviets would revert back to their previous position of no inspections.<sup>411</sup> The Soviets steadfastly maintained that Dean, Wiesner, and other United States officials had assured the Soviet representatives of the change in United States policy. Norman Cousins, personally, discussed this with Khrushchev in the spring of 1963. Cousins later related the Premier's remarks:

The Chairman leaned forward in his chair. There was a perceptible tightening in his expression.

"If the United States really wanted a treaty, it could have one," he said in measured tones. "If it wants one now it can have one. The U.S. said it wanted inspections. We don't believe inspections are really necessary. . . . But we wanted a treaty and the U.S. Said we couldn't get one without

inspections. So we agreed, only to have you change your position."

"There was a misunderstanding as to what our position really was," I said.

"A misunderstanding? How could there be a misunderstanding? Fedorov had a meeting with Wiesner in Washington last October. Wiesner told him that the United States was ready to proceed on the basis of a few annual inspections. Ambassador Dean told Kuznetsov the same thing. Kuznetsov is a very meticulous reporter. He always tells me exactly what happened. How can there be a misunderstanding?"

The President had asked me to say that he . . . was disposed to regard the matter as an honest misunderstanding; he felt a fresh start should be made. . . .

The Chairman shook his head sadly.

"It is not just one conversation. As I told you, there was the talk between Wiesner and Fedorov. Also, our scientists came back from Cambridge, where they met with American scientists who said the same thing. How could there be a misunderstanding?"<sup>412</sup>

The question naturally arises: Was this indeed a misunderstanding or was one side deliberately lying to gain an advantage? The truth of the situation has never been made public if, indeed, it is even known by anyone. Dean has steadfastly denied the Soviet charge that he was a source of their information,<sup>413</sup> and Ted Sorensen had tried to shift the blame for the confusion from the Americans to the British.<sup>414</sup> Yet, if it was a simple misunderstanding, the blame must certainly lie with the Americans. While the official United States position was eight to ten inspections, there was considerable speculation that a

lower number of inspections would soon be proposed by the West. The Western position was continually being undermined by indications that the present position was not final. Often influential American officials held the opinion that the United States could accept a significantly lower number of inspections than the current Western position indicated.<sup>415</sup> In testifying before a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Armed Services in February 1963, Dr. Harold Brown, then the Director of Research and Engineering in the Department of Defense, indicated that while three inspections would be unacceptable, he might accept four, providing the inspection procedures were acceptable.<sup>416</sup> At that time the official United States position was still seven.

However, the argument that this was all the fault of the American propensity to vacillate in public and private over its negotiating positions is weakened by the Soviet stance at this time. The Soviets clearly and emphatically indicated that Dean and Wiesner were their primary sources of information, and there was no indication from the Soviets that they had inferred from the Western representatives that three inspections would be acceptable if proposed. Indeed, Kuznetsov, the supposed recipient of

the information clearly stated in the ENDC, "our Western partners suggested two or three as an acceptable number of inspections."<sup>417</sup> Tsarapkin also indicated specifically that Wiesner had told the Soviets that the United States would agree to three inspections.<sup>418</sup> Finally, Khrushchev, in his letter of 19 December 1962 to Kennedy, was very specific as to the source of his information:

. . . on 30 October 1962, in discussions held in New York with Mr. V. V. Kuznetsov . . . your representative, Ambassador Dean, said that in the opinion of the United States Government, 2-4 on-site inspections a year in the territory of the Soviet Union would be sufficient.<sup>419</sup>

These and numerous other Soviet statements discredit any theory that it was all a simple misunderstanding or that it was the result of any intragovernmental indecisiveness as to what the actual minimum acceptable figure was. The Soviet references are simply too specific and involve too many American officials for these explanations to be valid.

On the other hand, there is the possibility that the Soviets deliberately fabricated these supposed statements by Western officials. Reviewing the history of these negotiations, it would certainly not be the first time the Soviets deliberately misquoted a Western official for tactical purposes. If the Soviets did deliberately fabricate this incident so as to force the West to accept

only three inspections annually, it did not succeed. However, the maneuver may have had some influence on the United States decision to lower its demand to seven and on the UAR's attempt to persuade the West to accept four or five inspections, but this cannot be verified.

To further indicate that their proposal for three on-site inspections was a final offer, the Soviets employed the technique of proclaiming that their position took full account of the West's desires. As Khrushchev so eloquently stated the Soviet argument:

It has always been our view, as it still is, that there is no need for inspection at all; and if we now agree to a quota of two or three inspections a year, we do so solely in order to remove the remaining differences for the sake of bringing about agreement.<sup>420</sup>

As in all the previous phases, the Soviets continued to stress the primacy of the political aspects of the negotiations. In the ENDC, Kuznetsov indicated this clearly:

The [Western] attempt to justify the number of inspections by referring to some sort of scientific approach should mislead no one. This is a purely political problem and science has nothing to do with it.<sup>421</sup>

Of course, the Soviets were not adverse to indicating that their proposals were also scientifically valid, if the opportunity arose, but such demonstrations were obviously

meant only to score debating points since they were generally based on a misquoted Western source and were quickly shown to be fallacious by the Western representatives.<sup>422</sup>

Despite continuing Western invitations to do so, the Soviets also continued to refuse to divulge any scientific information to prove their position that on-site inspections and automatic seismic stations were really unnecessary.<sup>423</sup> Yet, the Soviets continued to maintain that they were scientifically correct in insisting that national means of detection were quite sufficient.<sup>424</sup>

In summarizing the techniques used by the Soviets during this phase, it is interesting that there is a combination of accommodation and intransigence. The most abrasive of the Soviet negotiating techniques which were evident in the previous phase have been moderated to a certain extent. Yet, obviously, the Soviets had not returned to negotiating as they had in the second phase. It would seem that a test ban agreement had become a means to an end again, thereby gaining increased stature in the Soviet perception, but not regaining the importance it had in the late 1950s. Since the West had been continually modifying its position so as to come closer to the Soviet

position, perhaps the Soviets believed that with only slight encouragement (in the form of two modest concessions) the West would now agree, or be compelled to agree, to a comprehensive test ban treaty. Such a treaty would have included almost all the Soviet demands which the West had previously found to be totally unacceptable. When the West did not modify its position sufficiently for the Soviets, the latter reverted to an intransigent attitude. This attitude, finally, was modified when the Soviets accepted the concept of a limited test ban.

Phase V. 15-25 July 1963

Overview

The final phase of the test ban negotiations was also the shortest, lasting only eleven days. The negotiations took place in Moscow and were conducted by Averell Harriman, Lord Hailsham, Khrushchev and Gromyko. In contrast to the majority of the previous test ban negotiations, the Moscow negotiations were conducted in a much more private atmosphere. Further, no verbatim transcripts of the sessions were kept.

From the Soviet perspective, the negotiations were conducted against a background of worsening relations with

Communist China. A conference of the Soviet and Chinese Communist parties began in early July and continued to 20 July when it ended without a communique being issued. The meeting was not successful in bringing the two communist parties closer together. Indeed, on 14 July, the day before the test ban negotiations began, the Central Committee of the CPSU made a long and emotional statement sharply criticizing the Chinese view that war between the capitalist and communist states was inevitable and would end in victory for the communists. It stated that such views were "in crying contradiction to the ideas of Marxism-Leninism."<sup>425</sup> What effect this had on the subsequent test ban negotiations is unknown, but it is logical to assume that the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations could only enhance the Soviet desire to improve Soviet-Western relations.

Khrushchev led the Soviet negotiators on the first day of the test ban negotiations.<sup>426</sup> Apparently, Khrushchev was in good humor and optimistic about the negotiations. He brushed aside consideration of a comprehensive treaty because the conflicts between the East and West were insoluble. Each side submitted a draft treaty for a limited test ban. The West submitted its treaty of



27 August 1962. As Dean has noted, although this draft had been officially denounced by the Soviets at the time it was first proposed, it had aroused "considerable informal interest among Soviet representatives at Geneva and at the United Nations in 1962 before the Cuban crisis."<sup>427</sup> For their part, the Soviets submitted a limited test ban treaty which was quite similar to their draft treaties of 31 October 1958 and 28 November 1961. Jacobson and Stein have characterized it as "simple and brief. It merely stated that the three governments agreed to ban nuclear tests in the three environments." The treaty contained a provision for the accession of other states, but lacked any provisions for withdrawal or peaceful nuclear detonations.<sup>428</sup>

After the first day, Gromyko was the primary Soviet negotiator. The Soviets maintained a businesslike attitude throughout the negotiations, and soon the negotiations centered on the Western draft treaty. Tentative agreement on a draft treaty was reached on 20 July. This draft was then referred by the delegates to their governments. Minor amendments were apparently requested by both the Soviet Union and the West. A subcommittee representing all three states incorporated these latest amendments on 22 July.

The treaty was initialled by Harriman, Lord Hailsham and Gromyko on 25 July 1963.

The primary difficulties involved peaceful nuclear explosions, and the relationship of the test ban treaty to a NATO-Warsaw Pact nonaggression pact which the Soviets desired. The original Western draft treaty allowed carefully controlled peaceful nuclear explosions in all environments if they were approved by the original parties. This was unacceptable to the Soviets and was dropped. The idea of tying a nonaggression pact to the limited test ban treaty had been brought up by Khrushchev in his 2 July speech in East Berlin. This was unacceptable to the West. After some negotiation, the Soviets agreed to defer the question of such a pact, and the only reference made to it was in the final communique.

In addition to the above questions, other less important problems also arose. The West demanded a change in some of the language of the preamble since it appeared to ban the use of nuclear weapons even in self-defense. The Soviets did not want a withdrawal clause included in the treaty; the West wanted a very detailed withdrawal clause. A compromise was arranged based on a United States suggestion. The United States also originated the

suggestion of having three depository governments rather than the usual single depository government. This alleviated the problem of accession to the treaty by states such as the German Democratic Republic and Nationalist China which were not recognized by all three states. Finally, at Western insistence, the Soviets agreed to reduce the number of ratifications required for amending the treaty from two-thirds to a simple majority (including the original parties). The West hoped through this to make it easier to change the treaty and allow peaceful nuclear explosions.

Even with these modifications, the final treaty closely resembled the Western draft treaty of 27 August 1962. In his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Dean presented an excellent comparison of the two, superimposing the final treaty upon the original draft. This is reproduced in Annex IV.

#### Analysis of Negotiating Techniques in Phase V

The accounts of this phase are limited in number and are not very detailed in describing the negotiations. Because of this, it is much more difficult to ascertain exactly what negotiating techniques were used.

The Soviets did not use the negotiations for propaganda during this phase. Both sides made a distinct effort to keep the negotiations private. Of course, the resulting treaty was made the focal point of a considerable amount of Soviet propaganda, but that is beyond the limits of this phase.

The Soviets apparently maintained a stubborn and forceful attitude. The principal topic on which they proved adamant was peaceful nuclear explosions. The Soviets simply would not allow any nuclear explosions other than those which were underground. However, according to Schlesinger, it was Harriman who manifested the rigid attitude. In fact, the British became so fearful he would lose the treaty that Macmillan personally called Kennedy to complain.<sup>429</sup> Thus, this negotiating technique could not be credited to the Soviets in this phase.

Another negotiating technique not employed by the Soviets yet commonly ascribed to them was the technique of refusing to make concessions. The Soviets accepted the Western draft treaty as the basis for the final treaty. They also accepted the great majority of the Western modifications. The only area where their position was fully accepted by the West concerned the elimination of the

provision for peaceful nuclear detonations in the three environments covered by the treaty.<sup>430</sup> Of course, the primary concession by the Soviet Union was that it accepted a limited test ban treaty without demanding an accompanying moratorium on underground tests.

However, the Soviets did not forego all their negotiating techniques. They did employ a number of techniques previously noted in the other phases of the negotiations. One of these techniques was related to the Soviet call for a nonaggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization. It is not clear why the Soviets insisted on tying a nonaggression pact to the test ban treaty. One explanation might be that Khrushchev was simply attempting to build "more bridges" between East and West and felt that such a pact was the most logical disarmament problem to discuss subsequent to agreement on a test ban. It would also be of immediate benefit to the Soviet Union since it would protect its western flank while relations with the Peoples' Republic of China were deteriorating. It would not be much more than a year later when Khrushchev considered destroying Peking's atomic installations.<sup>431</sup> Having a nonaggression pact with NATO would be quite advantageous in planning such a maneuver.

Another explanation might be that Khrushchev saw this as an opportunity to sow discord among the Western allies and to attempt to isolate West Germany.<sup>432</sup> In either case, the Soviets would be using the negotiating process to divide their opponents and delay Western reactions to future Soviet activities.

A less likely explanation for the nonaggression pact proposal was that it was simply an exaggerated or unreasonable demand which was made to be given away as a concession in exchange for a concession from the West. Iklé considers this to be a possible reason for the presentation of this demand.<sup>433</sup>

Another negotiating technique used by the Soviets was to use a procedural device to gain a substantive advantage. During the negotiations, the Soviets pressed the West to accept the following as the title of the treaty: "Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests." The thought behind this was possibly to use the title at a later time for propaganda purposes, since it implied that all tests were banned. However, in the end, the Soviets acquiesced to the title suggested by the West: "Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under Water." Although the latter was not as

simple as the Soviets' proposed title, it was more accurate.

The Soviets also certainly maintained the primacy of the political aspects of the negotiations. In negotiating the limited test ban treaty, they completely ignored the arguments they had previously used to disparage such a treaty espoused a new set of arguments showing its benefits.

Finally, the Soviets continued to refuse to divulge any technical information. Professor Frank Press, a seismologist involved in the test ban negotiations, was a member of the American delegation to Moscow. The Soviets refused to negotiate a comprehensive test ban and, most likely as a result of this, would not allow Press to meet with any Soviet seismologists. The official reason the Soviets gave for denying Press access to his counterparts was that all the Soviet seismologists were out of town or too busy.<sup>434</sup> Since he had no role in negotiating a partial treaty and was not permitted to meet Soviet seismologists, Press left Moscow before the negotiations were concluded.<sup>435</sup>

In reviewing this last phase of the negotiations, it would appear that the negotiations were quite different from the other phases. Most striking is the absence of

most of the negotiating techniques which characterized the other phases. The Soviets obviously desired a treaty. In addition, the Soviets were fully aware of the Western positions, and therefore, there was no need for a lengthy exploration of the opponents' position. The result was that the negotiations were very business-like, and were swiftly brought to a successful conclusion.

Summary of the Test Ban Negotiations  
1957-1963

By reviewing the course of these negotiations, it is possible to document a number of techniques used by the Soviets. There are two techniques, however, noted by Western scholars which have not yet been discussed. These are (1) have the Soviet government/Communist Party give little freedom to Soviet negotiators, and (2) allow little or no personal relationships to develop between the Soviet negotiators and their opponents. It was simply not possible to ascertain from the verbatim transcripts of the negotiations and from other documents relating to the negotiations whether these techniques were employed or not. Instead, reliance had to be placed on the reminiscences of the Western negotiators who participated in the negotiations.



With regard to the freedom of action given to Soviet negotiators, Dean was the only Western negotiator in the test ban negotiations to address this question. He notes in his work on the test ban negotiations that the Soviet diplomats had "an iron determination to carry out a program previously determined in Moscow and not subject to change by the diplomat in the field." Because of this, the Soviet diplomat must always "wait for instructions . . . before he can react to a new proposal, however logical, or suggest changes [to the proposal]." <sup>436</sup> Dean also observes that this applied to the Soviet scientists who participated in the test ban negotiations as well. He characterizes these Soviet scientists as having "a directed role to play in a politically determined and far-reaching strategy." <sup>437</sup>

Dean goes so far as to describe three important Soviet negotiators. Tsarapkin was "very courteous and pleasant, highly intelligent, but ultra-cautious." Kuznetsov was "the most affable and agreeable of the three" but "apparently not interested in initiating substantive changes or making any substantive effort to accommodate the Soviet point of view to that of others." The third Soviet negotiator, Zorin, Dean noted,

was the only one who was willing to agree to changes --including drafting changes of some substance-- without having to refer to Moscow ahead of time, and the only one who seemed willing to initiate changes himself.<sup>438</sup>

Dean also mentions that Zorin got into quite a bit of trouble with his superiors on at least one occasion because of this.<sup>439</sup> Relying on Dean's account, it would appear that the Soviet negotiators participating in the test ban negotiations were in fact given little freedom by their superiors in Moscow. It is logical to assume that this held true for all the phases of the negotiations, since Dean makes no differentiation in their freedom of action over time. Even though he did not participate in the negotiations prior to 1961, there is nothing which would indicate the situation was any different at that time.

A number of other negotiators, as well as Dean, have discussed their personal relationships with their Soviet counterparts. They are quite consistent in their opinions. Harriman has observed:

You cannot be friendly with the Communists the way you can with the British or other Westerners. Their basic loyalties and conceptions are completely different. There is a certain point you can't go beyond because they are taught to believe that man is destined to live by Communist ideology and that we, the imperialist aggressors, are blocking it. You can talk about a man's religion up to a point and you can't go beyond it.<sup>440</sup>

This was confirmed by Dean who noted that a Soviet

negotiator lives a much more withdrawn life than is usual for other diplomats, and, again generally speaking, is not given to relaxed discussion with Western colleagues.<sup>441</sup>

Yet, he held Zorin to be somewhat of an exception to this. Wadsworth, on the other hand, indicates that he had "come to feel a genuine respect and affection" for some of the Soviet negotiators, even while he was describing Soviet negotiation as a "part of a grand strategy aimed at the eventual total defeat of the other side."<sup>442</sup> Perhaps the general relationship between Soviet and Western diplomats might be described as Schlesinger has described the Khrushchev-Kennedy meeting in Vienna in June 1961. Schlesinger notes that the meeting had "deeply disturbed" Kennedy, because he

. . . had never encountered any leader with whom he could not exchange ideas--anyone so impervious to reasoned argument. . . . He himself had indicated flexibility and admitted error, but Khrushchev had remained unmoved and immovable.<sup>443</sup>

At least part of this lack of personal relationship with Western negotiators may be the result of Soviet perceptions of these men as the representatives of an irrevocable enemy. For example, in the official Soviet history of the Kennedy Administration, Arthur Dean, in his role as chief United States negotiator, is held to have taken "into

account the interests of the military-industrial complex" in the United States.<sup>444</sup> Surely, it is not politically wise for a Soviet negotiator to have too close a relationship with a class enemy. Therefore, it is accurate to state that during the test ban negotiations little or no real personal relationships developed between the Soviet negotiators and their Western counterparts. It is again assumed that this was true for all five phases since none of the sources indicate any significant variations in their observations over time.

In reviewing the test ban negotiations as a whole and the negotiating techniques indicated by the Soviets, it can be seen that the Soviets used all the negotiating techniques indicated by the Western scholars in Chapter II. The Soviets also used a number of techniques not indicated in the previous chapter. These latter techniques are the following:\*

20. Take a certain position, but maintain that the position was first taken by the Soviets' opponent, and therefore the opponent must agree to it

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\*For ease of reference, the numbers of these negotiating techniques continue the numerical series of the techniques described by the Western scholars in Chapter II.

21. State that the Soviets' current proposal takes full account of their opponent's position, and therefore, the Soviets need make no further compromises
22. Maintain the primacy of the political aspects of the negotiations
23. Refuse to divulge technical information about the Soviet Union
24. Make a concession in such a way that it is really no concession at all, or make it dependent on the opponent making a concession which is known to be unacceptable to him
25. Negotiate not only by words, but by acts
26. Quote numerous Western sources to support the Soviet position
27. Stress that there is only one real impediment to reaching an agreement, and emphasize that if the opponent would only concede this point to the Soviets, then an agreement could be quickly concluded

Since these negotiating techniques have been described in the discussion of the five phases of the test ban negotiations, it is not necessary to give a detailed explanation of them here.

Chart 3 indicates during which phases of the negotiations the twenty-seven techniques were employed by the Soviets. In each case, where it is indicated that a particular technique was employed, the use of the technique is considered significant because (1) it was used quite regularly during the phase; or (2) it was used in relation to an issue which itself was important to the negotiations. An example of the former would be the use of rudeness and vilification. This was employed throughout the negotiations by the Soviets, and was not related to any particular issue under discussion. The latter is epitomized by the Soviet technique of taking a position and maintaining that it originated with the West. This was used in the negotiations over the quota for on-site inspections, one of the central questions of the negotiations. In the third phase, several techniques were used to such a great extent that they might be said to have characterized that phase. These are also indicated on the chart. In addition, in the third phase, some techniques were used, but not as much as normally expected. While it would be incorrect to indicate their use as being comparable to the other techniques, it would also be incorrect to indicate that they were not used. Therefore, they are shown as being used, but only to

CHART 3. SOVIET NEGOTIATING TECHNIQUES EMPLOYED IN THE  
TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS, 1957-1963

Technique No.	Phase No.				
	1	2	3	4	5
1	-✓	-✓	✓✓	✓	
2	✓	✓	✓✓	✓	
3	✓	✓	✓✓		
4	✓	✓	✓	✓	
5	✓	✓	✓✓	✓	
6	✓	✓	L		✓
7	-	-	✓✓	-✓	-
8	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
9	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
10	✓	✓	✓	✓	
11	✓	✓	✓✓	✓	
12	✓	✓	L	✓	✓
13	✓	-	-		
14		✓	✓	✓	
15	✓			✓	
16	✓	✓	✓		
17			✓		

CHART 3 (Continued)

Technique No.	Phase No.				
	1	2	3	4	5
18			✓		
19		✓	✓		
20	✓	✓	✓	✓	
21	✓		✓	✓	
22	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
23	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
24	✓	✓	✓		
25	✓		✓		
26		✓	✓		
27		✓	✓		

Keys to symbols:

✓ = The technique was used to a significant extent

- = The opposite of the technique was used to a significant extent.

-✓ = Both the technique and its opposite were used to a significant extent.

✓✓ = The technique was used to a great extent.

L = The technique was used only to a limited extent. A blank space indicates that either the technique was not used or that there is insufficient information to determine if the technique was used.



a limited extent. Throughout the negotiations, there were also instances where the Soviets did just the opposite of what a particular technique indicated they would do. Such instances are indicated on the chart. Finally, there were a number of cases where the Soviets used a particular technique in certain instances, and yet did just the opposite in other instances, all within the same phase. This is also noted on the chart.

A number of conclusions can be drawn from Chart 3 and the history of the test ban negotiations. First, it is clear that there is a Soviet negotiating style. The nineteen negotiating techniques which Western observers had noted as being characteristic of the Soviets were also used by the Soviets during the test ban negotiations. In addition, they were not characteristic on any one phase, but most were found throughout the negotiations. Therefore, these negotiating techniques are employed regardless of whether the Soviets are actually attempting to reach an agreement with their opponents or if they are pursuing other objectives through the negotiations. As a result of this, one cannot judge whether the Soviets are negotiating in good faith or not by simply ascertaining the presence or absence of these particular negotiating techniques.

Despite this, it should be noted that these techniques are most prominent when the Soviets are not seeking to reach an agreement but are pursuing other goals. As the chart indicates, in phase 3, these techniques were used most extensively. It was also during phase 3 that the Soviets were not interested at all in reaching a test ban agreement. Rather, the Soviets attempted to prod the West into resuming weapons tests before the Soviets did. At the same time, the Soviets also shifted their efforts from the problem of a test ban to the question of general and complete disarmament.

There was only one technique whose presence or absence accurately reflected whether the Soviets were serious in reaching an agreement. This was the seventh technique: refuse to make concessions. During the first, second, and fifth phases, this technique was conspicuously absent. That is, the Soviets made a number of concessions during these phases. These concessions dealt with both procedural and substantive issues. However, in the third phase, this negotiating technique was conspicuously present. No concessions of any importance were made.<sup>445</sup> The inconsistent use of this technique during the fourth phase is indicative of the ambivalent Soviet attitude

toward the negotiations at that time. Still it is important to note that this does not necessarily reflect the true purpose of the Soviets for engaging--the negotiations. For example, the Soviet "eagerness" to negotiate a test ban treaty from 1957 through 1960 was actually motivated by the desire to hinder American nuclear development in such areas as the neutron bomb and to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons by the European members of NATO, particularly West Germany. At the end of 1962 and in 1963, the Soviets' "desire" to negotiate was again less a factor of seriously desiring a test ban treaty than it was impelled by other factors as previously indicated in the discussion of the reasons for the shift in the Soviet position in phase IV of the negotiations.

The second conclusion is that in a number of instances, what in retrospect may appear to be a technique planned well in advance, might actually be nothing more than a marked Soviet ability to use developing situations to their own advantage. An example of this is the change in the Soviet and Western positions from March to August 1961. From hindsight, it would appear that as the West made more and more concessions to the Soviets, the Soviets responded by continual regressions. Thus, it appears that

the Soviets were attempting to force the West into even more concessions through the Soviets' hardening attitude. However, it is much more likely that the Soviets did not have this in mind, but were, in fact, attempting to frustrate the West into breaking off the negotiations and resuming nuclear weapons tests before the Soviets resumed their own tests. From this perspective, the Soviet tactic was a signal failure. However, at a later time the Soviets were able to use the results of these simultaneous Soviet regressions and Western concessions to their own advantage. The Soviets did this in the ENDC when they were able to identify the current Western position as the extreme position of the West.

The final conclusion drawn from the test ban negotiations is that the Soviets appear to make a political decision as to what their position in the negotiation will be and, then, attempt to support their position. This is opposed to the "Western" method of arriving at a negotiating position. The Western position would appear to be the result of combining the relevant scientific knowledge with the most logically defensible position. For example, the Soviet position in October 1958 was that a comprehensive test ban was desirable with the very minimum amount of

control. This position was defended by a number of varied arguments and was maintained until the Soviet leadership made another political decision as to what the Soviet position should be. The Soviet negotiating stance was then modified to fit this latest decision, and the arguments in defense of the Soviet position were modified accordingly. The Western position, on the other hand, was dependent upon the current scientific "knowledge" concerning the detection and identification of nuclear tests. As this scientific knowledge was modified, so too was the West's position modified. This resulted in a considerable number of changes in the Western position and a considerable amount of division in the West as to what the Western position should be based on.

There are two consequences resulting from the Soviets first choosing a negotiating position and then deciding on how to support this position. First, this causes some Soviet positions to be based on obviously untenable premises. Nevertheless, these premises are stoutly defended by the Soviet negotiators. For example, when in November 1961 the Soviet Union declared that an international control system was not necessary for a test ban agreement, they defended this position with a number

of arguments. One argument was that everyone knew that all tests could be detected and identified using national means of detection. This was obviously false, but the Soviet negotiators, supported by the Soviet leaders, constantly repeated this in the face of all evidence to the contrary.

The second consequence is that the Soviets have a wider choice of positions which they can assume in negotiations since they are not limited to positions which are either scientifically or logically defensible. During the test ban negotiations, the Soviets were able to change their position on whether an international control system was necessary or not and whether a limited test ban treaty was acceptable or not without any let-up in the defense of the current position. In contrast, the West was limited in the positions it could espouse because each new position had to be scientifically more correct or had to be scientifically acceptable and more politically logical than the previous position and any other positions.

## NOTES

1. The Soviet Union had entered into arms control agreements before 1945 and had also signed two minor agreements in the postwar era: the Antarctic Treaty in 1959 and the Hot Line Agreement in 1963.

2. Earl H. Voss, Nuclear Ambush: The Test Ban Trap (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1963), p. 47.

3. For example, Prime Minister Nehru of India called for a standstill agreement for atomic explosions on 2 April 1954. India became a vocal and consistent advocate of a test ban from this time on.

4. Annexes (X), Agenda item 59, p. 5. (References to UN documents will use the UN designations. Appendix A contains a list of the UN designations used and the complete titles of the corresponding documents.)

5. U.S., Department of State, Documents on Disarmaments, 1945-1959, Pubn. No. 7008 (1960), pp. 688-97. (Hereafter cited as State Documents, 1945-59.)

6. Phases II and III, the dates for the transition from the second to the third period and from the third to the fourth period are not precise, and valid arguments can be made for moving them either forward or back. The reasons for choosing the above dates will be explained when the particular period is discussed.

7. DC/SC.1/PV. 87, p. 23.

8. Ibid., p. 33.

9. DC/SC.1/PV. 89, p. 32.

10. Ibid.

11. DC/SC.1/PV. 88, p. 7.

12. DC/SC.1/PV. 91, p. 29.

13. DC/SC.1/PV. 93, p. 17.
14. State Documents, 1945-59, p. 773.
15. DC/SC.1/PV. 94, pp. 25-30.
16. Harold Karan Jacobson and Eric Stein, Diplomats, Scientists, and Politicians: The United States and the Nuclear Test Ban Negotiations (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1966), p. 98.
17. DC/SC.1/PV. 94, pp. 30-32.
18. Ibid., pp. 35-37.
19. DC/SC.1/56.
20. DC/SC.1/PV. 112, pp. 4-5.
21. Ibid., p. 36.
22. DC/SC.1/PV. 114, p. 14.
23. Ibid., p. 3.
24. Jacobson and Stein, Diplomats, Scientists, and Politicians, p. 15.
25. State Documents, 1945-59, p. 791.
26. DC/SC.1/PV. 121, p. 26.
27. State Documents, 1945-59, p. 803.
28. Ibid.
29. DC/SC.1/PV. 128, p. 37. The next day Jules Moch of France disassociated himself and France from Stassen's remarks on the possibility of extending the ten-month test suspension. DC/SC.1/PV. 129, p. 16.
30. U.S. Department of State, Disarmament: The International Effort, 1955-1958 (October 1960), p. 42. (Hereafter cited as State Disarmament, 1955-58.)



31. DC/SC.1/PV. 132, pp. 10, 11, 23-25.
32. Ibid., p. 30.
33. DC/SC.1/PV. 133, p. 31.
34. State Disarmament, 1955-58, p. 51.
35. DC/SC.1/PV. 149, pp. 21-22.
36. Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe, 1945-1970 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), p. 84.
37. DC/SC.1/PV. 151, p. 40.
38. Ciro E. Zoppo, The Issue of Nuclear Test Cessation at the London Disarmament Conference of 1957: A Study in East-West Negotiation (Santa Monica, CA.: RAND Corp., September 1961), p. 81.
39. DC/SC.1/PV. 153, p. 46.
40. State Disarmament, 1955-58, p. 52.
41. A/PV. 680, p. 19.
42. A/PV. 681, p. 29.
43. Ibid., p. 33.
44. A/Bur/SR. 113.
45. A/C.1/SR. 866, p. 5.
46. A/C.1/L. 179 and Add. 1, Annexes (XII), Agenda item 24, p. 12.
47. UN, General Assembly Resolution 1148 (XII).
48. A/C.1/SR. 893, p. 139.
49. A/C.1/L. 176/Rev. 4, Annexes (XII), Agenda item 24, p. 11.

50. Bechhoefer, Postwar Negotiations, p. 418.
51. State Documents, 1945-59, p. 921.
52. Ibid., p. 924.
53. Ibid., p. 936.
54. U.S., Department of State, Background of Heads of Government Conference, 1960; Principal Documents, 1955-1959, Pubn. No. 6972 (1960), p. 154. (Hereafter cited as State Background.)
55. State Documents, 1945-59, pp. 969-70.
56. Ibid., p. 979.
57. Jacobson and Stein, Diplomats, Scientists, and Politicians, p. 46.
58. State Documents, 1945-59, p. 981.
59. Ibid., p. 985.
60. Ibid., p. 1004.
61. Ibid., p. 1007.
62. Ibid., p. 1027.
63. Ibid., p. 1038.
64. Ibid., pp. 1050-51.
65. Ibid., p. 1081.
66. Ibid., p. 1084.
67. Jacobson and Stein, Diplomats, Scientists, and Politicians, p. 57.
68. State Documents, 1945-59, p. 1079.
69. Ciro E. Zoppo, Technical and Political Aspects of Arms Control Negotiation: The 1958 Experts' Conference (Santa Monica, CA.: RAND Corp., September 1962), p. 31.

70. Ibid., p. 33.
71. State Documents, 1945-59, p. 1108.
72. Zoppo, The 1958 Experts' Conference, p. 64.
73. Ibid., p. 2.
74. Quoted by Zoppo, *ibid.*, p. 65.
75. Ibid., p. 19.
76. State Documents, 1945-59, pp. 1111 and 1113.
77. DC/SC.1/PV. 95, p. 11.
78. For example, Moch on 18 March 1957. DC/SC.1/  
PV. 87, p. 43.
79. DC/SC.1/PV. 133, p. 4.
80. DC/SC.1/PV. 151, p. 23.
81. Zoppo, The 1958 Experts' Conference, p. 8.
82. Zoppo, The London Disarmament Conference,  
p. 69.
83. Ibid., p. 55.
84. State Documents, 1945-59, p. 1038.
85. DC/SC.1/PV. 126, p. 11.
86. Ibid., p. 17.
87. DC/SC.1/PV. 97, p. 17.
88. A/PV. 681, p. 33.
89. DC/SC.1/PV. 122, p. 21.
90. DC/SC.1/PV. 156, p. 6.
91. DC/SC.1/PV. 133, p. 31.

92. Ikle, How Nations Negotiate, p. 219.
93. DC/SC.1/PV. 93, p. 19.
94. DC/SC.1/PV. 116, p. 20.
95. DC/SC.1/PV. 138, p. 12.
96. Zoppo, The 1958 Experts' Conference, p. 2.
97. DC/SC.1/PV. 112, p. 36.
98. Zoppo, The 1958 Experts' Conference, p. 39.
99. DC/SC.1/PV. 150, p. 6.
100. State Documents, 1945-59, p. 1004. Spanier and Nogee, in their work, The Politics of Disarmament: A Study in Soviet-American Gamesmanship (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1962), hold this technique to be characteristic of both East and West in postwar disarmament negotiations.
101. State Documents, 1945-59, p. 1114.
102. Ibid., p. 1120.
103. Ibid., p. 1116.
104. Ibid., p. 1119.
105. Ibid., p. 1120.
106. Ibid., p. 1144.
107. Ibid., p. 1211.
108. A/Bur/SR. 117, p. 6.
109. A/PV. 750, p. 25.
110. A/C.1/SR. 942, pp. 3-4.
111. A/C.1/L. 203, Annexes (XIII), Agenda items 64, 70, and 72, p. 20.

112. A/C.1/L. 205, Annexes (XIII), Agenda items 64, 70, and 72, p. 21.

113. A/C.1/L. 202/Rev. 1 and Add. 1 and 2, Annexes (XIII), Agenda items 64, 70, and 72, p. 20.

114. A/C.1/SR. 948, p. 29.

115. A/C.1/SR. 953, p. 54.

116. Ibid., p. 55.

117. GEN/DNT/PV. 1, p. 33.

118. GEN/DNT/PV. 2, p. 5.

119. GEN/DNT/1.

120. GEN/DNT/PV. 2, p. 11.

121. GEN/DNT/PV. 15, p. 9.

122. GEN/DNT/PV. 29, p. 14.

123. Albert L. Latter et al., A Method of Concealing Underground Nuclear Explosions (Santa Monica, CA.: RAND Corp., 1959).

124. James J. Wadsworth, The Price of Peace (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1962), p. 26.

125. GEN/DNT/PV. 37, pp. 6 and 9.

126. GEN/DNT/PV. 72, pp. 7 and 10.

127. At the last meeting before the Easter recess, Tsarapkin indicated that the foreign personnel would not be mere observers but "should occupy certain leading positions in the control posts" and perform technical tasks. GEN/DNT/PV. 72, p. 23.

128. State Documents 1945-59, pp. 1374-78.

129. Ibid., p. 1392.

130. Ibid., pp. 1396-98.

131. Jacobson and Stein, Diplomats, Scientists, and Politicians, pp. 188-89.

132. GEN/DNT/PV. 127, pp. 4-6, 9-11, and 13-17.

133. Ibid., p. 8.

134. New York Times, 11 August 1959, p. 1.

135. State Documents, 1945-59, p. 1439.

136. Ibid., p. 1441.

137. Jacobson and Stein, Diplomats, Scientists, Politicians, p. 204.

138. A/Bur/SR. 122, p. 7.

139. A/PV. 797, p. 12.

140. A/PV. 799, p. 36.

141. A/C.1/SR. 1025, p. 3.

142. Annexes (XIV), Agenda item 69, p. 3.

143. GEN/DNT/PV. 132, p. 18.

144. GEN/DNT/PV. 148, pp. 13-16. In reality, the concessions were more apparent than real, but there was some indication of Soviet willingness to meet Western demands.

145. Jacobson and Stein, Diplomats, Scientists, and Politicians, p. 215.

146. Ibid., p. 216.

147. GEN/DNT/TWG.2/9.

148. GEN/DNT/PV. 150, p. 4.

149. Ibid., p. 26.

150. State Documents, 1945-59, p. 1591.

151. U.S., Department of State, Documents on Disarmament, 1960, Pubn. No. 7172 (1961), pp. 4-5.  
(Hereafter cited as State Documents, 1960.)

152. GEN/DNT/PV. 152, p. 6.

153. GEN/DNT/PV. 151, p. 27.

154. GEN/DNT/PV. 170, pp. 6-11.

155. Ibid., pp. 24-57.

156. GEN/DNT/PV. 172, pp. 6-7.

157. GEN/DNT/PV. 180, p. 7.

158. GEN/DNT/PV. 188, p. 16.

159. GEN/DNT/83, p. 2.

160. GEN/DNT/PV. 198, p. 8.

161. Jacobson and Stein, Diplomats, Scientists, and Politicians, p. 248.

162. GEN/DNT/PV. 196, p. 16.

163. GEN/DNT/PV. 202, pp. 3-4.

164. Ibid., p. 9.

165. Michel Tatu, Power in the Kremlin; From Khrushchev to Kosygin (New York: Viking Press, 1968), p. 122.

166. GEN/DNT/PV. 60, p. 30.

167. James J. Wadsworth, The Price of Peace, p. 26. Wadsworth discussed how to combat this in his testimony before a Senate subcommittee in March 1959. U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Geneva Test Ban Negotiations, 86th Cong., 1st sess., 1959, pp. 29-31.

168. GEN/DNT/PV. 32, p. 23.

169. GEN/DNT/PV. 151, p. 21.
170. New York Times, 10 November 1958, p. 5.
171. GEN/DNT/PV. 1, p. 8.
172. For example: GEN/DNT/PV. 72, p. 17;  
GEN/DNT/PV. 127, p. 18; and GEN/DNT/PV. 150, p. 70.
173. GEN/DNT/PV. 47, p. 21.
174. GEN/DNT/PV. 136, pp. 12-13.
175. GEN/DNT/PV. 164, p. 26.
176. GEN/DNT/45.
177. For example, GEN/DNT/PV. 181, p. 10.
178. For example, GEN/DNT/PV. 73, p. 26.
179. A typical example is the note from the Soviet Foreign Ministry to the American Embassy of 1 October 1958. State Documents, 1945-59, p. 1143.
180. GEN/DNT/PV. 66, p. 3, and GEN/DNT/PV. 114, pp. 9 and 18.
181. GEN/DNT/PV. 76, pp. 4-5.
182. Sir Michael Wright, Disarm and Verify: An Explanation of the Central Difficulties of National Policies (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1964), p. 109.
183. U.S., Department of State, Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests; History and Analysis of Negotiations, Pubn. No. 7258 (1961), p. 29. (Hereafter cited as State Geneva Conference, 1961.)
184. GEN/DNT/32.
185. GEN/DNT/PV. 202, p. 4.
186. GEN/DNT/PV. 148, p. 16.
187. GEN/DNT/PV. 67, pp. 5 and 11.



188. A/C.1/SR. 964, p. 111.
189. GEN/DNT/PV. 1, p. 5.
190. GEN/DNT/29.
191. GEN/DNT/PV. 47, p. 12.
192. GEN/DNT/PV. 43, p. 26.
193. GEN/DNT/PV. 93, p. 13.
194. GEN/DNT/PV. 118, p. 19.
195. GEN/DNT/PV. 169, p. 26.
196. GEN/DNT/2.
197. State Documents, 1945-59, p. 1120.
198. Ibid., p. 1144.
199. GEN/DNT/PV. 202, p. 18.
200. GEN/DNT/PV. 132, p. 10.
201. Ikle, How Nations Negotiate, p. 47.
202. GEN/DNT/29.
203. GEN/DNT/PV. 76, p. 15 is typical of this.
204. GEN/DNT/PV. 67, p. 23.
205. GEN/DNT/PV. 159, p. 7.
206. GEN/DNT/PV. 31, p. 25.
207. GEN/DNT/PV. 66, p. 14.
208. GEN/DNT/PV. 106, p. 11.
209. GEN/DNT/PV. 172, pp. 6-7.
210. A/C.1/SR. 947, p. 26.
211. GEN/DNT/PV. 150, p. 23.

212. GEN/DNT/PV. 151, p. 23.
213. Ibid.
214. Typical of this is Ormsby-Gore's appeal of 11 February 1959, GEN/DNT/PV. 52, p. 13; and Wadsworth's appeal of 14 January 1959, GEN/DNT/PV. 36, p. 7.
215. GEN/DNT/PV. 188, p. 16; and Dean, Test Ban and Disarmament, p. 93.
216. GEN/DNT/PV. 148, p. 17.
217. GEN/DNT/PV. 56, p. 34.
218. GEN/DNT/PV. 61, pp. 3-30.
219. Gromyko, Diplomacy of Contemporary Imperialism, p. 74.
220. GEN/DNT/PV. 85, p. 5.
221. GEN/DNT/PV. 120, p. 29.
222. This last criticism also applies to the United States. See, for example, Wright's criticism of the U.S. position on majority voting in the control commission. Wright, Disarm and Verify, p. 109.
223. Quoted by Wright, GEN/DNT/PV. 208, p. 27.
224. Ibid., pp. 15 and 28.
225. GEN/DNT/PV. 234, p. 23.
226. Ibid., p. 34.
227. Ibid., p. 28.
228. GEN/DNT/PV. 172, p. 5.
229. GEN/DNT/PV. 270, p. 35.
230. A/PV. 882, p. 319.
231. A/C.1/SR. 1083, p. 4.

232. U.S., Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, International Negotiations on Ending Nuclear Weapon Tests, September 1961-September 1962, Pubn. No. 9 (October 1962), p. 2. (Hereafter cited as ACDA, ----.)

233. A/C.1/L. 252/Rev. 1, Annexes (XV), Agenda items 67, 86, 69 and 73, p. 19.

234. A/4680, Annexes (SV), Agenda items 67, 86, 69 and 73, p. 25.

235. GEN/DNT/PV. 267, p. 21.

236. Disarmament: Negotiations and Treaties, 1946-1971 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1972), p. 189.

237. GEN/DNT/PV. 274, pp. 33-52.

238. Ibid., p. 26.

239. GEN/DNT/PV. 279, p. 8.

240. GEN/DNT/110.

241. GEN/DNT/PV. 300, p. 12.

242. GEN/DNT/PV. 311, p. 7.

243. Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), p. 549.

244. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), p. 373. Earl Voss suggests in his work, Nuclear Ambush, that the sudden hardening of the Soviet position when the negotiations resumed on 21 March was intended to cause the breaking off of the negotiations, thus giving the Soviet Union an excuse for resuming nuclear tests. Voss, Nuclear Ambush, p. 460.

245. GEN/DNT/111, p. 6.

246. GEN/DNT/PV. 337, p. 20.

247. GEN/DNT/PV. 338, pp. 11 and 13.

248. GEN/DNT/120.
249. A/Bur/SR. 135, pp. 4-5.
250. GEN/DNT/122.
251. ENDC/42, p. 2.
252. ACDA, Ending Nuclear Weapon Tests, p. 53.
253. U.S., ACDA, Documents on Disarmament, 1962,  
Pubn. No. 19 (1963), p. 156.
254. ENDC/28.
255. Jacobson and Stein, Diplomats, Scientists,  
and Politicians, p. 373.
256. ENDC/PV. 22, pp. 20-26.
257. ENDC/PV. 24, p. 5.
258. ENDC/58 and ENDC/59, respectively.
259. ENDC/PV. 26, pp. 61-62.
260. Jacobson and Stein, Diplomats, Scientists,  
and Politicians, p. 416.
261. A/5141, Annexes (XVII), Agenda item 77, p. 1.
262. A/PV. 1127, p. 43.
263. A/C.1/873, Annexes (XVII), Agenda item 77,  
p. 2.
264. A/C.1/SR. 1251, p. 38.
265. A/C.1/L. 310, Annexes (XVII), Agenda item 77,  
p. 8.
266. A/5279, Annexes (XVII), Agenda item 77,  
pp. 7-11.
267. Ibid., p. 11.

268. ACDA, Documents on Disarmament, 1962, p. 864.
269. GEN/DNT/PV. 99, p. 15.
270. U.S., ACDA, Review of International Negotiations on the Cessation of Nuclear Weapon Tests, September 1962-September 1965, Pubn. No. 32 (May 1966), p. 27. The Pugwash Conference report cannot be considered as approval of the black box concept by the Soviet government, since the scientists attending participate as individuals and do not represent their governments.
271. ACDA, Documents on Disarmament, 1962, p. 1045.
272. ENDC/SC.1/PV. 43, p. 40.
273. ENDC/PV. 90, p. 15.
274. Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence; Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1973, 2d ed. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974), pp. 668-69.
275. U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 88th Cong., 1st sess., 1963, p. 794.
276. Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Walter C. Clemens, Jr., and Franklyn Griffiths, Khrushchev and the Arms Race; Soviet Interests in Arms Control and Disarmament, 1954-1964 (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1966), p. 185.
277. GEN/DNT/PV. 261, p. 3.
278. GEN/DNT/PV. 231, p. 9.
279. GEN/DNT/PV. 262, p. 3.
280. GEN/DNT/PV. 291, p. 17.
281. GEN/DNT/PV. 318, p. 9.
282. GEN/DNT/PV. 325, p. 11.
283. A/PV. 1016, p. 91.

284. GEN/DNT/126.
285. GEN/DNT/PV. 291, p. 3.
286. GEN/DNT/PV. 302, p. 19.
287. GEN/DNT/PV. 325, p. 11.
288. U.S., ACDA, Documents on Disarmament, 1961,  
Pubn. No. 5 (1962), p. 533.
289. GEN/DNT/PV. 344, p. 25.
290. GEN/DNT/PV. 341, p. 21.
291. ENDC/SC.1/PV. 8, p. 31.
292. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 498.
293. ENDC/SC.1/PV. 18, p. 24.
294. A/PV. 1127, p. 43.
295. GEN/DNT/PV. 226, p. 24.
296. GEN/DNT/PV. 332, p. 17.
297. GEN/DNT/PV. 239, p. 20.
298. A/C.1/SR. 1246, p. 12.
299. Bryant M. Wedge and Cyril Muromcew, "Psychological Factors in Soviet Disarmament Negotiations,"  
Journal of Conflict Resolution, March 1965, pp. 24-25.
300. See, for example, GEN/DNT/PV. 268, p. 46,  
and ENDC/SC.1/PV. 45, p. 12.
301. ACDA, Documents on Disarmament, 1961, p. 244.
302. GEN/DNT/PV. 334, p. 3.
303. Wedge and Muromcew, "Psychological Factors,"  
p. 34.
304. ENDC/SC.1/PV. 28, p. 24.

305. State Documents, 1945-59, p. 1591.
306. Quoted in Sorensen, Kennedy, p. 544.
307. GEN/DNT/PV. 332, p. 10.
308. ACDA, Documents on Disarmament, 1962, p. 605.
309. Ibid., p. 656.
310. U.S. Senate, Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, pp.  
420 and 623.
311. Ibid., p. 155.
312. Ibid., p. 864.
313. This would appear to be disputed by some scholars, such as Lloyd Jensen. However, Jensen notes that in his evaluations of concessions and regressions he made no effort to link the pre- and post-1961 negotiations. This allowed him to indicate the Soviets as having made concessions after September 1961. However, I hold that such an approach is incorrect and any evaluation made which does not view the negotiations as a whole has made a fundamental error. Jensen, "Approach-Avoidance Bargaining."
314. ENDC/PV. 95, p. 52.
315. GEN/DNT/PV. 301, p. 3.
316. For example, see ENDC/SC.1/PV. 12, p. 17,  
and ENDC/SC.1/PV. 47, p. 31.
317. ENDC/SC.1/PV. 46, p. 38.
318. GEN/DNT/PV. 265, p. 6.
319. GEN/DNT/PV. 211, p. 52.
320. GEN/DNT/PV. 263, p. 7.
321. GEN/DNT/PV. 324, p. 6.
322. ENDC/SC.1/PV. 1, p. 13, and ENDC/SC.1/PV. 2,  
p. 16.

323. ENDC/SC.1/PV. 43, pp. 10-11.
324. GEN/DNT/PV. 234, p. 16.
325. A/C.1/SP. 1163, p. 4, and A/c.1/SR. 1245,  
p. 4.
326. For example, GEN/DNT/PV. 291, pp. 17-18, and  
GEN/DNT/PV. 294, p. 16.
327. GEN/DNT/PV. 214, p. 8, and GEN/DNT/PV. 232,  
p. 31.
328. GEN/DNT/PV. 310, p. 17.
329. ENDC/SC.1/PV. 10, p. 32.
330. ACDA, Documents on Disarmament, 1961, p. 570.
331. ENDC/SC.1/PV. 8, p. 12.
332. ENDC/SC.1/PV. 18, p. 21.
333. ENDC/SC.1/PV. 28, p. 13.
334. ENDC/SC.1/PV. 15, p. 22.
335. ENDC/SC.1/PV. 9, p. 17.
336. GEN/DNT/PV. 102, pp. 16-17, and GEN/DNT/PV.  
172, pp. 5-6.
337. GEN/DNT/104.
338. GEN/DNT/PV. 319, pp. 8-9.
339. A/PV. 1016, p. 99.
340. ENDC/SC.1/PV. 48, p. 28.
341. GEN/DNT/PV. 269, p. 13.
342. GEN/DNT/PV. 300, p. 17.
343. GEN/DNT/PV. 328, p. 12.
344. GEN/DNT/PV. 293, p. 10.



345. GEN/DNT/PV. 328, p. 12.
346. ENDC/SC.1/PV. 8, pp. 21-22.
347. GEN/DNT/PV. 300, p. 15.
348. GEN/DNT/127.
349. GEN/DNT/PV. 208, pp. 15-24.
350. ENDC/SC.1/PV. 21, p. 28.
351. ENDC/SC.1/PV. 46, p. 25.
352. GEN/DNT/PV. 333, p. 9.
353. ENDC/SC.1/PV. 42, p. 8.
354. Dean, Test Ban and Disarmament, p. 23.
355. GEN/DNT/PV. 302, pp. 10-11.
356. An example of this is Kuznetsov's statement in ENDC/SC.1/PV. 25, p. 29, and Khrushchev's TV address as reported in the New York Times, 16 June 1961, p. 2.
357. A/C.1/SR. 1168, p. 28.
358. For example, GEN/DNT/PV. 331, p. 15.
359. ENDC/SC.1/PV. 7, pp. 20-21.
360. GEN/DNT/PV. 319, p. 16.
361. GEN/DNT/PV. 322, p. 16.
362. ENDC/SC.1/PV. 10, p. 21.
363. Norman Cousins, "Notes on a 1963 Visit with Khrushchev," Saturday Review 47 (7 November 1964):18.
364. New York Times, 13 November 1962, p. 1.
365. Jacobsen and Stein, Diplomats, Scientists, and Politicians, p. 435.

366. U.S. Senate, Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, p. 423.
367. ENDC/PV. 90, p. 15.
368. Actually, there were earlier signs of a new Soviet flexibility, but these earlier indications were made privately to U.S. representatives, outside the context of the ENDC. See Dean, Test Ban and Disarmament, p. 41.
369. ACDA, Documents on Disarmament, 1962, pp. 1239-42. The primary contents of this letter were read to Dean privately by Kuznetsov on 7 November 1962. Dean, Test Ban and Disarmament, p. 41. Dean has also steadfastly maintained that the only figures he put forward for an inspection quota were 8-10. Ibid.
370. ACDA, Documents on Disarmament, 1962, pp. 1277-79.
371. ACDA, Documents on Disarmament, 1963, Pubn. No. 24 (1964), pp. 1-4.
372. ACDA, Cessation of Nuclear Weapon Tests, pp. 42-43.
373. ACDA, Documents on Disarmament, 1963, p. 28.
374. ENDC/PV. 98, p. 46.
375. ENDC/PV. 99, pp. 10-16.
376. ACDA, Documents on Disarmament, 1963, p. 73.
377. ENDC/PV. 101, p. 48.
378. ENDC/PV. 119, pp. 25-26.
379. Cousins, "1963 Visit with Khrushchev," pp. 20 and 58.
380. ACDA, Documents on Disarmament, 1963, p. 175.
381. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 898.
382. Ibid.

383. New York Times, 14 May 1963, p. 8.
384. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 899.
385. Ibid., p. 900.
- 215-22. 386. ACDA, Documents on Disarmament, 1963, pp.
387. Sorensen, Kennedy, pp. 730-31.
388. Ibid., p. 733. Apparently, the Soviets jammed one paragraph of the speech during its first broadcast by the Voice of America, but during subsequent broadcasts, it was not jammed at all.
389. ACDA, Documents on Disarmament, 1963, p. 228.
390. Ibid., p. 226.
391. Ibid., p. 245.
890. 392. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, pp. 898 and
393. ACDA, Documents on Disarmament, 1963, p. 174.
394. ENDC/PV. 96, p. 22.
395. ENDC/PV. 99, pp. 10-16.
- 222-28. 396. ACDA, Documents on Disarmament, 1963, pp.
397. Ibid., p. 194.
398. Ibid., p. 50.
399. ENDC/PV. 98, p. 21.
400. ACDA, Documents on Disarmament, 1963, p. 35.
401. ENDC/PV. 98, p. 46.
402. ENDC/PV. 95, p. 53.

403. ACDA, Documents on Disarmament, 1963, pp. 35-36.

404. Secretary of State Dean Rusk suggested this analysis of the Soviet position in congressional hearings. U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Test Ban Negotiations and Disarmament, 88th Cong., 1st sess., 1963, p. 10.

405. ENDC/PV. 96, pp. 34-35.

406. "Speech by Comrade N. S. Khrushchev at Berlin Rally on July 2, 1963," Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 5 (31 July 1963):9.

407. ENDC/PV. 101, p. 48.

408. U.S., Congress, Senate, Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, Military Aspects and Implications of Nuclear Test Ban Proposals and Related Matters, Part 1, 88th Cong., 1st sess., 1963, p. 48.

409. ACDA, Documents on Disarmament, 1963, pp. 193-94.

410. ACDA, Documents on Disarmament, 1962, p. 1240.

411. Cousins, "1963 Visit with Khrushchev," p. 58.

412. Ibid., p. 20.

413. Dean, Test Ban and Disarmament, pp. 40-41.

414. Sorensen, Kennedy, p. 728.

415. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 897.

416. U.S. Senate, Military Aspects of Test Ban Proposals, p. 48.

417. ENDC/PV. 100, p. 40.

418. U.S. Senate, Military Aspects of Test Ban Proposals, p. 49.

419. ACDA, Documents on Disarmament, 1962, p. 1241.
420. ACDA, Documents on Disarmament, 1963, p. 3.
421. ENDC/PV. 98, p. 40.
422. ENDC/PV. 116, p. 21.
423. ACDA, Documents on Disarmament, 1963, p. 28.
424. Ibid., p. 174.
425. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 905.
426. This account of the Moscow negotiations is based upon the following sources: Schlesinger, A Thousand Days; Sorensen, Kennedy; Dean, Test Ban and Disarmament; Jacobson and Stein, Diplomats, Scientists, and Politicians; Lester A. Sobel, ed., Disarmament and Nuclear Tests, 1960-1963 (New York: Facts on File, 1963); and the New York Times.
427. Dean, Test Ban and Disarmament, p. 91.
428. Jacobson and Stein, Diplomats, Scientists, and Politicians, p. 455.
429. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, pp. 907-8.
430. This evaluation would be correct even if one assumed that the treaty, as finally agreed upon, was disadvantageous to the West. This treaty was basically formulated by the West and, therefore, responsibility for most of its provisions lies with the West.
431. Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, The Rise of Modern China, 2d ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 817.
432. New York Times, 5 July 1963, p. 1.
433. Ikle, How Nations Negotiate, p. 179.
434. Jacobson and Stein, Diplomats, Scientists, and Politicians, p. 455.

435. New York Times, 21 July 1963, p. 1.
436. Dean, Test Ban and Disarmament, pp. 34-35.
437. Ibid., p. 15.
438. Ibid., pp. 36-37.
439. Ibid., pp. 28-30.
440. Harriman, "Observations on Negotiating," pp. 3-4.
441. Dean, Test Ban and Disarmament, p. 37.
442. Wadsworth, The Price of Peace, pp. 22 and 31.
443. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 374.
444. Anatoli A. Gromyko, Through Russian Eyes; Kennedy's 1036 Days (Washington, D.C.: International Library, 1973), p. 150.
445. This is based on my evaluation of the negotiations, and, of course, there are other opinions on this. To cite an obvious example, the Soviets insist that they made numerous substantial concessions throughout the negotiations, including the third phase.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE NEGOTIATIONS CONCERNING THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS

#### Background and Introduction to the Negotiations

The second detailed study of Soviet negotiating techniques will review the first phase of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) which culminated in the signing of an ABM Treaty and an interim agreement limiting strategic offensive arms. The formal Strategic Arms Limitation (SAL) negotiations were fairly short in comparison to other major arms control negotiations. They began officially on 17 November 1969 and were concluded on 26 May 1972, slightly over two and a half years later. In contrast, the formal negotiations on the Limited Test Ban Treaty lasted over four and a half years. However, similar to the Limited Test Ban negotiations, the formal SAL negotiations were preceded by a period of preliminary negotiating and maneuvering by both the United States and the Soviet Union. This study will include a discussion of

both the preliminary negotiations and the formal negotiations.

The format for the analysis of the negotiations will be similar to that used in the preceding chapter. The negotiations will be divided into chronological periods reflecting the varying interest of the Soviets in achieving an agreement. There are three such periods to consider:

I. January 1964-August 1968: Soviet resistance to United States proposals for a freeze on strategic arms.

II. August 1968-November 1969: Soviet agreement to formal negotiations on strategic arms.

III. November 1969-May 1972: The formal negotiations.

Each period will be reviewed separately. In the overview to each phase, probable Soviet goals will be discussed as well as the course of the negotiations. This review of the course of the negotiations will be followed by an analysis of the particular negotiating techniques. After the three periods are discussed, the chapter will conclude with a summarization of the Soviet techniques used during the entire course of the negotiations.



There is one significant difference in the source material used for this study vis-à-vis that used in the previous chapter. For the study of the Limited Test Ban negotiations there were available verbatim transcripts of most of the formal negotiations. This is not so for the SALT. The speeches presented at the formal negotiations have not been made public, nor have the negotiators' memoranda. I requested access to the SALT documents held by both the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and by the Department of Defense, and in both cases my request was denied. I also attempted to contact a number of the primary participants in the negotiations, but largely without success. However, there are a number of partial accounts of the negotiations which have been written by the participants for public dissemination. In addition, John Newhouse has written a fairly detailed account of the SALT. While it is not a primary source, it is generally agreed that Newhouse was given access to materials on the negotiations by Henry Kissinger, materials still denied to other scholars. Therefore, his book, Cold Dawn, is considered the authoritative account of the negotiations as presented by Henry Kissinger in his role as national security advisor in the Nixon and Ford Administrations.<sup>1</sup>

Yet, this work must be used with great caution because it is obviously biased, and is most authoritative in describing the American SALT negotiating process, not the Soviet negotiating process.

#### Phase I. January 1964-August 1968

##### Overview

This phase is characterized by several American attempts to induce the Soviet Union to negotiate arms limitations as an issue separate from the negotiations on general and complete disarmament and by the Soviet maneuvering to avoid such negotiations. While they were strategically inferior to the United States, the Soviets refused to discuss the matter of SAL seriously. At the same time, however, they attempted to give the impression of wanting to negotiate seriously, but of being prevented by American lack of good faith. The increasing attention given to the question of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons during this period aided the Soviets in avoiding genuine negotiations centering on strategic systems.

During this phase, the negotiations took place in several forums. Early United States proposals were presented and debated in the ENDC. The annual meetings of

the UN General Assembly were also used, but to a lesser extent. There were also a number of private meetings between United States representatives and their Soviet counterparts. Finally, as in the Limited Test Ban Treaty negotiations, the exchange of letters between the two heads of government and a meeting of the two leaders also played an important role in this period.

The ENDC Negotiations--  
18 January 1964-17 September 1964

On 18 January 1964, three months after the Limited Test Ban Treaty's ratification by the United States, the United Kingdom, and the USSR, President Lyndon Johnson wrote to Soviet Premier Khrushchev that both leaders should "present new proposals to the Geneva Disarmament Conference--in pursuit of the objectives we have previously identified. . . ." <sup>2</sup> One of the objectives specifically mentioned by Johnson was to "place limitations on nuclear weapons systems." This letter was followed up three days later by a message to the opening session of the ENDC in which Johnson indicated "five major types of potential agreement" which should be discussed in this forum. The second item in his list was a call "to halt further increases in strategic armaments" by agreeing "to explore

a verified freeze of the number and characteristics of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive vehicles."

Johnson held out the hope that agreement on such a measure would "open the path to reductions in all types of forces from present levels."<sup>3</sup> [Emphasis mine.]

The other specific proposals included in Johnson's message were: (1) abstention from the threat or use of force for the solution of territorial disputes; (2) cessation of the production of fissionable materials for weapons use; (3) reduction of the danger of war by accident, miscalculation or surprise attack; and (4) halt the spread of nuclear weapons to nonnuclear states. Johnson's proposals were in keeping with the ENDC's operating philosophy of formal adherence to general and complete disarmament while in practice attempting to advance actual disarmament through adopting less comprehensive collateral measures. The achievement of the Limited Test Ban Treaty the previous July had given great impetus to this procedure.

A week after the American proposals were presented, the Soviet Union presented its alternative collateral measures. The Soviet proposal reiterated its position that it considered the main task to be that of reaching agreement on general and complete disarmament. (Johnson's

statement did not even mention the term.) However, except for this fleeting reference, the Soviet memorandum concentrated on nine specific measures in the following priority:

1. Withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other countries
2. Reduction of the total numbers of the armed forces of states
3. Reduction of military budgets
4. Conclusion of a nonaggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact
5. Establishment of denuclearized zones
6. Prevention of the further spread of nuclear weapons
7. Measures to prevent surprise attack
8. Elimination of bomber aircraft
9. Prohibition of underground nuclear tests<sup>4</sup>

It is obvious that the two sets of proposals had little in common. Each side emphasized its own concerns and proposals to its own advantage. Only on one issue was there sufficient interest by both sides to breach the gap between the United States and Soviet proposals: the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. This issue became the center of attention for the next four

years and culminated in the signing of the Nonproliferation Treaty on 1 July 1968.

Throughout 1964, the United States continued to press the question of a freeze on strategic systems. In explaining the United States proposal to the ENDC, on 31 January, ACDA Director, William C. Foster, indicated that the freeze should include strategic aircraft, missiles and antiballistic missile systems. To exclude the latter defensive weapons, he indicated, would be "destabilizing and therefore unacceptable."<sup>5</sup> The objective of the freeze would be "to maintain the quantities of strategic nuclear vehicles held by the East and the West at constant levels" and "to prevent the development and deployment of strategic vehicles of a significantly new type."<sup>6</sup> Therefore, the American proposal included both a quantitative and qualitative freeze on strategic weapons. Finally, Foster also indicated that the proposal could require on-site inspection of "significant existing production and testing facilities" and a number of spot checks to guard against undeclared facilities.

The first comprehensive response to the United States proposal came from Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko on 2 March in an interview published in Izvestia. Gromyko

completely rejected the concept of a freeze, holding that it would not be disarmament at all, but rather would consolidate the present level of nuclear weapon vehicles and that the verification procedures would merely establish control without disarmament. In sum, he dismissed the proposal as a propaganda ploy created by the "cold war" attitude of the United States.<sup>7</sup> Semyon Tsarapkin, the Soviet representative to the ENDC, later expanded upon Gromyko's criticism. Tsarapkin complained that the proposal did not cover West European nuclear systems nor American and British submarine programs. The procedures for control of the freeze, Tsarapkin insisted,

would involve the danger that it would open up to any party interested in carrying on espionage and intelligence work in the territory of other States legal opportunities under the guise of control to collect the most valuable and secret information on the armed forces, defence systems and defence industry of those States . . . in any part of their territories. . . .<sup>8</sup>

Tsarapkin then expounded on the "virtues" of the Soviet proposal for the elimination of all bomber aircraft, which he insisted, "could be easily carried out in a short period of time--for instance, in one year." If the Soviet proposal were accepted, the Soviet government would be willing to agree on mutually-acceptable forms of control over the bombers' elimination.<sup>9</sup> Tsarapkin gave no

indication of what type control measures would be considered acceptable. However, Tsarapkin also indicated that even this Soviet proposal was of secondary importance, and that the Soviets were primarily interested in their proposal for the reduction of military budgets.

The situation in the ENDC by mid-March did not look promising for arms control. The United States was pressing for a program that would freeze strategic armaments at a time when the Soviets were in a markedly inferior position. The Soviets refused to accept any proposal that would relegate them to conspicuous military inferiority in any area. On the other hand, the Soviets were proposing to eliminate all bombers, an area in which the United States had a significant superiority in long range heavy bombers.<sup>10</sup> They also were pressing for an agreement in principle on the reduction of bombers without giving any indication of what would be included in the definition of a bomber or what specific methods of verification would be acceptable to them. Looking back on the Limited Test Ban negotiations, it could easily be seen how important such "details" would become. The Soviet demand for a reduction in defense budgets was similar in its pitfalls. While the proposal was ostensibly easily implemented, the fact was that it



would be inherently disadvantageous to the United States. The Soviet defense budget was shrouded in secrecy and only a small part was made public while the American defense budget was open knowledge. Therefore, equal percentage reductions would work adversely to the United States.

Yet overall, in outward appearances the American proposal was at a disadvantage in that it maintained the status quo in strategic weapons. Nothing would actually be reduced. The Soviet budget and bomber proposals both emphasized an actual reduction in forces. As a counter to this, on 19 March, the United States formally introduced a proposal for the actual reduction of strategic weapons. The proposal called for the destruction of an equal number of American B-47 bombers and Soviet TU-16 bombers at a rate of at least twenty from each side per month for two years.<sup>11</sup> This proposal was not new, however, for it was generally known that the question of a "bomber bonfire" had been discussed in American government circles for some months and, as the Burmese representative to the ENDC later noted, had at least partially inspired the Soviet bomber proposal. Adrian Fisher, the American representative, linked his government's proposal to that of the Soviet

Union, hoping that both states could work out "the widest possible area of agreement" and achieve an actual disarmament agreement. He thereby indicated some flexibility in the American position and a willingness to compromise.

The Soviet reaction was an uncompromising rejection of the American proposal as an attempt

to pass off the modernization of the United States armed forces, the building up of their fighting strength, as a disarmament measure, and to cloak this modernization with the authority of this Committee. . . .<sup>12</sup>

The Nineteenth and Twentieth UN  
General Assemblies and the Dis-  
armament Commission--  
1 December 1964-21 December 1965

Despite efforts of the nonaligned states in the ENDC, no headway was made in reconciling the opposing proposals prior to the committee's recess in September. Nor was any progress made in the nineteenth session of the United Nations which began shortly thereafter. At the insistence of the Soviet Union, the Disarmament Commission was called into session on 21 April 1965 after a recess of five years. The session of the commission ran through 16 June 1965.

By this time, there was increasing pressure among the members of the United Nations, including the United

States, for a nonproliferation treaty. On 26 April, Ambassador Adlai Stevenson had stated at the meeting of the Disarmament Commission that this question was the most urgent facing the world.<sup>13</sup> The United States presented its first draft treaty on nuclear nonproliferation on 17 August to the now reconvened ENDC.<sup>14</sup> Finally, the Soviet Union presented its first draft treaty on 24 September during the Twentieth UN General Assembly. From this time forward, the disarmament negotiations concentrated more and more on the problem of nuclear proliferation.

The issue of the limitation of strategic weapons receded into the background, but it was never completely forgotten. For example, U.S. Ambassador Goldberg, speaking before the General Assembly on 23 September, stated:

While pressing ahead, then, on nonproliferation as our very first priority, we must also take steps to reduce the dangers stemming from the high level of nuclear capabilities. There is no reason to wait. We are prepared to take practical steps here and now.

First, we should take steps to halt the accumulation of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. We should continue to explore a freeze on the number and characteristics of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive vehicles.

If progress is made in this field, the United States will also be willing to explore the possibility of significant reductions in the number of these carriers of mass destruction.<sup>15</sup>

The Soviet Union, for its part, refused to negotiate on the matter and simply kept reiterating its own proposals.

The ENDC and UN General Assembly  
Negotiations--27 January 1966-  
20 December 1966

In his message to the ENDC on 27 January 1966, President Johnson again urged the committee to consider a freeze on offensive and defensive strategic weapons. However, the lack of progress achieved in two years and the reordered American priorities now placed the proposal in sixth place out of a total of seven mentioned by the President. In 1964, it had held second place in Johnson's message to the ENDC.

The Soviet Union did not even give the concept of limiting or reducing strategic weapons systems minimal consideration. Instead, it limited itself to a half-hearted call for "the total destruction of all delivery vehicles and the total destruction of nuclear weapons."<sup>16</sup> When the topic was discussed in August 1966 as part of the ENDC's detailed agenda, the Soviet response was purely polemical. The result was that American attempts at negotiating the issue were stillborn.

The Twenty-first General Assembly met in the fall of 1966. Similar to the debate of the preceding months in

the ENDC, the disarmament debate in the UN centered on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. The limitation of strategic weapons systems was ignored.

The New American Initiative--  
December 1966-March 1968

However, a new approach to the question was taken in December. In the October Revolution parade, the Soviet Union included an ABM missile and thereafter began deploying an ABM around Moscow. At least partly in response to the Soviet activity, domestic pressure in the United States increased for an American ABM system. With the encouragement of the Secretary of Defense, President Johnson began a new approach to the question of strategic arms limitations.<sup>17</sup> Instead of attempting to engage the Soviet Union in negotiations on strategic weapons in an open forum such as the ENDC, the United States would now attempt to initiate private negotiations just between the United States and the USSR. United States ambassador to the Soviet Union, Llewellyn Thompson, contacted Anatoly Dobrynin in Washington about the possibility of a limitation. When Thompson and Dobrynin met to discuss the matter, Thompson emphasized limitations on the ABMs of each state while Dobrynin emphasized limitations on strategic offensive weapons.<sup>18</sup>

To back up this new American approach, Johnson wrote to Premier Kosygin in late January formally suggesting negotiations on limiting antiballistic missile systems. Johnson further suggested that after Ambassador Thompson's exploratory talks, "it may prove desirable to have some of our highest authorities meet in Geneva or another mutually agreeable place to carry the matter forward."<sup>19</sup> The letter was given to Kosygin on 27 January 1967, the day the Outer Space Treaty was signed in Moscow, London and Washington.

Two weeks later, while in London, Kosygin responded that the Soviet ABM "which prevents attack, is not a cause of the arms race but represents a factor preventing the death of people."<sup>20</sup> The same day, in response to Kosygin's statement, Secretary of State Rusk indicated in a news conference that the United States was prepared to discuss both offensive and defensive weapons with the Soviet Union.<sup>21</sup> On 27 February, Johnson received a reply to his January letter. Kosygin stated that the Soviet Union was "prepared to continue the exchange of views on questions relation to strategic rocket-nuclear weapons." [Emphasis mine.] He also approved of the possibility of a later "special meeting of our appropriate representatives for a

more detailed discussion of this entire problem."<sup>22</sup>

Despite this apparent Soviet willingness to negotiate, neither the talks in Moscow with Ambassador Thompson nor a meeting of Dobrynin and McNamara in April resulted in any progress toward substantive negotiations. On 19 May, Johnson again wrote to Kosygin urging progress toward limiting "our respective deployments of ABMs and ICBMs. . . ." Johnson indicated that forward motion on this would certainly encourage nonnuclear powers to accept the nonproliferation treaty.<sup>23</sup> In the latter area, the United States and the USSR were working on a joint draft of a nonproliferation treaty and would present it to the ENDC in August 1967.

In June, a little over a month after his letter, Johnson met with Kosygin in Glassboro, New Jersey. There he personally pressed the question of a strategic arms limitation. As Johnson notes in his memoirs:

I told him that I has been waiting for three months for his answer on starting talks on ABMs and ICBMs. As soon as I brought up strategic arms talks, he changed the subject to the Middle East. This became a pattern during both days of our talks. Each time I mentioned missiles, Kosygin talked about Arabs and Israelis. . . .

I tried repeatedly to bring the talks back to limiting the missile race. I invited McNamara to join this discussion. At lunch, he and I made the strongest case we could for opening strategic arms talks immediately, but Kosygin apparently had come

to Glassboro with a block against this subject. Time and time again, he implied that we only wanted to talk about limiting ABMs, while the Soviets felt that ABMs and offensive nuclear weapons should be linked. I reassured him repeatedly that we wanted to limit both offensive and defensive weapons, and McNamara said the same. But the point did not get across clearly--or Kosygin chose not to understand.

That Friday, and when we met again on Sunday, I tried several times to persuade Kosygin to agree to a time and a place for missile limitation talks. "Name the place," I said. "Give us a date--next week, next month. We will be there. Secretary McNamara is ready now." But it seemed obvious that Kosygin had come without the authority needed from the Soviet Presidium to make a firm commitment. We did promise to continue our search for agreement through talks between Rusk and Gromyko in New York.<sup>24</sup>

The next day while at the UN, Kosygin again defended the ABM and forcefully emphasized that both defensive and offensive systems should be discussed.<sup>25</sup>

With no response coming from the Soviets, Johnson decided that he had to proceed with the deployment of an American ABM system. McNamara announced the decision on 18 September 1967. He emphasized that it was directed against the Peoples' Republic of China, which had recently exploded its first hydrogen weapon the previous June. At the same time, he urged that negotiations on strategic arms limitations should get underway.<sup>26</sup> Yet, popular opinion saw the decision as a reaction to the Soviet ABM and a number of ABM supporters publicly indicated that the ABM system proposed did have an anti-Soviet potential and



could be expanded into a thick ABM directed against Soviet missiles.

Meanwhile at the ENDC negotiations on the non-proliferation treaty, criticism was mounting over the draft treaty submitted by the United States and the USSR on 24 August. A major criticism was that the draft treaty did not relate the nonproliferation treaty specifically enough with the obligation of the two major nuclear powers to engage in substantive disarmament negotiations.<sup>27</sup> Neither the United States nor the Soviet representative were enthusiastic about such a linkage and both criticized this effort in the ENDC.<sup>28</sup>

In the Twenty-first UN General Assembly, the United States continued to press the Soviet Union for negotiations on strategic arms.<sup>29</sup> The Soviet Union ignored this plea by Ambassador Goldberg, and instead submitted a draft convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. Typical of such Soviet propaganda techniques, the treaty had no substance to it. The important operative articles stated:

#### Article 1

Each Party to this Convention gives the solemn undertaking to refrain from using nuclear weapons, from threatening to use them and from inciting other States to use them.

## Article 2

Each Party to this Convention undertakes to make every effort to arrive as soon as possible at agreement on the cessation of production and the destruction of all stockpiles of nuclear weapons in conformity with a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control.<sup>30</sup>

Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov defended the draft treaty before the First Committee. He emphasized that there would not be any practical problems in solving the problem of the use of nuclear weapons.

The goodwill of all States possessing nuclear weapons would be sufficient. No serious collateral problems would arise, such as the establishment of control, verification, and so on.<sup>31</sup>

While the United Nations met, the United States took two other actions which would affect the situation surrounding the proposed strategic arms limitation negotiations. On 29 September, McNamara publicly disclosed the development of Multiple Independently Targeted Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs). In mid-December, it was announced that the MIRVs were to counter the Soviet ICBM build-up. Thus, the United States had initiated its own ABM and a new strategic weapon to counter Soviet strategic forces. The second event was the announcement by Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Warnke that the United States might agree to a strategic arms limitation in which "we may have to depend on our own unilateral capability for verification."<sup>32</sup>

He cited the Limited Test Ban treaty as a successful example of such a procedure. In this manner, the United States attempted to assure the Soviet Union that it would not press for the right of inspection on Soviet territory as we had in the 1964 freeze proposal.

The beginning of 1968 saw still no response from the Soviet Union except that the Soviet government was "studying the situation."<sup>33</sup> However, the United States kept pressing for a positive answer. In addition, the non-nuclear states kept up pressure both in the ENDC and in the second part of the Twenty-second UN General Assembly for the United States and the USSR to commit themselves to further arms control negotiations in the text of the non-proliferation treaty. On 18 January 1968, the Soviet Union and the United States submitted identical drafts of the proposed treaty to the ENDC. The draft included a new article VI which obligated the parties to undertake "to pursue negotiations in good faith of effective measures regarding cessation of the nuclear arms race and disarmament. . . ."<sup>34</sup>

Despite protests from both states, the nonnuclear states continued to press for stronger and more specific working. On 11 March, a new revised treaty was submitted

to the ENDC. Among other changes, article VI was revised to include the words "at an early date" and specified "nuclear disarmament."<sup>35</sup>

The Soviet Response--  
24 April 1968-19 August 1968

On 24 April, shortly after the ENDC recessed, the second part of the Twenty-second UN General Assembly began. Two days later, Soviet representative Kuznetsov stated in the First Committee that

the Soviet Union is prepared to proceed to talks on the implementation of other measures as [well as the nonproliferation treaty], including . . . limiting and, pursuant to this, reducing strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons; . . .<sup>36</sup>

Yet, apparently no other official communication from the Soviet Union backed this statement up. Indeed, the statement itself was only one of a number of disarmament proposals that Kuznetsov pledged the Soviet Union would follow up in good faith. In early May, Secretary of State Rusk indicated in a speech at Fordham University.

We attach very great importance to achieving an understanding with the Soviet Union to halt the strategic missile arms race. President Johnson has proposed meetings with the Soviets to discuss control of both offensive vehicles and antiballistic missiles. While expressing interest, the Soviets to date have not indicated a specific time for such a meeting. But we have not given up hope.<sup>37</sup>

Finally, on 20 May, again using the First Committee as his forum, Kuznetsov made a more definitive statement of the Soviet position.

We think it necessary to make a special point of the fact that the Soviet Union is prepared to agree on concrete steps aimed at limiting and, subsequently, reducing strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons. . . . Our country would be ready to exchange views with States concerned on mutual limitation and subsequent reduction of strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons.<sup>38</sup>

Despite this statement, the Soviets still refused to set a specific date for the beginning of the negotiations. The United States publicly continued to urge the Soviets to take this step. Before the United Nations General Assembly, President Johnson declared:

We desire--yes, we urgently desire--to begin early discussions on the limitations of strategic offensive and defensive nuclear-weapon systems.<sup>39</sup>

A little over a week later, on 21 June 1968, Kosygin wrote to Johnson concerning SALT. The Soviet leader hoped that soon the two could "more concretely . . . exchange views."<sup>40</sup> Significantly, this was after the General Assembly's approval of the Nonproliferation Treaty and just prior to a critical Senate vote to go forward with the Sentinel program. Three days after the Senate did approve the administration's ABM program, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko announced in a speech before the Supreme

Soviet on 27 June that the USSR was ready to exchange views on the question of the "mutual limitation and subsequent reduction of strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons, both offensive and defensive, including anti-ballistic missiles."<sup>41</sup> This was officially confirmed in a message from Kosygin to Johnson in which the Premier advised the President that they were prepared to make the formal announcement of the agreement to start negotiations on 1 July, the day the Nonproliferation Treaty was opened for signature.<sup>42</sup>

Still, a major question remained unsettled: the exact date on which President Johnson and Premier Kosygin would meet and officially begin the formal talks. It was not until more than a month and a half later that the Soviet government was prepared to suggest a firm date. On 19 August, Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin indicated to Secretary of State Rusk that the talks should begin in Moscow in early October. The Soviets pressed for an early announcement of the meeting and President Johnson agreed.

With the firm commitment on the part of the Soviets to engage in talks on the limitation of strategic arms, the first phase of the negotiations comes to an end.

## Analysis of the Negotiating Techniques in Phase I

During this phase, the Soviets employed a number of negotiating techniques. These techniques will now be reviewed in the order of their presentation in the preceding two chapters.

The first technique is the use of rudeness and vilification. This includes accusing the opponent of negotiating in bad faith. The Soviets used this as a primary tactic in avoiding substantive negotiations on United States proposals. In speaking before the UN Disarmament Commission against the United States proposal to freeze strategic nuclear weapon systems, Tsarapkin completely avoided any detailed refutation of the proposal. Instead, he merely reemphasized the same points the Soviets had been making for over a year:

The United States proposals for a freeze on strategic delivery vehicles and a halt to the production of fissionable material for weapons use are dictated by two main considerations. One of them is that delivery vehicles and fissionable material have already been stockpiled in the United States in quantities that satisfy even the most demanding United States generals. The second is that these generals feel that it might not be a bad idea to arrange for the international collection of intelligence on key sectors of State defence.<sup>43</sup>

In other debates, the American proposals were simply dismissed as being one-sided and politically motivated.

These United States proposals pursue the aim of securing unilateral advantages for the United States. Their detailed examination would merely divert the Committee from examining and agreeing on more important and realistic problems of disarmament.<sup>44</sup>

Thereby, the Soviets accused the United States of not negotiating in good faith.

The accusations made by the Soviets were often strong: such as asserting that the Americans had a "Hiroshima-Nagasaki complex," that is, they enjoyed bombing these cities so much that they simply could not renounce the possibility of using nuclear weapons again.<sup>45</sup> However, during this period, the use of rudeness and vilification never equalled the worst periods of the Limited Test Ban negotiations. Rather, from 1964 to 1968, it would appear to be more of a tactic to avoid substantive negotiations rather than to indicate the collapse of the negotiations.

It is also obvious from these examples that the propaganda effect was a primary consideration of the Soviets in making such statements. The Soviet counter to the American proposal to destroy the B-47s and the TU-16s was obviously made for propaganda purposes since the Soviets knew that it would be totally unacceptable. The blame,



however, for the failure to reach a disarmament agreement was laid at the door of the "advocates of the arms race" who were "a handful of profiteers who wax rich on military preparations and put their narrow interests before the interests of the overwhelming majority of mankind. . . ."46

Another example of the Soviet propaganda effort is clearly shown with regard to the construction of ABMs. The Soviets consistently insisted that their construction of an ABM complex around Moscow was peaceful. In London, Kosygin emphasized that

. . . a defensive system, which prevents attack, is not a cause of the arms race but represents a factor preventing the death of people. . . . An antimissile system may cost more than an offensive one, but it is intended not for killing people but for saving human lives.<sup>47</sup>

However, less than a year later, the Soviets claimed that the United States decision to build a limited ABM system could spur on a new nuclear arms race.<sup>48</sup>

The use of the arms control negotiations for propaganda purposes is indicative of the fact that the Soviets maintained an adversary attitude toward the United States during this period. In the public arena, the Soviet negotiators consistently labeled the United States "a potential aggressor." This is in contrast with the self-proclaimed image of the Soviet Union as one of the "peace-loving

States."<sup>49</sup> It is interesting as a side-light to this study that despite this adversary attitude, it was during this period that the United States and the Soviet Union, jointly, produced the Nonproliferation Treaty and jointly defended it against the criticisms of the nonnuclear states. Thus, it would appear that the Soviets were quite willing to work with "potential aggressors" when it suited their purposes.

The fourth negotiating technique noted in the second chapter was also conspicuous during this phase. This is the technique of being stubborn and attempting to wear the opponent down. The Soviets never did consent to negotiate the phased destruction of B-47s and TU-16s. For two years, they steadfastly refused to negotiate any freeze on strategic weapons systems. Even after they showed some indication, in early 1967, that they might be willing to discuss the concept of a limitation, it was not until June 1968--another year and a half--that there were definite indications that the Soviets would agree shortly to a specific date on which to begin the negotiations. Of course, there was a definite purpose for this change in their position. However, this will be discussed in a more appropriate section below.

The Soviets also used deceit during this first phase of the negotiations. Throughout this period they employed numerous excuses for rejecting American proposals for limiting strategic weapons: it was control without disarmament; it would be used to spy against the Soviet Union; it would speed up the arms race. Yet, the Soviet negotiators never indicated the primary reason for their rejection of the American proposals. The Soviets were attempting to eliminate their inferiority in strategic weapons, and they would not negotiate on freezing the number of weapons until they were about to achieve parity at least with the United States. While this is an important facet of the negotiations, there is still a more blatant example of the use of deceit in this phase.

To discuss this fully, it is necessary to look a little beyond the first phase of the negotiations. It was only in June 1968 that the Soviet leadership gave a fairly clear indication that they were prepared to set a date for the SALT to begin. On 19 August 1968, Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin formally proposed that the talks begin with Johnson visiting the Soviet Union in early October, less than two months away. What is significant here is that Dobrynin pressed for an early announcement of the visit

and the initiation of the talks. After so long why should there be such haste?

The answer to this was not long in coming. The next day Czechoslovakia was invaded by the Soviet Union and four of its allies. It was then apparent why the Soviets had suddenly decided upon a time for the talks to begin and why the announcement had to be made soon. It was very clear to the Soviets how important SALT was to the United States leadership. By finally agreeing to the American request at the same time that they were going to invade Czechoslovakia, the Soviet leaders probably hoped that the desire for the talks would greatly blunt any criticism of the invasion and discourage any long-term American reactions to the invasion that might be adverse to Soviet interests. This is indeed what happened.

This also highlights another technique of the Soviets: to employ negotiations in order to divide the opponent or to paralyze the will of the opponent so that he will not take a certain course of action. Negotiating the date on which formal negotiations would start was used to paralyze any anti-Soviet reaction to the invasion. When Dobrynin formally notified President Johnson of the invasion, he ended his statement with the following declaration:

We [the Soviet Union] proceed from the fact that the current events should not harm Soviet-American relations, to the development of which the Soviet Government as before attaches great importance.<sup>50</sup>

The Soviet leaders were clearly trying to use the promise of negotiations on limited strategic arms to blunt United States criticism of the invasion.

Another use to which this technique was put was to hinder any United States reaction as the Soviet Union approached military parity with the United States.<sup>51</sup> It is noteworthy that on two different occasions the Soviets used this technique, but with such caution, that it failed to serve its purpose as effectively as it could have. Early in 1967, Johnson requested authorization to begin an ABM deployment. At the same time, he was pressing the Soviets to agree to SALT. The Soviets, in fact, did change their position from a flat rejection of the talks to a cautious agreement that there should be talks some time in the future. However, they were so vague in their responses that even the self-generated optimism of Johnson and McNamara could not be sustained. Therefore, on 18 September 1967, the United States announced that it was proceeding with an ABM deployment.

In June 1968, the Soviets again used this technique, but so cautiously that it failed to achieve its

purpose. On 24 June 1968, the Senate voted approval of the administration's request for the Sentinel ABM. Three days prior to that critical vote, Kosygin wrote to Johnson indicating that the Soviet Union would soon be able to "move concretely . . . exchange views" regarding SALT.<sup>52</sup> However, once more the promise was so vague that it did not stop the Senate's approval of the ABM. Three days after the Senate vote, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko announced in the Supreme Soviet that the USSR was ready to begin SALT. However, by then it was too late to affect the vote or the momentum of the American ABM. Still, some were so encouraged by the prospects of the talks that they questioned the wisdom of deploying the ABM. In the July hearings on the Nonproliferation Treaty, Senator Cooper asked, "Is it not now possible to show good faith by deferring deployment of an ABM system at least until the outcome of the [SALT] talks is known?"<sup>53</sup>

It is obvious from the review of this phase that the Soviets did not make any concession to the American proposals. This refusal to make concessions is a well-known Soviet technique. The only concession they did make concerned whether negotiations would take place at all, and this has been discussed already.

Another technique used by the Soviets was to demand an agreement in principle prior to any technical discussions of the topic. This was not used in connection with the American proposals, of course, since the Soviets simply refused to negotiate on them at all. However, the Soviets did submit their own proposal for the elimination of all bomber aircraft. In regard to their proposal, the Soviets used this technique. In July 1964, for example, Tsar ~~in~~ stated in the ENDC:

We consider that it is important to arrive at an agreement in principle to eliminate all bomber aircraft within a definite short period. Within that period bombers could be eliminated in the sequence that will have to be agreed upon . . . if our proposal for the elimination of all bomber aircraft within a definite period is accepted in principle, the Soviet Union is prepared to discuss and determine specifically the sequence of the elimination of bombers by types within that period. . . .

. . . We do not think that any insuperable difficulties are likely to arise in the negotiations in connection with the question of the sequence in which the various types of bombers should be eliminated or with which types it would be most suitable to begin the elimination. Which bombers will be the first to go on the bonfire, which will follow them and so forth are matters on which agreement can be reached.<sup>54</sup>

As can be seen, the Soviets presented the task of reaching an agreement in principle as the greatest hurdle to be overcome. Once this was accomplished, all other problems could be easily overcome. Yet, previous experience indicated just the opposite: once the West would commit itself

to an agreement in principle, the Soviet representative would then present innumerable detailed positions all to the unilateral advantage of the USSR. If the West refused to accept these positions the Soviets would then claim the West was reneging on its agreement in principle. During the entire life of the Soviet proposal on bombers, this was the primary tactic used.

The Soviet proposal for the elimination of all bombers also illustrates the next Soviet negotiating technique. This technique is to present esaggerated or unreasonable demands. Normally this is used as a means of extracting concessions from the opponent. However, in this case, it appears that the purpose of the bomber proposal was meant to preempt the American proposal for the phased destruction of B-47s and TU-16s. The Soviet proposal was unreasonable in that it was blatantly advantageous to the Soviet Union. In comparing heavy bombers, the primary target of the Soviet proposal apparently, the United States, was far superior to the Soviets in both quantity and quality.

When the Soviets finally did indicate they might agree to beginning negotiations on strategic arms limitations, ignoring both proposals for the elimination of



bombers, they employed another technique. In return for agreeing to the negotiations, the Soviet Union demanded that offensive weapons be included in the discussions. The United States had emphasized limitations on ABMs since Johnson's new initiative in late 1966. Thus, the Soviets were demanding a United States concession in return for the Soviet agreement to negotiate. The United States agreed to this condition, and still it was not until mid-1968 that the Soviets finally did agree to negotiations. Of course, the American concession did not influence the Soviets to agree to negotiations, this was caused by other factors noted above.

During the course of this phase of the negotiations, the Soviets always maintained the primacy of the political aspects of the negotiations. It is apparent from the timing of the Soviet acceptance of the concept of negotiating on strategic weapons systems that political matters, not simply technical questions, were the primary influence. The Soviets first would not negotiate until they neared parity with the United States in strategic systems. Then they attempted to use their agreement to negotiate to hinder any American response to the Soviet build-up. Finally, they attempted to use the promise of

negotiations to lessen the political costs of their invasion of Czechoslovakia.

This is also related to the Soviet technique of negotiating by acts, and not only by words. All the time the Soviets refused to begin formal negotiations on freezing strategic weapons systems, they actually were in the midst of a major strategic build-up. When the formal negotiations took place, this build-up was of central importance to the ultimate outcome. Therefore, through their build-up, the Soviets were in fact preparing for the later negotiations. They were negotiating by acts throughout this phase of the negotiations.

Finally, the last technique that the Soviets used was to emphasize that there was only one real impediment to reaching agreement, and that once this impediment was removed all would go smoothly and quickly. The Soviets used this in advocating their proposal for the elimination of all bombers. As indicated above, the only impediment the Soviets supposedly saw was that the United States would not agree in principle to such a reduction of forces. If the United States would agree in principle, then the details of the negotiations could be handled easily.

From this discussion of the first phase of the

negotiations, it can be seen that many of the negotiating techniques previously used in the negotiations on a test ban were also used here. Of major significance is that while the formal negotiations during this phase appeared to be fruitless, in fact, the Soviets were actively negotiating by increasing their strategic forces. It cannot be said, of course, that the Soviets always entertained the idea that once they built up their forces, they would then negotiate. However, the Soviets were able to use their strategic build-up effectively once they decided that it would be to their advantage to negotiate.

Phase II. 20 August 1968-16 November 1969

Overview

This period covers the time from when the Soviets proposed a specific date for the formal negotiations to begin to the actual start of the negotiations. The negotiations took place almost entirely through private contacts. The United Nations was used only incidentally as a forum in which SALT was discussed. The ENDC busied itself with other arms control matters and from this point on played no significant role.

Negotiations Between the Johnson  
Administration and the Soviet  
Government--20 August 1968-  
19 January 1969

This phase began inauspiciously in that it became apparent quite quickly why the Soviets had finally pressed for a specific date on which to begin the negotiations. The Soviet leadership was attempting to limit their political losses from their planned invasion of Czechoslovakia. The American government found itself, on 20 August, in a rather uncomfortable position. It had finally obtained its long sought agreement to negotiate a strategic arms limitation, yet in order to keep this "prize," it must not react too strongly to the blatant Soviet aggression in Europe. The Soviets played upon this American dilemma. Former President Johnson notes in his memoirs:

In the wake of their callous, outrageous assault on Czechoslovakia, the Russians began pressing harder for a summit meeting and nuclear arms talks, probably feeling that these discussions would soften the criticism Moscow was getting around the world.<sup>55</sup>

Johnson cancelled the joint announcement that the talks would begin in early October. However, the administration's desire for the talks simply could not be contained. Merely two weeks after the invasion of

Czechoslovakia, the new Secretary of Defense, Clark Clifford, spoke before the National Press Club. While he noted rather circumspectly "the events of the past couple of weeks," he quickly emphasized that "we should hope at an appropriate time to begin to discuss with the USSR a limitation on both offensive and defensive nuclear weapons systems."<sup>56</sup>

It was apparent that the rest of the world was more concerned with beginning SALT than with Soviet aggression. On 27 September, the Conference on Non-nuclear-weapon States voted 79 to 0, with 5 abstentions, to approve a resolution urging the United States and the USSR to begin the formal negotiations "at an early date."<sup>57</sup> The Soviet Union encouraged this attitude through public statements indicating its desire to begin the talks as quickly as possible.

In the fall of 1968, both the Soviet Union and the United States kept SALT alive rhetorically. At least twice in October, Secretary of State Rusk, himself, emphasized the importance of the delayed negotiations. The one discordant note was interjected by the Republican presidential candidate, Richard Nixon. In a radio address on 24 October, Nixon charged the Democrats with creating

a "security gap for America" because "in recent years our country has followed policies which now threaten to make America second best both in numbers and quality of major weapons." While noting that the United States and the USSR should move from "confrontation to negotiation" if possible, Nixon vowed "I intend to restore our objective of clear-cut military superiority. . . ." <sup>58</sup> Two days later, in a second address, Nixon indicated the arms control initiatives he would take if elected president. SALT was conspicuously absent from the list of initiatives. <sup>59</sup>

After Nixon's election in November 1968, the Soviets continued to press for SALT to begin. In the First Committee of the General Assembly, the Soviet representative reiterated Gromyko's statement made earlier in the session that

the Soviet Government is ready, without delay, to undertake a serious exchange of views on this question [of the mutual limitation and subsequent reduction of strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons, offensive and defensive, including anti-missile missiles]. <sup>60</sup>

Soviet Premier Kosygin met with former Secretary of Defense McNamara and later Senators Albert Gore and Clairborne Pell. In each case, the message was the same: the Soviet Union is ready to initiate negotiations as soon

as possible.<sup>61</sup>

President Johnson, too, wanted to initiate the SALT negotiations without delay. Indeed, he was so anxious that he wanted to salvage the idea of a summit between himself and Kosygin to initiate the talks. At the end of November, Johnson made a final effort. Through U.S. Ambassador Thompson, Johnson suggested a summit meeting in Geneva just prior to Christmas.<sup>62</sup> In mid-December, Nixon's national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, met with a Soviet UN diplomat. Kissinger indicated to him that Nixon "did not want a pre-inauguration summit meeting and that if [the Soviets] held one with Johnson [Nixon] would have to state publicly that [he] would not be bound by it."<sup>63</sup> With this, the Soviet Union lost interest in a summit with the outgoing president and decided to wait until Nixon's inauguration before making any new overtures to the American government.

The last SALT related incident in 1968 was passage of a resolution by the UN General Assembly on 20 December. By the overwhelming vote of 108 to 0 (with 7 abstentions), the General Assembly urged the two superpowers "to enter at an early date into bilateral discussions on the limitation of offensive strategic nuclear-weapon delivery systems and systems of defense against ballistic

missiles."<sup>64</sup> Yet, the Johnson Administration could no longer take the initiative. Therefore, the negotiations on the start of SALT were effectively stalled until the Nixon Administration was in office.

Negotiations Between the Nixon  
Administration and the Soviet  
Government--20 January 1969-  
16 November 1969

Richard Nixon was sworn in as President of the United States on 20 January 1969. The same day, a statement was made by the Soviet Foreign Ministry in which it reaffirmed the readiness of the Soviet government "to begin a serious exchange of views" on this strategic arms limitations.<sup>65</sup> Thus, the Soviet government lost no time in pressing the new administration to begin the negotiations. Nixon's reply came a week later in a news conference. When asked for his position on SALT, Nixon indicated that he favored the talks, but stated "it is a question of not only when, but the context of those talks." He then continued to outline his perspective on SALT.

What I want to do is see to it that we have strategic arms talks in a way and at a time that will promote, if possible, progress on outstanding political problems at the same time--for example, on the problem of the Mideast and on other outstanding problems in which the United States and the Soviet Union, acting together, can serve the cause of peace.<sup>66</sup>



In this statement, Nixon clearly linked progress on SALT with progress on other political issues.

In his position as a new president, Nixon indicated that there would be a careful reevaluation of United States military programs, and on 6 February, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird ordered a temporary halt in the construction of the Sentinel system in connection with this reevaluation. Yet, it was apparent that in the case of SALT the administration felt it was the USSR which was in the position of wanting or needing the agreement. In a television interview on 9 February, Laird indicated that the Soviet Union had to show signs of cooperation in such areas as the Middle East and Vietnam before the SALT could start.<sup>67</sup>

In mid-February, Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin had a series of talks with President Nixon and Secretary of State William Rogers. Dobrynin indicated again that the USSR was ready to begin the negotiations. The Americans were noncommittal. Apparently, the American impression of the Soviet desire for the talks was reinforced during these meetings. Two weeks later, it was reported that President Nixon in a conference in Paris stated that it was his urgent duty to exploit Soviet interest in the SALT.<sup>68</sup>

In mid-March, Nixon announced his decision to deploy a modified Sentinel system, which was now renamed Safeguard. The Safeguard program was to be in two phases. The first phase would be for the protection of Minuteman sites. The second would be a thin ABM system to defend cities. In discussing SALT, Nixon indicated that the announced deployment would have no effect on the talks. He also indicated that the talks would involve only a freeze of weapon systems "where we are," rather than a limitation or reduction.<sup>69</sup> Thus, in late March, Soviet officials still indicated that the talks might begin in May or June, while the United States was obviously reluctant to make a specific commitment as to when the talks would start.

In the early spring, American officials began to emphasize much more strongly that the negotiations could go forward very soon. Secretary of State Rogers indicated that perhaps the talks might begin in the late spring or early summer.<sup>70</sup> On 5 June, Rogers reiterated his prediction that the talks would start in the early summer. Yet, at the same time, there was increasing criticism in the Soviet press over the stance the Nixon Administration had taken. This, then, presaged a reversal of the roles taken by the two countries.

On 11 June, Secretary of State Rogers informed Dobrynin of the American decision to set 31 July as a target date for the beginning of the SALT.<sup>71</sup> This was the administration's first definitive proposal for the beginning of the talks. Now it was the turn of the Soviets to keep the American government waiting. On 5 July, President Nixon announced that the director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Gerard Smith, would head the American delegation. However, the Soviets had not yet replied concerning the proposed date for beginning the talks. Five days later, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko addressed the Supreme Soviet. While the speech indicated again Soviet willingness to begin the talks, there was still no indication whether the 31 July date was acceptable to the Soviets or not.

Nixon's proposed date passed without any definitive response from the Soviets.<sup>72</sup> In August, it was Secretary of State Rogers who now complained that the Soviets were delaying the talks.<sup>73</sup> It was not until 22 September that Gromyko indicated at a meeting with Secretary of State Rogers, that the Soviet Union would soon set a date for the talks to begin.<sup>74</sup> A month later, on 21 October, Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin informed President Nixon that the

Soviet Union was ready to begin the SALT talks.<sup>75</sup>

Significantly, this was the same day that the Soviet government resumed border talks with the People's Republic of China.

The Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China had a territorial dispute of long standing. Border tension had escalated to such a degree that on 2 March and 14-15 March 1969, two large military clashes took place on Damansky Island in the Ussuri River. Subsequently, there were clashes on Goldinsky Island in the Amur River and along the Sinkiang border. Attempts to reinstitute negotiations (last held in 1964) on the border issue failed. In September 1969, a Soviet agent planted a story in the London Evening News that the Soviet Union was considering a preemptive nuclear strike against China.<sup>76</sup> It is not certain whether this was actually considered or just an attempt to pressure the Chinese into negotiations. However, on 11 September, Premier Kosygin was diverted in mid-air, when returning home from Ho Chi Minh's funeral, and landed in Peking. After a three-hour discussion with Chou En-lai, the border disputes subsided and high level border negotiations resumed on 20 October 1969.<sup>77</sup>

How the border problems with China affected the

Soviet attitude toward SALT is not known. The March clashes on Damansky Island took place while the Soviets were still pressing the Nixon Administration for an early beginning of SALT. However, it is certainly no coincidence that the Soviet Union definitely stated it was ready to proceed with SALT the same day the border negotiations began. It is most probable that the combination of the border dispute and the Nixon Administration's efforts to exploit the Soviet Union's desire for SALT caused the Soviets ostensibly to cool toward the negotiations on SALT. Then, with the border question being negotiated, and having let the Nixon Administration cool its heels for several months, the time was held to be propitious to begin SALT.

On 25 October, it was announced that SALT would begin in Helsinki on 17 November. Two significant changes in how the talks would commence had been made since Lyndon Johnson had attempted to institute the negotiations. First, Johnson had wanted to start the talks with a summit conference between himself and Premier Kosygin. Now the talks with a summit conference between himself and Premier Kosygin. Now the talks would begin at the ambassadorial level. Thus, the diplomatic importance of the talks was muted somewhat. Second, Johnson was prepared to begin the

talks in Moscow or another city in the Soviet Union. This certainly would have given a technical advantage to the Soviets. It would also have had a political significance. It would have been seen as the Americans going to Russia to negotiate arms control. The Soviets would have gained political stature. Now, however, the talks were to be held in Helsinki. This site had been proposed by the Soviets in contrast to the American proposal of 11 June suggesting either Vienna or Geneva.<sup>78</sup> The Soviet choice was accepted. While it was not as advantageous to the Soviets as the selection of a city in the USSR had been, the selection of Helsinki still allowed the Soviets considerable freedom of action during the negotiations as will be indicated below.

According to Raymond Garthoff, a member of the U.S. SALT delegation, before the talks opened, the Soviets asked the United States about the composition and size of the American delegation. While both delegations were composed of both civilian and military delegates, the Soviet military played a much more prominent role in the negotiations than did their American counterparts.<sup>79</sup> This will be discussed in the next two phases of the negotiations.

With the date and site for the commencement of the negotiations agreed upon, and with the delegations being

organized, the second phase came to an end. Now it is appropriate to turn to the negotiating techniques used by the Soviets in this phase.

#### Analysis of Negotiating Techniques in Phase II

During the period from August 1968 through 16 November 1969, the Soviets used significantly little vituperation or rudeness in connection with the pending SALT negotiations. This is in marked distinction from the language used in discussing other areas of arms control. For example, in a statement released by the Soviet Foreign Ministry on 20 January 1969, the portion dealing with SALT was free of polemics. However, the portion dealing with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty accused the United States, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany of an "intensification of military preparations," of "subversive activities against socialist countries, the expansion of existing hotbeds of international tension and the inflammation of the cold war atmosphere. . . ."80

In contrast to this, the Soviets continued to use the issue of SALT for propaganda purposes. The Soviet Union presented its willingness to engage in SALT as proof of its "peaceful" foreign policy. For example, Soviet

Foreign Minister Gromyko addressed the Supreme Soviet in July 1969 and stated:

One of the most basic questions that has arisen is that of so-called strategic weapons. What is involved here is above all the question of whether the major powers are to reach an agreement on checking the race for the creation of increasingly destructive means of attack and counterattack, or whether each power will seek to pull ahead in one area or another in order to achieve military superiority over its rival, which would compel the latter to mobilize still more national resources for the arms race. And so on, ad infinitum. . . .

Governments must do everything in their power so as to be able to determine the development of events, not find themselves in the role of captives of these events.

The Soviet government has already reported to the Supreme Soviet on its readiness to enter into an exchange of opinions with the U.S.A. on so-called strategic weapons. The U.S. government has stated that it is preparing for an exchange of opinions. The Soviet government is also ready for this. One would like to express the hope that both sides will approach this question with recognition of its great importance.<sup>81</sup>

During this phase, the ostensible assumption of an adversary attitude toward the United States was not maintained by the Soviets. This was in contrast to the adversary attitude the Soviets maintained toward the United States in such other areas as Czechoslovakia, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and NATO. In this phase, at least through the spring of 1969, the Soviet Union indicated its eagerness to begin negotiations and emphasized this by its "cooperative" attitude vis-à-vis SALT. Thereafter, other



matters such as China took precedence, together with the Soviet's desire to display a less enthusiastic attitude toward SALT so as not to be put in the position of a diplomatic demandeur. Yet, publicly at least, during the period, the Soviets did not indicate an adversary attitude toward the United States in connection with SALT.

The Soviets did successfully use the promise of SALT negotiations to divide American opinion on the benefit of continuing to improve American strategic forces. In June 1969, the Soviets indicated that the development of the Safeguard ABM system could only complicate future Soviet-American negotiations.<sup>82</sup> As Nixon noted in his memoirs:

The Soviets had indicated that they were willing to reach agreement on defensive arms limitation. Most of the liberals in Congress, the media, and the academic community tended to take them at face value in this regard and feared that a congressional vote for an ABM system would destabilize the existing arms balance and compel the Soviets to increase their own construction programs, thus losing a precious opportunity and moving the arms race up another notch.<sup>83</sup>

In August 1969, the Senate approved the administration's ABM plan only after Vice President Agnew cast the deciding vote in its favor.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in February

1969, and a significant portion of time was spent discussing the deployment of the American ABM and its probable effect of the SALT negotiations. The final report of the committee even went so far as to state:

The committee believes this treaty comes at a moment when both the United States and the Soviet Union are at national crossroads with respect to the arms race. Decisions facing both countries in the area of strategic offensive and defensive missiles are of vital importance not only to the peace and security of the world but to the successful implementation of the Nonproliferation Treaty.

. . . the committee believes that the administration should consider deferring the deployment of these weapons until it has had time to make an earnest effort to pursue meaningful discussions with the Soviet Union.<sup>84</sup>

In July 1969, Adrian Fisher, the Deputy Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency under Kennedy and Johnson, asserted before a subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee that

. . . unless the United States defers further MIRV testing until we have exhausted every effort to work out a mutual cessation of MIRV testing with the U.S.S.R., we will have let slip an opportunity to prevent a dangerous, perhaps suicidal acceleration in the arms race. This opportunity may never come again.<sup>85</sup>

Thus, simply on the promise of negotiations, a rather strong effort was made to curtail United States strategic programs.

This technique was also used to divide opinion in the West and particularly in the United States as to the appropriate response to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. When Dobrynin officially announced the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the message he delivered from the Soviet leadership ended with the statement: "We proceed from the fact that the current events should not harm Soviet-American relations, to the development of which the Soviet Government as before attaches great importance."<sup>86</sup> The technique worked quite well. The Johnson Administration made every effort to salvage the strategic arms limitation negotiations and this resulted in muting criticism of the Soviet actions. On 16 October 1968, Undersecretary of State Katzenbach told the Assembly of the Western European Union that the dialogue with the Soviet Union must continue in spite of Czechoslovakia. This is only a single example of the concerted effort made to divert attention from the uncomfortable facts of Soviet actions and to concentrate instead on desired outcomes from future negotiations.

During this phase, the Soviets also employed the technique of demanding a concession in return for agreeing to commence negotiations. While the Soviets did not make a specific demand in this regard, a modification of this

technique was used to good effect in the summer and fall of 1969. As noted in the review of this phase, the Nixon Administration perceived the Soviets as wanting SALT enough that the United States could extract political concessions in other areas in return for starting the negotiations. This was termed "linkage" by the Nixon Administration. However, when the United States finally announced it was prepared to begin the negotiations, the Soviets simply refused to acknowledge the American offer. In carrying this silence through to late September 1969, the Soviets were able to destroy the image that had been created of the USSR as demandeur. By the time the date for the negotiations was agreed upon, the Nixon concept of linkage was in "declining fashion"<sup>87</sup> as a guideline for the American government at least in part because it was no longer felt that the Soviets were willing to make political concessions in return for SALT. As Garthoff has noted in his review of SALT I:

The Soviets explicitly agreed to support movement to an "era of negotiation rather than confrontation," but they strenuously rejected the idea of linkage or the implicit assumption that they wanted or needed a SALT agreement more than did the United States. They agreed to proceed with SALT when direct attempts at linkage were permitted to fade away.<sup>88</sup>

While the Soviets remained noncommittal as to when the SALT negotiations should begin, they were very active in person-to-person negotiations concerning SALT related matters. For example, Soviet embassy and United Nations personnel worked hard on influential Americans, pressing the Soviet view on ABMs and MIRV.<sup>89</sup>

Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the Soviet Union continued to negotiate by acts as well as words. In the year from mid-1968, when the negotiations were agreed upon, to mid-1969, the USSR increased its operational ICBMs from 800 to 1,050.<sup>90</sup> This brought the Soviets to numerical parity with the United States in this weapon system. In addition, the Soviets also tested their largest missile, the SS-9, with a Multiple Reentry Vehicle (MRV) warhead and proceeded to make a number of other advances in their other strategic systems as well. These Soviet advances would have an important role in shaping American perceptions of what would be considered a desirable outcome of the negotiations.

Phase III. 17 November 1969-26 May 1972

Overview

The formal negotiations opened in Helsinki on 17 November 1969 and were concluded in Moscow on 26 May 1972. The negotiations were held in seven sessions with the location of the negotiations alternating between Helsinki and Vienna. From the beginning of 1971 on, the formal negotiations were paralleled by highly confidential negotiations involving President Nixon, Brezhnev, Kissinger and Dobrynin. These negotiations were referred to as the back channel negotiations to differentiate them from the formal, or front channel, negotiations. At least on the American side, the back and front channels were not always in harmony. This caused considerable confusion and negotiating blunders of primary importance. In addition, it also created a great deal of difficulty in attempting to reconstruct the negotiations in their entirety since the back channel deliberations were highly secret.

Significantly, these two channels were the only ones to be substantively involved in SALT. Other forums, such as the ENDC or the UN General Assembly, which had played important roles in previous negotiations, played no

role in SALT, other than to be a nuisance factor at times. Both the United States and the Soviet Union politely but firmly rejected any outside interference as to the direction the talks should take.

The primary Soviet arms limitation goal in the negotiations was to emasculate the American ABM program, a goal that was achieved. In addition, the Soviets were able to continue their strategic offensive programs and conclude the negotiations with a numerical superiority in the number of launchers allowed for both intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). Finally, they were able to reap two important political victories. First, they were able to negotiate alone as an equal with the United States. This emphasized their achievement of equality with the United States as a co-leader of the international system. Second, the political power of the Soviet Union was enhanced by its lead in the numbers of strategic offensive weapons, a lead which was legitimized by the interim agreement signed in 1972.

For ease of analysis, this phase will be discussed in chronological periods which parallel the seven sessions of the formal negotiations.

Round One--The Exploratory Negotiations  
in Helsinki and the Following Recess--  
17 November 1969-15 April 1970

As indicated in the title of this section the first session of SALT was not aimed at a definitive exchange of proposals. Prior to the talks, the White House had indicated in a secret message to the Soviet leadership that the United States would not offer any specific proposals in the talks at Helsinki. By agreement, the talks would center around a discussion of strategic concepts, but the United States did also put forth an "illustrative" package of limitations to discuss, and the Soviet Union presented a list of "Basic Principles" for the negotiations.

The United States delegation took the initiative in the opening round. The American position was to emphasize that the nuclear relationship between the two states was not one in which only one side could win while the other side had to lose. As Paul Nitze, one of the American negotiators stated:

We argued that an agreement which provided essential equivalence, and which maintained or enhanced crisis stability, would add to the security of both sides, reduce the risk of nuclear war, do so at a reduced cost in resources, and thus be of mutual benefit. We further contended that only if both sides approached the negotiations with the objective of optimizing mutual gains could the conflicting views be resolved as to whether one side's gains would be, or appear to be, the other side's losses.<sup>91</sup>



The Soviet representatives were unresponsive to this approach. In sharp contrast to this, the Soviet delegation--to quote Nitze again--"had worked out a highly one-sided negotiation strategy and was prepared to use a wide range of tactics to achieve its goals."<sup>92</sup> Characteristic of the Soviet attitude was their insistence on their using a highly one-sided definition of the term "strategic." Since the talks were to deal with strategic arms limitations, the way the term strategic was defined would influence what weapon systems would be included in the negotiations. The Soviets maintained that a strategic system was one which could strike the homeland of the other power from its area of deployment. In simple terms, this meant that the Soviet Union wanted all United States Forward-Based Systems (FBS) included in the negotiations. This would be primarily short-range fighter bombers in Europe and Asia, located either on land bases or aircraft carriers. These forces constitute a major American commitment to the defense of its allies since the forces are integrated into regional defense agreements such as NATO. Excluded from the discussion would be Soviet IRBMs and MRBMs and other Soviet nuclear forces which could strike the states protected by the American FBS. In short, the

Soviets wanted to include a much greater percentage of the American nuclear force than of the Soviet nuclear force.

In addition, the Soviets clearly indicated in the first round of talks that they were primarily interested in limiting the American ABM system and were only minimally interested in limiting offensive weapons. The Soviet definition of strategic was apparently meant to emphasize this. In all probability, the Soviets were aiming to deadlock the negotiations on offensive weapons so that the only alternative would be to agree on an ABM only limitation.

A final indication of the Soviet attitude on the "mutuality of interests" to be achieved through the talks was indicated by their preparations for the negotiations. Nitze has indicated that the Soviets had a Tass correspondent rent a room overlooking the offices of the U.S. SALT delegation. The room was outfitted with telescopes, antennas and other apparatus so that "all but the most secure telephone communications were being monitored."<sup>93</sup>

Using these indications to assess the Soviet attitude, it was apparent that the Soviet delegation was prepared to attempt to achieve unilateral advantages in the

course of the negotiations. However, the Soviets did change their style from previous negotiations in one significant manner at least which encouraged hope in some members of the American delegation. During the negotiating sessions, the Soviets avoided the use of extraneous ideologizing and propaganda.<sup>94</sup> This had been characteristic of most previous disarmament negotiations in which the Soviets had participated.

However, polemics was not the only item missing from the Soviet delegation's statements at Helsinki. The Soviets also refused to give the American delegation any specific data on Soviet strategic forces. The entire course of the negotiations would be based on American statistics for United States strategic forces and American statistics for Soviet strategic forces. Raymond Garthoff, a member of the U.S. SALT delegation, has indicated that Marshall Grechko had "ordered the Soviet delegation to provide no quantitative or qualitative information on Soviet military and technical capabilities."<sup>95</sup> This had been a traditional tactic for the Soviet Union in previous disarmament negotiations. The only time Soviet delegations had produced data of their own before SALT was when it clearly supported a position the delegation had taken.

Otherwise, Western data were used.

The first session, then, did not indicate that the Soviets had decided to reach agreements of mutual benefit despite Soviet public proclamations to the contrary. The opening round lasted until 22 December. The discussion remained general with the United States delegation generally taking the initiative. As a result, little was learned by the American delegation about the Soviet Union's nuclear objectives or military doctrine.<sup>96</sup> The talks began primarily as an American monologue.

During the first round of SALT, the Twenty-fourth UN General Assembly attempted to influence the course of the negotiations. On 9 December 1969, twelve nonaligned states submitted a draft resolution in the First Committee concerning the negotiations in Helsinki. The sole operative paragraph appealed to the United States and the USSR "to agree, as an urgent preliminary measure, on a moratorium on further testing and deployment of new offensive and defensive strategic nuclear-weapon systems."<sup>97</sup> The Soviet Union and the United States attempted to deflect the thrust of this resolution by using a rather unusual procedure. The day before the draft resolution was formally submitted to the First Committee, five nations

allied to the United States and the USSR submitted an amendment to it. The amendment changed the operative paragraph into an innocuous statement, simply calling upon the two states "to refrain from any action which might be prejudicial to the achievement of [substantial agreements on the limitation and subsequent reduction of strategic armaments]." <sup>98</sup> In the ensuing debate both the United States and the Soviet Union took the position that they should be left alone to negotiate a limitation on strategic arms as they saw fit. However, the amendment was defeated and on 16 December, the nonaligned states pushed through the resolution with its original operative paragraph intact. While no nation voted against the resolution, both the East and West abstained. The resolution had no apparent effect on the course of the negotiations.

During the first recess of the SALT negotiations, both sides reviewed their positions. The Soviet leadership continued to stress that its approach to SALT

. . . is not based on an endeavor to obtain for itself any kind of extra unilateral advantages in the area of providing for its security alone. . . . [But] is determined by a concern for strengthening international security without harming the interests of any other country. <sup>99</sup>

At the same time, the Soviet press berated the United States for announcing the further deployment of the

Safeguard ABM and the initial deployment of MIRVs.<sup>100</sup> The Soviet press statements were commonly seen as a Soviet propaganda effort to strengthen United States public and congressional opposition to these United States defense programs.<sup>101</sup>

In the United States, the Nixon Administration did encounter strong opposition to its policy of continuing offensive and defensive strategic weapons programs while SALT was in progress. On 9 March, for example, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved a sense-of-the-Senate resolution calling for the United States and the USSR to freeze the further deployment of offensive and defensive strategic weapons. On 9 April, less than a week before the second round of SALT was to begin, the Senate approved by 72 to 6 the resolution urging Nixon to propose to the Soviet Union a moratorium on the deployment of strategic weapons. In an editorial just as SALT began in Vienna, the New York Times said they even "regretted" that "hopes for halting the nuclear missile race now rest with the Soviet delegation."<sup>102</sup>

Round Two--The Vienna Negotiations  
and the Following Recess--  
16 April 1970-1 November 1970

As SALT opened in Vienna, the Nixon Administration was on the defensive domestically vis-à-vis its strategic program. (At the same time, the Soviet strategic build-up was of only secondary concern to the many vocal defense critics in the United States.) Yet, it was the American delegation that once again took the offensive. During the recess, four proposals had been developed for possible presentation at Vienna. President Nixon chose two of these proposals to be offered with equal weight to the Soviets.

The first American proposal offered at Vienna would have frozen both sides to 1,710 ICBM and SLBM launchers. The testing of MIRVs and their deployment would be banned. The ban on deployment would be verified by on-site inspection.

The Soviets rejected this proposal. They continued to press for an American agreement on the Soviet definition of strategic arms and continued to reiterate their position on American forward based systems. They claimed that the FBS was part of the strategic balance and that forward based nuclear armed aircraft together with their associated facilities should be removed. The Soviets also demanded

the elimination of foreign bases for American nuclear submarines.

The United States then offered its second proposal, which, the United States delegation stated, had equal standing and weight as the first United States proposal. The second proposal called for a reduction of ICBMs over a period of years from 1,710 launchers to 1,000. SLBMs were to be frozen, but not reduced. MIRVs were not limited. Again, the Soviet reaction was completely negative.<sup>103</sup>

When the negotiations were recessed for a short time in June, the situation was rather confused. The United States had rapidly presented two limitations on offensive weapons, both of which were equally rapidly rejected by the Soviets. The Soviets were pressing for the "real" United States position on offensive weapons, despite the fact that their own position on the subject was even less clear.<sup>104</sup>

Meanwhile, a new American proposal was originated in the SALT delegation. After being debated and modified within the American government, it was aired in Vienna.<sup>105</sup> On 25 July, the New York Times reported that the new proposal had been informally presented to the Soviets at the



talks which had by now started in Vienna.

This proposal came to be known as the 4 August proposal. The name was based on the date of its formal presentation at SALT. The proposal called for an overall limit of 1,900 strategic offensive weapons, i.e., ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers. There would be a sublimit of 1,710 on ICBM/SLBM launchers and a further sublimit on heavy ICBMs of 250 launchers. The latter sublimit was aimed at limiting the Soviets' huge SS-9 ICBM, but the United States reserved the right to build 250 heavy ICBMs if it so wanted. There were no limits on any MIRV, Soviet IRBMs, Soviet MRBMs and Soviet submarine launched cruise missiles. The two ABM options presented at this time as equally acceptable were zero ABMs or each state having one ABM to protect its National Command Authority (NCA), that is the national capital.

The United States had now presented three different plans for limiting offensive weapons in about four months. The Soviets did not present a counterproposal in response to this new American proposal, although they hinted they might. The Soviet aim was to keep the United States on the defensive, offering more alternative proposals. The Soviets continued, despite United States protests, to

insist that FBS be included in any aggregate of United States strategic systems.<sup>106</sup>

To the end of the session, on 14 August 1970, both sides remained firm in their positions. The Soviets did interject two new elements into the negotiations prior to the recess, however. They began to indicate that since the two sides were so far apart with regard to offensive weapons, it would be logical first to seek a separate agreement on limiting ABMs.<sup>107</sup>

Of course, the primary concern of the Soviets was to cripple the United States ABM effort. The American blunder of offering to limit the two ABM systems to the NCAs or to zero had played into the Soviets' hands. Were such an agreement concluded, it would mean that the Americans would have to eliminate the ABMs started around Minuteman sites and begin one around Washington. As it was, the Safeguard ABM was fighting for its life in Congress. In the summer of 1971, congressional supporters of the ABM let the White House know that they would no longer support the area defense concept but still strongly supported an ICBM defense. For all practical purposes, the NCA proposal would have eliminated all United States ABMs. At the same time, the Soviets would still have their

ABM around Moscow, the political and industrial heart of the USSR. In addition, the Moscow ABM also offered some protection to nearby Soviet ICBM sites--something which an ABM system around Washington would not do. Therefore, the Soviets were in a most advantageous position in having the issue of offensive weapons deadlocked while having reached apparent agreement on the question of ABMs.

The second element the Soviets interjected was rather unexpected. The Soviets attempted to involve the United States in a joint arrangement to prevent against "provocative" attacks by third powers intended to cause a United States-Soviet nuclear exchange. The proposal was obviously aimed at China, but could also cause problems for the United States in its relations with France and Great Britain. As Newhouse notes, "The Soviets, in effect, were proposing no less than a superpower alliance against the other nuclear powers."<sup>108</sup> The head of the Soviet delegation, Semenov, had called attention to this subject in Helsinki in 1969. However, on 7 July he suggested it to Gerard Smith.<sup>109</sup> The United States delegation rejected the idea immediately. However, the proposal did indicate that the Soviets were attempting to use SALT to enshrine their political objective of making the

international system into a condominium, presided over by the USSR and the United States.

The recess from 15 August to 2 November was uneventful with regard to SALT. At the Twenty-fifth UN General Assembly, which opened in the fall, speeches by the United States and Soviet representatives regarding SALT were innocuous and were unrelated to the course of the negotiation.

Round Three--The Helsinki Negotiations  
and the Close of 1970--2 November 1970-  
31 December 1970

The third session of SALT began in Helsinki with no changes in the positions adopted by either side. The United States continued to press for its 4 August proposal. The Soviets continued to reject the proposal without offering an alternative, but demanding that any limitation of strategic offensive weapons must include FBS.

The Soviet position was inflexible and couched in generalities. They would not comment on United States estimates of Soviet offensive weapons, but neither would they give any figures of their own as to their capabilities. The Soviet delegation was equally vague about their demand for the inclusion of FBS even though they held it had to be an integral part of any agreement. Newhouse had

described the Soviet position on the latter issue:

They began by urging that all forward-based systems--both carrier and land-based--be withdrawn some unspecified distance from Soviet territory. Next they demanded compensation; in exchange for those airplanes that were not withdrawn, the Soviet Union would be entitled under a SALT agreement to deploy more strategic missiles. Still another variation of the theme was the notion that the United States should be penalized for its forward-based aircraft by being obliged to liquidate some unspecified portion of its actual strategic weapons.<sup>110</sup>

On the first of December, the Soviets formally proposed that the offensive issues be separated from the question of a limitation on ABMs. They insisted ABMs should be dealt with first on the basis of the prior Soviet agreement to the American proposal limiting each country to an ABM for its capital. The American delegation refused to separate offensive and defensive limitations. The concern of the Americans was that this was no more than an attempt to preclude an American advantage in ABMs while allowing the Soviets to increase its offensive forces at the Americans' expense.

The session ended on 18 December with both sides maintaining their positions. The latter part of December brought no change in the positions of either side. Just before Christmas, in a news conference concerning the future of SALT, Secretary of State Rogers would only say, "I think

there are still prospects for agreement. It may take a little more time than we wished it would."<sup>111</sup> There was not much optimism about the future of SALT.

Round Four--The Back Channel is Opened  
and Joined to the Front Channel During  
the Vienna Negotiations--  
1 January 1971-28 May 1971

It was at this point, when the formal negotiations were stalemated, that the informal, or back-channel negotiations began. The negotiations were apparently initiated by Nixon, probably in his 9 January letter to Kosygin.<sup>112</sup> In this letter, Nixon stressed the necessity of maintaining a link between offensive and defensive weapons.<sup>113</sup> At the same time that this series of exchanges of correspondence was initiated, Kissinger and Dobrynin became key figures in the back-channel negotiations. Their meetings were meant to "supplement" the correspondence between the two heads of government, but it actually overshadowed the Nixon-Kosygin exchange.<sup>114</sup> Kissinger and Dobrynin agreed that the key issue was the United States position that both the offensive and defensive weapons systems had to be dealt with simultaneously or, as the Soviets wanted, first priority should be given to ABM limitations.<sup>115</sup>

Two days after the back-channel was opened,

Kissinger's staff submitted a memorandum to him in response to his earlier request for a new look at the offensive weapon aspect of SALT. Newhouse asserts that the memorandum indicated that "any agreement on offensive weapons especially if it were to exclude FBS, would have to grant Moscow in return a sizeable edge in strategic missiles."<sup>116</sup>

At the end of January, Dobrynin and Kissinger again met. Dobrynin was encouraging and indicated that the Soviet leadership wanted to continue the back-channel negotiations. Dobrynin proposed a summit meeting in the late summer. He also suggested that a SALT agreement might be agreed to by following the lines of the United States suggestion "an ABM-only formula coupled with a freeze on offensive weapons while further talks took place,"<sup>117</sup> although the Soviets preferred an agreement dealing only with ABMs for the capitals.<sup>118</sup>

Despite this apparent progress, on 12 March, three days prior to the opening of the fourth round of talks in Vienna, Dobrynin delivered a message to Nixon which indicated that the Soviets were reverting to their earlier insistence on an ABM-only treaty.<sup>119</sup> In Vienna, the Soviets were the first to present a proposal. They tabled a draft treaty limiting each side to an ABM consisting of

about 100 interceptors around its capital. The draft treaty ignored the crucial question of ABM affiliated radars. In reply, Smith offered the Soviets a new ABM proposal on 26 March, following instructions given him on 11 March, the day prior to Dobrynin's indication of Soviet regression. This third American ABM proposal would have allowed the Soviets to keep their Moscow ABM and in return, the United States would be allowed to complete the four ABM sites around Minuteman bases. These ABMs had already been funded by Congress. The Soviets rejected the American offer and reaffirmed their acceptance of the United States' NCA proposal. However, the front channel at Vienna was now unimportant. Zumwalt has characterized the formal negotiations during this period as "a charade artfully constructed by Kissinger and Dobrynin to conceal what they were doing in Washington."<sup>120</sup>

The same day Smith presented the new American ABM proposal in Vienna, Dobrynin received new instructions. While remaining adamant in Vienna, the Soviets indicated in Washington that they would agree to continued talks and a freeze on offensive weapons after reaching an ABM agreement.<sup>121</sup>

Shortly thereafter, the Twenty-fourth Congress of



the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) took place. This put a temporary halt in the negotiations since both Semenov, the head of the Soviet delegation in Vienna, and Dobrynin returned to Moscow at this time. Once the Congress was over and Dobrynin returned to Washington, the pace of the negotiations quickened. As Newhouse describes it:

The back channel was flooded with activity. Kissinger and Dobrynin were now negotiating. They often met in Kissinger's office, and they had innumerable telephone conversations.<sup>122</sup>

While the back channel was now the primary means of negotiation, the front channel in Vienna was not completely moribund. On 4 May, the head of the Soviet delegation proposed to Smith that an ABM agreement be made limiting both sides to defending their capitals, with an understanding that ICBM launcher construction would be halted thereafter. Two days later, Semenov indicated that his government might simply halt further ICBM launcher construction and hinted that it would also accept a sub-limit on very large missiles. The front and back channels were coming more into sync, even though the back channel would retain the ultimate lead.<sup>123</sup>

On 12 May, Dobrynin indicated to Kissinger that the Soviets had dropped their last remaining provision which the United States had found objectionable.<sup>124</sup> Eight days

later, on 20 May, a joint statement was made by the American and Soviet governments. President Nixon personally read the statement in a TV address.

The Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union, after reviewing the course of their talks on the limitation of strategic armaments, have agreed to concentrate this year on working out an agreement for the limitation of the deployment of antiballistic missile systems (ABMs). They have also agreed that, together with concluding an agreement to limit ABMs, they will agree on certain measures with respect to the limitation of offensive strategic weapons.

The two sides are taking this course in the conviction that it will create more favorable conditions for further negotiations to limit all strategic arms. These negotiations will be actively pursued.<sup>125</sup>

Up to this time, the existence of the back channel negotiations was completely unknown to the United States delegation in Vienna. Gerard Smith, and even Secretary of State Rogers, did not know the back channel existed until 19 May--the day before the joint announcement. According to Garthoff, the only hint the United States delegation had was that members of the Soviet delegation in Vienna had told them earlier in May that some special talks were taking place.<sup>126</sup> This would indicate that the Soviet delegation was much better informed concerning the back channel activity than their American counterparts were.

Another example, contrasting the Soviet coordination of the two channels with the United States lack of

coordination, concerns SLBMs. In February 1971, Dobrynin raised the question in the back channel whether SLBM launchers would be included in any limitation on strategic offensive weapons.<sup>127</sup> Kissinger, according to Garthoff, indicated that the choice was up to the Soviets. Kissinger, in keeping with his policy of secrecy, had not consulted with anyone knowledgeable in SLBMs before making his reply, nor had he consulted with the American SALT delegation.<sup>128</sup> Dobrynin promptly answered that the Soviet government would not want to limit SLBMs.<sup>129</sup> However, throughout late 1970, Paul Nitze, the Department of Defense's representative on the U.S. SALT delegation, had been reporting back to Secretary of Defense Laird and others that

the strategic questions about which the Soviet delegates to the talks were most curious and concerned were whether we were planning to replace Polaris, and if so when and with what.<sup>130</sup>

Thus, the Soviets effectively coordinated their back channel with their front channel, as opposed to the United States where no coordination existed. This one item came back to haunt the United States right up to the signing of the accords in Moscow. During the summer of 1971, as the United States government tried to arrive at new negotiating positions based on the 20 May statement, all agencies strongly advocated placing limitations on SLBMs.<sup>131</sup> It

became apparent that what Kissinger had not realized in making the February agreement was that while the Soviet Union had recently begun a major build-up of SLBM carrying submarines, an American follow-on Navy ballistic missile submarine design was not yet ready and American facilities for submarine construction were committed to work on other types of submarines.<sup>132</sup> This meant that Kissinger had agreed to allow the Soviets to continue their fast pace in submarine construction while the United States did not even have the capability to start a submarine construction program.

The formal negotiations in Vienna continued for eight days after the announcement on 20 May. Thereafter each delegation returned home for consultations and instructions.

Round Five--Preparation for and Participation  
in the Helsinki Negotiations--29 May 1971-  
24 September 1971

In the American government's reassessment of its position after 28 May 1971, a major point of dispute concerned a limitation on SLBMs. On 2 July, the policy was enunciated that the United States should propose a freeze on all SLBM launching submarines as of 31 July 1971. A proposal for a similar freeze on ICBM launchers would be

effective as of 31 December 1971. With regard to ABMs, the United States delegation was instructed to propose that each state could have either three ABMs protecting its ICBMs or one ABM protecting its capital. Included in the instructions was the authority to drop the ratio to 2:1 after a decent interval and also the authority to approach Semenov privately about a total elimination of ABMs.

The third round of negotiations to be held at Helsinki began on 8 July. Early in the negotiations, the United States presented a modified version of the 4 August 1970 proposal. In addition to the items indicated above, the new proposal eliminated all restrictions on strategic bombers.

The Soviets objected to the inclusion of limits on SLBMs saying they were not covered in the 20 May agreement. When Smith rebutted this, saying that nothing in the agreement said that SLBMs were not covered, the Soviets asserted that SLBMs could be controlled only if FBS would be controlled as well. The Soviets also objected to the freeze dates for ICBMs and SLBMs. Instead, they insisted that the freeze on ICBMs be based on the numbers deployed when the agreement was signed. They also disputed the nature of a future agreement on offensive weapons. The Soviets

pressed for a simple, informal understanding of very limited duration, which they indicated would be followed at a later date by a formal, comprehensive and permanent agreement.

The Soviet delegation attempted to focus on the ABM agreement first, and indeed, this was the primary consideration of the negotiations in Helsinki. The Soviets rejected both United States proposals for a 3:1 or 2:1 ratio of ABMs and continued to press for each state having only one ABM which would protect its capital. The first United States ABM proposal was not helped at all when on 23 July, the New York Times published the essential points of the United States proposal, including the fallback position on ABMs.

By the end of July, most of the United States delegation was pressing for permission to offer formally the zero ABM proposal to the Soviet delegation. After heated debate within the United States government, the 3 or 1 ABM proposal was reaffirmed on 12 August as the current American position. The reason for rejecting the delegation's request was that Kissinger had indicated that in his back channel negotiations with Dobrynin, the Soviet ambassador had rejected the zero ABM concept.<sup>134</sup>

The Soviets were still demanding equality vis-à-vis ABM systems, and within this context they emphasized the ABMs to protect the capitals. However, this position was modified later in the session. The Soviets then proposed a one-for-one arrangement in which each state would have one ABM protecting its capital and one protecting an ICBM field. This, too, was rejected at the time by the American delegation primarily for two reasons: (1) the proposal itself was ambiguous in parts, and (2) the United States did not want to accept equality in ABMs without having an agreement on offensive weapons as well.

Finally, this round of the negotiations included a United States proposal to ban exotic ABM systems of the future and the conclusion of two secondary agreements, one improving the Hot Line, originally agreed to in 1963, and the other an agreement for reducing the risk of accidental nuclear war between the two countries.

During this phase, one activity outside the context of the negotiations may have had an important impact on the SALT negotiations. This was the rapid improvement in Sino-American relations, dramatically indicated by Kissinger's "secret" visit to Peking from 9 to 11 July. On 15 July, President Nixon announced that he also would

visit China. The exact effect of these events on the course of the negotiations is difficult if not impossible to assess. However, it must certainly have made the Soviet Union less confident about its position vis-à-vis the United States. This, in turn, could have affected its perception of the SALT negotiations. John G. Stoessinger, in his work on Kissinger, has described Kissinger's concept of the role China should play in Soviet-American relations. Kissinger

. . . quickly made it a centerpiece of his entire policy. Rapprochement with China would give the United States enormous leverage over the Soviet Union. So long as the hostility between China and the Soviet Union prevailed, Kissinger could thrust the United States into the position of the balancer. America, in short, would then be wooed by both the leading powers of the communist world.<sup>135</sup>

Round Six--Recess and the Vienna  
Negotiations--25 September 1971-  
4 February 1972

During the recess in the negotiations, Henry Kissinger made a second, and longer, trip to Peking. However, just prior to the trip, President Nixon announced that he would go to Moscow in May 1972 for a summit meeting with the Soviet leaders. Nixon had begun his term of office by emphasizing the benefits of negotiation. Now, he was talking about "a generation of peace." It was apparent



that signing a SALT agreement in Moscow in May 1972 was a goal of the Nixon Administration, even if unannounced.<sup>136</sup> To cap the summit with a SALT agreement would be to show that the administration was capable of achieving its goals.

The negotiations on SALT opened in Vienna on 15 November 1971. The major issues to be settled were the levels of ABMs allowed, what limitations should be placed on ABM radar controls, the duration of the offensive agreement, on what date should the freeze dates take effect and whether or not SLBMs should be included in the agreement.<sup>137</sup> In accordance with the 20 May announcement, the negotiations concentrated on ABM limitations.

The United States position was that each side should keep what it had in ABMs. This meant two United States ABM sites protecting Minuteman missiles and the one Soviet ABM site around Moscow. The Soviets argued that they should be allowed to keep the ABM site around Moscow while building an additional site for the protection of an unspecified Soviet ICBM field. The Soviet proposal would allow the United States to keep only one ABM site, the one at Grand Forks.

On 19 November, the Soviets tabled a new draft proposal which called on both sides "not to deploy ABM

systems for defense of the territory of the [entire] country." The American delegation was concerned that if this general statement were accepted, the Soviets would insist it precluded the necessity of including in the treaty more specific limitations on radars and other items related to ABMs.<sup>138</sup> Much of the Vienna session was taken up with convincing the Soviets of the need for more specific limitations on ABMs and negotiating the wording of such limitations.

Prior to the Christmas break, the Soviets continued to refuse to allow any special sublimits to be placed on large missiles such as the SS-9.

In the area of exotic ABM systems, the Soviets ostensibly moved closer to the American position but in reality allowed no real limits to be placed on Soviet efforts in this area. The Soviets had previously refused to limit future stationary, land-based ABM systems, but had accepted limiting other types. Toward the end of January, they agreed that land-based exotic ABMs should also be banned.<sup>139</sup> However, what was an exotic ABM system was not detailed in the treaty, but was left to future resolution in the Standing Consultative Commission.

One of the most difficult problems was that of

limitations on SLBMs. The American delegation advocated parity in the number of SLBM-carrying submarines each country would have. The Soviets refused to agree that SLBMs should be limited at all. However, if any agreement were to be made, the Soviets maintained that equality in numbers was not enough. There must be equal security for both sides. This meant that the Soviet Union should have more submarines. Because of their geographic position, it took Soviet submarines longer to get on station than it did for United States submarines. This was especially true because of American bases in Spain and Scotland. The Soviets did not indicate the fact that they were working on an SLBM that would have a range of 4,800 miles, the SS-N-8. This range would give the Soviets a 2,000 mile advantage over U.S. SLBMs and more than make up for their geographic "disadvantage." The Soviet demand for more submarines may have been an attempt to gain an advantage over the United States in sheer numbers, or it may have been made simply to discourage the United States from pursuing any limitation at all on SLBMs.<sup>140</sup>

Finally, the Soviets simply refused to ban mobile ICBMs, a ban still sought by the United States delegation.<sup>141</sup> Thus, at the end of the Vienna session on

4 February 1972, a number of very important issues were still in dispute. The summit was only little more than two and a half months away.

Round Seven--Recess, Helsinki and  
Moscow--5 February 1972-26 May 1972

Soon after the Vienna negotiations recessed, President Nixon submitted his report on foreign policy to Congress. In a radio address accompanying the submission of the report, Nixon again emphasized the advances he had achieved in the past year.

Looking ahead on the world scene, how can we move ahead to make the most of the breakthroughs of the past year? We must advance the delicate process of creating a more constructive relationship between ourselves and the People's Republic of China.

We must bring the arms race under control, and by so doing, lay the basis for other major steps toward peace that can be taken together by the United States and the Soviet Union. . . .

By facing the realities of the world today--as this breakthrough year has shown we are capable of doing--we can make peace a reality in the generation ahead.<sup>142</sup>

The emphasis was on China and the Soviet Union. Clearly, great things were expected from the two impending summit conferences in order to fulfill the promise of a generation of peace.

The President's first summit conference was with the leaders of China from 21 to 28 February. Nixon spent

eight days in China, a very long time for a leader to visit one country. The visit was hailed as a great success. Perhaps the most significant result was the Shanghai Communiqué which indicated that both countries desired increased contacts with the other. In addition, the United States agreed that Taiwan was part of China and that the fate of the island should be settled by the Chinese themselves. Thus it appeared to many that the United States was actively attempting to woo China through concessions. If successful, this would leave the Soviet Union isolated, or at best, force it to buy United States favor through concessions in some area.

The last round of the formal negotiations began in Helsinki on 28 March, less than two months before the scheduled Moscow summit. Gerard Smith put forward a new United States proposal. The American initiative would allow the Soviets to have the same number of ABM sites as the United States, but there were two conditions attached. First, the Soviets would have to agree to limit SLBMs. Second, the United States would have both ABM sites protecting their Minuteman missiles, while the Soviets would have one site around Moscow and the second around an ICBM site. If the Soviets could not agree to this, then, the

United States would have to have two ABM sites to one Soviet site. The Soviet delegation replied with their old proposal of one-plus-one, one site around the national capital, one around an ICBM field. The two delegations remained deadlocked--unable to agree or to change their positions.

As had previously occurred with the front channel deadlocked, the back channel actively worked for a breakthrough. Toward this end, Kissinger made a secret trip to Moscow from 21 to 24 April. According to Newhouse, SALT was not the primary topic, Vietnam was.<sup>143</sup> However, SALT was discussed and some roadblocks were removed. Around the time of the Twenty-fourth CPSU Congress a year before, Brezhnev had replaced Kosygin as the Soviet leader with whom Kissinger and Nixon negotiated SALT.<sup>144</sup> Brezhnev now met with Kissinger and presented to him two memoranda on SALT: one on offensive weapons, one on defensive weapons.

Brezhnev indicated that SLBMs could be limited in the agreement. However, in return, he demanded, as Garthoff has noted, that the limit on Soviet SLBMs be at "the highest level then estimated that the Soviet Union might deploy in the five-year period of the interim freeze even without any SALT limitation."<sup>145</sup> In other words, what

was demanded was no effective limitation at all. This would also allow the Soviets to have more SLBM launchers than the United States in addition to already having more ICBM launchers.

With regard to ABMs, the position presented by Brezhnev repeated the one-plus-one proposal, each site having no more than 100 missiles. The Soviet leader did not mention the geographic separation of the two Soviet ABM sites demanded by the United States.

After his return to the United States and some internal United States negotiating, the United States agreed to the Soviet positions on both the SLBMs and on the one-plus-one ABM proposal. However, in accepting the Soviet figure of 62 submarines having 950 launchers, the United States delegation in Helsinki emphasized that the new boats to be built must be replacements for 210 older ICBMs or SLBMs. This was in accordance with United States intelligence figures which indicated that the Soviets had 41 to 43 SLBM carrying submarines either deployed or under construction at the time.

In response to this, the Soviets claimed that they had 48 submarines. This was the only time, as far as the public record shows, that the Soviets had stated a specific figure in connection with their military forces. Up to

that time, the negotiations had been entirely based on American figures for both United States and Soviet forces! The higher Soviet figure, if accepted by the United States delegation, would mean that the Soviets would not have to replace as many older SLBMs and ICBMs as the United States was proposing. This disparity remained for the rest of the negotiations in Helsinki. Thus, SLBMs remained a point of contention.

Other issues were settled by the two delegations, however. The Soviets still would not accept an ABM treaty that included a statement requiring that their second ABM site be "east of the Urals." An agreement was reached, however, by indicating that each state's ABM site for the defense of an ICBM field could not be "less than 1300 kilometers from its NCA site."

The question of limiting the amount of modifications that could be done to an ICBM silo was also agreed upon at Helsinki. Actually, the agreement was to disagree and to cover all opinions by using vague language instead of agreeing on specific limitations to silo modification. Thus, the agreement indicated that ICBM silos could not be "significantly increased."<sup>146</sup>

A third important area was agreed upon at Helsinki



as well. The Soviets agreed to ban all large ABM associated radars, with the exception of a few specifically mentioned in the treaty. This, in fact, allowed the Soviets to completely circumvent the agreement.<sup>147</sup>

These agreements were all reached on 22 May, the day Nixon, Kissinger and their entourage arrived in Moscow for the summit conference. At Moscow, then, there were three main issues yet to be resolved. First, the divergence in the numbers of SLBM submarines the Soviets had currently deployed or under construction. Second, whether mobile land-based missiles would be banned or not. Third, missile modifications, which included certain aspects of silo modifications and a proposed sublimit on Soviet heavy missiles.

When Nixon went to meet Brezhnev for the first time after arriving in Moscow, Brezhnev greeted him with blunt criticism. In Nixon's words, Brezhnev

. . . said that at the outset he had to tell me that it had not been easy for him to carry off this summit after our recent action in Vietnam. Only the overriding importance of improving Soviet-American relations and reaching agreements on some of the serious issues between us had made it possible.<sup>148</sup>

After this inauspicious start, however, Brezhnev warmed up. Nixon, Kissinger and the other Americans were taken up in

a whirlwind of social events and negotiating sessions.

In the afternoon of Tuesday, 23 May, Nixon, Kissinger, Brezhnev and Andrei Aleksandrov, Brezhnev's advisor on United States-Soviet affairs, met for over two hours to discuss SALT. Nixon has observed about Brezhnev in this meeting:

Despite the impatience he affected with the details and numbers, Brezhnev was obviously very well briefed on the subject of SALT. . . . When I said we felt that specific provisions for verifying that each side was fulfilling its obligations would give necessary reassurance to both sides, he turned to me and in an injured tone of voice said, "If we are trying to trick one another, why do we need a piece of paper? We are playing clean on our side. The approach of 'catching each other out' is quite inadmissible."<sup>149</sup>

The meeting ended with no progress made.

In the evening, the discussion again was about SALT. In discussing how far a second Soviet ABM should be from Moscow, Brezhnev "casually cut three hundred kilometers off the distance that had already been agreed upon." When caught in this by Nixon, he again agreed to the original figure. At the meeting, Brezhnev again tried to throw the United States negotiators off balance by asking why the interim agreement on offensive weapons could not be for ten years instead of just five. Five was finally agreed to again after Kissinger pointed out that the

Soviets had originally only wanted it to last for eighteen months.<sup>150</sup>

One issue was eliminated during the Brezhnev-Nixon talks. This was the question of a ban on mobile missiles. The Soviets refused to have an outright ban included in the treaty. Finally, Nixon gave in, but, according to Newhouse, "told Brezhnev that deployment of mobiles by the Soviets would be regarded as grounds for abrogating both the ABM treaty and the interim agreement."<sup>151</sup>

After meeting for three hours in the evening, Brezhnev and Nixon left the SALT negotiations to their representatives. The American negotiators were Kissinger, Helmut Sonnenfeld and William Hyland, none of whom had the technical knowledge to deal with the problems of SALT. In sharp contrast to this, the Soviets' chief negotiator was Leonid Smirnov, a deputy premier who was Chairman of the Military-Industrial Commission. As such, he is responsible for the manufacturing of Soviet missiles and other modern weapons. In other words, he was both politically astute and highly knowledgeable about all the technical aspects involved in the unresolved issues of SALT. Dobrynin and Gromyko also represented the Soviet Union in these negotiations.<sup>152</sup>

In the negotiations late Tuesday night, two primary topics were discussed: (1) a sublimit on heavy missiles, and (2) the modernization of missile silos. The Soviets refused to be more specific on a sublimit for their large missiles. They insisted that the missiles which would be covered by the sublimit should only be referred to as "heavy missiles." The Americans were unhappy with this vague term, but accepted it. The Soviets did, however, agree to being somewhat more specific about modifying silos. They agreed that by not allowing a "significant increase" in the dimensions of ICBM silo launchers that this meant that any increase would not be greater than 10 to 15 percent of the present dimensions.<sup>153</sup> However, this agreement was not included in the treaty itself, but only in the listing of "common understandings" published by the United States, but not initialed or formally accepted by the Soviet government. While this appeared at the time to be a Soviet concession, in actuality this "clarification" was itself not clear. After the treaty was signed, it became apparent that there was no agreement as to whether the 10 to 15 percent increase would be limited to only one dimension or each dimension could be increased by the agreed percentage. The latter interpretation would allow

a much larger increase to be made.

On Wednesday, 24 May, another long meeting was held on SALT. Then, after midnight when Nixon and Kissinger returned from a visit to Brezhnev's dacha, Kissinger, and his American colleagues together with Gromyko, Smirnov and Dobrynin met to negotiate on SALT. Both sides, apparently, were adamant in their positions. William Safire, Nixon's speech writer, was with the American party in Moscow. He has described the course of this early morning negotiating session in the following manner:

Kissinger returned to the negotiating table at 2:30 AM after a short visit to Nixon. Smirnov . . . heard the foreigner coolly describe the characteristics of Soviet weapons . . . Henry told me after, ". . . Smirnov practically had an apopleptic fit." The Deputy Prime Minister lost his temper. . . . Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko stepped in, as Kissinger kept describing Soviet weaponry to Smirnov's outrage, and asked for a fifteen-minute break. He cooled off his arms expert--or they agreed that the tactic of outrage was not working--and as Kissinger recalls, "at 3:30 AM . . . we got down to serious business."<sup>154</sup>

At 8:00 A.M., the Soviets went to the Politburo to report on the meeting and to get further instructions.

At 11:00 A.M., Kissinger informed Dobrynin that Nixon was prepared to go home without a SALT agreement if the remaining problems, especially the SLBM question, could not be solved. The evening was spent at the Bolshoi

Ballet and at dinner. Thereafter, Kissinger and his colleagues met with their Soviet counterparts to discuss SALT.

In the early hours of Friday morning, the issue had come down to a question of how many SLBM launcher tubes on their submarines the Soviets had. The Soviets insisted they had 768 on their Y-class submarines, while the United States estimated it was 640. In addition to these SLBMs, the Soviets had, according to United States estimates, 30 launchers on H-class submarines, and 70 launchers on G-class submarines. Both are older generation submarines, which the United States wanted to be included in the number of older strategic missile launchers to be retired and replaced by new SLBM launchers. The Soviets flatly refused.<sup>155</sup> Kissinger offered a compromise, the baseline number would be 740. For each SLBM launcher the Soviets built over that number they would have to retire an older missile (ICBM or SLBM). The Soviets refused to include the G- or H-class launchers in the formulation as part of the baseline. Although they agreed to take 740 as the baseline itself, they insisted it applied only to the launchers on Y-class submarines. By 3:00 A.M. the situation was again at an impasse, and the negotiations recessed.

At 11:30 on Friday morning, the negotiators met once again. The Soviets pressed their position once again. The agreement finally reached was that all Y-class submarines and their SLBM launchers would be counted. In addition, any modern SLBM launcher on a G-class submarine would be counted, but the submarine itself would not be counted. Finally, if H-class submarines were modified with modern SLBM launchers, then both the launchers and the submarine would be counted.<sup>156</sup> Kissinger and the Soviets then worked out joint instructions for the two delegations in Helsinki so they could draft the necessary documents without any delay.

After eleven frenzied hours in which all the necessary documents were written and delivered to Moscow, the treaties were signed by Nixon and Brezhnev. Thus, the last phase of the SALT negotiations had ended.

#### Analysis of the Negotiating Techniques Used in Phase III

The negotiating techniques used by the Soviets during the actual SALT negotiations were varied, and generally well executed. In most respects, however, they were not new. Any study of previous negotiations with the Soviets could have prepared the American negotiators for

their contacts with the Soviets. It is appropriate at this time to review the specific techniques used.

There is overwhelming agreement among the participants in SALT that the Soviets did not employ rudeness or vilification during the negotiations. Raymond Garthoff has stated:

Throughout, there was a remarkable absence of intrusion of extraneous ideologizing and propaganda. This stands in marked contrast to the experience of most earlier postwar negotiations with the Soviet Union.<sup>157</sup>

Some members of the American delegation took the lack of polemics to be an indication of Soviet sincerity in achieving mutual constraints on the strategic arms competition.<sup>158</sup> Yet, other members of the American delegation, such as William R. Van Cleave, were not so sure that a "businesslike manner" equated to a desire to reach equitable agreements in SALT.<sup>159</sup> From the results of SALT I, it would appear that the latter group was correct.

Even within these nonpolemical negotiations the Soviets did use polemics on at least one occasion. This occurred during the Moscow summit. When Kissinger and Soviet Deputy Premier Smirnov were engaged in negotiations, Smirnov became "outraged" at Kissinger and had to be "cooled off" by Gromyko. Safire noted that Smirnov's



"remarks lost flavor in the translation."<sup>160</sup> While it may have been the late night or Smirnov's personality that caused the outburst, it is much more probable that the polemics were planned to disconcert the American negotiators so that they might perhaps make some concession to mollify their Soviet counterpart.

In contrast to the generally nonpolemical nature of the negotiations, the public statements made by Soviet leaders and the Soviet press continued to contain a significant amount of polemics. The Soviets continually castigated certain "Hawk Congressmen," "militarist circles in the United States," and "the U.S.A.'s military-industrial complex, the bosses of which display nervousness at even the slightest hint of the possibility of a reduction in budgetary appropriations for military purposes."<sup>161</sup> Thus, from reading the Soviets' public statements on SALT, one could obtain a view different from that obtained by the participants of the negotiations. This is most likely due to the differing purposes to be served by the Soviet negotiators' bearing and the polemical language of the public statement. The latter were primarily intended for propaganda purposes.

This highlights another Soviet negotiating

technique: the use of the negotiating process to achieve propaganda purposes. Again, some of the American negotiators, such as Gerard Smith, have maintained that there was little if any propaganda in the negotiations.<sup>162</sup> Yet, the Soviet negotiating posture consistently maintained that the USSR desired no unilateral advantages, but that each state should maintain equal security. The Soviet negotiators then submitted very one-sided proposals claiming that the Soviet Union needed either additional submarines or ICBMs, etc., because of its "disadvantageous" geographic position. This certainly was an attempt to gain unilateral advantages through propaganda.

In addition, the negotiating process itself and the resulting agreements served Soviet propaganda purposes. Simply by negotiating alone with the United States on nuclear matters, the Soviet Union enhanced a perception of the USSR as an equal to the United States. Second, the resulting agreement, by giving the USSR overall superiority in ICBMs and SLBMs and equality in ABMs, was a propaganda victory for the USSR. To the world, the United States was publicly acknowledging and legitimizing Soviet superiority in strategic weapons.

Some American observers have indicated that the

Soviets have not made any systematic effort to exploit the negotiators for propaganda purposes.<sup>163</sup> In supporting this contention, Raymond Garthoff has even noted that

. . . notwithstanding the heavy and critical attention in the United States leveled against the unequal numbers of ICBM and SLBM launchers under the Interim Agreement, the Soviets have meticulously avoided any attempt to claim and advantage from these levels. Indeed, they have never even published the numbers!<sup>164</sup>

Yet, two factors must be considered. First, the fact that the Soviets achieved an advantage in numbers is well known. This, of itself, creates propaganda advantageous to the USSR. Thus, the act of signing such an agreement has its propaganda purposes. Second, the Soviets never publish figures dealing with their own military forces. Soviet internal propaganda has consistently maintained that the Soviet Union pursues a peaceful foreign policy and that the West is aggressively seeking advantages over the socialist states. To allow the Soviet public to know that it is the USSR that has the preponderance of ICBMs and SLBMs would be counterproductive. Garthoff did not state, however, that Soviet propaganda now routinely claims that "due to the shift in the correlation of forces in favor of the socialist states" that the foreign policy of the capitalist states is now on the defensive. Of course, the

Soviet concept of "correlation of forces" includes strategic weaponry as one of its primary components. From this it is clear that the Soviets did indeed use the negotiations for propaganda purposes.

The third technique is to maintain an adversary attitude toward those with whom the Soviets are negotiating. As noted in the discussion of the use of polemics, the Soviets did maintain an adversary attitude in their public statements, and Smirnov certainly maintained an adversary attitude toward Kissinger in Moscow. Other examples indicating this attitude are: (1) the Soviets' extensive use of the KGB and eavesdropping equipment in Helsinki;<sup>165</sup> (2) the Soviets' presentation of consistently one-sided proposals; and (3) the Soviets "bending local arrangements" to their own advantage as noted by Gerard Smith.<sup>166</sup> A further example can be seen in Soviet publications. Georgi A. Arbatov, a prominent Soviet expert on the United States who was involved in the SALT negotiations, stated less than a year after the SALT agreements were concluded that, despite an easing of tension between the United States and the USSR, relations between the two states will necessarily "remain relations of struggle," a struggle that is "historically inevitable."<sup>167</sup> Zumwalt,

in his memoirs, forcefully indicates that Kissinger clearly recognized this Soviet attitude, but felt that the American people were not up to competing with the Soviets. At the time of the SALT negotiations, Kissinger even called the Soviets "Sparta to our Athens." According to Zumwalt, Kissinger felt that "his job is to persuade the Russians to give us the best deal we can get, recognizing that the historical forces favor them."<sup>168</sup> From these examples, it is clear that the Soviets maintained an adversary attitude toward the United States during the negotiations.

Another technique used by the Soviets was to be stubborn in order to wear out the opponent. This technique was encouraged by the rapid changes in the American position early in the negotiations. These shifts gave the Soviets the perception that if they did not like the United States position all they would have to do is to wait a bit and it would change again. As James E. Dougherty, a noted expert on arms control, has noted,

. . . the Soviets proved themselves to be hard, single-minded bargainers equipped with a relatively simple strategy for gaining the maximum benefit for themselves by exploiting a willingness of the United States side to compromise for the sake of an election-year spectacular.<sup>169</sup>

Newhouse characterized the American approach to the negotiations in the following way: "American proposals were

sometimes thrown up like pasteboard figures, withdrawn at the first sign of resistance, and replaced by other equally perishable offers."<sup>170</sup> Van Cleave, speaking as a participant in the negotiations, has stated:

By changing its position frequently the U.S. delegation communicated to Moscow both its anxiety for an agreement and its lack of steadfastness. A Soviet nyet meant no; a U.S. no meant maybe. Very little must have seemed to be considered ipso facto non-negotiable to the U.S. This encouraged the Soviet negotiators to prod and probe, to temporize, and to parry U.S. initiatives.<sup>171</sup>

The Soviets were also encouraged to use this technique by the lack of coordination between the American front and back channels. The Soviets, for example, were adamant that SLBMs should not be included in the interim agreement, primarily because in the back channel negotiations of February 1971, Kissinger had not brought the subject up.<sup>172</sup> From the record of the negotiations, then, the Soviets not only used this technique, but were aided and abetted by United States negotiating activities and attitudes.

The Soviets also used deception to good effect as a negotiating technique. At the Moscow summit when Nixon mentioned provisions for the verification of the agreements. Brezhnev took on an injured tone and said, "We are playing the game clean on our side."<sup>173</sup> A year before at

an election meeting in Moscow, Brezhnev had also stated:

The decisive factor for the success of these [SALT] talks is strict observance of the principle of equal security for both sides, renunciation of attempts to secure any unilateral advantages at the expense of the other side.<sup>174</sup>

These statements are typical of the many made by the Soviet leadership and others in authority. Despite these protestations, the facts indicate otherwise. They indicate that rather than having equal security as a goal, they were aiming at unilateral advantages. One example of this is the question of SLBMs. The Soviets strongly resisted any limits being placed on SLBMs. However, when the United States proved adamant on their inclusion, the Soviets demanded to have a larger number of SLBMs because of their "geographic disadvantage." This disadvantage, as indicated in the chronology of the negotiations, was that it took Soviet submarines longer to get on station in their patrol areas off the United States coasts, and therefore, they could not stay on patrol as long as American submarines could in their patrol areas. This argument was ostensibly accepted by the United States and the final agreement gave the Soviet Union a maximum of 950 SLBM launchers to 710 for the United States. While the Soviets were making this argument, they were testing a new SLBM

Which had a range of 4,800 miles. This is a range which would allow the Soviet submarines to launch their missiles from their home ports, eliminating any "geographic disadvantage." While this new SLBM, the SS-N-8, had been tested before the Moscow summit, it had only been tested over a limited range, and the United States was kept unaware of its full capabilities.<sup>175</sup>

The Soviets also used deception in negotiating limitations on missile modernization. During the negotiations, the Soviets were developing a new generation of ICBMs. Yet, the United States proposed an article to prevent the Soviet Union from replacing its light ICBMs, such as the SS-11, with heavy ICBMs. While such a limitation was accepted by the Soviets, they refused to agree on a definition of what constituted a heavy ICBM. This, of course, left them free to violate the "spirit" of the agreement without technically violating it. This is exactly what occurred.<sup>176</sup>

Finally, the SALT agreements were intended to limit the "arms race," and the agreements were presented to Congress as having actually accomplished this by limiting the Soviet deployment programs for SLBMs and ICBMs.<sup>177</sup> Yet it now appears according to the CIA that



there were no limitations placed on the Soviet programs at all.<sup>178</sup> Therefore, it is clear that on several key issues at least, the Soviets intentionally used deception as a negotiating technique.

The Soviets were also very adept at using the negotiating process to divide their opponents and to paralyze their opponents' will to take a certain action. As has been noted, the primary Soviet objective in the SALT negotiations was to stop the American deployment of an ABM system. This was effectively accomplished. The Soviet proposal for an ABM only agreement was hailed by the anti-ABM forces in the United States. The New York Times stated that it "deserves an immediate, favorable American response without waiting for the resumption of formal talks March 15 in Vienna."<sup>179</sup> Hubert Humphrey, in his first major speech in the Senate since he returned there after running for president, urged the Nixon Administration to accept the Soviet proposal.<sup>180</sup> The Soviets encouraged such activities by making such statements as

. . . it is also necessary to emphasize that the line of building up military preparations that the U.S.A. is pursuing is incompatible with a constructive approach to the solution of the problems under discussion at the Soviet-American talks.<sup>181</sup>

This technique was not only effective vis-à-vis the American ABM. It was also used in an attempt to halt the American deployment of MIRVs. Typical of the results produced by Soviet statements critical of the planned United States MIRV deployment is the following statement by Senator William Fullbright:

I am bound to say I cannot quite see how the security of this country would be seriously endangered by a temporary suspension of MIRV simply to see what the [Soviet] reaction is.

Now, some of the best civilian authorities, outside the Government, like Mr. Shulman, believe that our continuing headlong advancement with MIRV and with everything that we can is very discouraging to the Russians.<sup>182</sup> [Emphasis mine.]

The Soviets also attempted to divide the U.S. SALT delegation against itself. Paul Nitze, from his personal experience, has written that the Soviet negotiators "tried to flatter individual members of the [US] team, hoping to play on the possible disagreements within it."<sup>183</sup>

It was also characteristic of the Soviets during the SALT negotiations to make no concessions of any substance. President Nixon, in his Foreign Policy Report to Congress on 25 February 1971, stated with regard to SALT, "the principle of mutual accommodation, if it is to have any meaning, must be that both of us seek compromises, mutual concessions, and new solutions to old problems."<sup>184</sup>

[Emphasis mine.] The Soviet attitude was just the opposite. Igor S. Glagolev, a former Chief of the Disarmament Section of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Academy of Sciences of the USSR, has stated unequivocally,

In the actual process of diplomatic negotiation, the proposals of the United States are accepted [by the Soviet Union] only in those cases where they do not hamper the military programs of the Soviet Union.<sup>185</sup>

Paul Nitze confirms this in a memorandum he wrote after interviewing a Soviet defector. The defector indicated to Nitze:

At the time of SALT One, the unanimous view of the Soviets was that their ABMs were worthless. They had second generation computers and his Institute had Bis II, which was used to run war games. It wasn't very good; certainly not good enough for ABM use. In the preparatory work for SALT One--in which the Institute had participated--the object was to control U.S. Safeguard, which they feared very much. The people at the Institute spent their time on studies analyzing what the Soviets could give in order for the U.S. to give up Safeguard. Grechko [the Soviet Minister of Defense] insisted that it was not necessary to give up anything. The Institute thought he was wrong--he turned out to be right.<sup>186</sup>

The SALT record itself indicates that on all the major issues, the Soviet Union was not restricted from achieving its desired goals. Only in the area of peripheral concern, such as exotic ABMs did the Soviet Union agree to a United

States proposal.

The Soviet leadership insured that their negotiating strategy was strictly complied with by keeping their negotiators tightly controlled. From all observers who have commented on this, it would seem that the Soviet negotiators were much more controlled than their American counterparts. As Van Cleave has remarked, "For the Soviets, control over their part of the negotiations was maintained in Moscow and all flexibility resided there also."<sup>187</sup> Some observers, such as Garthoff even maintained that the civilian Soviet negotiators did not know as much about their own military programs as the American negotiators did.<sup>188</sup> John Newhouse cited one occasion which supported this assertion, when

. . . Mr. Semenov, confused Minuteman silos, quite small, with SS-9 silos, very large. He seemed unacquainted with the elementary fact that Soviet ICBM's are much larger than America's. He was openly set straight by his colleague, Colonel-General Ogarkov. Later in the same round, Ogarkov, then listed as the second-ranking member of the Soviet delegation, took aside a U.S. delegate and said there was no reason why the Americans should disclose their knowledge of Russian military matters to civilian members of his delegation. Such information, said Ogarkov, is strictly the affair of the military.<sup>189</sup>

Other members of the United States delegation, however, do not feel that this was true, and assert that the Soviet

negotiators were knowledgeable in military matters. In any case, there is agreement that the Soviet negotiators were tightly controlled from Moscow.

The Soviets not only controlled the negotiating positions of their delegation, but also it would appear from the record that the socializing between delegations was controlled by Moscow with the aim of gaining unilateral advantages. Nitze has described some of the tactics used by the Soviet delegation in this regard.

They made an attempt to break down individual members of the U.S. team. Initially they tried to get people to drink too much. When it didn't work, they abandoned it. They invited us to Leningrad and inundated us with stories about the siege of Leningrad. They tried to flatter individual members of the team, hoping to play on possible disagreements within it.<sup>190</sup>

The history of the negotiations is one where the substantive work came more and more to be accomplished by small informal groups. Newhouse has noted that by April 1971, there was "a strong tendency to shift the bulk of the business into small working groups, . . ." <sup>191</sup> and by the following winter, "the plenary sessions had finally been wholly superceded by a pattern of troikas, working groups and working lunches." <sup>192</sup> From this it would seem that the former "coldness" of Soviet negotiators had been replaced by a new affability. However, this new demeanor

should not be taken for a mutuality of goals.

One negotiating technique that was quite common in the SALT negotiations was for the Soviet negotiators to demand an agreement in principle before discussing any details concerning the topic.<sup>193</sup> Similarly, they attempted to keep the negotiations on a general level as long as possible. Gerard Smith has contrasted the difference between the approaches of the two delegations:

. . . we tended to make specific proposals, while the Soviets for the most part made general proposals, assuring us that once they were accepted, the "fine print" would offer no problem.<sup>194</sup>

Smith cited a specific example of this in a Congressional testimony.

We were not able to agree on a definition of a "heavy" missile. The U.S.S.R. argued that this was unnecessary for a short-term freeze and that both sides could tell the difference between a light and heavy missile.<sup>195</sup>

Since then it has become obvious as to why the Soviets wanted to maintain only general wording vis-à-vis heavy missile limitations. This negotiating technique was used throughout the negotiations.

Another tactic used successfully by the Soviets was to present unreasonable or exaggerated demands so that any resulting compromise would be in their favor. The prime example of this was the issue of American forward

based systems. Soon after the negotiations began, the Soviets demanded American FBS be included in any limitations placed on offensive weapons. The American delegation never agreed to this, and FBS is not mentioned in the final agreements. Yet, Kissinger's staff recommended to him in January 1971 that "any agreement on offensive weapons, especially if it were to exclude FBS, would have to grant Moscow, in return, a sizable edge in strategic missiles."<sup>196</sup> After the negotiations were concluded, Secretary of State Rogers admitted that American FBS was a primary reason for giving the Soviets an advantage in the numbers of both ICBMs and SLBMs.<sup>197</sup> On the other hand, when the United States insisted that Soviet IRBMs and MRBMs should be included in offensive weapons limitations, the Soviets simply refused to discuss these weapons and the United States let the matter drop.

The Soviets also used this technique when discussing SLBMs. The United States had estimated that the Soviets had 640 SLBM launchers either deployed or under construction. The Soviets insisted that they had 768 SLBM launchers. This was the only time during SALT that the Soviets had not used American figures concerning Soviet forces. Of course, the Soviet figures would have allowed

the USSR to have 128 more launchers than would the American figures. The final compromise figure agreed to by Kissinger was 740. The Soviets were able to achieve significant advantages by using this negotiating technique.

The Soviet Union was equally adept at using procedural devices to its own advantage. For example, when the date of the talks was announced, Nixon indicated that Helsinki was not the first choice of the American administration. Although there is some contradiction as to which exact locations were offered, it is definite that the United States preferred Vienna. Yet the Soviets chose Helsinki, the capital of a state which makes every effort to accommodate the Soviets' wishes. When the talks opened, the Soviets were able to rent a room overlooking the United States delegation's offices. Nitze relates that the room "was equipped with telescopes, antennas, and various other gadgets. It soon became apparent that all but the most secure telephone communications were being monitored."<sup>198</sup> The final negotiations took place in Moscow, with the Soviets controlling all communications and activities. Being on their home territory, they were able to produce "out of thin air" an expert on the remaining items to be discussed, Leonid Smirnov.<sup>199</sup> In this



manner they were able to confront the American "political" experts with a technician, who could overwhelm them in technical details. As a result, Kissinger had to rely on telephone calls to his own experts who had been left back in Washington.<sup>200</sup> Thus, the Soviets had arranged the location of the negotiations to their advantage.

Another aspect of this technique is that the Soviets defined common terms so as to gain a unilateral advantage. The most blatant example of this, of course, is the Soviets' defining of the term "strategic" to include the U.S. FBS but not the equivalent Soviet forces. This was done early in the negotiations, and affected the rest of the negotiations to the disadvantage of the United States. Nitze put this into a broader context when he stated that the Soviets would "use imprecise language in presenting provisions which would limit their side and precise language where the object was to limit U.S. actions."<sup>201</sup> The Soviets made similar use of such phrases as a "heavy missile" and "significantly increased" missile silo dimensions. In these two cases, however, the Soviet advantage was not completely realized until after the agreements had been ratified.

There seems to be some disagreement concerning the

next technique, which is to make a concession or agreement and then withdraw it at a later date. Garthoff has said that "both sides at times changed positions, only we [the U.S.] withdrew proposals once accepted."<sup>202</sup> However, both Nitze and Gerard Smith indicate that the Soviets, including Brezhnev, had withdrawn positions to which they had previously agreed.<sup>203</sup> While the latter two SALT participants did not give any specific examples to illustrate their contention, it would appear from past experience that they are correct.

The Soviets also demanded concessions on some issues before they would agree to negotiate on the particular strategic weapons systems. For example, the Soviets at first refused to discuss SLBM launchers, but added that if they were to be discussed, the USSR must be allowed more launchers than the United States. It was clear that this was a precondition for any negotiations on SLBMs. In a somewhat similar manner, the Soviets refused to break the impasse on limiting strategic weapons unless the American FBS was included--which it finally was--although it was not specifically mentioned in the agreements.

Another familiar technique used by the Soviets was

to have the United States negotiators agree to waive a particular topic until a later time, and then, when the topic was raised again, to refuse to discuss the topic at all. The most glaring example of this was the Soviet attempt to break the linkage between an ABM treaty, which the Soviets wanted, and an agreement limiting offensive weapons, which the United States wanted. When the negotiations on offensive weapons quickly broke down in early 1970, the Soviets began to push for an ABM treaty. On 1 December 1970, they even submitted a treaty limiting only ABMs. In the end, the limitations on ABMs was codified into a permanent treaty and the limitations on strategic offensive weapons were included in an interim agreement. Thus, a permanent agreement was to be negotiated within the five-year duration of the interim agreement. Yet, this new, permanent agreement has not been agreed to seven years later.

Another example of this tactic is the content of the interim agreement. The United States agreed to the inequalities in the interim agreement because, as Nitze stated in Congressional testimony:

[The US advantage in MIRVs] was one of the reasons why it was possible for us to accept an agreement which was grossly unequal in the number and size of missiles that both sides had.

The hope was that one could negotiate a permanent agreement within the five-year period and hopefully by the end of 1974 which would have washed-out inequalities on both sides. It would have had to provide greater equality in the number and size of the missiles on both sides, to compensate for the fact that the Soviets would then have an equivalent MIRV capability.<sup>205</sup>

Yet, once the follow-on SALT negotiations began, the Soviets asserted that the Interim Agreement was not just a temporary freeze but that the inequalities had been agreed at the highest level to compensate them for "geographic and other considerations," and should be carried over unchanged into the replacement agreement.<sup>206</sup> In all, the Soviets through this technique have obtained a permanent ABM treaty and have retained, for all practical purposes, their advantage in ICBM and SLBM launchers.

The Soviets also obtained a significant advantage by applying another technique to the overall question of strategic arms limitations. In mid-1970, the Soviets had agreed to our first ABM proposal based on the defense of the capitals (NCA), but the two sides were deadlocked on the question of offensive weapons. To gain the most benefit from the situation, the Soviets dissected the American proposal accepting only that part advantageous to them. Van Cleave has described the Soviet tactic in the following way:

The . . . Soviets seized upon the NCA, pulled it out of the [US offensive-defensive] package, proposed an ABM only agreement based on the NCA deployments, argued that the US had proposed it in the first place, and the US side from that time on had expended its SAFEGUARD bargaining chip with nothing in return to show for it.<sup>207</sup> [Emphasis mine.]

In addition to the above techniques, the Soviets maintained the primacy of the political aspects of the negotiations at all times. Colin Grey has observed:

Soviet leaders do not apparently value arms control qua arms control. Arms control is but one instrument in the kaleidoscope of political struggle and accommodation that is the essence of international politics. The arms race is seen not as a beast to be tamed, but rather as a beast to be ridden at variable speeds for political ends.<sup>208</sup>

Gerard Smith characterized the Soviet approach to SALT as

. . . primarily a matter of international policies having technical aspects. For then, a major arms-control agreement would be so significant politically that it would not require detailed provisions. American officials, . . . tend to see arms control more as a search for solutions to the complex technical problems of establishing force levels and weapons characteristics by international agreement.<sup>209</sup>

Thus, Kissinger's attitude toward superiority was epitomized by his statement in 1974:

What in God's name is strategic superiority? What is the significance of it, politically, militarily, operationally, at these levels of numbers? What do you do with it?<sup>210</sup>

However, the Soviets apparently knew the answers and sought to attain it in SALT I. As a former Soviet arms control expert has stated:

. . . the SALT negotiations concern weapon systems actually in being. And the terms of SALT agreements both reflect the real correlation of forces in the international arena and induce changes in that correlation.

The shift from U.S. superiority in the number of thermonuclear delivery vehicles and in the total explosive power of warheads to Soviet superiority in these categories . . . has had a profound political and psychological impact throughout the world.<sup>211</sup>

Another familiar Soviet technique used in SALT was never to divulge technical information about their own forces. Gerard Smith has emphasized this aspect of Soviet negotiating techniques.

While American [military] force levels have long been in the public domain, the Soviets neither at SALT nor afterwards have made public (or even disclosed privately in the negotiation) their force levels. Soviet secrecy has even prevented them from telling their people the force levels agreed to in 1972 in SALT.<sup>212</sup>

The last part of Smith's statement is explained by the fact that the Soviets did publish the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement, but not the Protocol, which was the document containing specific SLBM force levels.<sup>213</sup> While this lack of openness seemed of concern to some, Smith held that Soviet reticence was at least in part due to the fact that for them to cite force figures would place in doubt the United States ability to monitor the agreement with national means of verification!<sup>214</sup> Smith did not

state why the United States stated American force levels without putting in question Soviet capability to monitor United States compliance with the agreements. As noted above, the only time the Soviets did state their force level, was when they claimed to have more SLBM launchers than United States intelligence indicated they had. Thus, they were able to gain an additional advantage in SLBMs.

This latter incident also is characteristic of another Soviet technique used in SALT. That is to make a concession in such a way that it is no concession. The Soviets held it to be a major concession that they allowed limits to be placed on SLBM launchers. However, as Garthoff has noted,

. . . the price for Soviet agreement to include SLBM launchers was to place the "limitation" at a very high level--indeed, at the highest level than estimated that the Soviet Union might deploy in the five-year period of the interim freeze even without any SALT limitation! (Theoretically possible higher Soviet SLBM levels for 1977, developed after the April Moscow meeting, were later cited as support for the value of the limitation.) This "break-through" also meant accepting a differential in SLBM launcher numbers favoring the Soviet side (950 to 656), compounding the difference in numbers of ICBM launchers (1,407 to 1,054).<sup>215</sup>

Other examples of this are: (1) the Soviet agreement to place a limit on heavy ICBMs, yet not defining the term "heavy" so that they could easily avoid the limitation,

and (2) the Soviet agreement to drop the question of FBS, but requiring that they be allowed more ICBM launchers in return.

The Soviets also used the technique of negotiating by acts as well as words. While the negotiations were in progress, the Soviet Union maintained a forceful program of ICBM and SLBM expansion. Van Cleave has concisely shown the effect of this technique in the SALT negotiations.

As the SALT were about to begin in November 1969, the U.S. Secretary of State declared that the United States hoped to "negotiate an arms limitation agreement that will keep us in the same relative position that we are now." At that time, the Soviet Union had about the same number of ICBMs as the United States (some 1,050) and had just begun deploying Polaris-type SLBMs (Y-class submarines). By mid-year 1971, the Soviets reportedly had some 1,500 ICBMs and some 400 Polaris-type SLBMs. According to recent reports, the Soviet ICBM total now exceeds 1,600, there are some 100 large but differently configured silo-launchers for new ICBMs under construction, and the Soviets have 41 Y-class submarines operational or under construction--the size of the U.S. Polaris force.<sup>216</sup>

Because of the Soviets negotiating by acts, the United States charged its negotiating goals from one of codifying a slight United States superiority to codifying a significant Soviet superiority in the number of ICBM and SLBM launchers.



During the negotiations, the Soviets also used the technique of quoting Western sources to support their position. This is a traditional technique made especially useful by the fact that the Soviets often used the quotations out of context or subtly modified them so as to more fully support the Soviet position.

A final technique used by the Soviets during SALT I was "to create expectations that if [the American delegation] conceded a given point, then other important points would become easy to resolve."<sup>218</sup> The Soviets were most likely encouraged to use this negotiating technique by the rapidity with which the United States changed its positions early in the negotiations.

In reviewing this phase of the SALT negotiations, it is clear that the Soviets used a multitude of negotiating techniques to effect their goals. There was no hesitation to take advantage of any American mistakes, nor was there any real effort to disguise the fact that they were striving for unilateral advantages. It appears from the history of this phase that the Soviets did not gain their advantages so much through their own adeptness, but rather because of the ineptness of the American negotiating effort, and primarily because of the leadership decisions

made by Kissinger and Nixon.

Summary of the SALT Negotiations  
1964-1972

The negotiating techniques used in the three phases of the SALT negotiations are displayed on Chart 4. The first phase and the second phase particularly indicate a low number of techniques employed. In the first case this is due to the fact that the Soviets were not yet engaged in the negotiations and did not want to be engaged in negotiations limiting strategic weapons. In the second phase, the Soviets and the United States had only limited opportunities to engage in maneuvering prior to the start of the negotiations. Primarily, it was outside factors which inhibited interaction between the governments: the invasion of Czechoslovakia and the election of a new American administration. When the negotiations were actually begun, however, the Soviets used a multitude of negotiating techniques as indicated in the third phase.

A number of conclusions can be drawn from a review of the entire course of the negotiations to limit strategic arms. First, a constant objective throughout the course of the negotiations was to divide the United States as to what policies should be pursued vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.

CHART 4. SOVIET NEGOTIATING TECHNIQUES EMPLOYED IN THE SALT  
NEGOTIATIONS, 1964-1972

Technique No.	Phase No.		
	1	2	3
1	✓		- ✓
2	✓	✓	✓✓
3	✓	-	✓
4	✓✓	L	✓✓
5	✓		✓
6	✓✓	✓✓	✓✓
7	✓✓		✓✓
8			✓
9			-
10	✓		✓
11	✓		✓
12			✓
13			
14			✓
15	✓	✓	✓
16			
17			

CHART 4 (Continued)

Technique No.	Phase No.		
	1	2	3
18			
19			✓
20			✓
21			
22	✓		✓
23			✓
24			✓
25	✓	✓	✓✓
26			✓
27	✓		✓

✓ The technique was used to a significant extent.

- The opposite of the technique was used to a significant extent.

-✓ Both the technique and its opposite were used to a significant extent.

✓✓ The technique was used to a great extent.

L: The technique was used only to a limited extent.

A blank space indicates that either the technique was not used or that there is insufficient information to determine if the technique was used.

During the first phase, the Soviets attempted to use the promise of negotiations to mute American criticism of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. During the second and third phases, the Soviets used the negotiations to inhibit or preclude entirely American strategic weapons programs, especially the American ABM effort.

A second conclusion is that despite years of American urging, the Soviets did not agree to engage in the negotiations until they felt it would be to their advantage. They were not embarrassed to have the United States urge them to negotiate. They simply ignored the American request or retorted by presenting their own proposal for strategic arms limitation, a proposal so one-sided that it offered no basis for negotiation. It would appear, then, that the Soviets were not responsive to outside pressures in this area, but rather chose the time most opportune for themselves to agree to negotiate.

Third, throughout the negotiations, the Soviets sought unilateral advantages, despite public statements to the contrary. There was only a minimal effort to disguise as mutually beneficial these attempts to enhance their own position. Yet, the positions they advocated were quite simple and superficially equitable: eliminate

all bombers; equal security for both states; a strategic weapon is one which can strike the opposing state from its base. Thus, to anyone knowledgeable the flaws of the proposals were apparent, but the proposals were well designed for propaganda purposes.

Fourth, the Soviet negotiators emphasized the political aspects of the negotiations, and sought to achieve a specific political goal. This was true as well when the Soviets attempted to gain a military advantage in the negotiations. It was apparent that a military advantage was perceived by the Soviets as enhancing their political position. Contrary to this, the American position, especially during the actual negotiations, was to take a highly technical approach disregarding both the military and political factors involved in the weapons systems discussed. The stated objective of the Nixon Administration prior to the beginning of the negotiations was to obtain international political benefits by negotiating at SALT. However, the concept that strategic weapons systems could be "mixed and matched" with alacrity so as to offer the Soviets a variety of arms limitation packages to choose from indicated not versatility, but rather a lack of understanding by the American leadership

of both strategic doctrine and the political aspects of strategic power. In the latter part of the negotiations, a distinct impression is received that what mattered most was not the political stability to be achieved by a SALT agreement, but rather the immediate political benefits to be obtained by the Nixon Administration to enhance its own chances for reelection in 1972. The perception of the actual negotiations is not, therefore, one of Soviet adeptness at negotiating, but a Soviet adeptness at assessing the limit to which the American administration would go to enhance its own political fortunes and an adeptness at using this knowledge.

## NOTES

1. See, for example, Elmo R. Zumwalt's comments re, Cold Dawn in Zumwalt's memoirs, On Watch: A Memoir (New York: New York Times Book Co., 1976), p. 348.

2. U.S., ACDA, Documents on Disarmament, 1964, Pubn. no. 27 (1965), p. 5.

3. Ibid., p. 8.

4. Ibid., pp. 12-16.

5. Ibid., p. 20.

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32. Ibid., p. 459.
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35. A/7072.
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37. Ibid., p. 276.
38. Ibid., pp. 470-71.
39. Ibid., p. 434.
40. Johnson, The Vantage Point, p. 485.
41. ACDA, Documents on Disarmament, 1968, p. 452.
42. Johnson, The Vantage Point, p. 485.
43. ACDA, Documents on Disarmament, 1965, p. 224.
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48. Yu. Petrov, "A New Spur to the Arms Race?"  
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29.
49. ACDA, Documents on Disarmament, 1964, p. 288.
50. Johnson, The Vantage Point, p. 488.
51. David S. Sullivan, "The Legacy of SALT I:  
Soviet Deception and US Retreat," Strategic Review 7  
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54. ACDA, Documents on Disarmament, 1964, p. 286.
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56. ACDA, Documents on Disarmament, 1968, p. 617.

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58. Richard M. Nixon, Radio Address by Mr. Nixon: The Security Gap, 24 October 1968, Republican National Committee News Release, 25 October 1968.

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61. Lawrence T. Caldwell, Soviet Attitudes to SALT, Adelphi Papers no. 75 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971), p. 7.

62. Johnson, The Vantage Point, p. 490.

63. Richard M. Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), p. 346.

64. A/RES/2456 (XXIII), 20 January 1969.

65. U.S., ACDA, Documents on Disarmament, 1969, Pubn, no. 55 (1970), p. 30.

66. Nixon: The First Year of His Presidency (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1970), pp. 1A-2A.

67. New York Times, 8 February 1969, p. 11.

68. Ibid., 2 March 1969, p. 1.

69. ACDA, Documents on Disarmament, 1969, p. 101.

70. New York Times, 8 April 1969, p. 3.

71. U.S., House, Impact of Multiple Warhead Missiles, p. 203.

72. However, there had been some informal indications in late July that a Soviet response was imminent. Ibid.

73. New York Times, 21 August 1969, p. 1.

74. Caldwell, Soviet Attitudes to SALT, p. 9.

75. Keesing, Disarmament, p. 359.

76. John Barron, KGB: The Secret Works of Soviet Agents (New York: Bantam Books, 1974), p. 243.

77. Hsu, The Rise of Modern China, p. 821.

78. There is some discrepancy concerning what sites the United States did in fact propose on 11 June. Secretary of State Rogers, in his news conference on 25 October, indicated that the U.S. had offered the Soviets a choice of three sites: Geneva, Vienna, and Helsinki. However, in his news conference of 19 June, President Nixon indicated that the U.S. offered only two sites: Geneva and Vienna. Dr. William R. Van Cleave, a member of the SALT I negotiating team has indicated that Geneva was never proposed to the Soviets by the U.S. Due to the great amount of diplomatic activity already taking place in Geneva.

79. Garthoff has indicated that the Soviets had originally considered naming a very senior military man as the head of their SALT delegation but followed the U.S. lead in naming a civilian head. (Garthoff, "Negotiating with the Russians," p. 4.) However, this is disputed by another member of the U.S. delegation, Dr. William R. Van Cleave.

80. ACDA, Documents on Disarmament, 1969, p. 31.

81. Ibid., p. 315.

82. New York Times, 11 June 1969.

83. Nixon, RN, p. 415.

84. ACDA, Documents on Disarmament, 1969, p. 95.

85. U.S. House, Impact of Multiple Warhead Missiles, p. 102.
86. Johnson, The Vantage Point, p. 488.
87. Newhouse, Cold Dawn, p. 169.
88. Garthoff, "Negotiating with the Russians," p. 4.
89. Interview with Dr. William R. Van Cleave, 17 July 1969.
90. The Military Balance, 1969-1970 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1969), p. 55.
91. Paul H. Nitze, "Soviets' Negotiating Style Assayed," Aviation Week and Space Technology 102 (17 February 1975):43.
92. Ibid., p. 41.
93. Paul H. Nitze, "The Strategic Balance between Hope and Skepticism," Foreign Policy, no. 17 (Winter 1974-75), p. 142.
94. Garthoff, "Negotiating with the Russians," p. 5.
95. Raymond L. Garthoff, "SALT and the Soviet Military," Problems of Communism 24 (January-February 1975): 36.
96. Jerome H. Kahan, Security in the Nuclear Age: Developing US Strategic Arms Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1975), p. 178.
97. ACDA, Documents on Disarmament, 1969, p. 645.
98. A/C.1/L.501, 8 December 1969.
99. Observer, "An Important Problem," Pravda, 7 March 1970, Current Digest of the Soviet Press 22 (7 April 1970):31.

100. For example, L. Tolkunov, "America Today," Izvestia 14 (March 1970), and V. Berezin, "Spokes in the Wheels," Krasnaya Zvezda, 14 March 1970, Current Digest of the Soviet Press 22 (14 April 1970):17-18.

101. New York Times, 9 March 1970, p. 1.

102. Ibid., 16 April 1970, p. 40.

103. Newhouse, Cold Dawn, p. 183.

104. U.S., State, Department of State Bulletin, 6 July 1970, p. 3.

105. Interview with Dr. William R. Van Cleave, 17 July 1979.

106. Garthoff, "Negotiating with the Russians," p. 7.

107. Newhouse, Cold Dawn, p. 186.

108. Ibid., p. 189.

109. Ibid., p. 188.

110. Ibid., p. 194.

111. U.S., ACDA, Documents on Disarmament, 1970, Pubn, no. 60 (1971), p. 702.

112. The record is unclear as to whom the letter was actually sent. Nixon states that it was to Brezhnev, others indicate that it was sent to Kosygin.

113. Nixon, RN, p. 523.

114. Raymond L. Garthoff, "Negotiating SALT," Wilson Quarterly 2 (Autumn 1977):80.

115. Interview with Dr. Van Cleave, 17 July 1979.

116. Newhouse, Cold Dawn, p. 205.

117. Nixon, RN, p. 523.

118. Newhouse, Cold Dawn, p. 204. Here again the sources are in apparent contradiction. Nixon puts this Soviet reply at two weeks after the 9 January meeting between Kissinger and Dobrynin. Newhouse indicates this occurred during the second week of February.

119. Nixon, RN, p. 523.

120. Zumwalt, On Watch, p. 351.

121. Nixon, RN., p. 523.

122. Newhouse, Cold Dawn, p. 216.

123. Ibid., pp. 214-15.

124. Nixon, RN, p. 524.

125. U.S., ACDA, Documents on Disarmament, 1971, Pubn. no. 66 (1973), p. 398.

126. Garthoff, "Negotiating SALT," p. 80.

127. Garthoff, "Negotiating with the Russians," p. 15.

128. Garthoff, "Negotiating SALT," p. 81.

129. Garthoff, "Negotiating with the Russians," p. 9.

130. Zumwalt, On Watch, p. 154.

131. Garthoff, "Negotiating with the Russians," p. 9.

132. Ibid., and Garthoff, "Negotiating SALT," p. 81.

133. Kahan, Security in the Nuclear Age, p. 185.

134. Newhouse, Cold Dawn, p. 229.

135. John G. Stoessinger, Henry Kissinger: The Anguish of Power (New York: Norton, 1976), p. 117.

136. Nixon: The Third Year of His Presidency  
(Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1972), 153-A.

137. Newhouse, Cold Dawn, p. 236.

138. Garthoff, "Negotiating SALT, " p. 84.

139. Newhouse, Cold Dawn, p. 237.

140. Ibid., p. 238.

141. John H. Barton and Lawrence D. Weiler, eds.,  
International Arms Control: Issues and Agreements  
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976), p. 194.

142. U.S., ACDA, Documents on Disarmament, 1972,  
Pubn. no. 69 (1974), p. 20.

143. Newhouse, Cold Dawn, p. 244.

144. Sources differ as to when this change took  
place. Some place it before, some during and some after  
the CPSU Congress.

145. Garthoff, "Negotiating with the Russians,"  
p. 15.

146. Newhouse, Cold Dawn, pp. 247-48.

147. Interview with Dr. Van Cleave, 17 July 1979.

148. Nixon, RN, p. 610. It should be noted that  
there are a number of contradictions and disagreements  
among the various sources used to reconstruct the events  
of the Moscow summit.

149. Ibid., p. 611.

150. Ibid., pp. 611-12.

151. Newhouse, Cold Dawn, p. 251.

152. Ibid., p. 253.

153. Ibid., p. 251.



154. William Safire, Before the Fall: An Inside View of the Pre-Watergate White House (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1975), p. 451.

155. Newhouse, Cold Dawn, pp. 253-54.

156. Interview with Dr. Van Cleave, 17 July 1979.

157. Garthoff, "Negotiating with the Russians," p. 5.

158. For example, see the testimony of Gerard Smith before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Arms Control and Disarmament Act Amendment, 1970, 91st Cong., 2d sess., 1970, p. 4.

159. U.S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations of the Committee on Government Operations, International Negotiations, 92nd Cong., 2d sess., 25 July 1972, p. 205.

160. Safire, Before the Fall, p. 451.

161. V. Shestov, "What is Hidden Behind the Propaganda Screen?" Pravda, 4 February 1971, Current Digest of the Soviet Press 23 (2 March 1971):7.

162. ACDA, Documents on Disarmament, 1969, p. 733.

163. Marshall D. Shulman, "SALT and the Soviet Union," in SALT: The Moscow Agreements and Beyond, ed. Willrich Mason and John E. Rhinelanders (New York: Free Press, 1974), p. 106.

164. Garthoff, "Negotiating with the Russians," p. 21.

165. Nitze, "The Strategic Balance," p. 142.

166. Gerard G. Smith, "Negotiating at SALT," Survival 20 (May-June 1977):117.

167. Georgi A. Arbatov, "On Soviet-American Relations," Kommunist, February 1973, Current Digest of the Soviet Press 25 (9 May 1973):7.

168. Zumwalt, On Watch, p. 319.
169. James E. Dougherty, "The Soviet Union and Arms Control," Orbis 17 (Fall 1973):768.
170. William R. Van Cleave, "Political and Negotiating Asymmetries: Insult in SALT I" (Paper prepared for the Sixth International Arms Control Symposium, Philadelphia, Penna., 2 November 1973), p. 13.
172. Garthoff, "Negotiating with the Russians," p. 15.
173. Nixon, RN, p. 611.
174. Leonid Brezhnev, "Soviet Statement on Disarmament," Current History 61 (October 1971):240.
175. Sullivan, "The Legacy of SALT I," p. 33.
176. Ibid., pp. 34-35.
177. U.S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Internal Security of the Judiciary Committee, Soviet Disarmament Propaganda and the Strange Case of Marshall Grechko, 93d Cong., 2d sess., 1974, p. 103.
178. Wall Street Journal, 15 November 1978; and Zumwalt, On Watch, p. 403.
179. New York Times, 17 January 1971, p. 14E.
180. Ibid., 26 March 1971, p. 13.
181. V. Shestov, "What is Hidden Behind the Propaganda Screen?" p. 8.
182. U.S., Senate, Arms Control and Disarmament Act Amendment, 1970, p. 9.
183. Nitze, "The Strategic Balance," p. 143.
184. ACDA, Documents on Disarmament, 1971, p. 54.
185. Igor S. Glagolev, "The Soviet Decision-Making Process in Arms Control Negotiations," Orbis 21 (Winter 1978):768.

186. Quoted in Zumwalt, On Watch, p. 427.
187. Van Cleave, "Political and Negotiating Asymmetries," p. 15.
188. Garthoff, "Negotiating SALT," p. 84.
189. Newhouse, Cold Dawn, p. 56.
190. Nitze, "The Strategic Balance," p. 143.
191. Newhouse, Cold Dawn, p. 212.
192. Ibid., p. 236.
193. Nitze, "Soviets' Negotiating Style Assayed,"  
p. 42.
194. Smith, "Negotiating at SALT," p. 119.
195. U.S., Congress, House, Armed Services  
Committee, Military Implications of Strategic Arms Limi-  
tation Talks Agreement, 92nd Cong., 2d sess., 25-27 July  
1972, p. 15088.
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Moscow: Unequal Terms Unevenly Applied? (new York:  
National Strategy Information Center, 1975), p. xiv.
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201. Nitze, "The Strategic Balance," p. 143.
202. Garthoff, "Negotiating with the Russians,"  
p. 13.
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206. Paul H. Nitze, "Nitze Delineates US-Soviet Differences," Aviation Week and Space Technology 102 (24 February 1975):63.

207. Van Cleave, "Political and Negotiating Asymmetries," p. 18.

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209. Smith, "Negotiating at SALT," pp. 118-19.

210. Quoted in Stoessinger, The Anguish of Power, p. 215.

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212. Gerard C. Smith, Review of The Game of Disarmament, by Alva Myrdal, in International Security 2 (Summer 1977):63.

213. Garthoff, "Negotiating with the Russians," pp. 21-22.

214. U.S., House, Military Implications of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks Agreements, p. 15098.

215. Garthoff, "Negotiating with the Russians," p. 15.

216. William R. Van Cleave, "Implications of Success or Failure of SALT," in SALT: Implications for Arms Control in the 1970s, ed. William R. Kintner and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1973), p. 317.

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## CHAPTER V

### CONCLUSION

The preceding three chapters have evaluated Soviet negotiating techniques from the beginning of the post-World War II era through 1972. From 1957 to 1972, this analysis was accomplished by observing two specific sets of negotiations: those leading to the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and those culminating in the SALT I agreements. In all, twenty-seven negotiating techniques have been observed during these two negotiations. These techniques are:

1. Use rudeness and vilification.
2. Use the negotiating process for propaganda purposes.
3. Maintain an adversary attitude toward those with whom the Soviets are negotiating.
4. Be stubborn; attempt to wear out the opponent.
5. Be devious; use deceit with little or no regard for the truth.
6. Use the negotiating process to divide or demoralize the opponent.

7. Refuse to make concessions; see concessions as a sign of weakness rather than goodwill.
8. Have the Soviet government/Communist Party give little freedom to Soviet negotiators.
9. Allow little or no real personal relationships to develop between the Soviet negotiators and their opponents.
10. Demand agreement in principle before negotiations on technical or detailed topics is undertaken.
11. Present unreasonable/exaggerated demands, so that any resulting compromise will ensure that the Soviets obtain the majority of their desired objectives.
12. Use procedural devices (such as the formulation of the agenda) to gain substantive advantages.
13. Use the threat to break off the negotiations to gain concessions from the opponent.
14. Make a concession, repudiate the concession, then make the same concession again at a later time.
15. Demand a concession from the opponent in return for agreement to enter into negotiations.
16. Emphasize grievances the Soviet Union has with the opponent.
17. Claim that a compromise position is actually only

the opponent's position and does not actually reflect the Soviet position, then demand that a compromise be made between the Soviet position and the compromise position. This is known as "splitting the half" and has a number of variations all of which have the aim of giving the Soviets three-fourths of what they wanted while allowing them to claim that each side made equal concessions toward the other.

18. Make increased demands each time the opponent makes a concession.
19. Have the opponent agree to waive discussion of a certain topic at the current stage of the negotiations, then, when he attempts to discuss it at a later time, refuse to discuss it at all. This is known as the "waiving gambit."
20. Take a certain position, but maintain that the position was first taken by the Soviets' opponent, and therefore, the opponent must agree to it.
21. State that the Soviets' current proposal takes full account of their opponent's position, and therefore, the Soviets need make no further compromise.
22. Maintain the primacy of the political aspects of the negotiation.

23. Refuse to divulge technical information about the Soviet Union.
24. Make a concession in such a way that it is really no concession at all, or make it dependent on the opponent making a concession which is known to be unacceptable to him.
25. Negotiate not only by words, but by acts.
26. Quote numerous Western sources to support the Soviet position.
27. Stress that there is only one real impediment to reaching an agreement, and emphasize that if the opponent would only concede this point to the Soviets, then an agreement could be quickly concluded.

A number of conclusions can be made about Soviet negotiating techniques from this list. These conclusions fall into two broad categories. The first set of conclusions deals with the literature on Soviet negotiating techniques and its relationship with the two case studies. The second set of conclusions contains observations about the Soviet approach to arms control negotiations with the United States.

The negotiating techniques noted in the review of literature and those observed in the two case studies



overlap to a great extent. The literature noted nineteen Soviet negotiating techniques and all were found in the case studies as well. This confirms the findings of the earlier observers of Soviet negotiating techniques. They are correct in ascribing these techniques to Soviet negotiators and they are correct in emphasizing that Soviet negotiating techniques are substantively different from those used by the United States negotiators.

However, a further comparison of the techniques indicated in the literature with those found in the case studies indicates that the literature is incomplete. The literature described only the first nineteen negotiating techniques, whereas the case studies highlighted eight more techniques. Therefore, it is possible that there are still other Soviet negotiating techniques which have been used in other negotiations, but which have not been publicized as yet.

A third conclusion becomes apparent when Charts 1, 3, and 4 are compared. These charts are reproduced here for ease of reference. Chart 1 indicates that there is a rough hierarchy of techniques which is shown by how many authors have mentioned them. Yet, if this hierarchy is compared to the number of phases in which the particular

CHART 1. CITATION OF SOVIET NEGOTIATING TECHNIQUES BY WESTERN AUTHORS

Technique No.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	No. of Tech- niques cited by Author
Ikle	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		17
Steibel	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X								12
Mosely	X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X						X				9
Pipes	X	X	X	X		X	X	X			X		X				X			9
Holsti	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X					X						9
Dean	X	X	X	X			X	X		X			X						X	9
Bechhoefer	X	X	X	X						X		X		X	X					8
Acheson	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X			X								8
Nogee	X	X	X		X	X				X	X	X								8
Craig	X	X	X		X	X	X						X							6
Hazard	X	X	X	X	X	X														6
Hayter	X	X	X	X	X	X		X			X									6
Osborn	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X								X				6
Pearson	X	X	X	X		X														5
Thayer	X	X	X	X	X	X														5
Deane	X			X	X		X	X		X										5
Kennan	X		X	X			X		X											5
Kertesz	X	X		X	X		X													5
No. of authors citing techniques	17	16	15	14	11	9	9	9	7	7	5	4	4	3	2	2	2	1	1	

CHART 3. SOVIET NEGOTIATING TECHNIQUES EMPLOYED IN THE  
TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS, 1957-1963

Technique No.	Phase No.				
	1	2	3	4	5
1	-✓	-✓	✓✓	✓	
2	✓	✓	✓✓	✓	
3	✓	✓	✓✓		
4	✓	✓	✓	✓	
5	✓	✓	✓✓	✓	
6	✓	✓	L		✓
7	-	-	✓✓	-✓	-
8	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
9	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
10	✓	✓	✓	✓	
11	✓	✓	✓✓	✓	
12	✓	✓	L	✓	✓
13	✓	-	-		
14		✓	✓	✓	
15	✓			✓	
16	✓	✓	✓		
17			✓		
18			✓		
19		✓	✓		
20	✓	✓	✓	✓	
21	✓		✓	✓	
22	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
23	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

CHART 3 (Continued)

Technique No.	Phase No.				
	1	2	3	4	5
24	✓	✓	✓		
25	✓		✓		
26		✓	✓		
27		✓	✓		

CHART 4. SOVIET NEGOTIATING TECHNIQUES EMPLOYED IN THE SALT  
NEGOTIATIONS, 1964-1972

Technique No.	Phase No.		
	1	2	3
1	✓		-✓
2	✓	✓	✓✓
3	✓	-	✓
4	✓✓	L	✓✓
5	✓		✓
6	✓✓	✓✓	✓✓
7	✓✓		✓✓
8			✓
9			-
10	✓		✓

CHART 4 (Continued)

Technique No.	Phase No.		
	1	2	3
11	✓		✓
12			✓
13			
14			✓
15	✓	✓	✓
16			
17			
18			
19			✓
20			✓
21			
22	✓		✓
23			✓
24			✓
25	✓	✓	✓✓
26			✓
27	✓		✓

Keys to Charts 3, 4.

- ✓ The technique was used to a significant extent.
  - The opposite of the technique was used to a significant extent.
  - ✓ Both the technique and its opposite were used to a significant extent.
  - ✓✓ The technique was used to a great extent.
  - L The technique was used only to a limited extent.
- A blank space indicates that either the technique was not used or that there is insufficient information to determine if the technique was used.

techniques were used, it is apparent that there is only a very slight similarity. For example, it is accurate to say that the first ten techniques listed in Chart 1 are also, for the most part, the techniques most often used of the nineteen techniques noted in the literature. There is no similarity, however, between the hierarchy as indicated in Chart 1 and the frequency of use of any technique among the first ten or among the last nine. In addition, some of the techniques not mentioned at all must be numbered among the most used of Soviet techniques. Therefore, it is not valid to say that because a particular technique is often mentioned in the literature, that it is one of the most used techniques.

In reviewing the literature and the case studies, it is possible to categorize the twenty-seven techniques that were observed. As noted in the introductory chapter, the term "technique" has been used in a very broad sense. The purpose was to have one term that could be all inclusive. However, the techniques that have been described can be placed into three, more specific categories: attitudinal factors, negotiating style and negotiating tactics.

Attitudinal factors stem from Soviet perceptions of themselves and others. The basis for these perceptions

are Soviet doctrine, culture and history. As such, these factors influence the Soviet negotiator's choice of tactics. Two attitudinal factors have been noted in this study. The foremost is that the Soviet negotiator must maintain an adversary attitude toward those with whom he is negotiating. The second is that the Soviet negotiator must maintain the primacy of the political aspects of the negotiation. In arms control negotiations, there are always a myriad of technical and military problems involved. While these must be resolved, the Soviet negotiator must not let them overshadow the political objective which he is attempting to achieve. This is in contrast to some instances in the case studies where the Western or American negotiators concentrated so much on solving technical matters that they ignored important political goals.

The second category is negotiating style. This category includes all techniques that indicate the manner in which the Soviets conduct negotiations and their bearing in the negotiations. This includes the Soviet leadership's severe restriction of the freedom of the Soviet negotiator. Almost all decisions must be referred to a higher authority, and this allows the Soviet negotiator little room to

maneuver or to take the initiative in reaching an agreement. Similarly, the Soviet negotiator is normally prohibited from developing a personal relationship with his opponent. Any relationship that is formed is done so conscientiously to gain an advantage over the opponent.

There are several other techniques which can be either a negotiating style or a tactic. These include using the negotiating process for propaganda purposes; emphasizing grievances held against the opponent; refusing to divulge technical data; negotiating by acts as well as words; and quoting numerous Western sources to substantiate Soviet positions. Each of these can be simply the method by which the Soviet negotiator presents his position, i.e., his method of communication. On the other hand, if these techniques are used to gain a specific advantage over an opponent or to obtain a desired goal, then they would be classified as negotiating tactics.

Soviet negotiating tactics is the third category of negotiating techniques. This includes the rest of the techniques observed in the study, numbers 1-2, 4-7, and 10-27. By studying the negotiating techniques employed by the Soviets in the Test Ban negotiations and the SALT negotiations, the Soviet approach to negotiations on arms



control with the United States becomes clear. Seven conclusions are evident from this study. Of these seven, the last two are the most important in assessing Soviet negotiating techniques.

The first conclusion is that the perceived advantage to be gained in arms control negotiations with the United States is a political advantage. As noted above, arms control negotiations deal with highly technical matters. In part because of this, American negotiators tend to concentrate on technical questions, basing the outcome on the yardstick of "objective" scientific facts. One of the problems with this approach is that science is not a static reference point. Man's knowledge advances and, at times, contradicts yesterday's truth. This can cause a significant amount of uncertainty as to the proper course to follow. A clear example of this was the problems the American delegation faced in presenting technically correct proposals for verifying a ban on underground nuclear tests. The Soviets, in contrast, use technical data or scientific facts only as support for their political goals. Because political considerations are primary, a change in the technical data will not cause the Soviets to change their position in the negotiations. Technical

data are used when it is advantageous to do so, and ignored if they contradict the accepted position.

The only deviation made by American negotiators from their scientific orientation in negotiations is made when the negotiations appear to be bogging down, yet there is domestic pressure to successfully conclude the negotiations. In this case, the political value of achieving an agreement overrides the "scientific difficulties," and an agreement is concluded. However, there is a sharp difference between the types of political objectives pursued by the two sides. American political objectives are concerned with domestic affairs. The Soviet political objectives are concerned primarily with improving the USSR's political position in the international system.

This Soviet political orientation is related to the second conclusion: the stated purpose of the Soviets for entering a particular negotiation on arms control is often not the real purpose. This is demonstrated in the two case studies reviewed. In the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the Soviets ostensibly pressed for the negotiations to prevent the peoples of the world from being threatened by the "massive" amounts of radiation in the atmosphere caused by nuclear weapons tests. In actuality, this was a

purely propaganda statement designed to embarrass the West and force the United States and United Kingdom into negotiations. The real objective of the Soviet Union in 1957 was to hinder American nuclear research in such areas as the development of the neutron bomb and to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons by the European members of NATO. From early 1961, the Soviets publicly advocated completing a nuclear test ban treaty, but their actual purpose was to so infuriate the United States and the United Kingdom that they would break off the negotiations. This would allow the USSR to resume testing without any adverse international political effects. When the Soviet Union again showed interest in a test ban treaty in December of 1962, the ostensible purpose for this was the same as it had always been: to spare humanity the adverse effects of nuclear radiation. In reality, however, the Soviets had several political objectives they wanted to achieve--objectives never stated publicly. First, in the post-Cuban missile crisis era, they were determined to ease United States-Soviet tensions. Second, they were embarking on a major military build-up so as not to be caught again in a position of military inferiority a la Cuba, October 1962, and they wanted to distract the West

from reacting to this build-up. Third, they had gained valuable information concerning ABM systems in their atmospheric tests of 1961 and 1962. They now wanted to prevent the United States from also obtaining this information by agreeing to a test ban.

In a similar way, the Soviet decision to enter the SALT negotiations was ostensibly to slow down the arms race which was said to have increased world tension. In actuality, the Soviets again had a number of political objectives. The primary objective was to hinder, if not halt, the American effort to build an ABM system. Second, it was to hinder any American reaction to the massive Soviet strategic build-up as it neared the level of United States strategic strength. Third, the original agreement to enter into talks was timed so as to inhibit both United States criticism of the planned Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and an American military build-up that might result from the invasion.

The third conclusion concerns the Soviet negotiating style. A primary characteristic of their style is that it is opportunistic rather than long range and persistent rather than persuasive. It is opportunistic rather than long range in that Soviet negotiators will

concentrate on gaining an immediate particular objective rather than estimating long range objectives and attempting to achieve them through cunning negotiating techniques. This needs emphasis. By simply looking at an entire course of negotiations it is easy to believe that the Soviets cleverly lead the American negotiators through an intricate series of maneuvers each designed to bring about the agreement as it finally appeared. This certainly gives too much credit to the abilities of the Soviet negotiators. In the test ban negotiations, the Soviets changed their immediate objectives at least three times, and pursued each objective with great tenacity. Yet, it was not planned that the objectives would change radically as they did when the negotiations began. It was simply that the Soviet leadership had reevaluated the international situation and decided to change Soviet foreign policy objectives.

In a like manner, the Soviet objective in the SALT negotiations was fairly simple: stop or hinder the United States ABM. Yet, the Soviets had not only achieved that goal at the conclusion of the negotiations, but also achieved significant advantages in strategic offensive weapons as well. This was not due to an intricate Soviet plan for the negotiations, but rather it was due to the

Soviet Union being able to take advantage of the negotiating position of the United States as it unfolded in Helsinki and Vienna.

The Soviets in both the test ban and SALT negotiations were not necessarily persuasive in their arguments. What made their arguments compelling in most cases was that the Soviets appeared intractable. United States negotiating positions were abandoned or modified simply because it was felt that to hold to a position would deadlock the negotiations. This is not to say that the United States did not remain firm on any position. Yet, American firmness in one area was unusually balanced by concessions in other areas. For example, the United States remained firm in its determination that SLBM launchers would be limited in the SALT agreement. However, limitations on Soviet SLBM launchers were then set so high that, in reality, they were not limited at all. The limitations were cosmetic. In a similar manner during the test ban negotiations, the United States remained firm in its insistence that a ban on underground tests should have on-site inspections as part of the verification procedures. However, in 1963, the Soviets were able to circumvent the issue by agreeing to a limited test ban treaty which did not require on-site inspections.

The fourth conclusion brings a number of the previous conclusions together. Because the Soviets negotiate on arms control for political objectives, which may not be related to the apparent purpose of the negotiations, and because the actual Soviet objectives are subject to change during the course of the negotiations, it is quite likely that Soviet negotiating tactics might change radically one or more times during the course of the negotiations, it is quite likely that Soviet negotiating tactics might change radically one or more times during the course of the negotiations.

These four conclusions are significant in and of themselves, but they also serve to highlight the final and most significant conclusions. The first is that the Soviets emphasize the conflictual aspects of arms control negotiations. The idea of reaching a mutually beneficial accommodation is alien to them. They perceive arms control negotiations as a zero-sum game, i.e., if one of the parties gains, the other party must lose. With this perception, any proposal offered by the United States is treated with the greatest suspicion. According to Soviet logic, it would not have been offered if it did not benefit the United States and, by definition, harm the

Soviet Union. The only exception to this would be where the Soviets were aware that the American negotiating team was under domestic pressure to reach an agreement. In this case, the Soviet negotiators would view the American proposal as a sign of American weakness, a weakness to be exploited. This would still be perceived as a zero-sum game.

The second conclusion is that there is a unique Soviet negotiating technique. It is unique for two reasons. It maintains an adversary attitude, denying the possibility of negotiating for mutual benefit. Because of this attitude, Soviet negotiators emphasize tactics designed to obtain unilateral advantages at the expense of those with whom the Soviets are negotiating.

These conclusions are important in that the United States assumes when it enters into negotiations with the Soviet Union that there are mutual benefits to be gained, and the United States, therefore, normally eschews using tactics designed to achieve a unilateral advantage. In such a situation, the United States cannot but start any arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union at a distinct disadvantage. Therefore, it is vital that the United States recognizes this disparity and adjusts its negotiating techniques to compensate for it.



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1957-1968.

APPENDIXES



## APPENDIX A

A/Bur/SR. __	United Nations, General Assembly, General Committee, <u>Summary Records</u> .
A/C.1/SR. __	United Nations, General Assembly, First Committee, <u>Summary Records</u> .
__ Annexes( __ ) __	United Nations, General Assembly, <u>Annexes</u> .
A/PV. __	United Nations, General Assembly, Plenary Meetings, <u>Verbatim Records</u> .
DC/SC.1/ __	United Nations, Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission, <u>Documents</u> .
DC/SC.1/PV. __	United Nations, Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission, <u>Verbatim Records</u> .
ENDC/ __	United Nations, Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, <u>Documents</u> .
ENDC/PV. __	United Nations, Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, Plenary Meetings, <u>Verbatim Records</u> .
ENDC/SC.1/PV. __	United Nations, Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, Sub-Committee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests, <u>Verbatim Records</u> .
GEN/DNT/ __	Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests, <u>Documents</u> .
GEN/DNT/PV. __	Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests, <u>Verbatim Records</u> .
GEN/DNT/TWG.2/ __	Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests, Technical Working Group II, <u>Documents</u> .

APPENDIX B

DRAFT AGREEMENT ON THE CESSATION OF ATOMIC AND HYDROGEN  
WEAPON TESTS SUBMITTED BY THE USSR DELEGATION  
31 October 1958

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,  
the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern  
Ireland and the Government of the United States of America,

Pursuing the aim of putting a check to the nuclear armaments  
race and to the further improvement and creation of new, even more  
destructive types of these weapons of mass destruction,

Endeavouring to take a practical step towards the "urgent  
objective of prohibiting atomic weapons and eliminating them from  
national armaments," as indicated by the United Nations,

Being moved by the desire to eliminate for ever the danger  
to the life and health of the population of all countries of the world  
resulting from experimental explosions of nuclear weapons,

Have decided to conclude for these purposes the present  
Agreement and have appointed as their plenipotentiaries . . . . .  
. . . . . who, having  
exchanged their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed  
as follows:

Article 1

The Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,  
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the  
United States of America solemnly undertake not to carry out any tests  
of atomic and hydrogen weapons of any type from the date on which  
the present Agreement is signed.

Article 2

The three Governments undertake to promote the assumption by  
all other States in the world of an undertaking not to carry out tests  
of atomic and hydrogen weapons of any type.

### Article 3

For the purpose of keeping observation on the fulfillment of this undertaking contained in Article 1 of this Agreement, the States Parties to this Agreement shall institute machinery for control.

The above-mentioned control machinery shall have at its disposal a network of control posts set up in accordance with the recommendations of the Geneva Conference of Experts.

### Article 4

The Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America agree to the installation on their territories and also--in the case of the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland--on the territories of their possessions and trust territories, of an agreed number of control posts.

### Article 5

This Agreement shall continue indefinitely and shall enter into force immediately after it has been signed.

In witness whereof the plenipotentiaries have signed the present Agreement and affixed thereto their seals.

Done at Geneva, . . . . . 1958, in . . . . . copies,  
. . . . . in Russian, . . . . . in English, all texts being  
equally authentic.

For the Government of  
the Union of Soviet  
Socialist Republics.

For the Government of  
the United Kingdom of  
Great Britain and  
Northern Ireland.

For the Govern-  
ment of the  
United States of  
America

## APPENDIX C

### DRAFT AGREEMENT ON THE DISCONTINUANCE OF NUCLEAR AND THERMO-NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS 27 November 1961

The Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French Republic,

Proclaiming as their principal aim the speediest possible achievement of an agreement on general and complete disarmament which would abolish for all time the threat of an outbreak of war, put an end to the armaments race and eliminate the incentive to the production and testing of all kinds of weapons, including nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons,

Believing that the renunciation by States of the testing of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons would facilitate the achievement on general and complete disarmament,

Have for these purposes agreed as follows:

#### Article 1

The States Parties to this Agreement solemnly undertake not to conduct tests of any kind of nuclear or thermonuclear weapons in the atmosphere, in outer space or under water.

#### Article 2

For the purpose of exercising mutual supervision of compliance with the undertaking contained in Article 1 of this Agreement, the States Parties to this Agreement shall use their national systems of detecting nuclear and thermonuclear explosions.

#### Article 3

The States Parties to this Agreement undertake not to conduct any underground tests of nuclear weapons until they have agreed together on a system of control over such tests as a constituent part of an international system of control over compliance with an agreement on general and complete disarmament.

#### Article 4

This Agreement shall enter into force immediately upon its signature by the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the French Republic, and shall be open for adherence to it by all States.

## APPENDIX D

COMPARISON BETWEEN TEXTS OF TREATY TABLED AT THE GENEVA DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE ON AUGUST 27, 1962, AND THAT SIGNED AT MOSCOW ON AUGUST 5, 1963<sup>1</sup>

### TITLE

Draft Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Underwater

### PREAMBLE

The Governments of the ~~Union of Soviet Socialist Republics~~ United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the ~~United States of America~~ Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the "Original Parties",

Proclaiming as their principal aim the speediest possible achievement of an agreement on general and complete disarmament under strict international control in accordance with the objectives of the United Nations which would put an end to the armaments race and eliminate the incentive to the production and testing of all kinds of weapons, including nuclear weapons.

Desiring of bringing about Seeking to achieve the permanent discontinuance of ~~all nuclear weapon test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, and determined to continue negotiations to this end, and desiring to put an end to the contamination of man's environment by radioactive substances.~~

Confident that immediate discontinuance of nuclear weapon test explosions in the atmosphere, in outer space, and in the ocean will facilitate progress toward the early agreement providing for the permanent and verified discontinuance of nuclear weapon test explosions in all environments.

Have agreed as follows:

<sup>1</sup> Deletion—elimination of material from August 1962 text; Italic—addition of new material in August 1963 text.

Source: U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Policy, Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 88th Cong., 1st sess., 12-27 August 1963, pp. 814-05.

ARTICLE I  
OBLIGATIONS

1. Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes to prohibit, to end and prevent the carrying out of, and not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control:
  - (a) in the atmosphere, above the atmosphere, beyond its limits, including outer space, or in underwater, including territorial waters or high seas; or
  - (b) in any other environment if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted. It is understood in this connection that the provisions of this subparagraph are without prejudice to the conclusion of a treaty resulting in the permanent banning of all nuclear test explosions, including all such explosions underground, the conclusions of which, as the Parties have stated in the preamble to this Treaty, they seek to achieve.
2. Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes furthermore to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in, the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, anywhere which would take place in any of the environments described, or have the effect prescribed, referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article.

ARTICLE II  
EXPLOSIONS FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES

The explosion of any nuclear device for peaceful purposes which would take place in any of the environments described, or would have the effect prescribed, in paragraph 1 of Article I may be conducted only:

- (a) if unanimously agreed to by the original Parties; or
- (b) if carried out in accordance with an Annex hereto, which Annex shall constitute an integral part of this Treaty.

ARTICLE III  
WITHDRAWAL

1. If any Party to this Treaty determines:
  - (a) that any other Party has not fulfilled its obligations under this Treaty;
  - (b) that nuclear explosions have been conducted by a State not a Party to this Treaty under circumstances which might jeopardize the determining Party's national security; or
  - (c) that nuclear explosions have occurred under circumstances in which it is not possible to identify the State conducting the explosions and that such explosions if conducted by a Party to this Treaty would violate the Treaty or if not conducted by a Party might jeopardize the determining Party's national security;it may submit to the Depositary Government a request for the convening of a conference to which all the Parties to this Treaty shall be invited, and the Depositary Government shall convene such a conference as soon after its receipt of the request as may be practicable. The request from the determining Party to the Depositary Government shall be accompanied by a statement of the evidence on which the determination was based.
2. The conference shall, taking into account the statement of evidence provided by the determining Party, and any other relevant information, examine the facts and assess the significance of the situation.
3. After the conclusion of the conference or after the expiration of a period of sixty days from the date of the receipt of the request for the conference by the Depositary Government, whichever is the earlier, any Party to this Treaty may, if it deems withdrawal from the Treaty necessary for its national security, give notice of such withdrawal to the Depositary Government. Such withdrawal shall take effect on the date specified in the notice, which shall in no event be earlier than sixty days from receipt of the notice by the Depositary Government. The notice shall be accompanied by a detailed statement of the reasons for the withdrawal.

## ARTICLE IV

### AMENDMENTS

1. Any Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to this Treaty. Thereafter, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which it they shall invite all the Parties, to consider such amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty or its Annex must be approved by a vote of two-thirds of the Parties majority of the votes of all the Parties to this Treaty, including the votes of all of the original Parties to this Treaty. The amendment shall enter into force for all Parties upon the deposit of instruments of ratifications by two-thirds of the Parties a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification by of all of the original Parties.

## ARTICLE V

### SIGNATURE, RATIFICATION, ACCESSION, ENTRY INTO FORCE AND REGISTRATION

1. This Treaty shall be open until \_\_\_\_\_ to all States for signature. Any state which does not sign this Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Government of \_\_\_\_\_, which is hereby designated the Depositary Government of the original Parties—the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Republics—which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force on \_\_\_\_\_ for States which have deposited instruments of ratification or accession on or before that date, provided that the ratifications deposited include those of the original Parties. If ratifications by all three original Parties are not deposited on or before \_\_\_\_\_, this Treaty shall enter into force on the date on which ratifications by all of them have been deposited after its ratification by all the original Parties and the deposit of their instruments of ratification.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty shall become binding, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification and accession to this Treaty, the date of its entry into force, and the date of receipt of any requests for conferences or other notices of withdrawal.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

## ARTICLE VI

This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the treaty three months in advance.

## ARTICLE VII

### AUTHENTIC TEXTS

This Treaty, of which the English and Russian texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.

DONE in triplicate at \_\_\_\_\_ Moscow, this fifth day of August, one thousand nine hundred and sixty-two sixty-three.



APPENDIX E

**Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the  
Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under  
Water**

*Done at Moscow August 5, 1963  
U.S. ratification deposited October 10, 1963  
Entered into force October 10, 1963*

The Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the "Original Parties",

Proclaiming as their principal aim the speediest possible achievement of an agreement on general and complete disarmament under strict international control in accordance with the objectives of the United Nations which would put an end to the armaments race and eliminate the incentive to the production and testing of all kinds of weapons, including nuclear weapons,

Seeking to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, determined to continue negotiations to this end, and desiring to put an end to the contamination of man's environment by radioactive substances,

Have agreed as follows:

**Article I**

1. Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes to prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, at any place under its jurisdiction or control:

(a) in the atmosphere; beyond its limits, including outer space; or under water, including territorial waters or high seas; or

(b) in any other environment if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted. It is understood in this connection that the provisions of this subparagraph are without prejudice to the conclusion of a treaty resulting in the permanent banning of all nuclear test explosions, including all such explosions underground, the conclusion of which, as the Parties have stated in the Preamble to this Treaty, they seek to achieve.

2. Each of the parties to this Treaty undertakes furthermore to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in, the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, anywhere which would take place in any of the environments described, or have the effect referred to, in paragraph 1 of this Article.

## Article II

1. Any Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to this Treaty. Thereafter, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all of the Parties, to consider such amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to this Treaty, including the votes of all of the Original Parties. The amendment shall enter into force for all Parties upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all of the Original Parties.

## Article III

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign this Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the Original Parties—the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by all the Original Parties and the deposit of their instruments of ratification.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification of and accession to this Treaty, the date of its entry into force, and the date of receipt of any requests for conferences or other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

## Article IV

This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty three months in advance.

Article V

This Treaty, of which the English and Russian texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.

DONE in triplicate at the city of Moscow the fifth day of August, one thousand nine hundred and sixty-three.

For the Government of  
the United States of  
America

For the Government of  
the United Kingdom  
of Great Britain and  
Northern Ireland

For the Government of  
the Union of Soviet  
Socialist Republics

*nan Runk*

*Here.*

*A. D. Danneberg*

APPENDIX F

Treaty Between the United States of America  
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics  
on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile  
Systems

*Signed at Moscow May 26, 1972*

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Proceeding from the premise that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind,

Considering that effective measures to limit anti-ballistic missile systems would be a substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms and would lead to a decrease in the risk of outbreak of war involving nuclear weapons,

Proceeding from the premise that the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems, as well as certain agreed measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms, would contribute to the creation of more favorable conditions for further negotiations on limiting strategic arms,

Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to take effective measures toward reductions in strategic arms, nuclear disarmament, and general and complete disarmament,

Desiring to contribute to the relaxation of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

1. Each Party undertakes to limit anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems and to adopt other measures in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty.

2. Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the territory of its country and not to provide a base for such a defense, and not to deploy ABM systems for defense of an individual region except as provided for in Article III of this Treaty.

Article II

1. For the purpose of this Treaty an ABM system is a system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, currently consisting of:

- (a) ABM interceptor missiles, which are interceptor missiles constructed and deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode;
- (b) ABM launchers, which are launchers constructed and deployed for launching ABM interceptor missiles; and
- (c) ABM radars, which are radars constructed and deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode.

2. The ABM system components listed in paragraph 1 of this Article include those which are:

- (a) operational;
- (b) under construction;
- (c) undergoing testing;
- (d) undergoing overhaul, repair or conversion; or
- (e) mothballed.

#### Article III

Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems or their components except that:

(a) within one ABM system deployment area having a radius of one hundred and fifty kilometers and centered on the Party's national capital, a Party may deploy: (1) no more than one hundred ABM launchers and no more than one hundred ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites, and (2) ABM radars within no more than six ABM radar complexes, the area of each complex being circular and having a diameter of no more than three kilometers; and

(b) within one ABM system deployment area having a radius of one hundred and fifty kilometers and containing ICBM silo launchers, a Party may deploy: (1) no more than one hundred ABM launchers and no more than one hundred ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites, (2) two large phased-array ABM radars comparable in potential to corresponding ABM radars operational or under construction on the date of signature of the Treaty in an ABM system deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers, and (3) no more than eighteen ABM radars each having a potential less than the potential of the smaller of the above-mentioned two large phased-array ABM radars.

#### Article IV

The limitations provided for in Article III shall not apply to ABM systems or their components used for development or testing, and located within current or additionally agreed test ranges. Each Party may have no more than a total of fifteen ABM launchers at test ranges.

#### Article V

1. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based.

2. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM launchers for launching more than one ABM interceptor missile at a time from each launcher, nor to modify deployed launchers to provide them with such a capability, nor to

impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty. This obligation shall not require changes in current construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul practices.

#### Article XIII

1. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties shall establish promptly a Standing Consultative Commission, within the framework of which they will:

(a) consider questions concerning compliance with the obligations assumed and related situations which may be considered ambiguous;

(b) provide on a voluntary basis such information as either Party considers necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed;

(c) consider questions involving unintended interference with national technical means of verification;

(d) consider possible changes in the strategic situation which have a bearing on the provisions of this Treaty;

(e) agree upon procedures and dates for destruction or dismantling of ABM systems or their components in cases provided for by the provisions of this Treaty;

(f) consider, as appropriate, possible proposals for further increasing the viability of this Treaty, including proposals for amendments in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty;

(g) consider, as appropriate, proposals for further measures aimed at limiting strategic arms.

2. The Parties through consultation shall establish, and may amend as appropriate, Regulations for the Standing Consultative Commission governing procedures, composition and other relevant matters.

#### Article XIV

1. Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures governing the entry into force of this Treaty.

2. Five years after entry into force of this Treaty, and at five-year intervals thereafter, the Parties shall together conduct a review of this Treaty.

#### Article XV

1. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

2. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from the Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

develop, test, or deploy automatic or semi-automatic or other similar systems for rapid reload of ABM launchers.

#### Article VI

To enhance assurance of the effectiveness of the limitations on ABM systems and their components provided by this Treaty, each Party undertakes:

(a) not to give missiles, launchers, or radars, other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars, capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, and not to test them in an ABM mode; and

(b) not to deploy in the future radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack except at locations along the periphery of its national territory and oriented outward.

#### Article VII

Subject to the provisions of this Treaty, modernization and replacement of ABM systems or their components may be carried out.

#### Article VIII

ABM systems or their components in excess of the numbers or outside the areas specified in this Treaty, as well as ABM systems or their components prohibited by this Treaty, shall be destroyed or dismantled under agreed procedures within the shortest possible agreed period of time.

#### Article IX

To assure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, each Party undertakes not to transfer to other States, and not to deploy outside its national territory, ABM systems or their components limited by this Treaty.

#### Article X

Each Party undertakes not to assume any international obligations which would conflict with this Treaty.

#### Article XI

The Parties undertake to continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic offensive arms.

#### Article XII

1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.

3. Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which

Article XVI



1. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. The Treaty shall enter into force on the day of the exchange of instruments of ratification.

2. This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Done at Moscow on May 26, 1972, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES  
OF AMERICA

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET  
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

President of the United  
States of America

General Secretary of the Central  
Committee of the CPSU



APPENDIX G

**Interim Agreement Between the United States  
of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics on Certain Measures With Respect  
to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms**

*Signed at Moscow May 26, 1972*

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,  
hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Convinced that the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems  
and this Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation  
of Strategic Offensive Arms will contribute to the creation of more favorable  
conditions for active negotiations on limiting strategic arms as well as to the  
relaxation of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States,

Taking into account the relationship between strategic offensive and defensive  
arms,

Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Have agreed as follows:

#### Article I

The Parties undertake not to start construction of additional fixed land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers after July 1, 1972.

#### Article II

The Parties undertake not to convert land-based launchers for light ICBMs, or for ICBMs of older types deployed prior to 1964, into land-based launchers for heavy ICBMs of types deployed after that time.

#### Article III

The Parties undertake to limit submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers and modern ballistic missile submarines to the numbers operational and under construction on the date of signature of this Interim Agreement, and in addition to launchers and submarines constructed under procedures established by the Parties as replacements for an equal number of ICBM launchers of older types deployed prior to 1964 or for launchers on older submarines.

#### Article IV

Subject to the provisions of this Interim Agreement, modernization and replacement of strategic offensive ballistic missiles and launchers covered by this Interim Agreement may be undertaken.

#### Article V

1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this Interim Agreement, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.

3. Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this Interim Agreement. This obligation shall not require changes in current construction, assembly, conversion, or over-haul practices.

#### Article VI

To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Interim Agreement, the Parties shall use the Standing Consultative Commission established under Article XIII of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems in accordance with the provisions of that Article.

#### Article VII

The Parties undertake to continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic offensive arms. The obligations provided for in this Interim Agreement shall not prejudice the scope or terms of the limitations on strategic offensive arms which may be worked out in the course of further negotiations.

#### Article VIII


1. This Interim Agreement shall enter into force upon exchange or written notices of acceptance by each Party, which exchange shall take place simultaneously with the exchange of instruments of ratification of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems.

2. This Interim Agreement shall remain in force for a period of five years unless replaced earlier by an agreement on more complete measures limiting strategic offensive arms. It is the objective of the Parties to conduct active follow-on negotiations with the aim of concluding such an agreement as soon as possible.

3. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Interim Agreement if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Interim Agreement have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from this Interim Agreement. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

Done at Moscow on May 26, 1972, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF  
AMERICA



The President of the United States

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET  
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS



General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU

APPENDIX H  
PROTOCOL

To the Interim Agreement Between the United States of  
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics  
on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation  
of Strategic Offensive Arms

*Signed at Moscow May 26, 1972*

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,  
hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Having agreed on certain limitations relating to submarine-launched ballistic  
missile launchers and modern ballistic missile submarines, and to replacement  
procedures, in the Interim Agreement,

Have agreed as follows:

The Parties understand that, under Article III of the Interim Agreement, for  
the period during which that Agreement remains in force:

The U.S. may have no more than 710 ballistic missile launchers on submarines  
(SLBMs) and no more than 44 modern ballistic missile submarines. The Soviet  
Union may have no more than 950 ballistic missile launchers on submarines  
and no more than 62 modern ballistic missile submarines.

Additional ballistic missile launchers on submarines up to the above-mentioned  
levels, in the U.S.—over 656 ballistic missile launchers on nuclear-powered  
submarines, and in the U.S.S.R.—over 740 ballistic missile launchers on nuclear-  
powered submarines, operational and under construction, may become oper-  
ational as replacements for equal numbers of ballistic missile launchers of older  
types deployed prior to 1964 or of ballistic missile launchers on older submarines.


The deployment of modern SLBMs on any submarine, regardless of type,  
will be counted against the total level of SLBMs permitted for the U.S. and the  
U.S.S.R.

This Protocol shall be considered an integral part of the Interim Agreement.

Done at Moscow this 26th day of May, 1972.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF  
AMERICA

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET  
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS



The President of the  
United States of America



The General Secretary of the  
Central Committee of the CPSU

APPENDIX I  
SALT: AGREED INTERPRETATIONS AND UNILATERAL STATEMENTS

1. AGREED INTERPRETATIONS

(c) *Initialed Statements.*—The texts of the statements set out below were agreed upon and initialed by the Heads of the Delegations on May 26, 1972.

ABM TREATY

[A]

The Parties understand that, in addition to the ABM radars which may be deployed in accordance with subparagraph (a) of Article III of the Treaty, those non-phased-array ABM radars operational on the date of signature of the Treaty within the ABM system deployment area for defense of the national capital may be retained.

[B]

The Parties understand that the potential (the product of mean emitted power in watts and antenna area in square meters) of the smaller of the two large phased-array ABM radars referred to in subparagraph (b) of Article III of the Treaty is considered for purposes of the Treaty to be three million.

[C]

The Parties understand that the center of the ABM system deployment area centered on the national capital and the center of the ABM system deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers for each Party shall be separated by no less than thirteen hundred kilometers.

[D]

The Parties agree not to deploy phased-array radars having a potential (the product of mean emitted power in watts and antenna area in square meters) exceeding three million, except as provided for in Articles III, IV and VI of the Treaty, or except for the purposes of tracking objects in outer space or for use as national technical means of verification.

[E]

In order to insure fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy ABM systems and their components except as provided in Article III of the Treaty, the Parties agree that in the event ABM systems based on other physical principles and including components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars are created in the future, specific limitations on such systems and their components would be subject to discussion in accordance with Article XIII and agreement in accordance with Article XIV of the Treaty.

[F]

The Parties understand that Article V of the Treaty includes obligations not to develop, test or deploy ABM interceptor missiles for the delivery by each ABM interceptor missile of more than one independently guided warhead.

[G]

The Parties understand that Article IX of the Treaty includes the obligation of the US and the USSR not to provide to other States technical descriptions or blueprints specially worked out for the construction of ABM systems and their components limited by the Treaty.

INTERIM AGREEMENT

[H]

The parties understand that land-based ICBM launchers referred to in the Interim Agreement are understood to be launchers for strategic ballistic missiles capable of ranges in excess of the shortest distance between the northeastern border of the continental U.S. and the northwestern border of the continental USSR.

[I]

The Parties understand that fixed land-based ICBM launchers under active construction as of the date of signature of the Interim Agreement may be completed.

[J]

The Parties understand that in the process of modernization and replacement the dimensions of land-based ICBM silo launchers will not be significantly increased.

[K]

The Parties understand that dismantling or destruction of ICBM launchers of older types deployed prior to 1964 and ballistic missile launchers on older submarines being replaced by new SLBM launchers on modern submarines will be initiated at the time of the beginning of sea trials of a replacement submarine, and will be completed in the shortest possible agreed period of time. Such dismantling or destruction, and timely notification thereof, will be accomplished under procedures to be agreed in the Standing Consultative Commission.

[L]

The Parties understand that during the period of the Interim Agreement there shall be no significant increase in the number of ICBM or SLBM test and training launchers, or in the number of such launchers for modern land-based heavy ICBMs. The Parties further understand that construction or conversion of ICBM launchers at test ranges shall be undertaken only for purposes of testing and training.

(b) *Common Understandings.*—Common understanding of the Parties on the following matters was reached during the negotiations:

A. INCREASE IN ICBM SILO DIMENSIONS

Ambassador Smith made the following statement on May 26, 1972:

The Parties agree that the term "significantly increased" means that an increase will not be greater than 10-15 percent of the present dimensions of land-based ICBM silo launchers.

Minister Semenov replied that this statement corresponded to the Soviet understanding.

#### B. LOCATION OF ICBM DEFENSES

The U.S. Delegation made the following statement on May 26, 1972:

Article III of the ABM Treaty provides for each side one ABM system deployment area centered on its national capital and one ABM system deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers. The two sides have registered agreement on the following statement: "The Parties understand that the center of the ABM system deployment area centered on the national capital and the center of the ABM system deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers for each Party shall be separated by no less than thirteen hundred kilometers." In this connection, the U.S. side notes that its ABM system deployment area for defense of ICBM silo launchers, located west of the Mississippi River, will be centered in the Grand Forks ICBM silo launcher deployment area. (See Initialed Statement [C].)

#### C. ABM TEST RANGES

The U.S. Delegation made the following statement on April 26, 1972:

Article IV of the ABM Treaty provides that "the limitations provided for in Article III shall not apply to ABM systems or their components used for development or testing, and located within current or additionally agreed test ranges." We believe it would be useful to assure that there is no misunderstanding as to current ABM test ranges. It is our understanding that ABM test ranges encompass the area within which ABM components are located for test purposes. The current U.S. ABM test ranges are at White Sands, New Mexico, and at Kwajalein Atoll, and the current Soviet ABM test range is near Sary Shagan in Kazakhstan. We consider that non-phased array radars of types used for range safety or instrumentation purposes may be located outside of ABM test ranges. We interpret the reference in Article IV to "additionally agreed test ranges" to mean that ABM components will not be located at any other test ranges without prior agreement between our Governments that there will be such additional ABM test ranges.

On May 5, 1972 the Soviet Delegation stated that there was a common understanding on what ABM test ranges were, that the use of the types of non-ABM radars for range safety or instrumentation was not limited under the Treaty, that the reference in Article IV to "additionally agreed" test ranges was sufficiently clear, and that national means permitted identifying current test ranges.

#### D. MOBILE ABM SYSTEMS

On January 28, 1972, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement:

Article V(1) of the Joint Draft Text of the ABM Treaty includes an undertaking not to develop, test, or deploy mobile land-based ABM systems and their components. On May 5, 1971, the U.S. side indicated that, in its view, a prohibition on deployment of mobile ABM systems and components would rule out the deployment of ABM launchers and radars which were not permanent fixed

types. At that time, we asked for the Soviet view of this interpretation. Does the Soviet side agree with the U.S. side's interpretation put forward on May 5, 1971?

On April 13, 1972, the Soviet Delegation said there is a general common understanding on this matter.

#### **E. STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION**

Ambassador Smith made the following statement on May 22, 1972:

The United States proposes that the sides agree that, with regard to initial implementation of the ABM Treaty's Article XIII on the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) and of the consultation Articles to the Interim Agreement on offensive arms and the Accidents Agreement,\* agreement establishing the SCC will be worked out early in the follow-on SALT negotiations; until that is completed, the following arrangements will prevail: when SALT is in session, any consultation desired by either side under these Articles can be carried out by the two SALT Delegations; when SALT is not in session, *ad hoc* arrangements for any desired consultations under these Articles may be made through diplomatic channels.

Minister Semenov replied that, on an *ad referendum* basis, he could agree that the U.S. statement corresponded to the Soviet understanding.

#### **F. STANDSTILL**

On May 6, 1972, Minister Semenov made the following statement:

In an effort to accommodate the wishes of the U.S. side, the Soviet Delegation is prepared to proceed on the basis that the two sides will in fact observe the obligations of both the Interim Agreement and the ABM Treaty beginning from the date of signature of these two documents.

In reply, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement on May 20, 1972:

The U.S. agrees in principle with the Soviet statement made on May 6 concerning observance of obligations beginning from date of signature but we would like to make clear our understanding that this means that, pending ratification and acceptance, neither side would take any action prohibited by the agreements after they had entered into force. This understanding would continue to apply in the absence of notification by either signatory of its intention not to proceed with ratification or approval.

The Soviet Delegation indicated agreement with the U.S. statement.

#### **2. UNILATERAL STATEMENTS**

(a) The following noteworthy unilateral statements were made during the negotiations by the United States Delegation:

\*See Article 7 of Agreement to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, signed Sept. 30, 1971.



#### A. WITHDRAWAL FROM THE ABM TREATY

On May 9, 1972, Ambassador Smith made the following statement:

The U.S. Delegation has stressed the importance the U.S. Government attaches to achieving agreement on more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms, following agreement on an ABM Treaty and on an Interim Agreement on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms. The U.S. Delegation believes that an objective of the follow-on negotiations should be to constrain and reduce on a long-term basis threats to the survivability of our respective strategic retaliatory forces. The USSR Delegation has also indicated that the objectives of SALT would remain unfulfilled without the achievement of an agreement providing for more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms. Both sides recognize that the initial agreements would be steps toward the achievement of more complete limitations on strategic arms. If an agreement providing for more complete strategic offensive arms limitations were not achieved within five years, U.S. supreme interests could be jeopardized. Should that occur, it would constitute a basis for withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. The U.S. does not wish to see such a situation occur, nor do we believe that the USSR does. It is because we wish to prevent such a situation that we emphasize the importance the U.S. Government attaches to achievement of more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms. The U.S. Executive will inform the Congress, in connection with Congressional consideration of the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement, of this statement of the U.S. position.

#### B. LAND-MOBILE ICBM LAUNCHERS

The U.S. Delegation made the following statement on May 20, 1972:

In connection with the important subject of land-mobile ICBM launchers, in the interest of concluding the Interim Agreement the U.S. Delegation now withdraws its proposal that Article I or an agreed statement explicitly prohibit the deployment of mobile land-based ICBM launchers. I have been instructed to inform you that, while agreeing to defer the question of limitation of operational land-mobile ICBM launchers to the subsequent negotiations on more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms, the U.S. would consider the deployment of operational land-mobile ICBM launchers during the period of the Interim Agreement as inconsistent with the objectives of that Agreement.

#### C. COVERED FACILITIES

The U.S. Delegation made the following statement on May 26, 1972:

I wish to emphasize the importance that the United States attaches to the provisions of Article V, including in particular their application to fitting out or berthing submarines.

#### D. "HEAVY" ICBM's

The U.S. Delegation made the following statement on May 26, 1972:

The U.S. Delegation regrets that the Soviet Delegation has not been willing to agree on a common definition of a heavy missile. Under these circum-

stances, the U.S. Delegation believes it necessary to state the following: The United States would consider any ICBM having a volume significantly greater than that of the largest light ICBM now operational on either side to be a heavy ICBM. The U.S. proceeds on the premise that the Soviet side will give due account to this consideration.

#### **E. TESTED IN ABM MODE**

On April 7, 1972, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement:

Article II of the Joint Text Draft uses the term "tested in an ABM mode," in defining ABM components, and Article VI includes certain obligations concerning such testing. We believe that the sides should have a common understanding of this phrase. First, we would note that the testing provisions of the ABM Treaty are intended to apply to testing which occurs after the date of signature of the Treaty, and not to any testing which may have occurred in the past. Next, we would amplify the remarks we have made on this subject during the previous Helsinki phase by setting forth the objectives which govern the U.S. view on the subject, namely, while prohibiting testing of non-ABM components for ABM purposes: not to prevent testing of ABM components, and not to prevent testing of non-ABM components for non-ABM purposes. To clarify our interpretation of "tested in an ABM mode," we note that we would consider a launcher, missile or radar to be "tested in an ABM mode" if, for example, any of the following events occur: (1) a launcher is used to launch an ABM interceptor missile, (2) an interceptor missile is flight tested against a target vehicle which has a flight trajectory with characteristics of a strategic ballistic missile flight trajectory, or is flight tested in conjunction with the test of an ABM interceptor missile or an ABM radar at the same test range, or is flight tested to an altitude inconsistent with interception of targets against which air defenses are deployed, (3) a radar makes measurements on a cooperative target vehicle of the kind referred to in item (2) above during the reentry portion of its trajectory or makes measurements in conjunction with the test of an ABM interceptor missile or an ABM radar at the same test range. Radars used for purposes such as range safety or instrumentation would be exempt from application of these criteria.

#### **F. NO-TRANSFER ARTICLE OF ABM TREATY**

On April 18, 1972, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement:

In regard to this Article [IX], I have a brief and I believe self-explanatory statement to make. The U.S. side wishes to make clear that the provisions of this Article do not set a precedent for whatever provision may be considered for a Treaty on Limiting Strategic Offensive Arms. The question of transfer of strategic offensive arms is a far more complex issue, which may require a different solution.

#### **G. NO INCREASE IN DEFENSE OF EARLY WARNING RADARS**

On July 28, 1970, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement:

Since Hen House radars [Soviet ballistic missile early warning radars] can detect and track ballistic missile warheads at great distances, they have

a significant ABM potential. Accordingly, the U.S. would regard any increase in the defenses of such radars by surface-to-air missiles as inconsistent with an agreement.

(b) The following noteworthy unilateral statement was made by the Delegation of the U.S.S.R. and is shown here with the U.S. reply:

On May 17, 1972, Minister Semenov made the following unilateral "Statement of the Soviet Side":

Taking into account that modern ballistic missile submarines are presently in the possession of not only the U.S. but also of its NATO allies, the Soviet Union agrees that for the period of effectiveness of the Interim 'Freeze' Agreement the U.S. and its NATO allies have up to 50 such submarines with a total of up to 800 ballistic missile launchers thereon (including 41 U.S. submarines with 656 ballistic missile launchers). However, if during the period of effectiveness of the Agreement U.S. allies in NATO should increase the number of their modern submarines to exceed the numbers of submarines they would have operational or under construction on the date of signature of the Agreement, the Soviet Union will have the right to a corresponding increase in the number of its submarines. In the opinion of the Soviet side, the solution of the question of modern ballistic missile submarines provided for in the Interim Agreement only partially compensates for the strategic imbalance in the deployment of the nuclear-powered missile submarines of the USSR and the U.S. Therefore, the Soviet side believes that this whole question, and above all the question of liquidating the American missile submarine bases outside the U.S., will be appropriately resolved in the course of follow-on negotiations.

On May 24, Ambassador Smith made the following reply to Minister Semenov:

The United States side has studied the statement made by the Soviet side" of May 17 concerning compensation for submarine basing and SLBM submarines belonging to third countries. The United States does not accept the validity of the considerations in that statement.

On May 26 Minister Semenov repeated the unilateral statement made on May 24. Ambassador Smith also repeated the U.S. rejection on May 26.